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The Role of Local Government Collaboration in Legacy Cities

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In the United States' decentralized federalist system, cities are situated within complex, layered, and often highly fragmented systems of government. This creates hurdles, but also opportunities, for solving the problems faced by legacy cities and the regions they anchor. In regions throughout the country, the scale of local government boundaries often to do not match the scale of the problems they face. This mismatch of scale has been identified as "the central problem for modern public administration" (Kettl 2006, 10). The boundary mismatch is a reality faced by all local governments, but in legacy cities contributes to especially "wicked problems" (Rittel and Webber 1973) that more regularly demand collaborative strategies. For example, the population loss and sprawl associated with legacy city status creates hollowed-out central cities with dramatically reduced human and financial capital available to support policy solutions (see chapter 3). They become poorer and with more concentrated poverty as middle-class residents continue flight to the suburbs, many of which also have stagnant or declining populations (Brachman 2012; see also chapter 7). In legacy cities, the scale of decline means the city government will more often *need* to collaborate to solve problems.

To create successful policy and effectively deliver public goods and services, cities may need to coordinate with neighboring municipalities and special districts, with private companies and nonprofit organizations, and with higher levels of government, including states and the federal government. Legacy cities have long been engaged in cooperation and collaboration in their attempts to solve local and regional problems. They have done so using a variety of strategies and in a variety of contexts and, as such, have experienced a wide range of outcomes. Successful use of collaborative strategies with measureable improvement in outcomes, though, has occurred often in and around legacy cities, and this provides reason for optimism that legacy cities can use collaboration to help them thrive. Examples of such collaborations have produced successes in legacy cities such as Baltimore, Cleveland, and Cincinnati.

The emergence of legacy cities owes, in no small part, to the fragmented nature of local government, which creates intermunicipal competition for resources and strong incentives for city leaders to focus on narrow, parochial goals at the expense of the health of the region as a whole (Mallach and Brachman 2013). These competitive dynamics among local governments remain, but over time cities have learned to collaborate with one another to solve all sorts of problems, including diseconomies of scale and common property-resource problems, through self-organized collaborative networks and arrangements among localities (Feiock 2014; Feiock and Scholz 2010). Other forms of collaboration, including those that involve incentives or mandates from higher levels of government and partnerships between local governments and nongovernmental organizations also are common.

In the United States local governments and organizations have been the main players in policy solutions to decline in legacy cities. Entrepreneurial mayors and nonprofit organizations have launched or contributed to policy responses in cities such as Cleveland, Detroit, and Youngstown (Luescher and Shetty 2013). To successfully regenerate, legacy cities will need to develop, nurture, and leverage flexible partnerships to carry out policy changes that contribute to a mutually held vision for the city's future. Indeed, new governance arrangements have been identified as a critical component for legacy city regeneration (Mallach and Brachman 2013), and cities are looking to collaborative strategies to make policy and deliver goods and services under increasingly complicated and difficult conditions (Emerson and Nabatchi 2015). However, local government fragmentation remains a substantial barrier to regenerative action. Citizens and leaders in suburban municipalities and counties often see the struggling central city as a liability and fear the potential effects of intermunicipal partnerships with struggling cities or more dramatic government reorganizations, such as city-county consolidations or mergers.

This chapter introduces the concepts central to understanding the collaborative activities of cities, including three specific types of collaboration: vertical intergovernmental collaboration, horizontal intergovernmental collaboration, and cross-sector collaboration. It then synthesizes previous research on these concepts and provides evidence of use of the three types of collaboration in legacy cities in the United States.

COLLABORATION: CONTESTED CONCEPTS EXPLAINED

Scholars of policy, politics, and public administration and management have approached the collaborative activities of local governments from a variety of perspectives with myriad and often conflicting definition of concepts, such as the oft-used "collaborative governance" (O'Leary and Vij 2012; Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh 2012). In using this term, some scholars focus on intergovernmental collaboration, while others focus on collaborations between a public agency and nonprofits and/or private organizations. Still others focus on the role of citizen engagement in collaborative policymaking. Here, collaboration by local governments is conceptualized broadly—meaning any joint interorganizational activities, formal or informal, that involve at least one local government and at least one external organization, which may be another city, another level of government, such as a state, or a nongovernmental partner, such as a nonprofit organization, foundation, or business.

Collaboration at the local level occurs in a number of distinct forms. Three regularly studied forms of local governmental collaboration are: (1) horizontal intergovernmental collaboration, which involves joint activities among at least two localities that are the same level of government (Carr et al. 2009; Gerber and Loh 2015), such as one city contracting with another for service provision or several neighboring cities coordinating with one another to solve a specific problem; (2) vertical intergovernmental collaboration refers to a variety of interactions among different levels of government within a hierarchy, such as a city contracting with a state government for services, or the federal government providing localities with funding for projects (Carr et al. 2009; Gerber and Loh 2015); and (3) cross-sector collaboration, which involves government coordination with private and quasi-public stakeholders, including citizens, nonprofit organizations, and businesses (Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Emerson and Nabatchi 2015).

Local governments are often engaged in all three types of collaboration, sometimes simultaneously for a single purpose or project. For example, a legacy city might collaborate with neighboring localities as well as nonprofit organizations and businesses to seek state or federal funding for economic development or an infrastructure project. Cities' perspectives on intergovernmental and cross-sector collaboration vary. Some embrace collaboration as a useful strategy for problem solving, while others collaborate begrudgingly, seeing it as a "necessary evil" (Agranoff and McGuire 2003, 3). Still others elect not to collaborate at all.

TYPE 1: VERTICAL COLLABORATION

While the study of vertical collaborations between subnational governments and the US federal government became popular following the federal grants-in-aid programs of the 1930s (Agranoff 2001), there is evidence that interactive relationships existed much earlier. In *The American Partnership* (1962), Daniel Elazar found that collaboration among the various levels of government, particularly states and the federal government, existed in the nineteenth century. The design of American federalism did not produce a neat system of three stacked and separate levels of government, but rather a highly interactive "matrix" of governments that regularly cooperate and bargain with other levels of government to further their own ends (Elazar 1984). Even within a structured hierarchy, the levels of government did not create a "layer cake" system, but a "marble cake" of shared functions, resources, and power that involves regular interactions, cooperation, and coordination among the levels of government (Grodzins 1966). While the nature of the interactions between the three major levels of government has shifted over time from cooperative to coercive to contractual (Conlan 2008), the matrix of vertical layers of governments has remained, and collaboration among them continues.

The nature of collaborative interactions between levels of government in a hierarchy is unique because of the distinct types of authority held by the various levels of government, the pressures and constraints they face, and the power asymmetry among them. Vertical intergovernmental collaboration refers to interactions among at least two governments that operate at different levels within the federalist hierarchy. For example, a city may contract with a state for planning services or it may work with a federal agency to secure grant funding for an infrastructure project. Cities or higher levels of government can initiate vertical collaboration and use vertical strategies differently depending on their position in the hierarchy. Federal and state agencies can "coerce" cities to take certain actions by withholding funding—for example, by making receipt of highway funds contingent upon a city investing in a particular infrastructure upgrade. While this would not be classified as collaboration, the federal government also can use its fiscal power to incentivize particular investments, policies, or even other types of collaborative governance. For example, the federal government may provide funding to cities who agree to collaborate with other local governments or nongovernmental partners for economic development projects. The federal government may engage in this sort of collaborative activity using a variety of policy tools, including grants, information provision, and intergovernmental partnerships to target specific urban problems. While a great deal of scholarship has examined collaboration between states and federal agencies (e.g., Elazar 1962; Cho and Wright 2001), this section focuses on local government vertical partnerships, especially how local governments in shrinking regions have participated in collaborative strategies with higher levels of government, such as counties, regional governments, states, and the federal government.

Because legacy cities and their regions often lack capacity to handle complex problems, states and federal governments are in a position to initiate collaborative activities that can improve outcomes in ways local actors cannot. Additionally, collaboration costs may be higher for local political actors, who are expected by their constituents to spend their efforts on activities that directly benefit the locality (Mullin and Daley 2010). Moreover, higher levels of government have strong incentives to ensure that the economic hubs within them thrive. In an analysis of survey data from local public health agency bureaucrats in Wisconsin, Mullin and Daley (2010) find that state agencies may be able to prod along vertical collaboration through incentives that reward local agencies that collaborate with their state-level counterparts. The authors find evidence that this incentive structure may be even more important in urban settings, where local public health agencies had significantly reduced rates of collaborative activity with state agencies. Urban areas, particularly those around legacy cities, typically have relatively complex, fragmented governments, as compared to more rural regions. For instance, in Wisconsin's urban areas, cities and counties typically have health departments, while outside of these areas, counties alone have health departments (Mullin and Daley 2010). In this more vertically complex environment, collaboration becomes an activity with higher transaction costs. States could help reduce those costs with incentives for local agency collaboration.

States have a fairly diverse toolkit of strategies that can be used to support and incentivize vertical collaboration, as well as other types of local government collaboration. States can focus their efforts on providing financial support through grants, loans, and other funding streams; they can make regulatory and institutional changes that allow for local innovation and collaboration; and they can build capacity of local institutions and actors, for instance, by providing technical assistance and training (Brachman 2012). The specific tools used by a state to collaborate with local governments may depend on the degree of autonomy granted to local governments in that state, a concept known as *home rule*, which varies dramatically from state to state and even among different types of local governments within states.

Unfortunately, states have often created policies that undercut legacy cities. For example, many states have policies that encourage suburbs to compete with central cities and with one another for economic development. These sorts of policies encourage localities to view economic development as zero-sum games in which one city will win while its neighbors will lose, when in reality, economic development is most beneficial when it is approached through coordinated action at the regional scale. States could be more instrumental in creating incentives or regional institutions that encourage collaboration in economic development (Brachman 2012), while respecting local autonomy. For example, in 2016 the state of New York launched a downtown revitalization initiative that provides $10 million to ten small cities after a competitive process that seeks local strategies. The grants provide funding for detailed planning, as well as flexible funding to execute the plans. To evaluate the cities' proposals and select winners, the state enlisted the expertise of its regional economic development councils, which were created in 2011 to coordinate economic development efforts (Mallach 2017).

The federal government, too, has opportunities to promote legacy city revitalization through vertical collaboration. Metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) are federally required regional institutions that carry out transportation planning, and sometimes other functions. While they have been around since the 1960s, MPOs gained more power in the early 1990s when the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act granted them power to make decisions about distribution of federal funding (Weir, Rongerude, and Ansell 2009). In their case studies of Chicago and Los Angeles, Weir, Rongerude, and Ansell found that the federal policy attempted to prompt more effective transportation planning collaboration through a stronger institution with more public involvement, but that this only produced sustained regional governance capacity building in Chicago, where existing relationships among actors in business and local government allowed for horizontal *and* vertical collaboration that strengthened the MPO (2009). Top-down vertical collaboration efforts for improved urban outcomes, then, may be more or less successful depending on how they are designed and on the way local and state actors are able to respond to and leverage them.

This lesson of the variable outcomes of vertical collaboration has been echoed in other research, including Michael Rich and Robert Stoker's (2014) study of the federal Empowerment Zone (EZ) Initiative. In 1995 the federal government granted $100 million each and a package of market-oriented policy tools to the six original urban Empowerment Zones, which included three legacy cities: Baltimore, Detroit, and Philadelphia. The other original EZ cities were Atlanta, Chicago, and New York. Rich and Stoker compare outcomes in census tracts within these zones to determine how well the program worked for each city. They argue that the cities that performed better under the EZ program, including Baltimore and Philadelphia, did so because of better quality of local governance. Where Empowerment Zone programming had the greatest impact, they find, local actors were able to build new local capacity or leverage existing organizational capacity to solve collective problems. They also involved high quality, meaningful community participation in the decision-making and implementation processes. Finally, the more successful cities demonstrated better local governance by effectively matching scarce resources to holistic, coordinated programming that empowered citizens and other local actors across sectors. The federal initiative provided a toolkit of policy tools from which cities selected and customized their packages of EZ programming.

Federal and state governments can structure regulations, institutions, and policies to encourage revitalization in legacy cities. This may mean creating funding opportunities and providing other resources to help legacy cities achieve specific goals, such as improved public education or stronger city leadership. However, funding relationships between federal and local governments, and state and local governments can become adversarial when the higher level of government tries to impose too much control over the local government. Since local governments are in a better position to understand and appreciate the details and contexts of the problems they face, allowing for local autonomy to tailor programming to fit local needs is important. Other times, higher levels of government may create opportunities and incentives for horizontal collaboration among local governments, nonprofits, and businesses in order to facilitate solutions to regional problems. In these cases, the local context again is important and outcomes may depend on local factors, such as the power and resources of organizations involved and existing ties among local governments and organizations in a region.

TYPE 2: HORIZONTAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL COLLABORATION

Local governments have long worked together to solve problems through formal and informal cross-boundary arrangements. They may share equipment and staff or combine purchasing power to realize economies of scale. They might contract with one another to provide local services, such as police, fire, or planning. They may coordinate to seek grant funding for a revitalization project, to protect natural resources, or to attract a developer to a mutually beneficial site. While collaboration among local governments may involve some vertical relationships—for example, a city collaborating with the county within which it is located—this section discusses all collaboration among local governments, including cities, counties, school districts, and special districts, such as water and sewer districts, and/or metropolitan planning organizations.

Interlocal collaboration in the United States involves coordination in a context that is highly fragmented. A multitude of neighboring general-purpose governments provide tax-and-spend packages within their borders. Meanwhile, special districts serve specific functions in jurisdictions that overlap municipal borders in complicated and messy ways. This fragmented system of government means that the most efficient and effective solutions, which often involve collaboration, remain elusive due to collective action dilemmas, externalities, and common pool-resource problems. While collaboration may often provide potential gains, local governments seeking those gains may face significant hurdles, especially defection of partners, domination by a single partner, and conflict among participants (Feiock and Scholz 2010; Ostrom 1990, 2005).

Horizontal collaboration played a role in Cleveland's late 1990s and early 2000s approach to coping with its status as a shrinking city (Zingale and Riemann 2013). Local and regional governments frequently partnered with one another to advance specific projects aimed at spurring growth. At times, these local-level intergovernmental partnerships involved collaboration with higher levels of government as well. For example, the regional metropolitan planning organization partnered with local communities and public agencies through its Transportation for Livable Communities Initiative to direct federal transportation funding to Cleveland-area projects that strengthened community livability and regional economic competitiveness (Zingale and Riemann 2013). This partnership continues.

This sort of intergovernmental collaboration among local governments would not always have been expected. Local governments have, in the past, been seen as holding monopolies on local policymaking and service delivery. However, with complex problems that often do not match the scale of local jurisdictions, collaboration among local governments is seen as an increasingly important strategy (Zeemering and Romero 2011; Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Miller 2002). In legacy regions the increasing complexity and wickedness of problems—for example, overbuilt and aging infrastructure—may create particular demand for horizontal interlocal collaboration as resource problems are especially severe due to population decreases and job losses. Legacy cities and their surrounding suburbs continue to suffer under these conditions in ways other regions do not. Legacy cities operating in an era of devolution, reduced state and federal aid, and increased mandates are at an extreme disadvantage as compared to growing cities that can leverage burgeoning local resources (see chapter 3). Local governments in and around legacy cities that seek to solve problems, create efficiencies, and provide more effective services will more often *need* to seek out partners to do so.

The Institutional Collective Action (ICA) framework provides a comprehensive lens through which to understand collaboration among local governments. The framework extends theories of contracting and individual collective action problems to groups and organizations, including local governments (Carr et al. 2009; Feiock 2007, 2013). The ICA framework conceptualizes interlocal collaboration as a product of cost-benefit assessments. Legacy cities may face ICA dilemmas in policy areas from natural resource management, to air pollution control, to provision of basic services, such as sewerage and road maintenance. Local governments might often be able to achieve better outcomes through collaboration with other jurisdictions, but must overcome transaction costs.

ICA dilemmas may be mitigated using a number of strategies that require varying levels of formal action from local or higher levels of government. Among these are "self-organized" mechanisms such as informal networks, intergovernmental contracts, and partnerships that retain local autonomy, as well as imposed mechanisms that involve local government reorganization, such as creation of new special districts or consolidation of local governments (Feiock and Scholz 2010). With more complex and controversial policy problems, such as many of those faced in legacy regions, self-organizing mechanisms may be unlikely to emerge. In these cases, higher levels of government, such as states, may need to coordinate or incentivize horizontal collaboration (Feiock and Scholz 2010).

ICA theory predicts that those government actors that have cooperated previously will develop norms of reciprocity that reduce transaction costs and build social capital. Social and professional connections among decision-makers in different localities also can make these localities more likely to overcome the transaction costs associated with collaboration (Gerber and Loh 2014; Kwon and Feiock 2010). Scholars have found local governments are more likely to collaborate with one another when there is a greater availability of potential partners (Post 2002), when leaders have more trust and connections with leaders in neighboring jurisdictions (LeRoux et al. 2010; Kwon and Feiock 2010), when collaboration is sought by entrepreneurs in city governments (Zeemering 2008), and when the service to be provided is uncontroversial and associated with uniform citizen preferences (LeRoux and Carr 2010). Others have found that horizontal interlocal collaboration is driven by diffusion mechanisms among local governments who learn from one another's past collaborative agreements (Rubado 2016), by federal grant opportunities (Bickers and Stein 2004), and by heightened incentives caused by increased externalities over time (Scholz and Stiftel 2005).

While a large body of past and ongoing scholarly work investigates how and why interlocal collaboration occurs, there is less evidence about the outcomes of horizontal collaboration. Some recent research questions the feasibility and success rates of voluntary collaboration among local governments. New regionalists, such as Katz and Bradley (2013), argue that complex networks of cooperation will necessarily improve policy outcomes and enhance equity for people living in metropolitan areas. However, Kantor (2015) argues that the ability of local governments to successfully collaborate on their own has been remarkably variable, with many instances of failure. Successes have tended to occur within limited functional scopes or under exceptional circumstances. Kantor notes that state and federal intervention may be key to producing the kinds of interlocal collaboration required for improving social equity in urban areas.

In another study focused on horizontal collaboration outcomes, Hoornbeek, Beechey, and Pascarella (2015) examine eight collaborative proposals in northeast Ohio over a four-year period to identify predictors of success, measured as goal attainment. The authors find that some of the same predictors of collaboration extend to prediction of success of the collaborative endeavor. Trust among collaborating governments, as measured by previous collaborative experiences with proposal partners, was associated with goal attainment. The single most consistent predictor of collaborative success, however, is a factor that may be especially critical in legacy regions: external influences in the form of a mandate or grant from a higher level of government. In fiscally strapped localities, collaboration may be particularly challenging without external encouragement. Collaboration comes with high costs. Information must be gathered and shared, technical and administrative capacity must be present, and partners must negotiate agreements that produce equitable costs and benefits for all parties. Moreover, these transactions occur largely among municipal governments that also must compete with one another for development and taxpayers, which are often scarce in legacy regions. In legacy cities, then, successful horizontal local government collaboration may more often require inducements from state and federal government.

TYPE 3: CROSS-SECTOR COLLABORATION

A large body of literature on local collaboration for public policy and management focuses on the role of nongovernmental actors in *collaborative networks* that also include local governments, and often state and federal agencies. Scholarship has increasingly recognized that governments are not alone in the process of governance. They are networked with a multitude of diverse actors, including interest groups, nonprofit organizations, businesses, and citizens (Arnoff and McGuire 2003). The roles of nongovernmental actors in collaborative efforts operate amidst existing vertical and horizontal intergovernmental relations, creating a complex network of governance. The role of such actors is often seen as definitional to the term *collaborative governance*, a topic of intense recent study by scholars of public administration and management (Ansell and Gash 2008). However, there is disagreement about whether non-state actors, such as nonprofit organizations, must be involved in governance for it to qualify as "collaborative" (Kettl 2006; Emerson and Nabatchi 2015).

Legacy cities, as their moniker suggests, were once powerhouses of industry and culture, and still often retain the majority of their region's most important private and nonprofit institutions (see Ryberg-Webster and Tighe's introduction to this volume). This makes cross-sector collaboration an especially promising avenue for legacy cities. Moreover, other options for revitalization are unlikely to be successful, on their own, in legacy cities due to poor economic conditions. Private markets are unlikely to reinvigorate legacy cities without intervention given the cities' long trajectory of economic decline, and horizontal, self-organizing collaboration may be particularly challenging for legacy cities because their fiscal conditions make them undesirable partners (Mallach 2017). Citizens and leaders in suburban municipalities and counties often see the struggling central city as a liability and fear the effects of intermunicipal partnerships or more dramatic government reorganizations, such as city-county consolidations or mergers (Mallach and Brachman 2013). Given this more challenging path for horizontal intergovernmental collaboration, the role of the private and nonprofit sectors in collaborative policymaking and management will likely be important for legacy cities.

In a typology of collaborative management approaches, Agranoff and McGuire (2003) distinguish between two dimensions: activity (inactive to active) and strategy (passive to opportunistic). The most opportunistic and active cities are identified as *jurisdiction-based* cities. In these cities, public managers take part in a high level of strategic action with actors from various agencies, governments, and sectors for the benefit of the jurisdiction. In their case studies of six cities, Agranoff and McGuire identify Cincinnati, the only large central city in the case study, as the prototypical jurisdiction-based city. They found that Cincinnati had actively developed intergovernmental programs with both horizontal and vertical linkages with hundreds of collaborators—public, private, and nonprofit. They had strategic and project partnerships with the chamber of commerce and Downtown Cincinnati Inc. (a local development corporation) to work toward redevelopment of the central business district and entertainment core. In jurisdiction-based cities, public managers actively and strategically seek linkages for collaboration, using a flexible network of partners to match resources to needs for a host of policies and programs (Agranoff and McGuire 2003).

Cleveland, a city with a large nonprofit sector, too has engaged in cross-sector collaboration. Public-private partnerships during economic turmoil provide examples of the linkages among the city government, private businesses, nonprofits, and foundations. In a study of public-private partnerships under Mayor George Voinovich and Mayor Frank Jackson, leverage of cross-sector relationships for a common cause were found to produce transformative administrative change and allowed the city to adjust to challenges of declining population and resources while meeting demands for increased transparency and good government (Vogelsang-Coombs et al. 2016).

Federal and state governments are in a position to make cross-sector collaborations easier for cities, as these higher levels of government often set the rules of collaboration—for example, by allowing a nongovernmental organization to take a central role in managing grant projects for local communities. They can allow cities autonomy to decide how to structure federal- or state-funded projects in ways that actively engage private actors, nonprofits, and citizens. For example, due to federal deference to cities in the Empowerment Zone program, Baltimore's EZ initiative included a well-coordinated set of strategies that allowed for workforce development and effective use by local businesses of tax incentives and loan programs (Rich and Stoker 2014). There, vertical collaboration combined with cross-sector collaboration to produce the most positive outcome of the original EZ cities.

CONCLUSION

Collaborative strategies for legacy city revitalization abound, and many have been used to achieve significant success in these cities and their regions. Collaboration, in its various forms, has long been used by cities to solve problems and effectively provide services to citizens. In and around legacy cities, it is likely that the wickedness and scale of problems will more regularly demand collaborative strategies. Moreover, many legacy regions are situated in intensely fragmented settings, with dozens or even hundreds of distinct jurisdictions, creating greater likelihood of mismatch between scales of government and scales of problems.

Collaborative strategies differ in important ways, and some may be more feasible and more likely to succeed than others in various contexts. Self-organizing horizontal collaboration among local governments, for example, may exclude local governments that are in the most desperate of conditions, since these cities are likely to be unattractive partners to other local governments. Because more attractive partners in particular policy areas may be selected by their peers for collaboration that provides benefits, those involved in partnerships may continue to gain while others lose. There is potential for this sort of collaboration to exacerbate existing inequalities among local governments within regions (Feiock 2015). Given that legacy cities are already prone to intense inequality between the city and its suburbs, horizontal collaborations may require coordination by a regional institution, state, or federal government to ensure that legacy cities are not left behind.

Vertical collaboration among cities, states, and the federal government can provide for legacy city improvements, as central cities like Cincinnati engage in interactive relationships with state and federal agencies and secure state and federal funding for projects (Agranoff and McGuire 2003). While devolution, mandates, and a more coercive style of federalism have produced difficult conditions for cities, vertical collaboration provides a key opportunity for cities in desperate need of resources. States and federal agencies, too, have incentives to target their vertical collaborative efforts in ways that specifically benefit legacy cities, which are the economic drivers of their regions and likely need more help than other local governments. Metropolitan region prosperity correlates with central city prosperity (Vey 2007), suggesting that higher levels of government will benefit from stronger regional economies if legacy cities make gains.

In legacy cities, which tend to have a large share of their regions' major non-state institutions, including nonprofit organizations, foundations, and major corporations, cross-sector collaboration has particular promise in driving legacy city revival. Cities often begin seeking out cross-sector collaboration as a result of failure—when, after failed attempts, they realize they cannot solve particular problems on their own (Bryson et al. 2006). In legacy cities the opportunities to collaborate with other local governments or even state governments may be severely limited due to the disadvantaged position of the city and potential adversarial relations with state government. For example, legacy cities that struggle to find willing partners among neighboring cities and state agencies will likely benefit from seeking out nonprofit partners. Under these conditions, cross-sector partnerships may be essential to achieving goals.

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