

JAMES M. MALLOY

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Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America: The Modal Pattern

For the foreseeable future at least, “modernizing authoritarian” regimes will remain a part of political life in Latin America. This fact has forced a rethinking of much of the conventional wisdom regarding the area, be it based on Marxist or liberal democratic theoretical foundations. The recent experiences of Brazil, Argentina, and Peru, and the discovery that behind the façade, Mexico is really an authoritarian system, have led many to suggest that the region is generating a “new path” to development which, if it is to be understood, demands the fashioning of new conceptual approaches to the analysis not only of these regimes but of the region as a whole.¹ Central to this rethinking is the recognition that authoritarian regimes are not historically doomed to extinction as societies modernize and develop but are potentially viable (if unpleasant) modes of organizing a society’s developmental efforts. Indeed, one author has persuasively argued that authoritarian regimes of a certain type are actually a product of high levels of modernization in the Latin American context.² Whichever is the case, it is now generally agreed that authoritarian systems constitute a regime type which must be understood in its own terms and within which it is possible to delineate a number of subtypes.

While the significance of the concept of authoritarianism as a regime type has been largely accepted, there remains some confusion regarding the delineation of subtypes, particularly when one comes to grips with authoritarian regimes that are self-consciously oriented toward the development and modernization of their respective societies. Thus, the terms bureaucratic authoritarianism, populist authoritarianism, and military populism have all recently been offered as ways of talking about specific modernizing authoritarian regimes in the area—with Juan Perón and Getúlio Vargas representing populist authoritarianism, Peru

since 1968 military populism, and Brazil since 1964 bureaucratic authoritarianism.³ These distinctions are undoubtedly useful in that they point out significant differences among these regimes in terms of the role of charismatic leadership, group coalitions supporting regimes, and differences in policy emphasis and developmental strategies. These, in turn, have been effectively traced to the varying levels of development achieved by the different countries when the specific regimes appeared.

Despite the important differences unearthed by this approach, others have pointed out an overarching similarity in structure and organizational principles among the regimes just mentioned and other authoritarian systems such as Mexico's. The critical point of similarity is that each of these regimes is characterized by strong and relatively autonomous governmental structures that seek to impose on the society a system of interest representation based on enforced limited pluralism. These regimes try to eliminate spontaneous interest articulation and establish a limited number of authoritatively recognized groups that interact with the governmental apparatus in defined and regularized ways. Moreover, the recognized groups in this type of regime are organized in vertical functional categories rather than horizontal class categories and are obliged to interact with the state through the designated leaders of authoritatively sanctioned interest associations. This mode of organizing state and society has aptly been termed "corporatism."⁴ Viewed from this perspective, the conceptual problem in the Latin American context can be broken down to three levels of analysis: (1) a general level of regime-type authoritarianism of which there can be many variants, running from an old-fashioned caudillo such as Anastasio Somoza to a sophisticated regime such as Brazil's; (2) an overarching subtype "corporatism" which is defined in terms of structural and organizational principles; and (3) a series of subtypes within corporatism (those noted above) defined in terms of the roles of leaders, supporting coalitions, and policy strategies. Thus, corporatism can be seen as a major authoritarian theme upon which there can be different variations.

Among those who address themselves to these questions there is considerable disagreement as to the factors, both regional and country-specific, that account for the emergence of corporatist authoritarian regimes. Some authors stress a Hispanic-Catholic tradition that has long lain dormant in the region and is presently asserting itself.⁵ Others go a step further and point to a persistent *de facto* mode of group formation and conflict always present in the region behind the façade of previous liberal democratic constitutional forms.⁶ From either of these two perspectives, one might say that the emergence of an authoritarian corporate regime in a given country represents less a breakdown of

democracy into authoritarianism than a break-out from a grafted liberal democratic structure of an underlying mode of political organization. Be that as it may, others who recognize the significance of these two factors rightly point out that they alone cannot account for the emergence of authoritarian corporate regimes and particularly their orientation toward the promotion of development and modernization.⁷

For these authors, the problem must be placed in its developmental focus. To do this, one must take into account the level of development achieved by specific countries and the international context of development impinging on the region as a whole and on specific countries. Those who approach the question from this more complex and historically specific developmental context have pointed to two important processes that are closely linked to the emergence of authoritarian corporate regimes. First, they point to the crucial fact that the region as a whole and countries within it began to develop later than the advanced industrial states; therefore, the nations of Latin America confront the process from different vantage points and different perspectives. One critical aspect of this lateness is the fact that all of the nations of the region are based on economies that are to one degree or another dependent on and influenced by the more advanced industrial states. In brief, the first factor of significance is the phenomenon of "delayed dependent development."⁸ The second factor is connected with the fact that throughout a large part of the region the most significant political movements that have sought to promote reform and change since the 1920s and 1930s were based, in some fashion or other, on an orientation generally called "populism."⁹ The term is no doubt vague and embraces a variety of political movements. Most agree, however, that the phenomenon of populism has been critical in the region. Thus, besides the Hispanic tradition and de facto modes of group conflict, two processes rooted in the region's twentieth-century developmental experiences are closely linked to the emergence of corporatist authoritarianism. These are the phenomena of delayed dependent development and populism.

Delayed Dependent Development

The contemporary trend toward authoritarian corporatist regimes in Latin America must be viewed against the backdrop of the region's previous pattern of economic development, which is best described as delayed dependent capitalist development. In this chapter, then, authoritarian corporatist regimes are seen as responses to a general crisis of public authority brought about by the multiple effects of delayed dependent development. More specifically, the problem to which these

regimes have responded has been that of integrating a multiplicity of societal interests into a decision-making structure that guarantees a minimum of political stability and allows decision makers to launch development-oriented policies. By and large, formally democratic regimes have been unable in the Latin American context simultaneously to integrate societal actors and to sponsor development, thus leading to the predisposition in many countries to adopt authoritarian corporatist solutions.

In this chapter, we will examine in broad terms the major sequences in the region's development pattern with the aim of linking the phenomena of delayed dependent development, populism, corporatism, and authoritarianism. Particular attention will be paid to the phenomenon of populism, which from the 1930s on was the most significant type of political movement in the entire region and, in my view, is the most important direct link between delayed dependent development and corporatist authoritarianism. In brief, the argument of this chapter is that populism was a general regional response to the first crisis of delayed dependent development. In both orientation and practice, populism was at least implicitly corporatist but left open the question of whether it would establish corporatist structures within a formally democratic or authoritarian framework. Both variations were attempted at various times in different countries. By and large, however, not only did populist elites fail to resolve the underlying crisis, but because of internal contradictions within the movements, in most cases they actually exacerbated the situation. They thereby contributed to an environment which tended to give rise to the more blatant authoritarian corporatist regimes we see in the region today.

The phenomena of delayed development and external dependence in Latin America have been examined at length by numerous scholars. In brief, this pattern of development took place during the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century in response to stimuli emanating from the more industrialized capitalist states of Western Europe and the United States. As a result, the various nations of the region were integrated into an international capitalist market system where they functioned mainly as suppliers of raw materials and consumers of manufactured goods. For the most part, economic growth and modernization in the region were the results of an outward-oriented growth model which overemphasized development of the export sectors of the local economies.

The outward-oriented growth model had numerous secondary effects on the nations of the region. In the first instance, the local economies became increasingly dependent on an international market structure over which they had little or no control. In addition, internal develop-

ment was extremely unbalanced, which in turn led to a local situation of structural dualism: The nations of the region experienced a differentiation into a relatively modern urbanized sphere based on the export sector and a more traditionally organized and more backward agricultural sphere. The former dominated and exploited the latter, thereby recapitulating within the countries of the region the phenomenon of the dependency of a more backward periphery on a more advanced center. Thus, by the 1920s, a major characteristic of the region was an interlocking hierarchy of dependency structures descending from the advanced industrial center, through the various states of Latin America, and into the most backward regions of the various nations.

Development during this period did not eliminate previous societal patterns in the region but added onto them more modern, externally derived patterns, creating the general Latin American phenomenon that Charles Anderson has labeled the "living museum."¹⁰ Internally, the countries of the area were cleft along myriad lines of division and potential conflict that cut along regional, racial, cultural, caste, and class lines. Internally, these powerful centrifugal tendencies were held in check by a powerful local elite of landed, export, and commercial interests—often referred to as the oligarchy—that was able to assert its hegemony through control of the state. The key to this pattern of elite control was a *de facto* internal structure of vertically organized patron-client networks based on an internal hierarchy of dependency and dominance that pervaded the nations of the region. These vertically ordered patron-client networks, as Julio Cotler has shown for Peru, ran from the local center to the local periphery, cutting across class, caste, and regional lines, thereby fostering highly particularistic orientations and vitiating mobilization along horizontal lines of class or caste.¹¹ Particularism, along with the multiple lines of cleavage, fostered a columnar social structure which has been excellently described by scholars such as Kalman Silvert and Ronald C. Newton.¹² Thus, in one sense, the various nations of the region manifested the invertebrate social structure that José Ortega y Gasset described in Spain.¹³

The tendency for this type of society to fly apart was held in check somewhat by a hegemonic elite in effective control of authority and the interlocking clientelistic nets descending from national elites down into intermediary and local subelites. Internally interconnected points of dependence created a vertically structured system of interdependence which tended to hold the parts of the system together.

A central social grouping to appear during the first stage of export-based development was a new urban middle class. As a product of delayed export-based development rather than autonomous industrial development, the Latin American middle class differed markedly from

the middle class in the industrial center. In the main, it was a class of liberal professionals and public and private white-collar employees who were dependent in the sense that they did not control hard sources of wealth but lived off wages, salaries, and fees. A large sector of the middle class depended on public employment, a phenomenon often referred to as premature bureaucratization: the tendency of the formal governmental apparatus to expand faster than underlying socio-economic structures. This pattern of premature bureaucratization fostered consumption patterns which in later years outstripped the local economies' ability to sustain them.¹⁴ In any event, the new dependent urban middle class was destined to become a critical political actor from the 1930s on and the human base that spawned populism.

Finally, delayed dependent development significantly affected the position of formal governmental structures or "the state." By the late 1920s, most Latin American state structures vis-à-vis both internal and external actors were characterized by low levels of autonomy and relative weakness. In other words, the general situation of dependence translated into the specific dependence of the state upon a limited number of internal and external actors. The growing need for financial resources to support expanding public employment owing to the incorporation of sectors of the urban middle class into the public bureaucracy increased even further the state's dependence on a limited number of internal and external sources of revenue. Thus, governments in the region were subjected to heavy pressure from the local elite as well as from external private and public interests who were able in the main to shape local public policy to reflect their interests. Again from the 1930s on, a critical political issue was to be the power, effectiveness, and autonomy of the various central state structures of Latin America.

The Emergence of Populism

The 1930s and 1940s are an important watershed in Latin American history. The worldwide depression hit the region with particular ferocity, bowling over the props of the area's export-based economies and causing widespread internal dislocation. The disruption of international trading structures threw the bulk of the Latin American states back on their own resources; the relative economic isolation of the 1930s was reinforced in the 1940s by World War II. Economic depression, sociopolitical disruptions, and relative isolation forced a general rethinking of the region's internal structures and their links to international structures.

Central to the rethinking of Latin America's position was a gener-

alized rejection of the "liberal" concepts of political economy that had been previously dominant and a significant rise in nationalist sentiment expressed as a generalized desire for autonomous national development of individual societies. Nationalism and developmentalism became, and were to remain, dominant ideological themes throughout the region.

The problem, of course, was to give concrete substance to the sentiments of nationalism and developmentalism. Although a variety of groups from left to right vied for power and the capacity to redefine individual societies, the most significant alternative political expression to emerge during the period was populism. Populism is a general and somewhat amorphous concept that embraces a wide-ranging spectrum of political movements and programs. Nonetheless, there is sufficient similarity in terms of group composition among these movements and enough thematic consistency behind their programs to justify considering them *as of a piece*.¹⁵

In retrospect, it is evident that populism was a specific and indigenous regional response to a general crisis which emerged from the exhaustion of a particular phase of delayed dependent development: namely, the exhaustion of the primary-product, outward-oriented growth model. The inability to sustain this model in the face of the global crisis of a stage of international capitalism reflected itself in Latin America in a general crisis of authority of the internal oligarchic power structures that had previously held sway. The hallmark of this "hegemonic" crisis was the disaffection of large sectors of the middle class from the system of which they had been the bedrock of support.¹⁶ With the collapse of oligarchic authority, sectors of the middle class were thrust to the forefront of the political struggle. However, these disaffected elements of the middle class could not independently carry out basic structural transformations, and to buttress their position they had to seek allies in other social strata. Populism became the guise within which change-oriented segments of the middle class sought to construct multiclass coalitions powerful enough to gain control of the state and underwrite programs of structural transformation. Populism in Latin America was and remains largely the ideological product of the highly bureaucratized and largely dependent Latin American middle class which found its previously secure position threatened by the multiple effects of the exhaustion of the export-oriented growth model.

Populist movements varied widely from the highly personalized style of Perón and Vargas, who both constructed movements and ideologies from positions of formal power, to the more organized movements such as the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) in Peru, Acción Democrática (AD) in Venezuela, and the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) in Bolivia, which constructed organizations

and ideologies as a means to assault the bastions of formal power. The biographies and relative "success" of these movements varied considerably; but in all cases populism left a deep imprint, both in terms of its concrete impact on the respective systems of political economy and as a potent ideological legacy. Populist rhetoric has played a major role in structuring political debate in Latin America since the 1930s, and in one manner or another all political forces from left to right have been forced to structure their behavior in response to the populist challenge. For good or ill, populism has, since its inception, been the major political force in Latin America.

Rhetoric and self-designation notwithstanding, Latin American populism was never revolutionary in the sense of advocating a radical break with the past and a total overhaul of existing structures. On the contrary, in both theory and practice it was and remains a reformist attempt at limited structural transformations aimed at adapting to new exigencies, while at the same time maintaining basic continuity with past cultural traditions. Populist political doctrine proceeded from a diagnosis of the ills of Latin America which anticipated many later theoretical formulations, including those of Raul Prebisch of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, and many aspects of the contemporary theory of "dependence."¹⁷

For the populists, the central problems of Latin America were economic underdevelopment and deformed economic structures. A central dilemma was the lack of internal "integration" owing to the dichotomy between a modern sector and what the populists called a semifeudal agrarian sector. In the Indo-American countries such as Peru and Bolivia, populists also stressed a lack of geographical and cultural integration reinforced by dualism. These internal structural problems were due to the structure of the international system—for example, imperialism, particularly that of the United States—and the way the international structures penetrated local economies, transforming them into semicolonial appendages. The mechanism of imperial penetration was the local oligarchy, which identified its interests with those of the imperial powers, thereby becoming agents who plundered the local economy for the benefit of their foreign allies.

The local oligarchy was a nonnational class that aided the imperial center to exploit the nation as a whole. Thus, the problem was not, as the Marxists would have it, the internal exploitation of class by class, but the global exploitation of the "nation" by the "antination." The nation was made up of all the groups other than the oligarchy (at a minimum, the middle class, workers, and peasants) who, because they were equally exploited, shared a common set of interests. The task, therefore, was not to form a class-based party to establish the rule of

one exploited class, but to form a broad multiclass movement to unseat the oligarchy and install leadership that would represent the entire nation.

The chief declared goals of the populists were: (1) to assert national economic independence, for example, anti-imperialism; (2) to break local semifeudal structures so as to liberate human and material resources for economic development; and (3) to promote social justice for all sectors of the nation. The central agency charged with achieving these goals was the state; central themes for the populists were state, nation, development, and social justice. The task of the multiclass movement was to seize the state and use it to promote the other goals. Populism was oriented to a system in which the state would control national resources to assure their local reinvestment and equitable distribution.

Populism was therefore "statist," but it was not socialist: Indeed, populism rejected in rhetoric both socialism and capitalism and advocated a third route to development which was unique to each nation. While populism was rhetorically anti-imperialist and anticapitalist, most populist ideologies argued that its backward, semifeudal condition made the nation's attempt to break completely with internal and external structures both impossible and foolhardy. Rather, the task was to expand state power so as to reform and regulate internal and external structures and achieve an evolutionary process of controlled economic development. In terms of political economy, populism advocated a system of "neomercantilism" or what some would call "state capitalism."

Another populist theme was that of "integral" development, an organizational principle to achieve maximum sociopolitical harmony. Having rejected Marxian principles of class analysis and the "egotistical individualism" of liberalism, and having assumed a community of interests among all groups of the nation, populism projected the possibility of achieving development with a minimum of social conflict. The key to achieving this goal was to construct society around a set of principles that would foster interdependence and cooperation.

The profound impact of the populist vision can be seen not only in those countries where populists came to power, but also in the fact that during this period most Latin American nations either amended or rewrote their constitutions in terms that heavily reflected populist concepts. The process of constitutional revision was so general that some have referred to the period as the "era of social constitutionalism."¹⁸ These ideas were so widespread that one could argue that there developed, particularly among the middle classes of Latin America, a general consensus around the image of reform preferred by

the populists.¹⁹ The problem, of course, was to put the image into practice. Latin American politics since the 1930s can be interpreted in part as a struggle to realize the reformist image of populism. When the Cuban Revolution transcended this reformist image and created an alternative radical revolutionary image, a sense of urgency was added which created among many groups, including sectors of the elite and the military, a belief that something resembling populist reform had to be implemented if more radical solutions were to be avoided.

Looking back at populism from this vantage point, in terms of ideological formulations, constitutional principles, and the kinds of practices implemented by populist governments such as those of Vargas, Perón, and the Mexican Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) (the Mexican Revolution anticipated populism and was a major symbol for most populists), the MNR, and others, it is now evident that populism was and is based on an implicit *corporatist* image of socio-political organization. With the exception of Vargas, the populist preference for a corporatist solution to the pressures of modernization was seldom stated explicitly, but there seems little gainsaying that populism has always shown a high affinity for corporatist principles of organizing the relations between state and society.²⁰ The real issue has been whether it would be a more or less democratic corporatist solution or a more or less authoritarian solution.

Populism advocated a pluralistic coalition to achieve reform and therefore sought to mobilize the working class and to some degree the peasants. But it is important to keep in mind that populism was primarily a middle-class phenomenon. Populist doctrine was also founded on the notion that because of economic backwardness and structural deformity, the mass of workers and peasants were themselves underdeveloped and hence ill prepared to define either their own interests or those of the nation. Populists saw the mass of workers and peasants as "human capital" to be freed from semifeudal fetters and more rationally organized as a productive force.²¹ Another theme was that the workers and peasants had to be "capacitated" (educated) to play their future role. In short, populism has always looked at the masses of workers and peasants as backward groups whose main role was to follow the lead of the populist elite, that is, the progressive sectors of the middle class. From its inception, populism has been infused with an elitist orientation in which the masses tended to be viewed as objects to be manipulated and controlled (for their own good) and were to remain the passive recipients of paternalistic social policies formulated by the elite. Whatever else it was, populist ideology was at its base nationalist, statist, and elitist.

The Impact of Populism

While populism was a multifaceted phenomenon whose impact varied throughout the region, a number of generalizations hold for most of Latin America from the 1930s to the 1960s. These can be related either to the direct impact of populist governments or to the indirect effect of populist orientations on public policy and/or the need of status-quo elites to respond to the challenge of populist movements.

Populism rejected classical liberal political economy and argued that one of the key problems of the region was the inability of the states of Latin America to limit the influence of external actors and to direct local economic activity so as to promote broad-based economic development. This inability was rooted in the weakness and low autonomy of the state, which in turn was rooted in external economic dependence and local oligarchic control. Thus, populist elites sought to control the state and use it to undermine the power of the local oligarchy, restructure external economic relations, and intervene in the economy to overcome the outward-oriented export model by stimulating economic diversification, mainly through policies of import substitution. In a sense, the real problem was to seize the state and create a base so as to render it capable of acting as an autonomous factor shaping both its internal and external environment rather than as a more or less passive instrumentality reflecting the push and pull of environmental stimuli and pressures.

In coping with this problem, populist regimes sought to expand the support base for more effective and directive governmental decision-making by mobilizing broad popular support, not on the basis of "class," but on the basis of "citizenship," that is, the nation (concretized in the state) versus the antination. Throughout the region, populism directly contributed to a significant increase in both the breadth and the tempo of political mobilization, drawing large sectors of hitherto excluded social groups (organized labor, marginal urban residents, peasants, etc.) directly into the political arena. To use E. E. Schattschneider's image, one impact of populism was to expand significantly the scope of political conflict.²²

In its first phases, then, by emphasizing mobilization, populism was oriented to the inclusion of a very broad set of actors into the political game. The purpose of this "inclusionary" approach was to underpin the power of populist regimes and increase the autonomy of the state. However, to make the state an effective regulatory instrumentality, central authorities had to achieve a degree of independence not only from traditional foci of pressure but from those mobilized by the

populists as well. Populist regimes therefore sought not only to mobilize a broad popular base but also to control that base and structure the relationships of its support groups to the state.

The objective need to control and structure the mobilization process fed directly into the elitist and statist tendency implicit in the populist leadership's orientation, which in some cases (Perón and Vargas, for example) mutated quickly into an openly authoritarian governmental style. Populist regimes attempted to structure and control their support base by a combination of three factors. In the first instance, they offered symbolic gratification in the form of charismatic leadership styles, new symbols of dignity (Perón's *descamisados*), nationalist rhetoric, and significant nationalistic acts such as the expropriation of foreign corporations. Populist regimes also offered their supporters material gratification in the form of increased wages and salaries, expansion of public employment, expansion of public services, etc. Finally, populist regimes sought to fashion centrally controlled organizational structures to link their support groups directly into the state structures. The bulk of these organizations were formed on sectoral and functional criteria, thereby fragmenting support groups into parallel primary organizational structures joined at the top by interlocking sectoral elites.²³ The success of populist organizational efforts varied considerably, but they all manifested a clear predilection for corporatist organizational principles; in the case of Vargas, the corporatist bias was made explicit in the constitution of the Estado Nôvo.

A central problem hampering the ability of most populist regimes to maintain control over their own followings was the inherent contradiction between the populist goal of stimulating state-sponsored economic development and the tactic of mobilizing a mass base by increasing the levels of popular consumption. The tension between policies fostering development and those increasing consumption in an environment of relative scarcity was manifested most directly in the problem of inflation, which was chronic in most countries of the Latin American region from the 1940s on.

Political mobilization concomitant with a rise in nationalism and increases in levels of popular consumption had two further impacts: the introduction of new principles of legitimacy, and the creation of serious strains on the limited economic resources of most countries in the region. By the 1940s, the principles of a nationalist-oriented welfare statism had become so deeply implanted that even status-quo regimes at least had to pay lip service to them. The problem of meeting an increase in range and intensity of material demands, manifested most directly in chronic inflation, created serious problems of social control which plagued populist as well as nonpopulist regimes. A combination of the

inability to unseat traditional elites as well as to control their own followers brought numerous populist experiments to untimely and often violent ends.

By the 1950s, populism had had a profound impact on the area. It had (1) weakened the power of the traditional elites; (2) stimulated import substitution growth, which increased the relevance of local industrialists and organized labor; and (3) stimulated a general increase in political mobilization and popular consumption. The last factor in particular tended to outstrip both the rate of growth and the control capacity of public institutions, contributing thereby to a general tendency in the direction of praetorian politics.²⁴

An important aspect of the praetorianization of Latin American politics during this period was the fact that although the formal state apparatuses in the region grew markedly, this was accompanied not by an increase in the power and efficiency of the states but rather by the reverse. The continuing reality of dependence was a critical factor in the development of states that were formally large and powerful but in practice weak. Another factor was a kind of *de facto* disaggregation of the state as various particularistic interest blocs in a sense captured relevant pieces of the state which they manipulated to their own benefit.²⁵ This *de facto* parceling out of bits of the state was particularly evident in the politics of social security policy. As some analysts have shown, the many funds tended to become the fiefdoms of the interests they served and were used in a manner that actually reinforced socioeconomic inequality even as social security spending fed inflation.²⁶ Thus, instead of an assertion of the autonomous power of the state apparatus to regulate its internal and external environment, this period saw an increase in the size of the state but a decrease in autonomy, power, and efficiency of governmental apparatuses.

Despite these developments, the pressures generated in the 1930s and 1940s were to a large extent contained during the 1950s and 1960s despite recurrent predictions of violent revolutionary upheavals that would sweep the continent. Anderson has effectively argued that containment was achieved because of the flexibility of established elites who adapted to the new situation by allowing proven power contenders into the political game as long as they did not seek to unseat established power groups.²⁷ In short, the period saw a kind of *de facto* politics of informal and nonstructured inclusion which expanded the participants in the political game without any significant restructuring of the game. This process (which Cotler described in Peru and labeled segmental incorporation) had numerous effects, including an increase in particularism, reinforcement of columnar social organization, and expansion of clientelistic politics.²⁸

The ability to maintain a politics of inclusion by co-optation of specific power contenders was a direct function of resources available to meet demands which, of course, varied widely in the region. The ability to generate resources was in turn tied to the previous nature and degree of external dependence, and the ability to generate horizontal growth based on import substitution—capacities which fluctuated widely. Variations on these factors were important variables accounting for the political patterns in different countries during the 1950s and 1960s. But even in countries with more diversified export sectors and a large capacity for import substitution, the ability to generate resources and maintain a politics of segmental incorporation was not unlimited. By the mid-1960s it became evident that even in nations such as Brazil and Argentina there were both internal and external structural limits on import substitution growth and that instead of diminishing external dependence, import substitution resulted in new and more onerous forms of dependence.

By the mid-1960s, a new structural crisis developed with the exhaustion of import substitution growth and the reality of even more pervasive external economic penetration by multinational corporations that assert control over local manufacturing activities. This time the crisis took place against a backdrop of an accumulated public legitimation of nationalism and developmentalism, and societies characterized by high rates of political mobilization. One might also add the existence of revolutionary Cuba, which acted as a specter of what might come if matters were left to drift. In this situation, increased praetorian politicization in a context of large but weak and disarticulated states rendered a civil solution to the accumulated problems and bottlenecks all but impossible.

Thus, acting under the guise of doctrines of national security and national developmentalism, military organizations in several Latin states seized formal power. Again, the effectiveness of these regimes has varied, but in all cases the orientation to state-sponsored rapid industrial development has been paramount. To achieve this general goal, two subsidiary goals have loomed large. First has been a concerted attempt to increase the power and autonomy of the formal state and establish it as the primary regulator and arbiter of political economy. Related to this has been a conscious decision to favor some power contenders and their interests over others. This has given rise to what Guillermo O'Donnell has called the politics of "exclusion," or the forcing of previous players out of the political game.²⁹ Given the fact that few groups would leave voluntarily, the perceived need to exclude has generated a move to blatant authoritarianism which consciously seeks to control political participation through a combination of state-

imposed structural controls and, when necessary, violent repression. Although the apparent mix of included and excluded varies from system to system (Peru versus Brazil, for example), the structural mechanisms of organizing and controlling participation are more than ever explicitly corporatist in principle and practice. Thus, in confronting this second crisis of delayed dependent development, a large part of Latin America has moved from the implicit and at least potentially democratic corporatism of the populists to the present blatant authoritarian corporatism of the soldiers and technocrats.

NOTES

1. Philippe C. Schmitter, "Paths to Political Development in Latin America," in *Changing Latin America: New Interpretations of Its Politics and Society*, ed. Douglas A. Chalmers (New York: Academy of Political Science, 1972), pp. 83-108.

2. Guillermo A. O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1973).

3. These types are developed by O'Donnell in *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism*.

4. The concept of corporatism has recently been used by a number of scholars when discussing Latin American politics. For an overview of several such usages see Frederick B. Pike, ed., "The New Corporatism: Social and Political Structures in the Iberian World," *Review of Politics*, 36, no. 1 (special edition, January 1974). For an exhaustive operational definition, see especially Philippe C. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" in the same issue, pp. 85-131.

5. See, for example, Howard J. Wiarda, "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model," *World Politics*, 25 (January 1973):206-36.

6. Ronald C. Newton, "On 'Functional Groups,' 'Fragmentation,' and 'Pluralism' in Spanish American Political Society," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 50 (February 1970):1-29.

7. Among the more salient proponents of this viewpoint are Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" and O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism*.

8. See James D. Cockroft, André Gunder Frank, and Dale L. Johnson, eds., *Dependence and Underdevelopment* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1972); Susanne Bodenheimer, "Dependency and Imperialism," and Theotonio dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," both in *Readings in U.S. Imperialism*, ed. K. T. Fann and Donald C. Hodges (Boston: Sargent, 1971), pp. 155-82, 225-36; and Helio Jaguaribe, *Political Development: A General Theory and a Latin American Case Study* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 470-78.

9. See Torcuato di Tella, "Populism and Reform in Latin America," in *Obstacles to Change in Latin America*, ed. Claudio Veliz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 47-74; James Malloy, "Populismo militar en el Perú y Bolivia: antecedentes y posibilidades," *Estudios Andinos*, 2, no. 2 (1971-1972):114-34; Alistair Hennessy, "América Latina," in *Populismo*, ed. Ghita Ionesui and Ernest Gellner (Buenos Aires: Amorrortu, 1969); Ronald C. Newton, "Natural Corporatism and the