

HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND THE BALKANS

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In the aftermath of four Yugoslav wars during the course of the 1990s, South Eastern Europe is “now a vast political laboratory on top of a mass grave.”¹ Ongoing efforts at reconstruction have focused on rebuilding the security of governments, states, and the region as a whole. These efforts, however, have devoted less attention to dimensions of human security—securing freedom from want and freedom from fear and establishing and strengthening the rule of law—that enhance protections for the region’s most vulnerable populations in their daily lives.² It is in this context that South Eastern Europe, and especially the Western Balkan region,³ has emerged as a nexus point in the trafficking of persons into the European Union, especially women both from within the region and from other areas of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.⁴ The contributors to this volume explore the trafficking in human beings and its ramifications for human security in the region.

According to the 2006 U.S. *Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report*, each year an estimated six hundred thousand to eight hundred thousand men,

women, and children are victims of international human trafficking worldwide, with women and girls constituting up to 80 percent of those trafficked. Internal trafficking—trafficking that does not cross national borders—claims an estimated additional four to twenty-seven million persons.⁵ In an effort to gain insights into these patterns, scholars and analysts since the late 1990s have turned to the exploration of trafficking patterns especially in Europe and Asia, particularly those involving the former Soviet Union and Thailand.⁶ With the fragmentation of Yugoslavia and the expansion of the EU's borders through the process of enlargement, however, the Western Balkans also emerged as an area of concern.

By 2001 the International Organization for Migration (IOM) was reporting that the Balkans had emerged as a significant region in the trafficking of women and children to Western Europe.⁷ Estimates of the scale of human trafficking varied. IOM discussion of estimates reported by the European Commission in 2001 became recast in media and United Nations reports as IOM claims of 120,000 women and children trafficked annually into Western Europe, mostly through the Balkans.⁸ By 2003, the European Security Strategy, adopted by European Council meeting in Brussels, proclaimed that “Balkan criminal networks” were responsible for the trafficking of 200,000 women victimized in the worldwide sex trade.⁹ The role of the Western Balkans in human trafficking, however, was and is not as simple as a transit point into the EU or as a base for Balkan criminals. Reports released by Human Rights Watch in 2002 and Amnesty International in 2004 also revealed extensive trafficking into and within the region beginning in the 1990s to meet demand generated by an expanding pool of United Nations and NATO international peacekeepers, private subcontractors, and relief workers.¹⁰

The *TIP Report* process initially designated Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as primarily countries of transit and destination; Albania and Serbia and Montenegro (and Kosovo) were characterized as primarily countries of source and transit. Over time, the annual reports have become more nuanced in recognizing that multiple dynamics are at play within and between the in-

dividual countries that compose the Western Balkan region. However, this volume reveals an even greater complexity in trafficking patterns in the region. These patterns vary extensively by the country of origin and ethnicity of the women being trafficked; by economic conditions within different areas of individual countries and relative to other countries in and outside of the region; and by shifting patterns of local and foreign demand. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, local women were trafficked out of the country while women from elsewhere in the region were trafficked into the country for prostitution networks that focused on the growing international community as clientele. In Albania, women and girls from Moldova, Romania, Russia, and other countries were trafficked through the country on the way to the EU, as well as into the country as a final destination. Albanian women were also trafficked into Europe, while Albanian girls were trafficked into Kosovo. The traffickers also reveal considerable diversity, ranging from family members of victims, to local and foreign organized criminal networks, to corrupt government officials and members of international stabilization and police forces charged with helping to rebuild order in the region.¹¹ This diversity, and especially the participation of the latter groups in human trafficking, represents a profound challenge to the establishment of the rule of law.

Global and Regional Contexts

Human trafficking since the 1990s has taken place in the context of broader processes of globalization and regionalization. Globalization processes, linking economic liberalization and technological innovation in transportation and communication, have increased the incentives for labor movement as the distribution of wealth becomes increasingly attenuated and differentiated. Expanding global flows of goods and services have facilitated development while threatening less competitive manufacturing and agricultural sectors and marginalized populations in developed, transitional, and developing countries alike. Formal and informal social safety nets have become overwhelmed by this process, leading to the displacement of marginalized populations and, in turn, increased incentives for migration and the rise of transnational criminal networks.

Some migrants have sought assistance from smugglers for transport across borders into the labor markets of advanced industrial countries. Others, especially women and children, have been recruited into trafficking networks with deceptive promises of employment abroad.¹²

Parallel to these globalization processes, regionalization processes (particularly in Europe) have contributed to the increasingly porous nature of national borders. Within the EU, states have become less able to regulate transnational flows as external borders have pushed deeper into geographic areas where the institutional apparatus and physical capacity to guard borders have not, historically, been as well developed. The rapid expansion of the EU, for example, has pushed its geographical eastward borders to the point where new member states have less capacity to regulate, or interest in regulating, transnational flows.¹³ Although EU policymakers have emphasized enhanced border security measures as well as intensified steps against transnational organized crime, human trafficking continues.¹⁴ Intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations active in Europe have attempted to offset economic deprivation through alternative development programs; they have also tried to counter deceptive recruiting practices through educational and support programs targeted at likely trafficking victims. Both initiatives have met with varying degrees of success.¹⁵

For the Western Balkans, the fragmentation of Yugoslavia intensified the impact of processes of globalization and regionalization. Unbridled ethnic conflict on a scale not witnessed in Europe since 1945, several episodes of external intervention (often involving the overwhelming use of force), and the unabated use of violence by criminal elements provided waves of challenges to civil society in the region. Even as the more explicit challenges to law and order—genocidal activities and open civil war—were quelled through external intervention, transnational crime surged. Transnational crime networks have a long history of presence in the Balkans, and include cigarette, heroin, and arms trafficking that predate the collapse of Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, the Yugoslav wars and their aftermath intensified the scale of transnational crime and the levels at which criminal networks preyed on the population.¹⁶

Human Trafficking Contested

Human trafficking is neither a new nor an uncontested phenomenon. Despite successes against the trans-Atlantic slave trade in the mid-nineteenth century, and the curtailing of “legal ownership of human beings,” new challenges of exploitation soon emerged.¹⁷ The end of the nineteenth century saw an expansion of “migratory, multinational prostitution” internationally and regionally, especially into the Americas and Asia. This expansion was pulled and pushed by a combination of economic displacement, colonialism-induced flows of indentured and non-indentured male labor, and, by the early twentieth century, the effects of war.¹⁸ State-regulated prostitution, and proposals to improve these regulations during the 1800s, had already attracted the concern of groups in the United States and Europe. Drawing on the successes of the earlier campaign against the slave trade, these groups posited the intersection of prostitution and the state as the threat of white slavery. By the end of the nineteenth century, the concept of white slavery had broadened to include all forms of prostitution, with special emphasis on white European and American women recruited into prostitution “by force or fraud.”¹⁹ The rise of what Peter Andreas and Ethan Nadelmann term “transnational moral entrepreneurs” during this period, such as the National Vigilance Association of London, Josephine Butler, and the American Purity Alliance, sparked a “moral crusade” to prohibit white slavery, either broadly or narrowly defined.²⁰ Moral entrepreneurs claimed that the widespread risk to unsuspecting white women and children from organized trafficking networks necessitated international conferences and agreements to criminalize human trafficking and prostitution, despite the fact that “99 percent” of those trafficked were “women of color” and trafficking was taking place primarily “in colonial areas.”²¹

Although international conferences were held and agreements on trafficking were reached, these efforts failed to create a successful global prohibition regime against human trafficking, and they did not generate widespread national “legislation prohibiting prostitution.”²² The 1904 International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic and

the 1910 Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, for example, focused on detecting and preventing the “procuring of women or girls for immoral purposes abroad.” Yet the agreement was primarily limited to calls for broad measures, including the identification and eventual repatriation of prostitutes and the need for governmental oversight of employment agencies and transportation facilities.²³ As Andreas and Nadelmann observe, World War I and national restrictions on migration flows had a greater effect on migration and human trafficking than those early steps toward a prohibition regime.²⁴

As concern over the trafficking of women and children reemerged in the aftermath of World War I and the “reopening of commerce and frontiers,” the League of Nations (LON) held international conferences and conventions on the issue.²⁵ Steps such as the 1921 Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Women and Children and the 1933 International Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Women of Full Age rejected the narrow focus on white slavery and included calls for wider criminalization and greater punishment of trafficking offenses. But as Eileen Scully observes, with the LON “organically unequipped to force compliance,” steps toward implementation of the conventions relied primarily on “self-reporting by signatories.”²⁶ As concern over trafficking in Asia and Europe reemerged after World War II, the United Nations drew on previous LON efforts and earlier agreements and conventions to introduce the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others in 1949. This convention broadly called on member states to punish those engaged in the trafficking of persons for purposes of prostitution, but again gave governments “primary responsibility for reporting their own compliance.”²⁷ Only fourteen signatories initially endorsed the convention, and seventy-two parties had signed by the year 2000.²⁸

From the 1950s through the 1980s, the trafficking of women and children from developing areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America into Europe, Japan, and the United States, coupled with a thriving international sex tourism trade involving nationals from developed countries traveling

to developing countries, continued to raise concerns among reformers. Transnational moral entrepreneurs again worked assiduously toward the goal of instituting global prohibitions with limited results. Steps such as the passage of Article 6 of the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), for example, consisted of only a broad provision requiring the suppression of trafficking and exploitation of prostitution of women.²⁹

The political and economic collapse of the Soviet Union created new challenges as trafficking of white women and children surged from Russia, the Ukraine, and other former Soviet Republics into Western Europe.³⁰ By the mid-1990s, the Global Survival Network estimated that upward of five hundred thousand women were being trafficked from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union into Western Europe each year.³¹

The convergence of the interests and influences of transnational moral entrepreneurs on trafficking with the interests and influences of the governments of powerful states (especially the United States) on the broader issue of transnational organized crime prompted significant steps toward a global prohibition regime in 2000. The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and especially the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Trafficking Protocol) consisted of several components. It included a legal definition of human trafficking; it extended beyond the issue of exploitative prostitution and the focus of prior initiatives on women and children; and it contained detailed requirements for signatories in areas of criminalization and prosecution, prevention of trafficking, and protection of trafficking victims.³² This protocol entered into force on 25 December 2003, and by 2006 had 117 signatories and 110 parties.³³ Unlike earlier steps against human trafficking, the United States also supported the Trafficking Protocol through funding for foreign anti-trafficking programs and personnel training, and, more importantly, threats of shame and sanction linked to assessments of the activities of foreign governments as published in the annual *TIP Report*.³⁴

Nevertheless, the Trafficking Protocol has not resolved disputes over how best to conceptualize human trafficking. For example, Article 3 defines trafficking in persons as:

the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.³⁵

In practice, governments and nongovernmental actors continue to define trafficking in terms of two broad categories—forced labor and sexual exploitation. The latter has attracted much greater attention in the campaigns against human trafficking for diverse reasons, including: the interests of political conservatives, religious leaders, feminists, and other moral entrepreneurs advocating trafficking controls; and the media sensationalism of, and public fascination with, incidents of female sexual exploitation. Even as official trafficking definitions have become more broadly interpreted as “involuntary servitude” and “modern-day slavery,” sex trafficking remains a high-profile issue of concern.³⁶

A challenge for the introduction of effective measures against trafficking, however, is that the definition of sex trafficking itself remains contested. The glaring absence in the definition adopted in the Trafficking Protocol is an explicit link between prostitution and trafficking. The definition adopted reflects a divide between those contending that all prostitution is a form of exploitation and involuntary servitude on the one hand, and those contending that persons can choose freely to work in the commercial sex industry and migrate to work as prostitutes, but that they become trafficked when they lose the power of choice and are forced to

work in “slave-like conditions” through threat of violence, force, or deceit by another.³⁷ The *travaux préparatoires* (interpretive notes) for the Trafficking Protocol reveal that the terms “exploitation of the prostitution of others” and “other forms of sexual exploitation” in Article 3 remain consciously undefined in the protocol in order to allow states flexibility in how they “address prostitution in their respective domestic laws.”³⁸

Differences in policy and practice among the member states of the EU regarding sex work have led to pressure for alternative frameworks—some that define trafficking in terms of labor and sexual exploitation, including exploitation in prostitution, but stop short of equating prostitution with trafficking.³⁹ The U.S. government backed the compromise in the Trafficking Protocol, over domestic opposition for stronger language, in order to obtain European and other international support for enforcement provisions in the Transnational Organized Crime Convention. However, the primary U.S. legislation on human trafficking, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA), reauthorized in 2003 and 2005, defines trafficking more broadly to include prostitution and other commercial sex acts. In practice, nonetheless, U.S. operative regulations on trafficking have focused on its “severe” forms—those entailing the use of “fraud, force or coercion.”⁴⁰ Under the George W. Bush administration, and especially since 2003, the line between the operative and broader definitions in the TVPA has blurred with the U.S. government’s posited linkage between trafficking and prostitution, regardless of its legality, and push for criminalization abroad.⁴¹

Andreas and Nadelmann observe that, as in earlier efforts against human trafficking, the contested issue of prostitution appears likely to continue to derail the global prohibition regime against human trafficking.⁴² As played out in the Western Balkan region, the absence of a consensus on the definition of trafficking or on how best to address the trafficking problem has resulted in institutional steps by governments geared more toward the goal of EU accession than actual problem solving and in policy practices mired in contradictions.

Trafficking Responses in the Balkans

The challenge of human trafficking for the Western Balkans has been raised in numerous multilateral and regional forums, reflecting, in part, the concerns of the United States, the EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) with the spillover effects of instability and organized crime. Hosted by the United States, a February 2003 conference called Pathbreaking Strategies in the Global Fight against Sex Trafficking, for example, included workshops exploring strategies to combat trafficking from Eastern to Western Europe.⁴³ Human trafficking also emerged as a central theme in the summit held in Ohrid, Macedonia, cosponsored by the EU, the OSCE, NATO, and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe on 22–23 May 2003, and the 2 June 2003 follow-up declaration by five Western Balkan presidents.⁴⁴ These and subsequent forums have consistently highlighted the need for: national legislation criminalizing trafficking; greater regional and subregional cooperation; and anti-trafficking measures that conform to EU standards, especially for those countries seeking eventual membership in the EU.

Regional steps incorporating these themes have taken place through the Stability Pact Task Force on Trafficking in Human Beings (SPTF), and the South Eastern European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) Task Force on Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling. International organizations—ranging from the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to IOM—and nongovernmental organizations, such as the La Strada Foundation and the Save the Children Alliance, also have prioritized steps against trafficking. The result has been the introduction of National Action Plans by Western Balkan governments that incorporate, to varying degrees, new laws and institution building measures, targeted education efforts, victim assistance and protection programs, and broader public relations campaigns against trafficking.

Yet throughout the Western Balkans, distinctions between contending views of trafficking remain blurred in policy and practice. At times re-

gional and individual governmental law enforcement efforts have treated all prostitutes as trafficking victims, arrested trafficking victims as prostitutes, drawn distinctions that equate only foreign prostitutes or prostitutes under eighteen years of age as those having been trafficked, or simply treated foreign prostitutes as illegal migrants.⁴⁵ According to the extensive UN overviews of the trafficking situation in South Eastern Europe, most Western Balkan governments entered the new millennium with criminal codes that criminalized prostitution and the mediation of prostitution. Enforcement of these measures, however, was limited at best. Furthermore, anti-trafficking legislation and consideration of the treatment of prostitution in such legislation were still in varying stages of introduction.⁴⁶ National Action Plans have increased the institutional infrastructure against trafficking, but the blurred intersection of sex trafficking and the treatment of prostitution remains.

The conceptualization of the nature of the trafficking problem remains even more contested. At a basic level, data problems concerning the extent of human trafficking plague the Western Balkans. Clearly this is not a problem unique to the region. Issues of underreporting and corruption, and the blurring of irregular migration, immigrant smuggling, and trafficking have challenged anti-trafficking efforts around the world.⁴⁷ Additional data issues in the region, however, include arguments that the figures are alternatively classified or not suitable for publication as well as arguments by governments that estimates of trafficking are being fabricated by nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations with a stake in overstating the trafficking problem. Data collection in the region has improved with the establishment of the Regional Clearing Point under the auspices of the SPTF in 2003 and the Nexus Institute to Combat Human Trafficking in 2005.⁴⁸ Yet insights into the magnitude of trafficking remain woefully incomplete.

Nicole Lindstrom observes an even greater source of tension between and among governments, intergovernmental organizations, and transnational and local nongovernmental organizations active in the Western Balkans.⁴⁹ The tension stems from four major conceptual approaches commonly used to address human trafficking as: a migration

problem, a law enforcement problem, a human rights challenge, or a broader economic issue. Each of these approaches advocates a different solution, including border control, repatriation, and suppressing traffickers; expanding the legal and socioeconomic rights of those at risk of trafficking; and addressing the broader challenge of poverty that places especially women and children at risk.

Elements of all four approaches appear in regional initiatives as well as in the National Action Plans adopted by individual Western Balkan governments. However, the prioritization of trafficking as a migration/criminal problem has held sway.⁵⁰ This pattern has reflected the influence of the United States, IOM, the OSCE, and especially the EU through its accession requirements. Though acknowledging the broader socioeconomic conditions that lead women and children into the arms of traffickers and the need for extensive victim protections, the United States and the EU have placed greater emphasis on rule of law approaches by calling on Balkan countries to both criminalize human trafficking and enhance border control, especially on those borders shared with EU member states. Yet this prioritization has led to unintended results that erode, rather than enhance, human security.

Important steps against human trafficking have been taken in the Western Balkans. As shown in table 1.1, the rankings of countries in the region by the U.S. *TIP Reports* from 2001 to 2006 suggest an improvement. However, despite such steps and efforts at greater exploration and dialogue between governments, nongovernmental organizations, and international organizations, the region continues to reveal deep-seated challenges to resolving human trafficking.

Human trafficking is a complex problem that requires a nuanced exploration of its sources and ways in which to develop and implement a coordinated, multifaceted response. This volume seeks to facilitate such exploration for the Western Balkans. The following chapters explore the economic dynamics of human trafficking, the impact of international and transnational policies and practices framing the issue of trafficking in the region, the impact of peacekeeping forces, the emergence of national and regional action plans in the Western Balkans and more broadly in

Table 1.1. Annual *Trafficking in Persons Report* Tier Rankings for the Western Balkans

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Albania	Tier 3	Tier 2	Tier 2	Tier 2	Tier 2	Tier 2
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Tier 3	Tier 3	Tier 3 but updated to Tier 2 (9/03)	Tier 2	Tier 2	Tier 2
Croatia	Not reviewed	Not reviewed	Tier 2	Tier 2 watch list	Tier 2	Tier 2
Macedonia	Tier 2	Tier 1	Tier 1	Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 2
Serbia and Montenegro	Tier 3	Tier 2	Tier 2	Tier 2 watch list	Tier 2	Tier 2

Notes: The tier rankings in table 1.1 are drawn from the 2001–2006 annual *TIP Reports*. As discussed in the reports, a Tier 1 ranking reflects full compliance with the U.S. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000’s “minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking”; a Tier 2 ranking is for countries that have not met the minimum standards but are making “significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance”; a Tier 3 ranking is applied to countries who are not making “significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance.” In 2004, the Department of State added a Tier 2 watch list category.

Although discussed separately, Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo are given one combined tier ranking as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the 2001 and 2002 *TIP Report* and as Serbia-Montenegro in subsequent reports. Montenegro’s independence in mid-2006 came too late for a separate tier ranking in the 2006 *TIP Report*.

South Eastern Europe, and the nature and ramifications of the gap between human security rhetoric and institutional and policy steps against human trafficking.

Lynellyn Long argues that the trafficking of women for sexual services is best understood in the context of cultural practices and economic incentives. Long posits trafficking as an exchange transaction involving an array of different parties and women as the objects/providers of services being exchanged. She identifies and analyzes the motivations of such actors and the conditions and organizational patterns that facilitate the trafficking exchange. Different forms of exchange transactions can exist. Long focuses on “the gift, the service and the commodified exchange” and, drawing on examples from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, traces the ways in which these dimensions have changed over

time. For example, gift transactions involving women have a long history in the Balkans. However, the violent Yugoslav fragmentation and economic downturns altered traditional social relations in ways that led to more exploitative trafficking exchanges of women and young girls and the proliferation of new networks of suppliers, distributors, and clients. Exploring trafficking as an exchange transaction, Long reveals, can help to explain the unintended negative effects of counter-trafficking programs based on “moral regimes” that often clash with “economic incentives and deeply-rooted cultural practices.” She argues for developing effective anti-trafficking measures that address the transnational vertical integration of human trafficking. Moreover, she contends, strengthening economic rights approaches would address underlying incentives that can place women at risk. Such steps include altering the incentives that shape gift, service, and commodity exchanges. Long advocates empowering women through measures ranging from education and skill training to allowances for legal circular migration, as well as addressing the demand side of the exchange through education and holding past perpetrators of war crimes to task for their actions.

Julie Mertus and Andrea Bertone focus on international efforts against human trafficking and their implications for the Western Balkans. These authors argue that international approaches have addressed human trafficking as more of a “social and criminal phenomenon” isolated from broader structural challenges of “poverty, unemployment, discrimination, violence in the family, and [sources of] demand.” Narrowly focused law enforcement approaches have overshadowed broader human rights approaches in international efforts and, in turn, the National Action Plans adopted by West Balkan governments, with unintended results. Mertus and Bertone note the persistence of human trafficking despite the proliferation of enforcement strategies as traffickers move operations underground and shift to new routes. They also reveal how enforcement and preventative measures that are informed by the conceptual framing of those trafficked as victims and that conflate human trafficking and human smuggling can fall short. For example, treating women as victims of trafficking fails to capture the broader structural economic forces and mi-

gration regimes that lead women seeking economic opportunity to risk being trafficked. Mertus and Bertone also address operational factors that have inhibited the effective implementation of anti-trafficking measures. These include resource tensions between international organizations and local nongovernmental organizations, disputes over information sharing and the “blending and burying” of counter-trafficking initiatives into broader enforcement, and migration and development programs. The authors reveal that despite these problems, progress has taken place. Governments in the region have taken important legislative steps. The capacity of NGOs and governments to address trafficking and to identify and assist trafficked persons has increased, as have regional cooperative efforts. “Transnational advocacy networks” active in the region have been especially instrumental in facilitating the shift toward expanding human rights approaches to trafficking with positive results. Nonetheless, the authors conclude that further efforts, including more research on trafficking and its socioeconomic sources and impacts, are necessary.

Nicole Lindstrom focuses on transnational responses to human trafficking, with a particular emphasis on politics and practice in Serbia and Montenegro. She argues that “transnational policy actors” have played a critical role in the development, diffusion, and implementation of anti-trafficking programs in the Balkans. Transnational networks have linked external actors, such as representatives from the United States, EU, United Nations, IOM, and the OSCE, with local nongovernmental organizations and governments. Lindstrom reveals that the policy process has been largely top-down in framing the problem of human trafficking as well as solutions to the problem. Transnational actors, however, have differed in their approaches. As noted above, Lindstrom explores contending and in some cases overlapping approaches emphasizing law enforcement, the control of irregular migration, the protection of human rights, and the socioeconomic conditions that facilitate human trafficking. She argues that differences in the approaches and influences of transnational policy actors help to explain patterns of variation in the National Action Plans adopted by Western Balkan countries. Focusing on the cases of Serbia and Montenegro, Lindstrom reveals top-down dynamics in both coun-

tries, though leading to “slightly different” anti-trafficking mechanisms and institutionalized roles for transnational actors. She also notes the unintended consequences of such steps, including: the reliance on flawed indicators of success, shortcomings in victim assistance and protection as trafficking moves underground in the face of enforcement, and the rise of re-trafficking of women who have been repatriated to their home countries. The path to resolving these problems, she argues, lies in opening the policymaking process by giving greater voice to relevant actors, including trafficked persons. Immediate and broader policy steps also are necessary to address the underlying socioeconomic factors shaping trafficking. Lindstrom concludes with recommendations for modifying visa regimes to reduce the risk of re-trafficking, and linking EU development assistance and trade liberalization policies to steps by Western Balkan governments to combat corruption and crime.

Martina Vandenberg focuses on Bosnia and Herzegovina and the evolution and failure of United Nations anti-trafficking policies. Drawing on fieldwork conducted for Human Rights Watch from 1998 to 2001, additional field work in 2006, and documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, she argues that international peacekeeping operations in the region created the context within which human trafficking thrived. The chapter details the expansion of a diverse community of peacekeeping personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1990s, including thousands of military troops, contractors, UN civilian personnel, and international civilian police officers. Vandenberg explores how this community infused millions of dollars into the local economy, expanding demand for licit as well as illicit goods and services. She argues that in this context, the trafficking of women for prostitution boomed. Vandenberg traces the growing patterns of corruption surrounding human trafficking, the gradual rise of ad hoc UN and Bosnian responses, and the impact of patterns of immunity accorded to members of the international community in eroding anti-trafficking efforts. She reveals how as negative publicity in the local media made the trafficking issue too difficult to ignore, new anti-trafficking initiatives turned to aggressive policing steps, including the Special Trafficking Operations Program (STOP).

These measures, however, were poorly integrated into local civil society, spurred more corruption, undermined the human rights and protections for victims of trafficking, and often drove the practice of human trafficking underground. Although statistics from 2005 suggested that trafficking of women into Bosnia and Herzegovina had declined, Vandenberg concludes by cautioning that such shifts may have less to do with the successes of local and international anti-trafficking strategies in curtailing trafficking or in driving trafficking underground and more with the shrinking international military and civilian forces in the country. Thus, a key step against human trafficking lies in addressing the ability of internationals to “act with impunity.” Vandenberg notes in closing that while extensive reform in this area has yet to take place, there is “room for some optimism” with steps in mid-2006 to address the criminal accountability of UN personnel.

Vasilika Hysi focuses on the rise and persistence of human trafficking in Albania, beginning with the country’s democratic transition of the 1990s. She argues that Albania’s emergence as a source, transit, and destination country for trafficked Albanian and foreign women and children stems from a convergence of factors, including: poor socioeconomic conditions, fragile state and societal institutions, and the country’s location between the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the European Union. Hysi traces the rise of human trafficking during the 1990s and the subsequent shifts in transit routes and methods used by Albanian and foreign traffickers. Though slow to recognize and acknowledge the problem, Albania’s government has amended the criminal code and criminal procedure to explicitly address trafficking, ratified and begun to implement international conventions on organized crime and trafficking, and engaged in international police and judicial cooperation. Yet Hysi reveals that institutional reforms of the police and judiciary have fallen short, especially in the identification and protection of trafficking victims. In addition to further work in this area, Hysi suggests that the region must address socioeconomic factors that increase the risk of victimization for women and children, especially those from rural areas. Hysi calls for greater cooperation between the Albanian government and civil society

groups, nongovernmental organizations, and regional partners to meet the challenge of human trafficking and, in turn, to enhance regional stability and security.

Gabriela Konevska places the issue of human trafficking in the Western Balkans in the broader context of challenges and responses in South Eastern Europe. She argues that a “comprehensive legislative framework” is essential to combat the multidimensional and multinational aspects of human trafficking. Such a framework, drawing on European and international standards, must incorporate common patterns of criminalization; procedural tools for investigation, prosecution, and trial; and especially provisions for victim and witness protection. Moreover, legislation incorporating prevention, protection, and prosecution measures and the implementation of such legislation must be embraced not only by governments but also by the private sector and civil society. Regional integration efforts that link governmental and nongovernmental actors have played an important role against human trafficking. Konevska offers insights into the role of the SECI Regional Center for Combating Trans-Border Crime as a positive example on how to facilitate cooperation. She concludes the chapter by offering a series of recommendations for addressing the challenges of human trafficking in the Western Balkans and paths for their implementation.

In our concluding chapter, we focus on human trafficking as an issue of human security and the lessons that the Western Balkans hold for how to bridge the gap between human security in principle and practice. We argue that the issue of human trafficking requires a multifaceted, integrated response, which a human security approach is, in principle, capable of offering. We review the development of human security as a concept, which is contested not only by advocates of state security but also by proponents of human security arguments who seek to privilege the need to address the proximate causes of fear and violence over underlying issues of economic development and need, or over rights protections and the rule of law. We explore the extent to which elements of human security appear, in principle, in the prevention, protection, and prosecution measures in the UN Trafficking Protocol, the U.S. TVPA

and *TIP Report* process, the EU Council Framework Decision on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, and the proposed EU Plan of Action. Drawing on the Western Balkans and the insights of the volume's contributors, we reveal ways in which considerations of state security have overshadowed human security in practice and the impact of uneven prioritization and implementation of prevention, protection, and prosecution that has left human security as well as state security unrealized. The experience of the Western Balkans reveals that the problem is not "the absence of ideas" for a multifaceted, integrated approach to human trafficking, "but the failure of these ideas to attract the requisite support for integrated implementation." We conclude by exploring the sources of resistance to this implementation and the potential for governments and nongovernmental moral entrepreneurs to realize a human security approach to human trafficking.