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## Institutionalization, Political Elites, and Foreign Policies

The “institutionalization of the Cuban Revolution” since 1970 has been acclaimed by outside observers and the Cuban leadership alike as marking a new, decisive stage in Cuba’s political order. Indeed, the Cuba of the late 1970s is strikingly different from the Cuba of a decade earlier. Institutionalization has brought about the depersonalization of governance, the strengthening of the party and governmental structures, and the greater efficacy and rationality of the economy. Additionally, the state and governmental system has undergone a major reorganization under the new socialist constitution, leading to the creation of new leadership posts and organs of representation, and culminating in island-wide elections in late 1976. Yet it is not only Cuba’s domestic order that experienced major transformations: Cuba’s foreign policies also were dramatically altered in the post-1970 period.

On the foreign policy front, the strained relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union from 1966 to 1968 have given way to a new and mutually supportive harmony. Nowhere was this relationship more apparent than in the direct support given by the USSR to Cuba’s military incursion into Angola beginning in late 1975 and in Cuba’s furtherance of Soviet objectives not only in Angola, but also later in Ethiopia and other African states. Elsewhere the Cuban government had moved to diversify its economic ties with Japan, Canada, Western Europe, and other non-Communist countries in an apparent effort to lessen the island’s economic dependence on the Soviet Union. In 1974, 41 percent of Cuba’s total trade turnover was accounted for by these countries as opposed to 32 percent during 1971–1973.<sup>1</sup> Havana’s stance toward much of Latin America also underwent a fundamental change from the 1960s. The Cuban government seemed far less interested in promoting violent revolution in the hemisphere than in restoring diplomatic ties and developing closer relations with a host of Latin American countries, including Venezuela and Colombia which only a few years earlier had been theaters of guerrilla activity. Indeed, Havana’s new moderation paved the way not only for the lifting of sanctions by the Organization of American States (OAS) at the San Jose conference in August 1975, but also for the visit of Mexican President Luis Echeverría to Cuba that same month, marking the first visit of a ruling, nonsocialist Latin American president to Communist Cuba.

Most astonishing of all, however, were Havana’s moves to normalize rela-

tions with Washington despite Fidel Castro's earlier and repeated insistence that his regime would never approach the "imperialist" government of the United States. During 1974 and 1975, the Cuban government publicly and privately signaled its interest in working toward some kind of accommodation with the Ford administration. As a result, informal talks were held by representatives of the two governments between late 1974 and late 1975, only to lapse at the time of Cuba's rapid military buildup in Angola. But the new Carter administration quickly resumed the talks in March 1977, with both governments announcing on June 3 that they had agreed to exchange diplomatic officials who would set up "interests sections" in their respective closed embassies in Washington and Havana the following September.<sup>2</sup> These subdiplomatic ties seemed to signify that the state of mutual hostility and acrimony that had existed between the two countries for over seventeen years was coming to an end.

It can be argued that Havana's foreign policies in the 1970s simply responded to developments internal and external to Cuba. After years of Fidelista mismanagement of the economy, for instance, the near ruinous drive for the ten-million-ton sugar harvest in 1970 left the Castro regime with no alternative but to synchronize Cuba's foreign policy with that of the Soviet Union, to integrate Cuba's economy more closely with that of the Soviet Union and with the countries of COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), and to reorganize the administration of the economy along Soviet lines. The extraordinary rise in world (and Soviet) sugar prices beginning in 1973 enabled Cuba to increase greatly its trade and credit with the advanced capitalist countries. Meanwhile, the demise of the guerrilla movements in Latin America after 1967, along with the emergence of nationalist leaders such as Velasco in Peru, Allende in Chile, and Peron in Argentina, had made it opportune for Havana to shift from a revolutionary to a diplomatic offensive in the hemisphere. The new international leverage and cohesiveness of the Third World, dramatized by the success of the Arab oil embargo and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), also marked a decisive change in the international balance of forces and emboldened Cuba to extend its global reach to the Middle East, Angola, and elsewhere in Africa. Finally, the Castro regime no longer confronted a highly antagonistic United States following the termination of the Nixon presidency, as Ford and especially Carter became more receptive to ending the deadlock with Cuba. This development, it can be argued, together with the sharp decline in world sugar prices after 1974 and the resulting adverse effects on the Cuban economy, persuaded Havana to improve relations with its archenemy to the north.

While these and other factors became major determinants of Cuban foreign policy in the 1970s, the contextual explanation tends to view the Cuban regime as essentially a unitary and reactive actor in world affairs, or simply as a dutiful surrogate of the Soviet Union. What is overlooked is the internal complexity of the Cuban regime and the ways in which different tendencies within the regime interact with external developments in the shaping of Cuban foreign policies. In

the analysis that follows, I will examine not only the impact of external developments on the regime, but also how the institutionalization process of the 1970s and the resulting changes in the distribution of political elites and power within Cuba have themselves affected the regime's foreign policies. In so doing, I hope to provide a more adequate explanation concerning the dynamic, seemingly volatile character of recent Cuban global behavior which ranges simultaneously from close alliance with the Soviets and militant activities in the Third World, to steps toward normalizing relations with the United States.

Before proceeding, I need to state certain fundamental assumptions central to the analysis. First, while there exists a high level of elite consensus, I do not hold the Cuban regime to be monolithic. Rather, there are divisions within the Cuban leadership which stem from differences among political elites in their ideological and issue orientations, power considerations, and bureaucratic and organizational interests.<sup>3</sup> Second, I believe there are linkages between these political elites and policy outcomes. For example, Cuba's more pragmatic policies on the domestic and foreign fronts can be traced in part to the rise in influence of more moderate technocratic elites since 1970. Finally, I hold that both the internal elites and elite-policy linkages can be identified by means of careful analysis. Such analysis must necessarily be inferential owing to the nature of the Cuban system, just as it is in Soviet and Chinese studies. But there is evidence of elite groupings and of occasional conflict within the Cuban regime. The position of these elites can be tracked by reading the Cuban press and by analyzing changes in the composition of the party, state, and government. Similarly, elite-policy linkages can at least be imputed on the basis of what is known about specific elite groupings and from both policy statements and policy actions.

This study is divided into three parts. The first examines the ways in which the institutionalization process has both broadened Cuba's ruling coalition of political elites and reconcentrated power in Fidel and Raúl Castro and their following. The second discusses how three elite tendencies—the technocratic, the revolutionary, and the military—have affected the regime's foreign policies in recent years. The conclusion is a speculative analysis of Cuba's future foreign policy postures in light of the internal constellation of elite forces within Cuba and of developments occurring on the international front.

## The Reconcentration of Power

### *Institutionalization and Broadened Leadership*

There are three major aspects of the institutionalization process that has altered the composition of the Cuban leadership since 1970.<sup>4</sup> The first is the depersonalization of governance—the delegation of effective decision-making powers from Fidel Castro and his immediate entourage to new and more technically qualified appointees and to governmental agencies that could now function in more regularized and orderly fashion without the interventions of the *líder*

*máximo*. This step was initiated immediately after the 1970 harvest when some of Fidel's closest associates were replaced by new personnel drawn from more qualified civilian and military circles.

The second aspect involves two major administrative reorganizations. Carried out in November 1972, the first change established a new Executive Committee attached to the Council of Ministers, with seven deputy prime ministers to supervise and coordinate clusters of ministries engaged in related activities. This reorganization gave further impetus to the post-1970 tendency of appointing new personnel to leadership posts, with no less than four army majors—then the highest rank in the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)—being appointed deputy prime ministers and another becoming a minister by the end of 1972. The second and more sweeping institutional change has occurred since February 1976, with the implementation of Cuba's new socialist constitution. As will be seen subsequently, it has led to the remodeling of Cuba's state and governmental structure similar to that of the Soviet Union, with a new National Assembly of People's Power, Council of State, and Council of Ministers being established in December 1976.

The third aspect of the institutionalization process concerns the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC): A stepped-up recruitment drive more than doubled its membership from 100,000 in 1970 to 202,807 in September 1975; new leadership was introduced at the highest levels through the expansion of the old six-man Secretariat to include five additional members in February 1973; and finally, a new Political Bureau, Secretariat, and Central Committee were unveiled at the party congress. In sum, the PCC was being transformed in Leninist fashion and accorded heightened political legitimacy as Cuba's ruling institution.<sup>5</sup>

These and other measures had the full support of the Soviet Union and were acclaimed by Leonid Brezhnev as evidence of the growing maturity of the Cuban Revolution. They were also matched by significant increases in Soviet support for the Cuban economy. Indeed, not only organizational reforms but major policy changes as well appear to have been the price the regime had to pay for ensuring high levels of Soviet bloc support after 1970. Major ideological and political concessions were announced at the thirteenth congress of the Central Organization of Cuban Trade Unions (CTC) in November 1973, signaling the wholesale replacement of Fidelista policies by a new, Soviet-style orthodoxy in Cuba's economic and labor affairs.<sup>6</sup>

In the meantime, the institutionalization process initially weakened the position of Fidel and his followers, particularly as it came on the heels of the devastating 1970 harvest shortfall when Fidel's charismatic authority had been severely shaken. For the first time in over a decade, other elite elements—among the "old Communists" from the Popular Socialist Party (PSP) and the new generation of technocratic managers—could now avail themselves of Soviet backing to seek greater power within the regime and the imposition of formal constraints on the Fidelistas.<sup>7</sup> Indeed, there were some former PSP leaders who gained influence and prestige in the post-1970 period. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, for example, after long service as minister without portfolio, was named chair-

man of Cuba's delegation to the Intergovernmental Soviet-Cuban Commission for Economic, Scientific, and Technological Cooperation in December 1970 and became deputy prime minister in charge of foreign economic and diplomatic relations in November 1972; he was elevated to membership in the Political Bureau of the PCC in December 1975. Other ex-PSP members who also gained in prominence include Blas Roca and Arnaldo Milián as new members of the enlarged Political Bureau (1975), Isidoro Malmierca as member of the expanded Secretariat (1973), and Joel Domenech and Major Flavio Bravo as deputy prime ministers (1972).

In retrospect, the slippage in Fidel's position appears to have occurred between 1970 and 1973, with the CTC congress in November 1973 perhaps marking the nadir of Fidelista authority. But in 1969 Richard Fagen noted prophetically that, "while hardly consistent over the years in some of his policies and public pronouncements, he [Fidel] has been extremely consistent in reasserting his dominance over the shifting revolutionary power struggle."<sup>8</sup> To this end, Fidel employed three strategems to turn the institutionalization process to his advantage prior to the PCC congress in December 1975 and to refashion a new broader coalition of political, technocratic, managerial, and military elites dominated once again by Fidelistas and by Raulistas associated with the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR).<sup>9</sup> First, by accepting organizational and policy reforms, and by delegating decision-making authority to others within the top leadership, Fidel ensured the continued support of those civilian and military elites who might otherwise have opposed him had he insisted on clinging to the old personalistic order. Second, he pulled nine senior or high-level officers from the MINFAR who were loyal to him and to Raúl and placed them in the expanded PCC Secretariat, the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers, and at the top of several ministries. In doing so, he limited the extent to which others without Fidelista or Raulista affiliations—such as the postrevolutionary generation of civilian technocrats and former PSP cadres—would occupy new positions in the party and government. And third, he and Raúl, as minister of the FAR, strengthened their position by making extensive personal appearances before troops and combat units and by ensuring that party organizational activities were conducted by personally loyal officers. This entrenched basis of support within the FAR provided strong leverage with which to assert their leadership over the party and government.

### *The 1975 PCC Congress*

The party congress confirmed these changes in regime leadership whereby a broader coalition of elites now rules, but the two Castro brothers and their followers form the dominant, cohesive core (table 1.1). Fidel and Raúl were reelected as first and second secretaries, respectively. The original eight-man Political Bureau was enlarged to include five additional members, of which three come from the ranks of the PSP (Blas Roca, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, and Arnaldo Milián). But the other two new members are followers of Fidel and Raúl (Pedro Miret and José Ramón Machado), while the original Fidelista and July 26

TABLE 1.1  
The Cuban Leadership and Its Major Responsibilities: January 1976

	Political Origins and Allegiances <sup>a</sup>	Political Bureau <sup>b</sup>	Secretariat <sup>b</sup>	Other Party Positions	Principal Current Government Posts
Fidel Castro	M-26-7	1st sec.	1st sec.	—	Prime minister; commander-in-chief; pres. of Executive Committee, Council of Ministers
Raúl Castro	M-26-7	2d sec.	2d sec.	Pres., Commission on Security and Armed Forces	First dep. prime minister; min. of armed forces
Juan Almeida	M-26-7:F	Member	—	Political Bureau delegate to Oriente Province <sup>c</sup>	—
Oswaldo Dorticós <sup>d</sup>	M-26-7	Member	—	Pres., Commission on Economy	President of the Republic; pres., Central Planning Board (JUCEPLAN)
Guillermo García	M-26-7:F	Member	—	—	Dep. prime minister (transportation, communications)
Armando Hart	M-26-7:F	Member	—	1st sec., Oriente Province	—
Ramiro Valdés	M-26-7:F	Member	—	Member, Com- mission on Security and Armed Forces	Dep. prime minister (construction)

Sergio del Valle	M-26-7:F	Member	—	Member, Commission on Security and Armed Forces Pres., Commission on Legal Studies	Min. of interior
Bias Roca	PSP	Member (1975)	Member	1st sec., Havana Province	—
José Ramón Machado	M-26-7:R	Member (1975)	—	—	—
Carlos Rafael Rodríguez	PSP	Member (1975)	Member	—	Dep. prime minister (foreign relations); pres., National Commission for Economic, Scientific, and Technological Cooperation, and chief Cuban delegate to Soviet-Cuban commission in this field
Pedro Milret	M-26-7:F	Member (1975)	Member (1973)	—	—
Arnaldo Milián	PSP	Member (1975)	—	1st sec., Las Villas Province	—
Isidoro Malmierca	PSP	—	Member (1973)	—	—
Jorge Risquet	M-26-7:R	—	Member (1973)	—	—
Antonio Pérez	M-26-7:R	—	Member (1973)	—	—
Raúl García	M-26-7:F	—	Member (1973)	—	—

(Continued on next page)

Notes to Table 1.1

Sources: *Granma Weekly Review*, January 4, 1976, p. 12; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *Directory of Personalities of the Cuban Government, Official Organizations and Mass Organizations*, A (CR) 74-7, March 1974; and *ibid.*, *Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments*, A (CR) 75-46, December 1975. The CIA sources are available through the Documents Expediting (DOCEX) Project, Exchange and Gifts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 20540.

Note: This table is adapted from Edward Gonzalez, "Castro and Cuba's New Orthodoxy," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1976, p. 17.

a. The abbreviations used in this column are: M-26-7 = July 26 Movement; F = Fidelista; PSP = Popular Socialist Party, or "Old Communists"; R = Raulista.

b. Incumbents since 1965 unless appointed recently, in which case the year is indicated in parentheses. Membership in the political bureau and secretariat are listed in the order and form presented in *Granma Weekly Review*, January 4, 1976.

c. Almeida was appointed delegate from the Political Bureau to Oriente Province on September 23, 1970, perhaps a reflection of its great economic importance as a sugar producer, its political complexities, and Almeida's personal ties to the area.

d. Dorticós's removal in December 1975 from the Secretariat, where he had served since 1965, may have been for reasons of health. He was not named as a vice-president in the new Council of State that was unveiled in December 1976, however, which may have been for political reasons.



Movement core remains intact (see the first eight names in table 1.1) and was listed first by *Granma*. The new Secretariat was pruned to nine members with the dropping of President Dorticós and Faure Chomón, but otherwise this body remains unchanged from February 1973. As a result, Fidel, Raúl, and four of their followers emerged in firm command of the top organs of the party.

The new lineup of the Central Committee is similarly weighted in favor of the two Castro brothers, but is also a more representative body that reflects the broader coalition that now rules Cuba. The membership of the Central Committee was increased from 91 to 112, with 12 alternates, with considerable renovation having occurred in the election of the new body. Excluding the 17 members of the new Central Committee who occupy positions in the Political Bureau and Secretariat, there are 46 new members (43 percent) and 61 continuing members (57 percent) among the remaining 107 members and alternates in the new body. Furthermore, the new Central Committee is a somewhat more balanced body when compared with the old in terms of political and institutional affiliations.

Although I have been unable to identify the former political affiliations of all the Central Committee members, table 1.2 does indicate that the share of the July 26 movement in the new body has increased in absolute numbers but has declined in percentage terms, whereas the PSP's share has remained fixed numerically and has declined even more sharply in percentage terms. These figures on political affiliation, of course, are affected by the large number of unknowns—23 (21 percent) of the 107 members. (This in itself might be suggestive of the declining importance of former political affiliations dating back two decades ago, or it may only reflect the incompleteness of data available to this author.) More conclusive is the data on institutional affiliations.

As table 1.3 shows, the largest institutional blocs consist of the active duty officers attached to MINFAR and the civilian ministries and agencies taken as a whole. At the time the new Central Committee was elected, the representation of

TABLE 1.2  
Composition of the PCC Central Committee According to Political Affiliations

	July 26 Movement		Popular Socialist Party		Revolutionary Directorate of March 13		Unknown		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
New body	63	59	17	16	4	4	23	21	107	100
Old body	54	71	17	22	5	7	0	0	76	100

Sources: *Granma Weekly Review*, January 4, 1976, p. 12; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *Directory of Personalities of the Cuban Government, Official Organizations and Mass Organizations*, A (CR) 74-7, March 1974; and idem., *Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments*, A (CR) 75-46, December 1975.

Note: Members of the Political Bureau and Secretariat are excluded, but the twelve alternate members of the new body are included. Percentage figures are rounded out.

the MINFAR increased numerically from twenty-four to twenty-seven regular members (and three alternates), although its share slipped from 31.5 to 28 percent owing to the larger size of the new body. (By fall 1976, two of these active duty officers had become civilians, with one being appointed to the newly created post of minister of higher education.) The biggest gain was seemingly registered by the civilian ministries, whose numerical representation increased from twenty-eight to forty-one members and its share from 27 to 39 percent. But these bloc figures are deceptive in that the MINFAR representation may be larger than it seems if one counts former FAR-MINFAR officers now serving in civilian posts. In this regard, ten of the representatives from the civilian ministries were former ranking officers on active duty with the FAR before 1972, with two serving as deputy prime ministers and eight heading civilian ministries and agencies at the time the new Central Committee was named. If one adds—to use Jorge I. Domínguez's concept—the ten "civic soldiers" who occupied civilian posts, then the direct and indirect MINFAR representation runs to forty members or 37.0 percent of the Central Committee.<sup>10</sup>

The composition of the Political Bureau and Central Committee at the December 1975 PCC congress thus revealed the greater elite diversity that had come to characterize the post-1970 Cuban leadership. But it was clear from the outcome of the congress that Fidel and Raúl, together with their closest followers, remained very much in control of the party organs. Indeed, not only the two Castro brothers, but also veteran Fidelistas and Raulistas from the guerrilla campaign were accorded the greatest prominence on the pages of *Granma* in the nine months following the party congress.

### *Elites in the New State-Government Structure*

As unveiled in December 1976, the reorganization of the state and government under the new constitution fully conformed to and formalized the existing

TABLE 1.3  
Composition of the PCC Central Committee According to Institutional Affiliation

	Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces		Ministry of the Interior		Civilian Ministries		Mass Organs		Party Professionals		Unknown		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
New body	30	28	5	4	41	39	8	7	13	12	10	10	107	100
Old body	24	32	4	5	28	37	3	4	10	14	7	8	76	100

Sources: *Granma Weekly Review*, January 4, 1976, p. 12; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *Directory of Personalities of the Cuban Government, Official Organizations and Mass Organizations*, A (CR) 74-7, March 1974; and *idem.*, *Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments*, A (CR) 75-46, December 1975.

Note: Members of the Political Bureau and Secretariat are excluded, but the twelve alternate members of the new body are included. Percentage figures are rounded out.

distribution of political power.<sup>11</sup> As table 1.4 shows, Fidel and his brother were, not unexpectedly, elected by the deputies to the National Assembly of People's Power as president and first vice-president, respectively, of the Council of State and the Council of Ministers. The top leadership of the Council of State, in turn, corresponds to the party's Political Bureau: thus, along with Fidel and Raúl, the five vice-presidents and the first six members of the Council of State make up the Political Bureau. The remaining seventeen members, apart from the secretary, hold top government posts, control the mass organizations, head specialized institutes or associations, or otherwise represent important political groups. All but two of the thirty-one members of the Council of State are in the Central Committee. It thus represents a prestigious political body in which the original revolutionaries—among them veteran Moncadistas and Sierra Maestra combatants—once again predominate: twenty-one of the members are from the ranks of the July 26 Movement, eight come from the PSP, with the two remaining unknown to this author. Significantly, the MINFAR is represented not only by Army General Raúl Castro, but also by Division General Senén Casas—next to Raúl, the top man in MINFAR since 1971—and Division General Abelardo Colomé who was acclaimed for his role in leading victorious Cuban troops in Angola.<sup>12</sup>

The eight vice-presidents named to the Executive Committee of the new Council of Ministers were chosen by Fidel in his capacity as president. They had been deputy prime ministers forming the Executive Committee on the previous Council of Ministers (or president as in the case of Dorticós). Hence, no change has occurred with the naming of the new body: Fidel and Raúl remain flanked by five close associates; the ex-PSP members continue with three members, the most prominent of whom remains Carlos Rafael Rodríguez (see table 1.4). The agency heads and ministers who are included in the Council of Ministers, but not its Executive Committee, provide somewhat greater variation.<sup>13</sup> Of the twenty-two ministers, excluding Raúl Castro and Sergio del Valle, sixteen are hold-overs, five are new appointees, and one has been promoted by virtue of the office being elevated. Still, the political pattern remains the same: At least eleven ministers were affiliated with the July 26 Movement, only two with the PSP, two with the Revolutionary Directorate of March 13, and five are unknown to this author. Furthermore, the "civic soldier" remains very much in evidence in the new Council of Ministers: Excluding Raúl and Sergio del Valle, no less than nine ministers originally came from the FAR or MINFAR, the most recent being former Major-General Fernando Vecino Alegret who was appointed to the new post of minister for higher education in August 1976.

On the other hand, there are fewer civilian technocrats or managers heading the ministries and state committee within the Council of Ministers than perhaps might have been expected. Of the twenty-two civilian ministries, only five appear to be headed by civilians with technocratic and managerial qualifications: Agriculture (Rafael Francia); Sugar Industry (Marcos Lage); Foreign Trade (Marcelo Fernández); National Bank of Cuba (Raúl E. León); and Electric Power Industry (José L. Beltrán). Instead, recruitment often seems to have favored the

TABLE 1.4  
The Cuban Leadership, December 1976

	Political Origins & Allegiances	Post in B or S	Post in Council of State	Post in Council of Ministers	Other Posts
Fidel Castro	M-26-7	1st sec., PB, S	President	President	Commander-in-chief
Raúl Castro	M-26-7	2d sec., PB, S	1st vice-pres.	1st vice-pres.	Min. of armed forces
Juan Almeida	M-26-7:F	Member, PB	Vice-pres.	—	—
Ramiro Valdés	M-26-7:F	Member, PB	Vice-pres.	Vice-pres.	—
Guillermo García	M-26-7:F	Member, PB	Vice-pres.	Vice-pres.	—
Bías Roca	PSP	Member, PB, S	Vice-pres.	—	Pres., National Ass.
Carlos Ratael Rodríguez	PSP	Member, PB, S	Vice-pres.	Vice-pres.	—
Celia Sánchez	M-26-7:F	—	Sec.	—	—
Pedro Mirret	M-26-7:F <sup>b</sup>	Member, PB, S	Member	—	—
Oswaldo Dorticós	M-26-7:F	Member, PB	Member	Vice-pres.	—
Armando Hart	M-26-7:F	Member, PB	Member	Min. of culture	—
Sergio del Valle	M-26-7:F	Member, PB	Member	Min. of interior	—
José Ramón Machado	M-26-7:R	Member, PB	Member	—	—
Arnaldo Milán	PSP	Member, PB	Member	—	—
Diocles Torralba	M-26-7:R <sup>b</sup>	—	Member	Vice-pres.	—
Belarmino Castilla	M-26-7:R <sup>b</sup>	—	Member	Vice-pres.	—
Flavio Bravo	PSP <sup>b</sup>	—	Member	Vice-pres.	—
Joel Domenech	PSP	—	Member	Vice-pres.	—
Luis Orlando Domínguez	M-26-7	—	Member	—	1st sec., Communist Youth League
Roberto Veiga	M-26-7	—	Member	—	Sec. gen., Confederation of Cuban Workers

Jorge Lezcano	M-26-7	—	Member	—	National coordinator, Committees for the Defense of the Revolution Pres., Federation of Cuban Women
Vilma Espín	M-26-7:R	—	Member	—	Pres., National Association of Small Farmers
José Ramírez	PSP	—	Member	—	Dir., Casa de las Americas
Haydée Santamaría	M-26-7:F	—	Member	—	—
Osmany Cienguegos	M-26-7	—	Member	—	Pres., Peace and Sovereignty Movement
Juan Marinello	PSP	Died, March 1977	Member	Sec.	—
Severo Aguirre	PSP	—	Member	—	—
Reinaldo Castro	—	—	Member	—	—
Marta Deprés	—	—	Member	—	—
Senén Casas	M-26-7:R	—	Member	—	Sec., Federation of Cuban Women
Abelardo Colomé	M-26-7:R	—	Member	—	1st vice-min., MINFAR
Isidoro Malmierca	PSP	Member, S (to 1977)	Member	—	Vice-min., MINFAR
Jorge Risquet	M-26-7:R	Member, S	—	Min. of foreign affairs	—
Antonio Pérez	M-26-7:R	Member, S	—	—	—
Raúl García	M-26-7:F	Member, S	—	—	—

Sources: *Granma*, January 14, 1976, p. 12; *ibid.*, December 12, 1976; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *Directory of Personalities of the Cuban Government, Official Organizations and Mass Organizations*, A (CR) 74-7, March 1974; and *ibid.*, *Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments*, A (CR) 75-46, December 1975.

Note: Names are listed in the order given in *Granma* for the Council of State. On June 10, 1977, the Political Bureau designated Arnaldo Miliani as a new member of the PCC Secretariat. In its first regular session held July 12-14, 1977, the National Assembly of People's Power elected Raul Roa (Cuba's foreign minister from 1959 to 1976) to fill the post on the Council of State left vacant by Marinello's death.

a. The abbreviations used in this column are: M-26-7 = the July 26 Movement; F = Fidelista; PSP = Popular Socialist Party, or "Old Communists"; R = Raulista. In column 2: PB = Political Bureau; S = Secretariat.

b. Formerly attached to FAR-MINFAR.

military officer or civilian with political qualifications, even in ministries and agencies dealing with more technical matters. Thus, a former military attaché to Chile (1972–1973) continues to head the Ministry of Mines and Geology.

*Elite Coalitions and Reconcentrated Political Power*

By the mid-1970s there existed a broader distribution and diversity of political elites in the Cuban leadership than at any time since the mid-1960s. The “old Communists” from the PSP were now included in the supreme organs of the party, state, and government. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez became the most prominent of the ex-PSP notables by virtue of his membership in the Political Bureau and Secretariat and his vice-presidency in both the Council of State and Council of Ministers. Isidoro Malmierca also stands out as a rising ex-PSP member due to his 1973 appointment to the Secretariat and to his December 1976 appointment as minister of foreign affairs. Additionally, civilian technocrats and managers have gained somewhat broader representation at the highest levels of the government, both by heading individual ministries and participating in the Intergovernmental Soviet-Cuban Commission for Economic, Scientific, and Technological Cooperation which Rodríguez leads on the Cuban side.

Despite this greater elite diversity, the Cuban leadership remains limited. To begin with, the “old Communists” are becoming an aged and passing leadership generation as exemplified by Blas Roca, Severo Aguirre, and Juan Marinello (who died in March 1977). For political and symbolic reasons, they are represented in the prestigious Council of State, and Blas Roca has been named president of the National Assembly. But these are not decision-making bodies; and in such bodies where the ex-PSP members do have representation, as in the Political Bureau and the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers, they remain a small minority. Furthermore, the ascendancy of the civilian technocrats and managers has been checked by the appointment of ex-military officers to civilian posts. The FAR-MINFAR officers—whether in civilian posts or on active duty—constitute the most important elite grouping within the new Cuban leadership. Not only have they come to occupy vice-presidential posts in the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers, to control individual ministries, and to hold membership in the Council of State. They also have provided the key element in Fidel’s successful coalition-building, coalescing to form a Fidelista-Raulista core within the top leadership organs and providing institutional backing to the Cuban leader.

While a broadening of elite representation has occurred, this coalition-building has thus led to a reconcentration of political power in the two Castro brothers and their following. They clearly dominate the key organs of the party, state, and government in terms of sheer membership numbers and control over the most sensitive or powerful ministries. But more than that, Fidel’s position as the supreme *líder máximo* has now been institutionalized in his multiple roles as first secretary, president of both the Council of State and Council of Ministers, and commander-in-chief. As president of the Council of State, moreover, he is