

STRATEGIES BEYOND FOLLOWERSHIP

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This book examines how those involved in international affairs attempt to evade, modify, and even resist U.S. government policy preferences. It explores the strategies and tactics they may use to prevent official Washington from getting what it wants in terms of quantity, quality, timeliness, or cost. The chapters focus on the options these players have used and may use in the future, their rationales, and the circumstances affecting their choices. These international factors also have strong links to domestic politics. All politics is not “local,” but politicians maintain or lose their power according to how they manage homeland politics. Our observations and conclusions suggest that how Washington goes about international affairs and domestic politics has more or less helpful implications for how the United States is perceived internationally. For example, certain actions might suggest to others that the United States seeks to dominate or withdraw from the world stage, and other actions might be seen as righteous or hypocritical, competent or incompetent, benign or malignant, indifferent or exploitative.

It is hardly news that some in the world dislike and even defy the policies of the United States or indeed of any superpower. America’s debacles in Iraq and Vietnam, like those of the Soviets in Afghanistan and the French in Algeria, illustrate how violence using asymmetric means can favor those far weaker in terms of the classical measures of power preferred in conventional U.S. political-military assessments. And international affairs realists have long dis-

cussed counter-balancing, in which another state, or a coalition of them, tries to enhance or pool its power to counter unipolar dominance, whether present or expected, global or regional.

This volume goes beyond those widely recognized possibilities to explore a more complex and nuanced set of options, related goals, and their implications for the United States. Many of the additional options are more available, more frequently used, and less risky than attempts to inflict a direct, militarized defeat on some American policy venture or to sharply reduce the absolute and relative international power and presence of the United States. In part, that is because the practices of interest are not limited to those centered on military ends and means but include “actions” on the whole range of international issues on which the American government might try to exert influence and apply power or to avoid involvement altogether. The goals of some challenges are to increase America’s international commitments, presence, and activism beyond what Washington has preferred, in contrast to those associated with militarized resistance and hard power counter-balancing. The changes others may seek are not limited to pushing the United States out, back, or down. Further, efforts to modify, evade, or resist what official Washington wants do not necessarily run counter to American national interests, whatever U.S. policy makers may claim. Not all U.S. government policy preferences really advance American interests even if intended to do so.

As will be seen, pigeonholing others into one or two broad “grand strategy” categories (e.g., “moderate” or “extremist,” “pro-” or “anti-”American) or doing so for issues on which they interact with the United States (e.g., “high” or “low” politics, economic or ecological matters) has quite limited usefulness. Different foreign actors bring different “histories in use” and domestic and regional circumstances to issues. The factors most important to particular actors vary from issue to issue, place to place, and time to time. Those specifics may be far different than the themes of any “Washington consensus” or convenient Washington dichotomy for policy debates and spin contests. They may lead foreigners to challenge U.S. policy by suggesting linkages between issues that U.S. policies treat as unrelated or by separating issues that U.S. policy glues together. Of course, the great geographic and functional breadth of official U.S. policy concerns and goals often presents others with opportunities to invoke and exploit issue linkages.

To make matters still more realistic, albeit less parsimonious, unitary actor formulations can obscure and distort the particulars of challenge strategies and tactics and predicted U.S. responses. What options would-be challengers choose depends on their internal distributions of influence, and an apparent choice may be a commitment, a probing bluff, or even an unauthorized action.

A challenger trying to forecast or interpret a U.S. response may well consider relations between key elements in a current presidential administration and between themselves and other participants (bureaucratic, political, and special interest) in American politics. Both Americans and international actors assess who on the opposing side has policy clout and look for converging interests between particular participants in American and challenger policy processes. International challengers may view some U.S. officials, bureaus, and third-sector organizations as potential *de facto* partners. Domestic challengers to U.S. international policies can try to gain leverage by enlisting foreign support and even strengthening foreign supporters.

Starting Points

This volume was conceived during widespread discussions of U.S. world primacy and international affairs practices early in President George W. Bush's first term, but the aspects of international affairs central to his administration did not begin and will not end with his presidency. Two premises that have ongoing importance for challengers and challenges underlie our work. First, leaders in much of the world believe that they cannot avoid being affected by U.S. acts of commission and omission. That belief plays a significant role in, for example, how nations protect their material assets and the intangible values of society as a whole (Wolfers 1952). More in line with prospect theory, a nation that strives to achieve its preferred vision for the future (perhaps restoring past values) will keep one eye focused on the United States (Levy 1997). Others will then be attentive to U.S. policies and policy-making processes and search for ways to affect them so as to advance their own priorities.

Second, the view that "the strong do what they can and the weak do what they must" fails to capture much of the reality of international affairs (Barnett and Duvall 2005). The "strong," such as the United States, often do not do everything they can because of the press of competing priorities, domestically prevailing norms of legitimate action, and the pressures posed by domestic political and policy competitors (George 1980). The strong are not always indifferent to the current and prospective costs their actions may involve. As for the weak, treating them as "clay" to be molded at will by the strong ignores the full range of actions the weak may have available to achieve their goals both now and in the future. Those who are generally considered to be the weak, or the weaker, may not actually be weak in specific situations or on specific issues that are more important to them than to the strong. Even if they are "weak," their cost tolerance may be greater. And the political elites of the weak are not any less concerned with domestic politics than their superpower or great power counterparts.

Much American thinking slights the options available to others in the world to affect what the U.S. government can achieve. In spite of alternative voices (see, e.g., Walt 2005; Pape 2005), that unwarranted underemphasis is especially pronounced when U.S. policy elites claim moral superiority. Those claims are frequently voiced by President Bush, with the consequences Hans Morgenthau warned about: “the light hearted assumption that what one’s own nation aims at and does is morally good and that those who oppose that nation’s policies are evil is morally indefensible and intellectually untenable and leads in practice to that distortion of judgment, born of the blindness of crusading frenzy, which has been the curse of nations from the beginning of time” (1952, 984).

Unwisely, top U.S. officials often seem to expect almost complete, unquestioning compliance from nations with fewer material power assets or to believe it desirable and feasible to deal with the noncompliant mostly through policies of domination or conversion (Ikenberry 1998–99, 54). Both Bill Clinton’s and George W. Bush’s national strategy statements contain a substantial pledge to engage in “world-shaping” on both realistic and idealistic grounds, albeit with differences on the effectiveness and efficiency of various means to do so (Brown et al. 2000, 351–411; Bush 2002). Both have encouraged the use of American power through some combination of direct rule imposed by force, controlled international institutions, structural leverage based on asymmetric dependence, and export of belief, governance, and economic systems. At root, there has been an implicit assumption that what is held to be good for America is good for all informed and respectable others. There are substantial indications of a resurrection of American exceptionalism and “manifest destiny” accompanied by assumptions that the United States holds an unrivaled and thus decisive share of military, commercial, and soft power assets.

Dominance advocates call for the United States to shape the world in a geographically and functionally comprehensive way based on its superior might and superior values: “American power advantages are multidimensional, unprecedented, and unlikely to disappear any time” (Ikenberry 2003). Putting those advantages to work can ensure inherently justified American national interests against numerous threats. U.S. government policy preferences are then attainable and legitimate. Evidence to the contrary (for example, the course of events in Iraq) does not point to dubious assumptions but only to poor management of details. Serving U.S. interests allegedly will advance collective global interests in world progress and peace through the stabilizing structure of a unipolar international system centered on and designed by the United States (Bobrow 2001; 2002). If necessary, dominance or conversion can

feasibly be supplemented with “internal reconstruction,” in which the United States directly “intervenes in the secondary state and transforms its domestic political institutions” (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 292).¹

As a practical matter, a U.S. policy portfolio whose major elements are domination, conversion, and replacing the political infrastructure of others should call for the most serious attention to what those others will attempt by way of strategies of modification, evasion, and resistance. Ironically, the conceptions underlying such an American portfolio make that studious attention seem unimportant or even unnecessary. In essence, the United States is asserted to be the international rule maker, one that can (as a practical matter) and should (as a normative matter) determine or at least exert enormous influence on the content and processes of international cooperation and confrontation. The American “superiority triad” of values, military power, and economic resources does and will allow the United States to play the rule-maker role at what for it are tolerable or even modest costs (Wohlforth 1999).

Relevant and indeed central policy contests within the United States should then primarily have two foci. One is on the policy *actions* that will be emphasized in general vis-à-vis particular foreign players and situations. There are issues about resource allocation and preferred instruments of a broad nature, most obviously military versus nonmilitary, and of relative priority within each broad category (e.g., for military defense versus force projection, or for economic liberal openness versus neomercantilist nationalism).

The second focus is on the *arenas* in which Washington will exercise its leading role: unilateral assertion; forging and commanding problem-specific “coalitions of the willing” (Haass 1997; 2002); or designing, managing, and leading broad, formally organized, ongoing multilateral institutions. The United States should not shrink from the first arena, although the second is preferable. Dominating recalcitrant foreigners and imposing regime change merits a prominent place in America’s policy portfolio. The third arena, multilateral institutions, should not be allowed to hamper the United States’ ability or will to pursue the others (Gaddis 2002). Institutionalized multilateralism does not have merit in its own right but only as a case-specific instrument to be used as it facilitates U.S. pursuit of domination, conversion, or regime change.

Whatever their disagreements about policy actions and arenas, those committed to the dominant superpower view tend to agree that others have only a very limited set of choices about the role they will play vis-à-vis American scripted international security scenarios. Their options, as in the run-up to invading Iraq, ostensibly are limited to ultimately self-defeating irrational

and evil opposition (e.g., Saddam Hussein's Iraq), marginalization while the world passes them by (e.g., Gerhard Schroeder's Germany, Jacques Chirac's France), or compliant following (e.g., Tony Blair's United Kingdom).

Many proponents of American dominance contend that most other states and nonstate groups faced with that menu will accept followership as their only viable alternative. Their decision makers will sign on to the international security ends and means the United States prefers, thinking that doing so will at least minimize costs while acting otherwise will trigger U.S. punishments and reduce any consideration Washington gives to another's views and interests. Also, given the allegedly intrinsic appeal of the "American model," foreign elites will find compliance the course of least resistance because mass sentiments in their populations resonate with U.S. values and practices. Clarity and commitment in American policy will then produce assent. Assent to any particular American policy will create precedents and momentum for followership on other issues. Foreigners who opt for strategies of modification, evasion, or resistance are doomed to isolation and rejection internationally and domestically. As they demonstrably fail, such strategies will seem increasingly less attractive.

Compared to adherents of the "dominance school" described above, the "loyal opposition" view certainly favors much more apparent consideration for the views of others (e.g., consultations and dialogues) with less unilateral assertion and more development and use of multilateral institutions. Those are the preferred arenas favored by coalitions of the willing. With such a "velvet glove" approach, an America that acts with "tact" will get its way more often and at lower cost than one whose behavior seems like that of "a sullen, pouting, oblivious, and over-muscled teenager" (Gaddis 2002, 56). Others treated with a show of respect are more likely to comply with U.S. policy positions that are tolerable in terms of both their national pride and domestic politics and to take on some of the burdens of policy implementation.

Yet the "velvet glove" school shares a fundamental premise of indispensability with the dominance advocates regarding the extent to which the United States should, can, and must play the critical role in the evolution of international affairs. In Joseph Nye's words, "If the largest beneficiary of a public good (such as international order) does not take the lead toward its maintenance, nobody else will" (2001, 102). Most international others supposedly do and will recognize that situation and want America to act accordingly. Most others supposedly do and will view America as being the positive exemplar of secular trends (modernity and globalization) and the definitive exemplar of best practices in the political (democracy) and military (the revolution in military affairs or RMA) realms. Accordingly, for instrumental reasons, the "velvet

glove” perspective differs from the dominance view in calling for America to make greater use of “strategies of restraint” and “reassurance” (as in Ikenberry 2001; 2003). These supporting assumptions are empirically dubious (Bobrow and Boyer 2005), as are those of the explicit dominance school. In any event, the two perspectives agree on the feasibility and desirability of an end result that amounts to “legitimate domination” by the United States (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990).

These widespread views about what the United States can and should do in the early twenty-first century seem to slight what post–World War II history tells us about the options actually available to others and their likely consequences for U.S. foreign policy ventures. Much of the language in contemporary American policy circles echoes that of the Vietnam War years. Consider the November 1964 assertion by Walt Rostow that “our assets . . . are sufficient . . . if we enter the exercise with adequate determination to succeed. . . . [A]t this stage of history we are the greatest power in the world—if we behave like it” (quoted in Rosi 1973, 16). Noncompliance by and criticism from others allegedly made pursuing U.S. policy preferences even more imperative rather than indicating a need for rethinking their merits. Credibility required staying the course in the face of mounting costs lest others doubt America’s “power, resolve, and competence” to discharge its morally obligatory mission (Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton in 1965, quoted in Rosi 1973, 16). The Vietnam War policies of the United States turned out to have grossly underestimated the costs that counter-strategies to Washington’s preferences would impose, and those policies were eventually abandoned.

In fact, the last half of the twentieth century and the years since have been rich in examples where others evaded, modified, or resisted official U.S. preferences even though the United States had a massive share of global hard and soft power assets. Such policy lines were pursued with some success even by states identified as America’s closest “kin” in the international system and as members of a putative security community with the United States at its core, as well as by avowed enemies and neutrals.

In the early Cold War years, “[t]he Europeans themselves were crucial in recasting the terms of liberal multilateralism—if only in resisting, modifying, and circumventing American proposals” (Ikenberry 1989, 398). Subsequent Cold War decades saw numerous European attempts to evade and modify U.S. military deployment and doctrinal preferences. Japan evaded and modified U.S. official preferences that it assume extended military obligations or comply with the political economy of the Structural Impediments Initiative, and it secured the reversion of Okinawa. The 1970s oil shocks saw the United States having to modify its initial preferences for dealing with the

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Lack of simple compliance marked the behavior even of others who at the same time saw the United States as the best (or even the only) available guarantor against a common source of threats, or as a hard (or even impossible) to replace provider of economic benefits.

History suggests that there can be policy traps inherent in both the harder, more militaristic and unilateral stance (“hegemony with ‘imperial characteristics’”) and the softer, less militaristic and more multilateral stance (“hegemony with ‘liberal characteristics’”).² Unduly rosy anticipations of foreign compliance can lead to unrealistic estimates of a specific policy’s benefits (too high) and costs (too low). Policy commitments based on such enticing estimates can entangle the United States in unproductive situations for which policy modifications are delayed because of their perceived credibility costs. In other words, U.S. policies considered attractive (primarily because policy makers underestimated evasion, modification, and resistance efforts by others) are still pursued even when there is ample evidence of noncompliance. The regret in the phrase “if we knew then what we know now” does not translate into decisive action to reverse policy (e.g., the absence of imminent WMD capability in Iraq coupled with mounting expenses and casualties). Internationally, others may well see encouraging precedents in instances of relatively successful attempts to evade, modify, and resist U.S. preferences. Eventual U.S. policy reappraisals (withdrawals and various forms of “backing down” or even tardy increases in commitments) can make such options more attractive to others. Actual or perceived foreign attempts at evasion, modification, and resistance also can foster in America a domestic climate of aversion to international commitments and responsibilities given what seems to be the unreasonable behavior of others.

Several self-inflicted circumstances are policy traps for the United States. In one, American policy elites have propagated such exaggerated images of U.S. power that the threshold for promising options that challenge U.S. policy preferences is set very low. David need not actually succeed in slaying Goliath to seem successful; it is sufficient to entice Goliath into self-exhausting and vulnerability-increasing behaviors. Success in baiting such traps would increase the chances of achieving a draw, securing substantial concessions, or even wounding Goliath enough to make him a shadow of his former self. In another self-inflicted circumstance, American officials focus almost exclusively on the possibility that “great powers” or “major states” will attempt evasion, modification, and resistance, ignoring the “little guys” with very small material power assets relative to the United States and thus getting caught unprepared. In a third circumstance, American officials believe that others are not in a general search-and-learning mode about nonfollowership strate-

gies, that only a few are interested in them and then for only a few specific issues.³ Finally, American policy elites may be prone to ignore potential coalitions established to evade, modify, or resist what an incumbent administration prefers. Such coalitions could be established between foreign parties and organized participants in U.S. politics (e.g., opposition politicians, dissenting bureaucrats, issue-interested business sectors, and nongovernmental organizations [NGOs]). Coalitions of that sort can make it more difficult and resource intensive to secure and sustain a domestic mandate for the major international commitments that vigorous imperial or liberal domination requires. Prudent American statecraft would take considerable pains to avoid such traps and the conditions that lead to them. That calls for a fuller understanding of the strategies of evasion, modification, and resistance available to others and their calculus for choosing to pursue one or more of them. With perceptiveness on those counts, the United States will, if anything, be more able to convince others that strategies other than followership are inferior to compliance. It would at least be more able to persuade others to adopt options that are easier for the United States to counter.

Anticipating What Others Might Conclude and Do

Developing an appropriate degree of perceptiveness about others' strategies of evasion, modification, and resistance starts by placing those others at the center of attention. This strategy follows the rules of good policy analysis put forward by Albert Wohlstetter and Richard Elmore. In analyses of "conflict systems" and "opposed systems design," Wohlstetter (1964; 1968) recommended giving others in such systems as much attention as we give ourselves; allowing them to follow their own accepted rules of the game to act rationally and intelligently to advance their interests; and conducting end-to-end analysis of the paths from an American policy choice to its impacts on a target situation and realization of initial U.S. policy objectives.

Elmore (1985) did not limit his counsel to policy systems already opposed or in conflict but instead to any system in which no single organization has sole and complete control of policy adoption, implementation, and impact. For this larger set, he in effect accepts the Wohlstetter maxims and argues for working through a "reversible logic" of "forward and backward mapping." Doing so generates a realistic understanding of the determinants of policy outcomes, the actors involved, and their options and likely choices. What difference does emphasis on the forward or the backward approach make?

From the forward mapping perspective, the problem is finding a collection of implements likely to produce the effect that policy makers want. From

the backward mapping perspective, the problem is finding a set of decisions that policy can influence and specifying how policy can tip those decisions in the desired direction. Forward mapping stresses what policy makers control; backward mapping stresses the marginal influence that policy exercises over decisions by individuals and organizations. If we were to look at policy decisions only from the forward mapping perspective, we would consistently overestimate the degree of control policy makers exercise. Policy makers tend to see the world through the lens of the implements they control. . . . But the success of policy depends . . . as well on conditions outside the control of policy makers and on decisions over which policy exercises only a marginal influence . . . to be good strategists, policy makers have to calculate the consequences of their actions from the point of view of the decisions they are trying to influence. (Elmore 1985, 68–69)

The backward mapping perspective suggests that sound policy design by U.S. officials would seek to answer two questions about others providing elements that are critical or at least conducive to realizing American policy preferences: To what extent will those elements suit the self-perceived needs and values of the other actors? If providing those elements is clearly not in their interests, what could the other actor do to avoid providing them in an effective and timely manner? If there is a gap between, on the one hand, others' perceived interests and values and, on the other, their view of the implications of official U.S. policy preferences, answers to the second question amount to options for evasion, modification, and resistance.

The stimulus to challenge the United States rather than comply with it stems from judgments by foreign elites that U.S. policy preferences will impede realization of their own domestic and international goals. Judgments about domestic consequences often will get more weight, and these are shaped by evolving constituency interests, prejudices, historical experiences, ideology, identity, values, and national and group institutional patterns.⁴ Those factors may well have momentum, motivational intensity, salience, and potential repercussions of far greater magnitude and predictability than the carrots and sticks the U.S. government might try to use. When foreign judgments emphasize long-term national and group futures, immediate net gains from followership may carry less weight than long-term gains from evasion, modification, and resistance.

Compliance with U.S. policy preferences is hardly a foregone conclusion. First, for many others in international affairs, there is a persistent contradiction between what they consider to be legitimate and what they consider to be domination by the United States (or even by a coalition of the willing). Con-

sider, for example, the oft-quoted statement of Joschka Fischer, who as Germany's foreign minister contended that "alliances between free democracies should not be reduced to following. Alliance partners are not satellites" (quoted in Erlanger 2002). Refusing compliance seems especially unsurprising when displayed by others who view their historical experiences with Washington as worthy of a "justice" claim for compensation for historical damage or neglect or evidence that "legitimate domination" amounts to their elimination.⁵

Second, standards set by others for determining the magnitude, credibility, and irreversibility of American "strategies of restraint" or "reassurance" may be more demanding than what American officials and publics regard as conclusive evidence. Those external actors are especially likely to be leery of the United States asserting its "right" to curtail commitments, for example, by not ratifying or by unilaterally withdrawing from international agreements it has signed. Indeed, American persuasiveness about its own military prowess, economic wealth, technological superiority, and cultural reach may raise the bar for U.S. credibility. An America ostensibly able to do whatever it wants has fewer excuses for failure or for claiming a waiver on grounds of expense or difficulty. If America has so great an advantage over others, then U.S. rejection of a proposed reduction in its margin of superiority can seem unjustified. After all, the United States will have an abundance of private goods in any event.

Third, socialization into or conversion to exported "American ideas" may raise the threshold for American legitimacy and lower the threshold for sensing a U.S. goal of domination: "when the hegemon finds it necessary to pursue policies that are at odds with the norms it initially articulated . . . elites in secondary states may question the sincerity and credibility of the hegemon's normative program" (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 294). Also, others may use these exported ideas as a lever to mobilize American public opinion and thus pressure the government to change official policy, by charging that the policy violates basic U.S. values.

Fourth, many others monitor American domestic politics and social currents, including policy ideas that have gained popular support. Their appraisals may contain grave doubts about the extent to which U.S. policy elites can sustain their commitments to "self-binding" restrictions on autonomous action, costly or risky actions, or side-payments (i.e., convenient concessions) to members of ad hoc coalitions. Some claim that the "open" nature of U.S. policy formation processes will assuage such doubts because of the opportunities it affords foreigners to influence outcomes (see, e.g., Ikenberry 1998–1999). Foreigners accepting that argument might arrive at conclusions less supportive of compliance. With regard to evasion, modification, and resistance, that openness could lead others to conclude that they have important allies in the

U.S. polity with whom they can coalesce to bargain successfully for a better deal. Alternatively, that openness might be exploited by other foreigners who have different agendas and who are better positioned to wield influence in Washington. Of course, American claims to openness might be a device to trick foreigners or embroil them in domestically oriented struggles among U.S. actors with their own parochial agendas.

While it is premature to claim to have developed a high-quality typology of nonfollowership options (a set of categories mutually distinct and comprehensive), we can begin to discern some categories with distinctly different cores, and these cores have plenty of conceptual or experiential illustrations (if only fuzzy boundaries).⁶ The authors of the chapters that follow have started from a framework in which nonfollowership options always have two sorts of content: *actions* and the *arenas* in which and through which they are taken. Besides using some current action capabilities and existing arenas, others may try to build for the future more and different action capabilities and create new or enhanced arena arrangements. Actions may be taken in more than one of the arenas but not necessarily in all of them; each arena may accommodate more than one of the actions but not necessarily all of them. Those who do not simply follow the United States on some particular issue may well have the opportunity and the capacity to pursue several combinations of actions and arenas simultaneously or sequentially. If issues persist for a lengthy period, the options considered and used may change in view of others' experience with them, their domestic context, third-party behavior, and U.S. responses.

Table 1.1 sets out the cells of an exploratory matrix of options to evade, modify, or resist U.S. official preferences, with types of actions in rows and types of arenas in columns. Many of the possibilities may be used to seek expanded, not just curtailed, U.S. involvement. As suggested earlier, it is reasonable to assume that an attentive international audience seeks to learn from the success and failure of attempts to challenge the United States in any of the ways shown.

Actions

The category of "‘craziness’ and martyrdom" demonstrates "readiness to sacrifice self-existence" by taking steps that run counter to widely held norms of state behavior and mainstream utilitarian calculation.⁷ Such actions thus seem crazy and senseless but may in fact be strategically rational (Kahn 1960; Schelling 1960). The actions are often shocking to American sensibilities and seem very difficult to prevent by normal government action. Their most extreme forms directly impose pain and suffering in dramatic ways: "genocide, . . . mass assassination of leaders, food poisoning, systematic sabotage of civilian

Table 1.1. An initial framework

<i>Actions</i>	<i>Arenas</i>				
	<i>Unilateral</i>	<i>Broad agenda institutions with U.S. excluded</i>	<i>Coalitions of the unwilling</i>	<i>Clubs and caucuses in U.S. member IGOs, INGOs</i>	<i>Collective action networks with American participants</i>
"Craziness," martyrdom					
Melting					
Counter-balancing					
Fait accompli					
Bloc creation					
Rule-based retaliation					
Rule expansion					
Consent and exploit					
Consent and deceive					
Promise, protest, retraction					
Conditional support commitments					
Schedule delays					
Linkage to large side-payments					
Standing aside					
Credible helplessness					

peaceful facilities, counter value terror against schools, hospitals, recreation areas, civil transportation." Such actions challenge compliance with U.S. preferences in ways beyond killing those who collaborate with Washington. They may persuade Americans to doubt the benefits of maintaining international commitments in the face of such extreme hostility. They may lead foreign elites and populations to conclude that the United States will not dominate the "crazy" challenger or will do so in illegitimate ways that impose substantial costs on bystanders. An American administration faced with such developments may change the policies that craziness and martyrdom challenge.

While craziness and martyrdom inflict pain on the United States, its foreign associates, and even innocent bystanders, "melting" evades U.S. attempts to eliminate a foe by simply disappearing, as the Taliban did for a while, to await an opportunity for later reconstitution. Then the United States must choose between abandoning its elimination preference (at least implicitly) and undertaking a longer and more resource-demanding suppression campaign than officials had anticipated (and may have promised to American and for-

eign audiences). After 9/11, subsequent developments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and transit bombings in Madrid and London, craziness and martyrdom as well as melting actions are by now all too familiar. Given the space constraints of this volume, the following chapters concentrate on other ways that actors may evade, modify, and resist U.S. policies.

“Counter-balancing” refers to more varied actions than the classic political-military alliance of weaker or equally matched states or the bipolarity sought by a single “peer competitor.” Those sorts of structural “hard counter-balancing” actions involve a general, ongoing, and explicit rejection of U.S. primacy and its perceived status as the sole rule maker. They are, however, harder and more time consuming (and thus rarer) than smaller efforts to deprive the United States of its preferred course of action. Such situational or issue-specific counter-balancing actions are used more frequently, as they are easier and quicker to mount (and abandon). They often involve actions designed less to alter the status quo than to render too costly the American attempts to gain an advantage. This type of challenge is less direct than a potentially countervailing one. For example, a state may move to develop an international organization excluding the United States in order to counter-balance new U.S. military bases near its borders. Consider China’s leadership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in the context of U.S. military basing in Central Asia or the European Union and Mercosur agreements that provide some counter-balancing to a U.S.-sought free trade area of the Americas. On occasion, others in the world may seem to be tolerating or even encouraging U.S. policies, when in actuality they anticipate that that those policies can easily be blunted through soft counter-balancing.

The next action type, “fait accompli,” challenges the United States by making moves that create a changed situation, as with Israeli settlement policy or North Korean nuclear testing. By presenting the United States with a new set of international facts, challengers try to make obsolete the assumptions made by American policy planners and decision makers. The feasibility of the United States achieving its policy preference at all, let alone at the initially estimated cost and schedule, can be rendered increasingly doubtful.

“Bloc creation,” with the United States left on the outside of the bloc, may present considerably more opportunities for future nonfollowership coalitions. It can involve forming a new international governmental organization (IGO), adding a major mission to the scope of an existing institution, or forming a new interest group caucus within an IGO to which the United States does belong. Examples include steps toward the regional economic arrangement of the Asia-10 (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations +3), the EU pursuit of

a European defense identity other than NATO, and the developing country G-20+ grouping in the Millennium Round World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations.

“Rule-based retaliation” uses codes of behavior previously accepted by the United States to pose substantial costs for the policy preferences the federal government currently pursues or is considering for future adoption. It hinders U.S. defection from previously agreed-upon restraints on autonomous action, or at least raises the price of defection or failure to implement. Numerous cases brought against the United States in the WTO are illustrative.

“Rule expansion” proposes initiatives that, if accepted by the United States, would impose new restraints and, if rejected, would generate criticism among politically significant Americans who advocate the rules in question. The Kyoto Protocol, the Anti-Land Mine Convention, and initiatives to make inexpensive pharmaceuticals more readily available in poor countries are illustrative.

Actions of evasion, modification, and resistance do not need to be framed as opposition but can be wrapped in a cloak of consent. “Consent and exploit” actions declare and may even undertake cooperation with a general U.S. policy line while using it to justify specific practices that U.S. policy elites view with disfavor. Examples include the most expansionist versions of the Israeli wall for the West Bank and Russian actions in Chechnya. “Consent and deceive” actions amount to overt, declaratory support while acting in direct contradiction to it. Consider Egypt with regard to the promotion of democracy.

“Promise-protest-retraction” actions provide consent but later explicitly withdraw it. The consenting foreign leaders claim to find themselves overruled by protests or institutional responses from within their domestic polity. Those protests, which often are actually not surprising to the foreign leader who had issued a promise, are followed by a “reluctant” withdrawal of consent. Leaders of Japan’s conservative ruling party for almost fifty years used this type of action to fend off U.S. pressures for a less restrained military posture. In such circumstances U.S. officials find themselves pressed to modify their policy preferences or risk weakening an ostensibly compliant, pro-American foreign leader or regime.

A cloak of consent may also be wrapped around “conditional support commitments.” Prospects of compliance are explicitly contingent on meeting some conditions considered highly unlikely to develop or be met. The up-front conditions usually are considered legitimate by important elements of challenger, third-party, and U.S. selectorates. Consider how the French and others made their support for the U.S. invasion of Iraq conditional upon UN

Security Council approval and how Israel announced it would commit to U.S.-supported plans for resolving the Palestinian conflict only if the Palestinian Authority suppresses attacks from its territory.

Less forthrightly, “schedule delays” may be used after consent and cooperation pledges. Promises are one thing, while implementing actions are another, as with pledges of development assistance, humanitarian relief, or peacekeeping military forces that never or only fractionally ever reach their destination—as the Hamid Karzai government in Afghanistan can attest about pledges from American allies in Europe and Asia. Delaying efforts may last long enough for U.S. policy elites to adjust their priorities and lose the will to make up for shortfalls in pledged foreign contributions or to pressure dilatory foreigners to honor their pledges.

Consent, even if not denied outright, may not amount to followership if it is linked to Washington repeatedly earning it in ways that sacrifice some important U.S. priorities. Such “linkage to large side-payments” can substantially reduce, or eventually outweigh, any American policy gains from whatever cooperation foreigners have been induced to provide. Consider, for example, how Chinese officials have managed to cooperate on North Korean nuclear matters in return for official U.S. restraint from pressure for currency reevaluation, human rights improvements, or Taiwan’s formal independence.

Strategies of evasion and modification can also take the form of “standing aside.” Staying out of a situation altogether challenges American policy preferences under either or both of two conditions. In one circumstance U.S. policy planning assumes the availability of assets that a foreign party controls, such as military resources, intelligence assets, or financial and trade regulatory authorities.⁸ The United States can find itself in a dependency trap that foreign parties can trigger (whether or not they intentionally created the trap). The second condition is that significant elements of the U.S. political scene trust particular foreign parties to certify the correctness of Washington’s policy preferences. Their standing aside calls into question the judgments underlying the relevant U.S. policy preferences.

The actions discussed to this point largely involve what foreign parties may persuade Washington that they have the capacity to do. The final type of action, “credible helplessness,” invokes a lack of capacity. The more Washington comes to recognize that others have large capacity deficits, the less promise U.S. officials will see in pressing followership on them. Incapacity may be a deliberate achievement, as with Japan’s decades of inaction in developing the military capabilities the United States wanted it to have. In other instances, the lack of capacity may be unintended but, once credible, is useful in inducing Washington to tolerate a retreat from compliance. For example, heavily

indebted middle-income countries in Latin America have used an inability to meet debt and debt service obligations to extract relief that the United States would have preferred not to provide.

Arenas

Whatever actions foreigners consider, they also have to make choices about the arenas in which to pursue them. Some major possibilities appear in the column headings in table 1.1. In the “unilateral” variant, a particular state or non-state actor engages in evasion, modification, or resistance on its own. All the other possibilities involve joint action with one or more other states or nonstate actors. Whether intended to do so or not, unilateral efforts may encourage emulation by others if they seem effective. Such effectiveness can also trigger American responses that make nonfollowership more attractive to third parties. While unilateral actions can be taken in any of the other arenas (e.g., a single member veto in the UN Security Council), our interest lies primarily in their use outside of multi-member settings.

“Broad agenda institutions with the United States excluded” are composed of states or NGOs but do not include American organizations as more than observers. Their members provide or seek to provide them with rules of appropriate behavior, some established commitment to collective action by their members, and accepted processes to undertake it. Those commitments and processes can operate independent of U.S. approval. Such institutions need not engage in a blanket rejection of U.S. policy preferences and may on occasion even support them. They do, however, rest on the mutually recognized interests of their members in pursuing certain objectives over time, whatever the nature of U.S. policy preferences, and pooling their assets for doing so. Exclusion of American organizations may be based on regional identity (e.g., the EU and ASEAN) or economic characteristics (e.g., OPEC and other commodity cartels), or it may result from U.S. rejection or nonratification of particular international agreements (e.g., the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol).

By way of contrast, state and nonstate “coalitions of the unwilling” have a more ad hoc, issue-specific character. They lack established processes for arriving at collective decisions about anything, including challenges to official U.S. preferences, and their continued existence is highly uncertain. The French-German-Russian endeavor to hold back the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 is illustrative.

A fourth type of arena for mounting challenges is that of “clubs and caucuses in U.S. member IGOs and INGOs.” Resources are pooled to strengthen support for agreed-to caucus positions and to hold out prospects of bloc vot-

ing. The possibility of harmonization between club and caucus preferences and those of the United States may not be denied and may even be sought after. An underlying premise of challengers choosing this type of arena is that some part of the U.S. government or some American interest group has a stake in the future of the relevant international governmental or nongovernmental organization and in having it handle a variety of issues. Pulling an issue into such an arena where a substantial non-U.S. club or caucus exists may induce desired American policy changes, delay unwanted U.S. policy actions, and reduce the chances of substantial U.S. retaliation for nonfollowership. U.S. officials may be denied a domestically persuasive mandate justifying their initial policy preferences and may be provided with a justification for modifying them.⁹ The United States may then face a more demanding carrot-and-stick problem, especially when the club or caucus is empowered by the institution's rules and norms to forestall mandates the United States seeks (as with the ASEAN caucus in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC], the Islamic caucus in the UN, and the G-20+ in the WTO).

The last type of arena, "collective action networks with American participants," can resemble other arenas discussed above in terms of some ongoing commitment to collective action, established processes for decision making, and a shared sense of objectives among members. As the term "network" in this last category suggests, it need not have those characteristics any more than do coalitions of the unwilling. What makes this arena reasonably distinct is the mix of network participants: nonstate actors both foreign and American, foreign governments, and, formally or informally, some elements from American central or subnational bureaucracies and politics. Many such networks are created and sustained with one major purpose: shaping official U.S. policies in directions they might not otherwise take.¹⁰ As a generic type, such networks may pursue almost any of the types of actions discussed previously and support use of the other types of arenas.

Our Explorations

The chapters that follow probe actors, policy issues, actions, and arenas likely to be of continuing importance in international affairs. Although they do not cover a representative sample of all nonfollowership practices, they do suggest alternatives to compliance with U.S. policies not limited to the particular time periods and situations examined.

Some chapters focus on country-specific foreign actors. Others center on strategies and behavior in multilateral groupings and organizations. Particular attention is paid to political-military issues in chapters on Iraq, Germany, Turkey, the G-7, and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Other

chapters are more concerned with nonmilitary issues: global warming, trade and trade-related issues, financial regulation, and public health with respect to dangerous substances. Of course, the same foreign actors may or may not practice nonfollowership on both military and nonmilitary issues. Differences and similarities in resorting to nonfollowership are covered in chapters on China, Turkey, and the G-7. A chapter on international public opinion addresses domestic political conditions in various countries and the incentives for their political elites to constrain American hegemony. The final chapter draws some conclusions about and implications for the perspective and framework introduced in the previous pages. It thus addresses possible future challenges to American policies as well as the development of more realistic and anticipatory U.S. statecraft.