Jo-Marie Burt and Philip Mauceri

Introduction

Since the early 1990s, the Andean region of Latin America has been the most unstable and violent area in the hemisphere. The intensification of guerrilla, paramilitary, and drug violence in Colombia has raised the specter of the regionalization of a conflict that has persisted for decades. The weakness of political parties has strengthened the hand of the military elsewhere in the Andes, most notably in Peru, where democratic institutions were systematically undermined during the Fujimori administration. In Venezuela, President Hugo Chávez's caudillo-style government used executive powers to curtail and control the power of other governmental institutions, while in Ecuador the chronic inability to forge and maintain a governing coalition has resulted in weak governments, a presidential impeachment, and Latin America's first successful coup d'état in over a decade. The turmoil and violence that has affected the region have been accompanied by important social changes, particularly the emergence of previously excluded sectors as important political actors. New indigenous and women's organizations have challenged traditional relationships as they assert and redefine the nature of citizenship in their countries.

Although part of the Andean region's instability results from the continued difficulties in resolving ongoing political conflicts and institutionalizing democratic procedures and norms, persistent economic crises have also taken their toll. Over the last two decades, economic crises have taken different forms in the region, and policy responses have also varied. Although this makes it difficult to apply broad generalizations to the entire region, it also underscores how policy makers have responded in different ways to the opportunities and challenges confronting them. While neoliberal economics is often depicted as having triumphed throughout Latin America, the record of the Andean region in the last two decades suggests a more complex scenario. In Venezuela and Ecuador, resistance to International Monetary Fund (IMF) austerity packages by sectors of political and civil society has forestalled neoliberalism, while in Colombia, until the early 1990s, a record of steady economic growth—and the absence of populism—allowed the country to avoid the high debt levels and external pressures that were a prelude to neoliberal

structural reforms elsewhere in the region. By contrast, external vulnerabilities in Peru and Bolivia led to significant neoliberal restructuring of their economies, although even here paths diverged, with Peru's unsuccessful "heterodox" experiment in the late 1980s leading the country into its worst crisis since the Great Depression before neoliberalism was imposed in the 1990s.

There is clearly a need for renewed attention to the nations of the Andes. Although comparative studies of the large countries of Latin America (Mexico, Brazil, Argentina) and the smaller countries of Central America and the Caribbean are common, there are few systematic book-length studies of the middle-sized countries of the Andes.[1] Building on a detailed comparative analysis, the current volume focuses on the key factors that have influenced political patterns in the region. A comparative analysis of the region is justified not only by the fact that the countries have faced a similar set of challenges during the last decades but by the fact that in many ways the problems the Andean region faces have diverged significantly from those confronting the other subregions of Latin America. In facing the challenges of neoliberalism and globalization, the medium-sized countries of the Andes lack the economic diversity and large internal markets of Brazil and Mexico, although they are also clearly in a more advantageous position than the largely monoculture economies of the Caribbean and Central America. Democratization in the Andes faces some of the same problems as elsewhere in Latin America, but the task of institutionalizing democratic norms and procedures in the region is made more complicated by the more intense, though varying, combinations of drug trafficking, corruption, violence and human rights abuses, fragmented party systems, weak national identity, and autocratic executives that seem to have plagued the Andean region. Here too there are important subregional differences that merit greater attention: while elites in Colombia and Venezuela engaged in pact-making in the 1950s in order to institutionalize relatively stable democratic governments, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia were classic praetorian societies suffering seemingly endless cycles of alternation between civilian and military rule. Recently, however, the challenges facing democratic governance in both Colombia and Venezuela have raised important questions about the viability of these institutions in an increasingly globalized world—questions that a comparative analysis of the region might help to inform.

Both state development and social organization in the Andes have been shaped by historically persistent factors shared by the five Andean countries. Yet political actors have responded in different ways to the challenges and opportunities these forces have presented. The purpose here is to flesh out the common historical forces that have shaped the region and the conditions created by the different choices, policies, and priorities of its actors. The book is

organized around three specific themes: the struggle for identity; conflict, violence, and drug trafficking; and political change and democracy.

The Struggle for Identity

Ethnic and regional diversity in the Andes has been a significant source of political and social conflict since the creation of nation-states in the region. Indigenous rebellions, civil wars, border conflicts, caudillismo, and guerrilla insurgency are all manifestations of this diversity. The pattern of colonial settlement and later political and economic development accentuated social and regional cleavages and made the formation of national identity a difficult and to some extent an incomplete process, especially in the central Andean republics of Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador (see table 0.1). Cleavages in each of the countries are the unique product of a particular national history, and not surprisingly, the specific path taken depends on the choices and opportunities of different national actors.

Ethnic cleavages exist throughout the Andes, and inclusionary reforms have been undertaken, with varying success, in almost every country. The 1991 constitution in Colombia guaranteed new political autonomy for indigenous groups and greater control of natural resources in their territories, as did the new constitution approved by a wide majority in a referendum in Venezuela in 1999. Ethnic-based identities are strongest in the central Andean countries of Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, with their larger indigenous populations, yet there is considerable variation in their salience. Bolivia, the only Andean nation to have experienced a social revolution, has seen the greatest integration of indigenous identity into national symbols and a substantial legitimation of Aymara culture. On the other hand, Peru's political elites, intellectuals, and indigenous leaders opted for a discourse that was overtly "classist" rather than ethnic/cultural. This led to an absence of significant indigenous organizations and a denigration of indigenous culture among elites. Still, Peru is the first Andean nation to elect a mestizo/cholo president (Alejandro Toledo, elected in 2001). Ecuador offers a third model of ethnic identity in the region, based on the gradual emergence of indigenous identity from below and a long and at times difficult effort to legitimize the political, cultural, and economic demands of the indigenous population and integrate them into the national agenda.

Sometimes overlapping with ethnicity, regional cleavages have exercised an important influence on the politics and economies of the Andes. Patterns of colonial settlement were reinforced by the structure of the emerging primary-product export economy to create highly unequal distributions of wealth and power within countries. The emergence of megacities like Caracas, Lima, and La Paz, with their multiple concentrations of populations, in-

dustry, and political power, has exacerbated these inequalities. Even Ecuador and Colombia, with their long histories of competing and conflicting regional elites, have not escaped this pattern.

The tradition of unitary government has historically been used to suppress regional autonomy, but this has not meant that strong central control has been established. Despite repeated efforts, central states throughout the region have had difficulty maintaining and establishing effective control in much of the countryside. Weak national identity and political unity have combined with geographical barriers to impede the exercise of strong state control outside of key population centers. Indirect rule through the power of local notables, caudillos, or landowners has thus been common, a situation that has exacerbated economic and political inequalities and limited the possibilities of reforms, particularly in the countryside. These trends have been accentuated in more recent decades by neoliberal economic policies, which have tended to further centralize economic decision-making in the hands of a centralized executive, often at the expense of regional and local government.

Ethnic and regional diversity presents a number of challenges to efforts at democratization. In addition to being a source of conflict and inequality, the lack of an integrated national identity has made the forging of notions of democratic citizenship and effective representation difficult. Recent trends in the region, particularly decentralization, including the democratic election of mayors and local officials previously appointed by the central government, offer some hope. Combined with the growing organization of indigenous groups and gender-based associations, these efforts may present effective challenges to the barriers that have impeded full national integration. It is important, however, to also assess whether decentralizing reforms contribute to democratization or further reinforce age-old practices of clientelism and corruption, and the degree to which social movements are engaged in practices that challenge established orders as opposed to defensive mobilizations that are easily co-opted by local and national elites.

Conflict, Violence, and Drug Trafficking

The Andean region has been the focal point of numerous internal conflicts during the twentieth century: rebellion and social revolution in Bolivia; guerrilla insurgencies in Peru; rebellions and military coups in Ecuador; civil wars and insurgency in Colombia; and military coups and rebellions in Venezuela. The human toll of these conflicts has been enormous, not to mention the social and economic dislocation caused by the virulence of the violence unleashed. Although the origins and course of all of these conflicts are unique to the countries involved, they have all tended to result in similar distortions at both the state and civil society levels. Political violence has resulted in the

armed forces taking on increased control of the state apparatus, in certain situations coming close to militarizing the state in the name of "protecting" it. Militarization has been exacerbated in some cases, notably Colombia and Peru, by the emergence of paramilitary groups that are at least tacitly endorsed by state actors and by the U.S. funding of a "war on drugs" that has enhanced the power of the military even as civilians attempt to establish control over it. Social and political polarization has intensified dramatically with concomitant declines in institutional legitimacy and the ability to forge a programmatic consensus. Finally, egregious human rights records reflect a pattern of abuse that political actors and the population at large increasingly accept as tolerable, thus making the establishment of democratic norms and procedures more difficult.

The continued power of state security forces, especially the armed forces, which have maintained traditional prerogatives and thus limited democratic accountability, remains a significant obstacle to deepening democracy. Historically, one of the few national institutions with legitimacy and effective organizational capacity was the armed forces, which took on a dominating political role in the aftermath of independence. A clear exception to this pattern was Colombia, which has had few experiences with direct military rule. The historic dominance of the two traditional Colombian parties (Liberal and Conservative) has been an important factor in limiting the development of a strong institutional identity within the military. Elsewhere in the region, however, the lack of early party-system consolidation created a political vacuum usually filled by the armed forces. Long-standing traditions of military autonomy on such issues as budgets, missions, and training have had a pernicious effect on civil-military relations by restricting civilian oversight and control of the armed forces. Moreover, civilian leaders and institutions have often turned to the armed forces for political support or to help carry out policies: witness the use of the military to suppress labor, peasant, and student protests by Colombian administrations in the 1970s and 1980s; the reliance of the Fujimori government on the military for support of its "self-coup" in 1992; the alliance between sectors of the indigenous movement and the military in ousting a sitting president in Ecuador in 2000; and the failed coup of April 2002 in Venezuela, which was closely coordinated between the military high command and business leaders. This situation has been worsened by cycles of political violence in which the military has engaged in human rights abuses with impunity. Massacres, torture, forced disappearances, and extrajudicial executions are an unfortunate part of the reality of those countries that have experienced internal conflicts.

Violence in the region has been exacerbated since the early 1980s by the dramatic growth in narco-trafficking. Exploding demand for cocaine in the

United States and Europe laid the basis for the emergence of powerful organized criminal syndicates willing and able to use violence to achieve their ends. The "narco-terrorism" that Colombia experienced in the early 1990s, which led to the assassination of four presidential candidates and a wave of terrorist attacks, stands as a reminder of the political distortions created by the narcotics trade. The breakup of the large Colombian cartels in the early 1990s, initially seen as a victory in the war on drugs, has only led to the emergence of smaller, although still powerful, groups throughout the region. Money from the drug trade has become an important source of funding for guerrillas and paramilitary groups in Colombia and has corrupted political parties, government officials, militaries, and civil society actors throughout the Andes.

Narco-trafficking has also brought renewed pressures on the region from the United States. The decertification of Colombia during the Samper administration (1994–98) was a reminder of the continued dependence of the region on U.S. economic and military assistance. The launching of Plan Colombia in 1998, and its later expansion into the Andean Regional Initiative, has deepened U.S. involvement in a region that historically has been tangential to U.S. interests. It has also distorted U.S. priorities. The United States supported the authoritarian government of Alberto Fujimori during the 1990s in part because of Peru's commitment to Washington's supply-side antidrug strategy and its adoption of extreme tactics, such as the shooting down of civilian planes. Although many of these problems were restricted to Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, they have now spread throughout the region and present a significant challenge to the consolidation of democracy as well as social and economic stability in the region.

Political Change and Democracy

All of the countries of the Andes have had a tentative and incomplete experience with liberal democratic institutions. Through much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, military dictatorships and/or oligarchic democracies effectively limited political participation and rights for the majority of the population in the region. After World War II efforts to establish democratic institutions accelerated but were hampered by inequality, political violence, weak civil societies, and the continued power of the armed forces. Venezuela and Colombia were the most successful countries in the region in creating liberal democratic institutions, including strong political parties, a marked contrast to the central Andean republics, which despite the existence of historic parties such as the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) in Bolivia and the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) in Peru, failed to consolidate viable party systems. At the same time, however, the functioning of Venezuelan and Colombian democracy relied heavily on both explicit and

implicit restrictions on participation and the possibility of reform. The 1990s witnessed significant efforts at institutional reform in the region, but this has not indicated a clear pattern toward greater institutional democratization. While constitutional reforms in Colombia (1991) and Bolivia (1994) were aimed at providing greater local government autonomy and new rights for indigenous peoples, clearly opening the political field to new contenders, in some cases they have also provided governing elites with new opportunities for clientelistic forms of co-optation and control. The new constitutions adopted in Peru (1993) and Venezuela (1998), while including some interesting innovations (such as an ombudsman's office in the Peruvian case), primarily strengthened the powers of presidents at the cost of local governments and legislatures.

Particularly in the central Andean republics, political parties have grown even weaker, giving rise to an alarming personalization of politics that presents a serious challenge to the consolidation of democracy in the region. In Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, party systems have become increasingly fragmented, with electoral competition focusing on "independents" and ever-changing lists of notables. With little internal structure, national organization, or programmatic interests, these "parties" are short-lived and have accelerated the tendency toward the personalization of electoral politics. The lack of a structured political society has increased the level of unpredictability in electoral politics and blurred the political spectrum, allowing politicians to base their campaigns on contradictory promises or to simply abandon their promises once elected. The ever-changing acronyms that dominate political society confuse voters and allow politicians to switch allies and programs without concern for party loyalty or organizational accountability, contributing to a growing cynicism about the electoral process.

Venezuela and Colombia, which managed to preserve a modicum of electoral democracy from the 1960s onward, have not been exempt from the disintegration of political society in the region. In both cases, the inability of political society to adapt to social and economic changes, corruption, and fierce factionalization has led to the decline of traditional political parties. The stunning election of President Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and the virtual electoral disappearance of the two traditional parties—Democratic Action and COPEI (Partido Social Cristiano de Venezuela)—reconfigured the country's electoral map. In Colombia, the gradual emergence of independents, particularly at the local level, the disappearance of significant differences between Liberals and Conservatives, the rapid growth of multiple electoral lists by the two parties, declining state resources to support traditional clientelism, and growing levels of extrasystemic violence have all represented a significant challenge to two-party dominance. While the traditional party

systems in both countries were fraught with corruption and clientelism and were far from fully representative of their diverse societies, it should also be emphasized that the decline of these parties without an adequate reordering of political society could result in new dangers, from military coups and caudillismo to outright civil wars. In both cases, the final outcome of many of these changes remains to be seen, although electoral instability in the coming years is almost a given.

Throughout the region, clientelism has endured as a way to link parties with their supporters and the state with society. Even where traditional parties have decayed, politicians such as Alberto Fujimori have created clientelist networks upon which they base their support. With their unequal power relations, clientelist networks have contributed to the persistent corruption and authoritarian practices of the region's political elites. The inability of political society to develop more open and accountable forms of relating with citizens represents a continuing challenge for the region. Internal democratization of the parties, new laws that regulate campaign financing and media access, and limitations on the political usages of governmental bureaucracies are among the reforms that remain to be considered in much of the region.

Weak civil societies have proved fertile ground for the persistence of clientelist practices. Violence, state repression, ethnic and regional cleavages, and high rates of poverty and inequality have all conspired to limit the possibility of developing civil society organizations. Although the 1980s and 1990s witnessed a growth of autonomous social organizations throughout the Andes, for the most part, they remain weak and vulnerable to economic pressure and outside manipulation. Still, there are clear differences in civil society organization throughout the region that are likely to shape future developments. One notable pattern is the link between these organizations and parties. Where civil society organizations in Venezuela and Bolivia had close relations with the traditional parties (with labor unions as virtual creations of the dominant reformist parties), those in Ecuador and Peru had greater autonomy, but not necessarily more political influence. The growing personalization and fragmentation of the party system in the region may thus provide civil society organizations an opportunity to gain both greater autonomy and greater influence, as appears to be the case with the indigenous movement in Ecuador. The role of Peru's civil society groups in challenging the Fujimori regime's fraudulent 2000 reelection suggests a more active if still limited role for these organizations.

Clientelism, corruption, and the difficulty in establishing citizen representation are to a large extent the result of persistent social and economic inequalities in the region. The lack of a sustainable development model that effectively reduces poverty and inequality remains a significant problem for the

deepening of democracy in the region. Economic development throughout the Andean region in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was based on a primary-product export model that linked these countries with Europe and North America. Tin, petroleum, copper, coffee, bananas, and sugar were and continue to be the region's main sources of income. While all of the countries in the postwar period adopted some variation of state-led development to deal with the difficulties posed by external dependence, there was considerable variation in the types of policies adopted and their implementation.

The central Andean countries of Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia fared worst. Sharp swings in policy directions, poor implementation, and uneven export income produced persistently weak currencies, high external debts, balance of payments crises, and bouts of hyperinflation. Continued high rates of poverty and income inequality have resulted in persistently low standards of living for the vast majority of the population. Macroeconomic instability also contributed to an accentuation of external dependence. International financial actors, particularly private banks and lending agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank, acquired an increased role in determining policy priorities. Economic crises prompted governments to put forward a series of IMF austerity packages, the burden of which have fallen most heavily on the lower classes. Not surprisingly, such measures provoked sustained opposition, including strikes, demonstrations, electoral backlashes against governing parties, and even military rebellions, though resistance to austerity and the neoliberal restructuring of the economy has varied. The strongest opposition has been evident in Ecuador, where successive mobilizations by civil society helped overturn or stall neoliberal measures, with the least effective resistance in Bolivia (until recently, as witnessed by an explosion of protests against neoliberal measures, such as the 2000 protests against the privatization of public utilities). In Venezuela, Hugo Chávez came to power on the heels of anti-neoliberal protests. Meanwhile, in Peru, the turn to "heterodoxy" under President Alan García in the 1985–89 period, in defiance of international financial actors, was quickly followed by the more orthodox policies of the 1990s under the Fujimori administration.

By contrast, Venezuela and Colombia offer two distinctly different patterns from those found in the central Andes. From the 1960s through the mid-1980s both countries were more consistent than their central Andean counterparts in economic policy-making, and both enjoyed substantial growth and even poverty reduction. (The resulting improved living standards are evident in the socioeconomic indicators listed in table 0.1.) In Venezuela, the petroleum export boom provided the state with the wherewithal to fund distributive policies, build infrastructure, and avoid high external debts or currency crises. Colombia kept its exchange levels at reasonable levels, stimu-

lated the economy through modest expenditures, and successfully diversified its export base beyond coffee into other profitable products, including manufactures. Yet by the 1990s both of these countries were facing economic slowdowns. Declines in the price of petroleum between the late 1980s and late 1990s led to a crisis in Venezuela reminiscent of prior crises in the central Andean nations. The political repercussions were felt almost immediately, starting with the 1989 Caracazo protests that left hundreds dead. Continued protests of neoliberal austerity throughout the early 1990s finally culminated in the rise of President Hugo Chávez, elected in 1998 on an explicit promise to reduce poverty and end policies that result in economic inequalities. The economic consequences in Colombia of economic restructuring have also been severe. The gradual adoption of neoliberal policies during the Gaviria administration led to a decade-long slowdown and by 2000 the highest unemployment rate (20 percent) in Latin America. Politically, the gradual erosion of the traditional parties and perhaps most importantly the exponential growth of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in the 1990s attest to the long-term challenges confronting the country.

The lack of sustainable development models in the region, combined with internal market distortions and external vulnerabilities, has been a major source of concentration of wealth, income inequality, and persistent poverty. Governmental policies have failed to meet the basic needs of citizens, and this is as true for "populist" governments as it is for more conservative governments. The sizable proportion of people engaged in the informal economy has not only distorted the economy and state development in tangible ways—that is, by limiting tax revenues—but has made it more difficult to design policies capable of breaking cycles of poverty. Meanwhile, corruption, drug trafficking, high rates of military spending, and mounting foreign debt continue to siphon off resources that could be used to meet basic needs.

Organization of the Book

Part 1 of *Politics in the Andes* examines the issue of social identity in the Andes and the ways identity has shaped political conflict and representation in the region. Chapter 1, by Xavier Albó, provides a historical overview of the role of indigenous organizations in the central Andean countries, focusing special attention on the factors that have led to an indigenous "awakening" over the last three decades. Jennifer Collins's chapter focuses on Ecuador, a crucial case study of indigenous mobilization, where ethnic-based organizations have become important social and political players. Collins argues that the indigenous movement has had a positive impact on democratization by channeling the demands and participation of a previously excluded sector of the population. Amy Lind rounds out the discussion by analyzing the changes

in women's political practices in the context of neoliberal economic and social policies in Ecuador and Bolivia. The rise of new women's organizations such as communal kitchens in the context of economic and political restructuring has brought both fortune and misfortune to women. While they have gained increased political space both within governmental institutions and in the nongovernmental arena, women's organizations have remained fragmented and often vulnerable to clientelist manipulation by political parties or state organizations.

Part 2 focuses on explaining the high level of violence, human rights abuses, and drug trafficking in the region. Fernando Coronil and Julie Skurski analyze the semantics of political violence in Venezuela. Focusing on violent confrontations in the late 1980s in a nation that at the time was held out as a model democracy, Coronil and Skurski argue that violence played an important role in defining and reordering politics in the country and relate that violence, by no means unique to Venezuela, to new forms of social relations that have begun to emerge in the globalized era. Examining the case of Colombia, Ricardo Vargas emphasizes the importance of regional dynamics in the drug trade. Arguing that the link between drugs, violence, and politics begins at the local level, Vargas reminds the reader that simply destroying coca fields can often exacerbate political problems and violence. Coletta A. Youngers focuses specifically on how the U.S.-sponsored "war on drugs" has distorted regional priorities. Comparing the situations in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, Youngers argues that U.S. involvement in the region has led to unholy alliances with militaries that have deplorable human rights records and are often involved in the drug trade themselves, with serious negative consequences for nascent democratic institutions. Philip Mauceri offers some comparisons between violence in Colombia and Peru, arguing that national and local elites and their relation with the state are significant in explaining how states respond to violence. Mauceri suggests that Colombia's historic preference for a "privatization and abdication" model and Peru's adoption of an "authoritarian reengineering" model of counterinsurgency in the 1990s have less to do with state weakness and more to do with state-elite relations. Finally, Mark Ungar examines the issue of human rights in the Andes, focusing his attention on the development of new state institutions, such as ombudsman offices, to defend human rights and hold states accountable. Although they are promising, Ungar finds that such institutions are often subject to the sort of political attacks and bureaucratic inefficiency that undermine many state institutions in the Andes.

In Part 3, the authors focus on evaluating challenges facing democracy in the region. In her analysis of Ecuador, Liisa L. North examines the dynamic between a dependent economy and rising social demands, arguing that the

TABLE 0.1 Human Development, Demographics, Poverty, and Inequality in the Andes

	Bolivia	*Colombia*	*Ecuador*	*Peru*	*Venezuela*
Human Development Index (HDI)					
HDI rank	104	62	84	73	61
Life expectancy at birth (years)	62.0	70.9	69.8	68.5	72.7
Gross domestic product (GDP)/capita (US$)	2,355	5,749	2,994	4,622	6,495
GDP growth (annual %), year 2000[a]	3	3	2	4	3
Total debt/GDP, year 2000[b]	83	44	105	53	31
Demographic Trends					
Total population (millions)					
Year 1975	4.8	25.4	6.9	15.2	12.7
Year 1999	8.1	41.4	12.4	25.2	23.7
Year 2015	11.2	52.6	15.9	31.9	30.9
Annual population growth rate (%)					
Years 1975–99	2.2	2.0	2.4	2.1	2.6
Years 1999–2015	2.0	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.7
Urban population (% of total)					
Year 1975	41.5	60.7	42.4	61.5	75.7
Year 1999	61.9	73.5	64.3	72.4	86.6
Year 2015	70.1	79.1	75.8	77.9	90
Population under age 15 (% of total)					
Year 1999	39.8	33.1	34.3	33.9	34.5
Year 2015	33.7	27.0	27.1	26.7	27.6
Ethnic composition of population (% of total)[e]					
Indigenous	55	1	25	45	2
Mestizo	30	58	65[f]	37	65
White	15	20		15	20
Black		4	3		10
Other		17	7	3[g]	3
Poverty and Income Distribution					
Adult illiteracy rate (% above age 15)	15.0	8.5	9.0	10.4	7.7
Population below national poverty line (%) 1984–99[c]	n/a	17.7	35.0	49.0	31.3
Population living on less than $1 a day (%) (1993 US$) 1983–99[c]	29.4	11.0	20.2	15.5	18.7
Survival					
Life expectancy at birth (years)					
Years 1970–75	46.7	61.6	58.8	55.4	65.7
Years 1995–2000	61.4	70.4	69.5	68.0	72.4
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)					
Year 1970	144	70	87	115	47
Year 1999	64	26	27	42	20
Under-5 mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)					
Year 1970	243	113	140	178	61
Year 1999	83	31	35	52	23
Maternal mortality/100,000 live births, year 1990	373	107	150	280	200
Maternal mortality/100,000 live births 1980–99[c]	170	80	160	270	60

TABLE 0.1 *(Continued)*

	Bolivia	*Colombia*	*Ecuador*	*Peru*	*Venezuela*
Inequality in Income or Consumption					
Survey year	1997	1996	1995	1996	1997
Share of income or consumption (%)					
Poorest 10%	0.5	1.1	2.2	1.6	1.6
Poorest 20%	1.9	3.0	5.4	4.4	4.1
Richest 20%	61.8	60.9	49.7	51.2	53.7
Richest 10%	45.7	46.1	33.8	35.4	37.6
Inequality measures					
Richest 10% to poorest 10%	91.4	42.7	15.4	22.3	24.3
Richest 20% to poorest 20%	32.0	20.3	9.2	11.7	13.0
Gini Index[d]	58.9	57.1	43.7	46.2	48.8

SOURCE: All data is from the UNDP 2001 Human Development Report, unless noted.

NOTES: All years other than 1999 are noted.

a. Data from World Bank. Available at <http://www.devdata.worldbank.org>.

b. Data from USAID. Available at <http://qesdb.cdie.org/lac/index.html>.

c. Results are averages of the years noted.

d. The Gini Index is a common statistical indicator of inequality, with 0 representing perfect equality and 100 perfect inequality.

e. Ethnic composition statistics for Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, and Peru are from *The Columbia Encyclopedia*. 6th edition. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003). For Venezuela, *The World Factbook*. (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2002).

f. Includes "white" as category

g. Includes Peruvians of African, Japanese, and Chinese descent.

country's economic model has been catastrophic for both social and political stability. Engaging in a broad historical analysis, North concludes that Ecuador's economic elite and its political allies have at critical moments blocked the possibility of significant redistributive reforms or alternative development strategies, a strategy that in turn has provoked financial crises and political instability. In their chapter on Venezuela, Margarita López Maya and Luis E. Lander evaluate the implications of Hugo Chávez's rapid rise to power for Venezuelan democracy. The authors suggest that Venezuela is undergoing a "recomposition of hegemony" that is radically transforming the country and creating an unprecedented level of indeterminacy in the political system. Examining Colombia's evolving political system, Francisco Gutiérrez Sanin and Luisa Ramírez Rueda undertake one of the few analyses that tie changing electoral and party dynamics to the political violence that affects the country. The authors raise an important question: How to characterize a political system that incorporates electoral competition and is relatively open to participation and at the same time has low levels of protection for political actors as well as ordinary citizens? Finally, Jo-Marie Burt examines the process of state breakdown in Peru in the 1980s, arguing that this is a key variable in understanding the rise of an extremely personalistic and authoritarian regime in the

1990s. The process of rebuilding state institutions under the Fujimori regime, she argues, became inimical to the imperative of building democracy and offers important lessons for other countries, such as Colombia, that have similarly experienced significant state breakdown.

In the conclusion, Jo-Marie Burt and Philip Mauceri return to these themes and attempt to place them in the context of wider-ranging trends in Latin America as well as within the current scholarly debate regarding democratization, economic reform, and social identity. The objective of *Politics in the Andes* is to highlight some of the unique contexts and processes occurring in the Andean region but also to provoke theoretical and comparative analyses with other regions of Latin America and the world that face some of the same challenges. We hope this book will provide the necessary context to understand the unfolding and often dramatic events in the Andes and allow the interested reader to see beyond the sensational news of the moment and link events to broader historical, political, economic, and social trends.