

## INTRODUCTION

**T**HE KHANATE OF Khoqand was an exceptionally dynamic Central Asian state that gradually emerged over the course of the eighteenth century in eastern Uzbekistan's Ferghana (Farghāna) Valley. The Shahrukhid dynastic family that ruled Khoqand belonged to the Ming, an Uzbek political group, or for want of a better word, tribe.<sup>1</sup> Although the term Uzbek is used more inclusively today, in Central Asian historical literature it refers to the descendants of the several hundred thousand Turkic people who migrated into the region from the Qipchaq Steppe under the leadership of Muhammad Shibani Khan (d. 1510) at the turn of the sixteenth century.<sup>2</sup> It therefore distinguishes the Uzbek tribes that were part of that migration from the many other Turkic peoples that had entered the region previously and others who would arrive later.

The Uzbeks were the dominant political force in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Central Asia, and perhaps for that reason the Khanate of Khoqand is sometimes identified as an "Uzbek state." That designation falls short, however, as Khoqand's population was much more diverse than it suggests. In addition to the Uzbek

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1. Despite their similar names, the Uzbek Ming had no relation to the Ming dynasty of China (1368–1644). In Uzbek, *ming* means 1,000, whereas the Chinese Ming dynasty chose that name to suggest the dynasty's "brilliance."
  2. Yuri Bregel, "Turko-Mongol Influences in Central Asia," in *Turko-Persia in Historical Perspective*, ed. Robert L. Canfield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 74 and note.

Ming, the Khanate of Khoqand was home to substantial populations of Kyrgyz, other Uzbek tribes (including especially the Qipchaq), “Uyghur” Turks (as they would be identified today) from Altishahr, and large numbers of Persian language-speaking Tajiks, all of whom played a role in the state’s hierarchies of power, as well as its religious, cultural, and economic landscape.<sup>3</sup> The history of Khoqand is also closely intertwined with the histories of both Qing and Russian imperial expansion in the region, processes that unfolded over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the legacies of which remain potent across the region today.

Khoqand’s own legacy also merits close consideration as it continues to shape the lives and experiences of the contemporary peoples of the Ferghana Valley, the most densely populated region in modern Central Asia. This is apparent in the Ferghana Valley’s religious heritage, ethnic demographics, and conflicts over water rights, all of which represent factors in the social tensions and recurrent unrest that have plagued the region in recent years, and all of which have roots that stretch back into the history of the khanate. Despite its relevance to both historical and contemporary concerns, comparatively little is known about the history of Khoqand, including the factors that contributed to its emergence, its remarkable territorial expansion and cultural efflorescence at the turn of the nineteenth century, and its ultimate demise under the weight of Russian colonial expansion into the region.<sup>4</sup>

3. The same critique could, of course, be applied to the Bukharan Amirate and the Khivan Khanate.

4. The Khanate of Khoqand has attracted some scholarly attention. The collective works that Timur Beisembiev has produced over the past several decades, many of which are cited throughout this volume and listed in the bibliography, mark the single greatest contribution to the field. Also notable is the recent Russian-language study by Bakhtiyar Babadjanov, *Kokandskoe khanstvo: vlast', politika, religii* (Tokyo and Tashkent: Yangi Nashr, 2010). Babadjanov adds a critical voice to the earlier treatment by Haidarbek Nazirbekovich Bababekov, *Qo'qon tarixi* (Toshkent: Fan, 1996). Some of Bababekov’s conclusions are available in a sketchy and unreliable English translation, Victor Dubovitski and Khaydarbek Bababekov, “The Rise and Fall of the Kokand Khanate,” in *Ferghana Valley: The Heart of Central Asia*, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2011), 29–68. See also the Uzbek-language treatment by Shadman Vohidov, *Qo'qon khonligida tarikhnavislik (genezisi, funktsiyasi, namoyandalari, asarlari)* (Tashkent: Akademnashr, 2010). For a thorough study of the ways in which the government administration changed over the years, see Sherzodhon Mahmudov, “Sistema administrativnogo upravleniia v Kokandskom Khanstve (1709–1876 gg)” (PhD diss., Akademiia Nauk Respubliki Uzbekistan, Institut Istorii, 2007). The classic history of the khanate by the Russian Orientalist Vladimir Nalivkin, *Kratkaia istoriia Kokandskago khanstva* (Kazan, 1886), is based on his work with a number of chronicles, but his interpretations are problematic and often misleading, and so I have relied on it sparingly. In the English-language scholarship, the one work that merits attention here is Laura Newby, *The Empire and the Khanate: A Political History of Qing Relations with Khoqand c. 1760–1860* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2005). Newby’s careful and reliable study combines deep original research in Qing archival records and other Chinese documentary sources with some Central Asian literature and thoughtful analysis. The discussions below reference her conclusions often, but New-

Khoqand emerged in the context of the eighteenth-century Bukharan crisis, the general contours of which are now well established in the scholarly literature.<sup>5</sup> From the late seventeenth century, the final Chinggisid (descendants of Chinggis Khan) rulers in the region, the Toqay-Timurid (1599–1747) Bukharan khans, suffered a diminished capacity to control their subordinate Uzbek amirs whose allegiance and loyalty was the cornerstone of their own military strength and legitimacy.<sup>6</sup> The chronicles detail a growing fiscal crisis over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and numismatic evidence supports claims that silver became increasingly scarce. Ultimately, Bukharan coinage was debased to the point of losing nearly all its value. Fiscal problems made it increasingly difficult for an inherently decentralized regime such as the Bukharan Khanate to maintain patronage systems. It then became impossible.

Rebellions took root in the seventeenth century with increasing frequency in the early eighteenth century. The southern agricultural region of Central Asia meanwhile suffered debilitating invasions from nomadic peoples, most notably during the Kazakh “Barefooted Flight,” a horrific event in Kazakh history propelled by a 1723 Jungar (also Zungar, Zhungar, Dzungar) Mongol invasion that pushed the Kazakhs southward, where they occupied Bukharan agricultural territories.<sup>7</sup> Efforts to achieve greater centralization by imposing military reforms met with failure, exacerbating rebellions and further undermining Chinggisid legitimacy. The traditional Bukharan forces crumbled under the weight of more technologically advanced Persian artillery in 1737, and they simply submitted when Nadir Shah returned in 1740. With the assassination of Nadir Shah in 1747, the Uzbek Manghit tribal leadership executed the final Chinggisid ruler, Abu’l Fayz Khan (r. 1711–47), and took over leadership for themselves.<sup>8</sup> None of these points are contested. In

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by’s primary concern is focused on Qing history as seen through Qing relations with Khoqand. It is not a history of Khoqand, nor does it set out to be one.

5. Wolfgang Holzwarth, “Relations Between Uzbek Central Asia, the Great Steppe and Iran, 1700–1750,” in *Shifts and Drifts in Nomad-Sedentary Relations*, ed. Stefan Leder and Bernhard Streck (Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert, 2015), 179–216. For the most detailed, comprehensive history of the Bukharan state in this period, see Andreas Wilde, *What is Beyond the River? Power, Authority and Social Order in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Transoxania* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2016). See also the same author’s essay in ORE-AH, s.v. “The Bukharan Amirate.”
6. Thomas Welsford, *Four Types of Loyalty in Early Modern Central Asia: The Tūqāy-Timūrid Takeover of Greater Mā warā al-Nahr, 1598–1605* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2013).
7. I have opted to refer to this early modern nomadic power using the more straightforward (in English) spelling of Jungar, rather than Dzungar, Zhungar, Zungar, Züüngar, Jüün Ghar, or other more precise transliterations from the Mongolian, Manchu, Chinese, Kazakh, Russian, or Persian languages.
8. The Bukharan amirs maintained puppet khans until 1785, but from 1747 regal authority rested with the Manghit leadership.

retrospect, perhaps what is most remarkable is that the Toqay-Timurids were able to hold on for as long as they did.

To date, the sole explanation scholars have presented for this crisis is that a general shift in international trade to the maritime arena had usurped the early modern overland caravan trade passing through Central Asia, allegedly isolating the region and causing it to plunge into economic crisis. Starved of resources, Central Asian societies suffered a decline in commercial life, cultural production, and military strength. I have elsewhere argued that this explanation for the Bukharan crisis is flawed, and there is no need to repeat myself here.<sup>9</sup> It is worth noting, though, that even if this explanation were correct, it completely fails to explain why the Bukharan crisis became critical only in the first half of the eighteenth century. Why not a century earlier, or later? In fact, there is abundant evidence demonstrating Central Asia's continued economic integration with China, Russia, and India throughout the early modern era, including during the first half of the eighteenth century. Economic isolation cannot explain the Bukharan crisis.<sup>10</sup>

A central argument of this book is that integration, not isolation, shaped the trajectory of early modern Central Asian history. I do not mean to say that early modern Central Asia was uniformly on a trajectory of increased integration. One can identify many political, social, economic, and intellectual institutions and processes that had earlier linked Central Asia to distant regions and that deteriorated or even collapsed during this period. But the discussions below demonstrate that, even as some important aspects of Central Asian integrative structures unraveled, other processes emerged to weave new patterns. Building on that premise, this book examines how globalizing processes during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries contributed to the rise, and subsequent fall, of the Khanate of Khoqand.

In pursuit of this goal, I have made a deliberate, sustained effort to connect Central Asian history and historiography to multiple other historical fields. While the geographical focus for this study remains centered squarely within Central Asia, and even more precisely within the Ferghana Valley, the discussions below take readers

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9. My earliest engagement with this debate is found in Scott C. Levi, "India, Russia and the Eighteenth-Century Transformation of the Central Asian Caravan Trade," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 42, no. 4 (1999): 519–48. Additional references can be found in the bibliography.

10. I am currently preparing a separate study that aims to identify the causal factors behind the Bukharan crisis. This analysis suggests that there were multiple factors at play, some independent and some linked, some of which emerged slowly while others erupted more abruptly, and all of which converged in the early eighteenth century to the great detriment of the Bukharan Khanate and those dependent on it.

far afield, engaging the historiographies of Qing China, the Russian Empire, and the fields of Indian Ocean and world history. Integrating Central Asian history into these scholarly literatures highlights the transregional connections that linked those who lived in the heart of Asia with larger Eurasian and global historical process, and illuminates how those processes shaped Central Asian lives and the trajectory of Central Asian history.

This is a book about the rise and fall of the Khanate of Khoqand, so I dedicate a substantial amount of attention to the political history of that state, including the Shahrukhids's methods of establishing dynastic legitimacy and the power structures that they used to sustain their state. At the same time, the chapters below engage discussions of economic history, including commercial history but also monetary flows; diplomatic history; innovations in military technologies and their role in changing Central Asian statecraft and the ideas underpinning legitimacy; work in environmental history, including the history of water and the "hydraulic state"; as well as new perspectives on Khoqand made available through scholarly analyses of poetry and other historical literature. This book brings all of this literature together to provide new insights into early modern Central Asian history. These discussions give shape to the canvas on which the rise and fall of Khoqand took place.

## THE HISTORICAL ARC OF KHOQAND

The chapters in this book trace the formation of the Khanate of Khoqand to the reign of Shah Rukh Biy (r. 1709–22), the leader of the Uzbek Ming tribe and progenitor of the ruling dynasty (the "Shahrukhids") of Khoqand, and they situate his achievements and those of his heirs in their larger Eurasian context. Bukhara lost its ability to assert authority in the Ferghana Valley in the late seventeenth century. Already in the early decades of the eighteenth century, the inhabitants of the valley benefited from their position along caravan routes leading to Kashgar, Yarkand, and other markets to the east. This position became substantially more important after 1756–59, when the Qing conquest of the territory that would later be designated Xinjiang (including both the pastoral-nomadic Buddhist Jungar state in the north and the settled Islamic region of Altishahr in the south) brought the Qing imperial frontier to the borders of Khoqand.<sup>11</sup>

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11. For a summary of the literature on, and meaning of, the Qing frontier, see Mark Elliott, "Frontier Stories: Periphery as Center in Qing History," *Frontiers of History in China* 9, no. 3 (2014): 336–60.

The Ferghana Valley was fully brought under Shahrukhid authority during the long, prosperous reign of Narbuta Biy (r. 1770–99). By the time Narbuta Biy ascended the throne, the Shahrukhid ruling family had effectively neutralized threats posed by a politically ambitious network of Naqshbandi sufi khojas, established a new capital at Khoqand, defended the valley from multiple invasions, formed a political relationship with the Qing, and used that relationship to negotiate lucrative privileges for Khoqandi merchants in Qing territory.<sup>12</sup> During the second half of the eighteenth century, the Khoqandi khans began using these resources to expand irrigation agriculture in the valley and leverage their ability to provide access to water as a means to settle tens of thousands of migrants, increase their productivity, mediate their conflicts, and control their political ambitions. At the same time, Khoqand developed a formidable military arsenal equipped with cannons, muskets, and other artillery capable of subjugating rivals throughout the valley and beyond.

The state of Khoqand was formally restyled as a “khanate” during the reign of Narbuta Biy’s son and successor ‘Alim Khan (r. 1799–1811), the first in the Shahrukhid line to assume the lofty title of “khan.” Doing so was a breach of tradition, as in Central Asia the use of that title had for nearly six centuries been restricted to rulers who could trace their male ancestry directly to Chinggis Khan (d. 1227). Undeterred, the Shahrukhids devised new mechanisms to support their claims to legitimacy. They leveraged the gravity associated with the title of khan for diplomatic influence abroad, and they consolidated their authority at home through the deliberate imitation of the fifteenth-century Timurids, whose legacy in the region had risen to mythical proportions in the eighteenth century as the Chinggisids teetered and fell. This most famously included crafting a new origin myth for the Shahrukhid khans of Khoqand, the Altun Beshik (“Golden Cradle”) legend, that traced the ancestry of the dynasty’s Uzbek founder, Shah Rukh Biy, to Zahir al-Din Muhammad Babur himself (1483–1530). Linking the Shahrukhid ancestry to Babur’s legacy was ideal because he was the last Timurid prince to rule in the ancestral capital of Samarqand, the founder of early modern India’s great Mughal Empire (1526–1857), and a native of the Ferghana Valley.

Some Shahrukhids also sought to imitate the Timurids in their method of governance by patronizing a broad base of constituencies that included tribal interests and the military, as well as the highly influential mystical orders (sufis), more orthodox-minded Muslim scholars (‘ulama), poets, scholars, artists, and more. Through

12. For a discussion of political sufism in Central Asia, see Alexandre Papas, *Soufisme et politique entre Chine, Tibet et Turkestan: Étude sur les Khwajas Naqshbandis du Turkestan orientale* (Paris: Jean Maisonneuve, 2005).

much of its history Khoqand was on a centralizing trajectory, but at no point would one be justified in classifying Khoqand as a modern “centralized state.” Rather, the Shahrukhid leadership flourished by balancing the interests of multiple constituencies and serving as the chief negotiator among them. This technique brought rewards, and, in the early decades of the nineteenth century, the khanate flourished as the epicenter of a brief Islamic cultural efflorescence in the region. In this way, too, the Shahrukhids reflected their Timurid models.

The comparison stops there. While the medieval Timurid state was built on nomadic military power, technological advancements in the early modern world offered Central Asian rulers new opportunities, and new challenges. The Shahrukhids exploited their access to a growing population, greater economic resources, and improved gunpowder-weapons technologies. Khoqand was able to develop a formidable standing army that the Shahrukhids used to extend their authority deep into the Pamirs and far into the Kazakh steppe. To the north, in 1820 Khoqand established the fortress of Aq Masjid (also Ak Mechet, the “White Mosque,” and modern Kyzylorda) near the shores of the Aral Sea as a Khoqandi outpost on the lower course of the Syr Darya, and its territory stretched eastward across the steppe to the borders of the Qing Empire.<sup>13</sup> During the first four decades of the nineteenth century, Khoqand’s territorial holdings increased by a factor of thirty. By 1840, with some 3,000,000 subjects and a territory that stretched over some 250,000 square miles, Khoqand rivalled Bukhara in population and greatly exceeded it in size.

Destabilization took root when Khoqand lost the ability to manage its constituencies. In an effort to explain that process, this book examines the dialectic between Russian colonial expansion in Central Asia and the escalating ethnic tensions that terminally undermined indigenous political authority in the valley. Russian imperial literature and a long scholarly tradition emanating from that literature have tended to portray the later rulers in Khoqand as shortsighted feudal warlords and tyrants, stereotypical “Oriental despots” most interested in extracting wealth from their own people to support their own debaucherous pursuits. To be sure, one can find evidence to support those notions, and that evidence is discussed in the chapters that follow. But that evidence represents only one part of the whole. The discussion here challenges that interpretation by examining Khoqandi motivations and agendas and approaching Russian imperial expansion into the region from a Khoqandi perspective.

The final chapters outline multiple ways that the Russian imperial presence itself

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13. Timur Beisembiev, *Tarikh-i Shahrukhii kak istoricheskii istochnik* (Alma-Ata: Nauka, 1987), 17.

served as a destabilizing factor in the region. Russian generals repeatedly expressed their desire to reach a firm, stable frontier. But approaching their actions from the Khoqandi perspective, one finds that, more than anything else, it was Russian expansion itself that led to the deterioration of Khoqand's political climate, not least by undermining the support of political factions that had previously been loyal to Khoqand. The resulting instability, chaos, and conflict created both the opportunity for Russian colonial expansion into Khoqand's territory and a perceived need among some in the Russian administration to act on that opportunity in an effort to impose stability on their frontier. Russian forces took the Khoqandi steppe outpost of Aq Masjid in 1853, and, in the immediate wake of the Crimean War (1853–56), Russian troops redirected their attention to the other Khoqandi steppe fortresses. They continued southward, annexed Tashkent in 1865, defeated the army of Khoqand in 1868, and in 1876 Tsar Alexander II (r. 1855–81) formally extinguished the khanate altogether and incorporated the Ferghana Valley into the Russian Empire. Again, rather than casting Central Asians as ahistorical victims of Russian imperialism, this book emphasizes Central Asians' agency in the process.

As noted above, this study demonstrates the methodological merits of conducting “connected histories” and applying a world historical perspective to local and regional histories. In doing so, the book advances a number of conclusions relevant to Central Asian specialists as well as scholars working in other areas of Eurasian and world history. Perhaps most important, the broader community of historians may find value in directing attention to ways that the more compact states of Central Asia resemble—or differ from—other states emerging on the frontier of, and in contact with, expanding imperial powers during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Globalization, with roots stretching back at least to the sixteenth century, is a driving force in this process.<sup>14</sup> I recognize that what constitutes “globalization” itself is a contested notion, but a rehearsal of the many volumes written on the subject would be more cumbersome than helpful.<sup>15</sup> I apply it here in reference to a dramatic increase in global mobility; the general intensification of early modern global commercial bonds; the development of transregional networks, technologies, and institutions that facilitated that intensification; the growing commodification

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14. See Dennis O. Flynn and A. Giraldez, “Born Again: Globalization's Sixteenth-Century Origins (Asian/Global versus European Dynamics),” *Pacific Economic Review* 13, no. 3 (2008): 359–87.

15. I will refrain from digressing into a discussion of the many dozens of articles and books authored by Immanuel Wallerstein, Andre Gunder Frank, and other historical sociologists and economic historians that debate when globalization began and whether a “world system” took shape in the nineteenth century, the fifteenth century, or already in the third millennium BCE.



of certain agricultural products and other merchandise; and the variegated impacts that this process had on localities across the globe in terms of politics, economics, culture, and more.<sup>16</sup>

I argue that globalizing forces contributed to the rise, efflorescence, and collapse of the Khanate of Khoqand, and that this Central Asian case merits comparative analysis with, for example, the Burmese kingdom in mainland Southeast Asia, both Bali and the Siak Sultanate in Indonesia, and the Sultanate of Aceh in Sumatra; Ranjit Singh's Sikh state in the Punjab, Hyderabad, and many of the other "princely states" and "agencies" of post-Mughal India; the Sokoto Caliphate and the Tijaniyya Caliphate of Umar Tal in western Africa, the non-Muslim Asante (Ashanti) Kingdom in contemporary Ghana, and the Zulu Kingdom of South Africa. These are just a few of many states and other regional powers that exploited opportunities brought about by globalizing forces to establish a trajectory of growth and centralization, only to suffer eventual crisis and collapse as a result of those same forces. But before one may compare Khoqand with any of these other case studies, it is first necessary to introduce the Ferghana Valley, the heart of Central Asia.

## THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE FERGHANA VALLEY

Surrounded by the Tian Shan (Heavenly Mountains) and Pamir-Alay mountain ranges, the Ferghana Valley is today home to roughly 14,000,000 people, making it the most densely populated region in Central Asia.<sup>17</sup> In the arid climate of the region, the Ferghana Valley offers fertile soil and an abundance of water, drawn primarily from the annual snowmelt that feeds the Naryn and Qara Darya rivers, which—even before they join to form the Syr Darya—channel water into hundreds of miles of

16. See Jan de Vries, "The Limits of Globalization in the Early Modern World," *Economic History Review* 63, no. 3 (2010): 710–33. Where de Vries directs his attention to the limits of the maritime networks orchestrated by the European Companies, I am more interested in how the general early modern pattern of globalization shaped historical developments deep in the hinterland. For an exceptionally useful treatment, see C. A. Bayly, "'Archaic' and 'Modern' Globalization in the Eurasian-African Arena," in *Globalization in World History*, ed. A. G. Hopkins (London: Plimco Press, 2009), 47–93. For a recent study of the cultural implications of globalization in the field of literature, see Ning Ma, *The Age of Silver: The Rise of the Novel East and West* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).

17. This section is an abbreviated and edited excerpt from Scott C. Levi, "Farghana Valley," *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Three*, ed. Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, Everett Rowson, Brill Online, [http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-3/farghana-valley-COM\\_27096](http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-3/farghana-valley-COM_27096). I am grateful to the editors for granting permission to reproduce that material here in a slightly altered format.

canals that today irrigate nearly every part of the valley. This fact, combined with the valley's long, hot summers, has for millennia enabled its farmers to produce a regular surplus of crops including the peaches, melons, and other fruits for which the area is famous. An extra measure of historical importance is afforded to the valley as it rests along caravan routes that connected Bukhara, Samarqand, and other urban centers of Mawarannah to the west, with Kashgar and the other oasis cities of Altishahr to the east.

The recorded history of the valley stretches into antiquity. In the year 329 BCE, Alexander the Great (356–323 BCE) is said to have established a settlement known as Alexandria Eschatae (“The Farthest”) near the western entrance to the Ferghana Valley, at or very near the location of Khojand, an important Khoqandi possession in the nineteenth century now located in Tajikistan. Population growth and urbanization were well underway by the second century BCE, when (c. 126 BCE) the Han Chinese ambassador to Bactria, Zhang Qian (Chang Chi'en) traveled through the Ferghana Valley (Dayuan, or Ta-yüan, in his account) and left one of the earliest written accounts of the region. Zhang Qian reported that, at that time, Ferghana was home to a sedentary civilization of several hundred thousand people, mostly farmers. He found that the people of the valley had developed a sharp commercial acumen, and his account was perhaps the first to identify the Ferghana Valley as a source of the legendary blood-sweating “heavenly horses” that would for centuries spark the Chinese imagination.

In the early centuries of the Common Era, the inhabitants of the Ferghana Valley continued to thrive. This is partly attributable to their relationship with the neighboring Sogdians, who orchestrated a merchant diaspora that spanned much of Asia and connected local Central Asian economies with the much larger economies of China, India, and the Middle East.<sup>18</sup> The valley's medieval importance peaked in the middle of the eighth century, when the Chinese Tang Empire (618–907) successfully extended its authority across the Tian Shan and the rulers of both Tashkent (known at the time as Chach, or Shash) and the Ferghana Valley accepted Chinese suzerainty. This was at least partially in the expectation of achieving a closer commercial relationship with the Tang.

In the 740s, the Tang took advantage of the political fragmentation of the Second Türk Qaghanate (682–742), a superpower in steppe politics, to expand their interests westward. But that was quickly brought to a halt. In the year 750, the Tang were

18. Étienne de la Vaissière, *Histoire des marchands Sogdiens* (Paris: Collège France, Institute des Hautes Études Chinoises, 2004). See also the English translation, Étienne de la Vaissière, *Sogdian Traders: A History*, trans. James Ward (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2005).

drawn into a minor conflict between their two Central Asian vassals, the kingdoms of Tashkent and Ferghana. Following orders from the emperor, the Tang governor of the western province interfered on the side of Ferghana, forced the ruler of Tashkent into submission, and brought him to China to be executed.<sup>19</sup> The Tashkent ruler's son fled the Chinese and made his way to nearby Samarqand, where he requested aid from the city's new Arab Muslim ruler. The following summer, in 751, an Arab army from Samarqand, bolstered with reinforcements from Khurasan and Qarluq deserters from the Chinese confederation, defeated the Tang near the city of Talas (Taraz, previously Jambyl), in contemporary southern Kazakhstan. Both Tashkent and Ferghana were left firmly in the hands of the Arabs, and Chinese forces were confined to the east side of the Tian Shan. Just a few years later, following the 755 An Lushan Rebellion, Chinese armies retreated all the way to China proper. It would be a thousand years before the Manchurian Qing dynasty would again conquer that far to the west.


In subsequent centuries, the people of the Ferghana Valley, along with others in the region, gradually set aside their Zoroastrian faith and other ancestral religious traditions in favor of Islam. The maturation of this process is evidenced by the anonymous author of the tenth-century *Hudūd al-Ālam* (The limits of the world), a cultural and geographical survey of the Islamic world at that time.<sup>20</sup> Some five centuries later, Ferghana's established position in Central Asian Islamic civilization was recorded in Babur's personal memoir, the *Baburnama*.

In Babur's time, Ferghana was elevated in status as a political unit, a Timurid *soyūrgāl* (a land grant intended to provide revenue for a Timurid prince), but it remained subordinate to Samarqand and was in actuality little more than a collection of seven modestly sized cities surrounded by villages and abundant wilderness designated to a lesser Timurid heir.<sup>21</sup> Babur's capital city was Andijan, the largest city in Ferghana but smaller than Samarqand or Shahrīsabz. Other urban centers in Babur's realm included Akhsi and Kasan in the northern part of the valley, Osh to the east, and Marghilan, Isfara, and Khojand to the south and west. Cities such as Namangan, Tura Qurghan, Chust, and of course Khoqand itself were later developments, either not yet established or little more than villages that grew into important urban centers only from the eighteenth century.

19. Bregel, *Atlas*, 18.

20. Vladimir Minorsky, *Hudūd al-Ālam: "The Regions of the World," A Persian Geography, 272 A.H.–982 A.D.*, ed. C. E. Bosworth, 2nd ed. (London: Gibb Memorial Trust, 1970), 112–19.

21. See Babur's description in Wheeler M. Thackston, trans., *The Baburnama: Memoirs of Babur, Prince and Emperor* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002): 3–8.



**MAP 2** Babur's Ferghana Valley.  
**MAP BY BILL NELSON.**

In his memoir, Babur describes his youth in Ferghana. He longingly recalls that the melons, grapes, and pears of Andijan were among the best anywhere; that peaches, pomegranates, and other fruit grew in abundance elsewhere in the valley; and that the valley offered a wealth of untouched wilderness for hunting deer, pheasant, hare, and other game. His account references a few locations where irrigation canals channeled water from rivers to agricultural lands, and he proudly asserts: “the income of Ferghana Province, if justly managed, will maintain three to four thousand men.”<sup>22</sup> Exploring demographic and environmental change over time, the image of the Ferghana Valley Babur presents contrasts sharply with descriptions of the mid-nineteenth century, which depict a substantially more densely populated and heavily irrigated Ferghana Valley at the heart of a state that could produce an army as large as 100,000 troops.

What happened in the interim? With Babur's expulsion from Central Asia at the turn of the sixteenth century, the valley fell into Uzbek hands, and it remained a peripheral province of the Bukharan Khanate for nearly two centuries.<sup>23</sup> Bukharan

22. Thackston, *The Baburnama*, 7.

23. There is little historical work on the Ferghana Valley during this period. R. N. Nabiev has done some work on this theme. See R. N. Nabiev, “Iz istorii feodal'nogo zemlevladieniia v Fergane v XVI–XVII vekakh,” *IAN* 3 (1960), 25–34; and his “Novye dokumental'nye materialy k izucheniiu feodal'nogo instituta 'suiurgal' v Fergane XVI–XVII vv.,” *IAN* 3 (1959), 23–32. For another short treatment, see A. Juvonmardiev, “XVI va XVII asr boshlarida Farghonada dehqonlarning erga birkittirilishi masalasiga doir,” *ONU* 2 (1963), 61–64.

control over its eastern territories, including the Ferghana Valley, slipped away during the latter half of the seventeenth century. At the turn of the eighteenth century, the valley was independent of Bukhara and home to multiple ethnic and religious groups with competing political visions. The valley's transformation from Babur's idyllic wilderness paradise into a much more densely populated and agriculturally rich commercial hub was a product of integrative structures that began to take shape only during the early eighteenth century, even as the neighboring Bukharan Khanate plunged into a deepening state of crisis and political decentralization. It is the story of Khoqand.