IN THE ERA BEFORE THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR National Security Affairs (ANSA) became a permanent, often dominating, aspect of presidential decision making on national security, President Eisenhower contemplated moving the center of foreign policy making into the White House. He toyed with the idea of appointing a National Security Council (NSC) based administrator/adviser who would be the senior assistant to the president for foreign policy. Some proposals designated Secretary of State John Foster Dulles as that official, but each time Eisenhower brought the idea to Dulles, the secretary did his best to quash it. Dulles rejected the creation of a powerful special assistant for foreign affairs at the White House in any scenario, whether he or anyone else took the new position. Twice when he was instructed by Eisenhower to sound out prominent candidates to become either his replacement as secretary or the new White House assistant, Dulles made the offers (specifically to John McCloy and C. D. Jackson) so unattractive that they were refused. Eisenhower valued Dulles’s role as first-among-equals adviser above all other aspects of his foreign policy process; he tolerated Dulles’s bureaucratic games. No special assistant such as this was ever created.¹

Over forty years later, in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks...
on the United States, the G. W. Bush administration swiftly moved to restructure its decision-making processes related to the new threats that had emerged. The new global war on terrorism loomed as a struggle that would be fought overseas and at home. The merger of foreign policy and domestic law enforcement issues called for a new style of decision making for what was soon called homeland security. The administration created a White House–based Homeland Security Council, Office of Homeland Security, and Homeland Security Adviser system based on the NSC model that had endured since the 1960s. In the face of congressional calls for a new Department of Homeland Security that would be subject to congressional oversight and directed by a Senate-confirmed cabinet office, the administration initially defended the White House system, even refusing to allow Homeland Security Adviser Tom Ridge to testify before Congress. Ridge himself summed up the notion succinctly, explaining that it was his personal relationship with the president that would give him his power and authority. Eliminating that bond by forcing Ridge to become one of many cabinet officers rather than the president’s personal adviser on homeland security might destroy his effectiveness.

These small tales of decision-making organization illustrate the two key themes of this work. First, presidents feel pressure to centralize decision making in the White House in an effort to gain more direct control over the policy process. Even within the White House, institutional and political pressures lead the president to streamline or create shortcuts around the system he designed to fit his own decision-making preferences. Eisenhower initiated a process to create his own personal assistant on national security affairs; G. W. Bush placed the system for addressing new national priorities as close to him as possible. Each was acting out of a desire to gain more control or establish initial control over the decision making on crucial issues. Second, the scholarly work on presidential decision making may ultimately lead to one conclusion: The key to understanding the decision-making process rests upon the study of the relationships between the president and his senior advisers. Eisenhower’s relationship with Dulles was so important to him that he abandoned his plans for reorganization rather than have them jeopardize that relationship. Bush, in office less than a year and facing a new and complex war, chose a close and trusted friend to take command on his behalf. In short, all presidents feel institutional and political pressures to manipulate the decision-making process toward a more centralized, yet more informal process. Each president’s relationship with his advisers, however, will determine if and how these pressures are translated into actual decision-making processes.

INTRODUCTION
These basic notions provide a foundation for the examination of the changes that occur in national security decision-making processes within the senior levels of the executive branch of the U.S. government. Four questions are crucial. First, what are the causes of change in national security advisory and decision-making processes? Second, are there any distinct patterns in the way those processes change over time? Third, if there are similarities in the pattern of change over time, what are the causes of those similarities? Fourth, if there are differences in the pattern of change over time, what are the causes of those differences? These questions are answered through the development of an evolution model of national security decision making and the testing of this model with case studies of decision making on arms control and nuclear strategy by the Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations. The key contribution of the evolution model to the study of national security decision making is its focus on the way the structure of the decision unit changes over time. Decision making is not seen as a static process, but as a dynamic one that evolves and matures in important ways during a president’s term in office.

The case studies identify the similarities and differences in the way administrations’ national security processes change over time. The case study evidence suggests that the structure of national security decision making begins to follow a distinct pattern of evolution over the first term of any presidential administration. Each administration begins with a standard National Security Council–based interagency process. Decision making then starts to evolve in a predictable manner—participation in the decision unit is narrowed, ad hoc and informal procedures play greater and greater roles in the process, and the standard interagency process is bypassed or streamlined more and more often. These changes represent tendencies or leanings, not a rigid linear evolution that leads all administrations toward identical structures. All administrations do seem to begin a journey in the same direction, but they do not all reach the same destination. The pressures they feel to initiate modifications in the decision-making structure are quite the same, however. These similarities stem from the pressures of the international political system, domestic political system, internal executive branch decision making, and presidential management strategies and political goals. Presidents use three structures to make decisions—a formal, informal, and confidence structure. The differences in the changes actually made within each administration, their duration, and the variation in the origins, use, and interactions between these three structures stem from the idiosyncratic leadership styles of individual presidents. The individual leadership style of each president shapes the way in which he reacts to similar pressures.
The importance of this study lies in its attention to the factors that influence the evolution of the decision unit, its identification of the tendencies toward a specific structural evolution, and its focus on the interrelationship of leadership style, political and institutional pressures. Incoming presidents designing their national security decision structures usually create systems that are the mirror image of their predecessors. In a sense, they reinvent the wheel during the presidential transition and then spend years learning how to make decisions, adjusting their decision structures along the way. Understanding the pressures on the decision unit and knowing how their personal leadership style has an impact on decision making may be essential to helping new presidents design decision structures that fit the realities of national security decision making. Although no “best decision-making process” that fits all administrations can be devised, the case studies suggest that an administration that has all three structures operating in tandem provides the best foundation for decision making. In addition, the research here makes it clear that presidents use different types of decision structures to make different types of decisions.

THE SCHOLARLY CONTEXT

Since the 1960s, foreign and national security policy decision making have been explained in two general ways. First, some scholars have argued that organizational and bureaucratic dynamics inherent in governmental decision making are the key determinants in policy making. The organizational process model contends that the government is best described as a vast conglomeration of semi-independent departments with interests and perspectives of their own; governmental policy is the output of attempts to merge those competing interests into coherent policy or the uncoordinated aggregate of decisions made by each department. The bureaucratic politics model focuses on the perceptions, interests, and ambitions of individual governmental officials. The president is often portrayed as just another player in the bureaucratic game. Governmental policy, ultimately, is the result of bargaining and compromise between individuals and coalitions of individuals. These models taken together are usually called the “governmental politics” model. Their common ingredient is the description of decision-making processes as a competition for control of policy between government officials and departments and policy choices made through negotiations among these officials and departments. In addition, they portray a process
that is ruled by the institutional nature of decision making within the executive branch—separate organizations and individuals competing to see their interests become policy. Each president faces these similar institutional pressures.

Others have suggested that the role of the president, his decision-making style, and his political needs are the crucial variables. Ex-presidential advisers argue that presidents must be seen as unique individuals; each decision-making system must be tailored to the idiosyncratic needs of the particular president. Some analyses have suggested different ways of categorizing management styles; however, the purpose of the management strategy was the same in each case—gaining presidential control over self-interested departments and ambitious, often feuding officials. These management strategies are a function of a president’s own decision-making theory. From his own predispositions and from the advice of scholars and practitioners, a president creates committee structures, decision-making procedures, and roles and responsibilities for specific officials and agencies. Much of the literature emphasizing the role of the president is a direct critique of the organizational and bureaucratic process models in which the president was often described as captive to the executive branch. In all of these ideas, the president is the dominant player. He manages the process to make sure that decisions are made the way he wants them made and that the policy outcomes reflect his political preferences. Within this book, these concepts will be referred to as presidential management models.

Often the governmental politics and presidential management models are seen as mutually exclusive, even competing models. Such a debate over which factors are more important can eventually grow sterile. Since the late 1960s and early 1970s these ideas have not been developed to a great extent. Both models hold more explanatory power if they are seen as complementary. Each model describes forces within an administration that shape the process. Organizational and bureaucratic actors fight for the needs of their organizations or their individual needs, respectively; presidents fight for their needs. This book argues that the internal dynamics of the executive branch and the managerial preferences of the president both influence the shape of decision-making processes.

A third paradigm that springs from the “new institutionalism” literature provides a more comprehensive framework for explaining decision making. These ideas can be adapted to include the concepts contained within the governmental politics and presidential management models. Initially the new institutionalism literature considered the structure of governmental decision making to be determined by Congress and the pressure of various interest groups; the depart-
mental structure of the government was seen as a reflection of congressional and lobby group concerns. Further scholarship refocused the literature on the power of the presidency, suggesting that he has both the motivation and managerial advantages to win decision-making struggles with Congress, interest groups, and the bureaucracy. In this view, the president becomes the key actor in structuring decision making. Importantly, this literature adds the domestic political environment as a factor in decision making, a factor that the governmental politics and presidential management models often downplay.

These ideas originally concentrated on domestic policy making. By applying them to national security policy, the differences between domestic and national security policy are highlighted. In the latter, the president has even more of an advantage than in the domestic arena; the influence of interest groups and Congress are muted. The addition of international events as a key influence on decision making is crucial and obvious, yet often ignored.

All three models have a key limitation. They usually do not consider time as a factor in the decision-making process. There is the sense that an administration will put into place a decision-making system at the start of its stewardship over U.S. foreign policy, and maintain that structure for the next four to eight years. Time and the cumulative effects of multiple decisions on the process and personnel are not addressed. Without an inclusion of time as a factor, studies of national security decision making are handicapped. Too often one case study from an administration’s tenure in office is used as a representative example of how the administration made decisions for its entire term in office. Other studies use generic anecdotal tales of how a president made decisions to characterize a president’s decision-making process. This study examines the way presidents made decisions over time on a specific issue to see how and why that process changes.

A MODEL OF DECISION-MAKING CHANGE

This book uses a modified version of Walcott and Hult’s “governance” model. In considering the influences on decision making and White House staff structure, this model identifies three sources of decision-making structure: the political environment, the organizational dynamics/role of the advisory system, and the role of the president. Dividing the political environment further into a domestic and international political context allows this model to include all the in-
influences on decision making suggested by the governmental politics, presidential management, and new institutional literature.

The international and domestic political environment, the internal organizational and bureaucratic dynamics of the executive branch, and the president’s leadership style, management, and political strategy are all factors in shaping the process of decision making. The way in which the international and domestic political environment affect decision making seems obvious. International events, changes in domestic public opinion, and/or congressional pressure could all create new demands on an administration’s decision-making process. Organizational and bureaucratic dynamics place similar pressures on standard interagency procedures. These organizational and bureaucratic forces are the basic reality of executive branch life, but can only cause changes in the decision-making process if some aspect of organizational or bureaucratic competition is settled, reshaped, or restarted because of international or domestic political pressures.

The president as an influence on decision making is more complex. His role is a function of three different factors: presidential leadership style, presidential management strategy, and political strategy. Each illustrates a different type of presidential impact on the process. The three are different enough that it is important to separate them. Their unique effects on the process help provide a clear picture of the president’s place in decision making. Leadership style here is defined as the president’s own choices about how deeply he wishes to participate in administration decision making and how he relates to his advisers individually and as a group. Management style refers to his preferred design for administrative decision making in terms of NSC committee structures, information flow, as well as organizational and bureaucratic roles of key agencies and officials (particularly the Secretary of State and ANSA). Political strategy is added as a factor here to emphasize that the president’s policy choices are deeply dependent on his overall political beliefs, goals, and fortunes at any given point. Presidents are politicians first; national security may be a third or fourth order concern unless there is a crisis facing the United States. In many cases, national security policy may simply not even be on the president’s agenda of important tasks. How those priorities change and how national security issues, in this case arms control and nuclear strategy, become issues of importance is deeply influenced by the president’s overall political concerns.

This work takes a short-term focus. It examines the changes in decision-making processes in the first terms of the Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations in an effort to isolate in a fairly detailed manner what factors account for
what types of change. Changes in the international political environment and/or changes in the domestic political environment lead to changes in the organizational dynamics and presidential management and political strategies. This in turn leads to changes in decision-making structure.

The key factor in these manipulations of the process is the president. Although all four variables can lead to changes in the decision-making process, these changes are deliberately made by the president or by his key senior advisers. These adjustments in the process are responses to developments in the international and domestic political context and/or the ways in which the internal organizational and bureaucratic dynamics are affected by the changing political context. A president may also decide that he needs to make modifications in his decision-making process if he comes to perceive issues or individuals in a different way. This may not be caused by any specific event or any internal dynamics, but instead by the cumulative weight of events that might lead to a shift in presidential views. In all cases, however, changes in decision making are not inadvertent, but are conscious attempts by the president to adjust the decision-making process in ways that he feels will serve him best. How these adjustments to the process evolve also depends on the president.

The case studies suggest that the structure of national security decision making within the U.S. executive branch leans toward a distinct pattern of evolution over the first term of any presidential administration, a pattern called the evolution model throughout this book. Each administration begins with a similar NSC and NSC staff–based interagency process, and soon begins to make similar modifications. Narrowing takes place as the president comes to rely on fewer advisers; increased informal and ad hoc processes develop as senior decision makers turn to informal and ad hoc settings; increased bypassing or streamlining of the interagency process results as the president and a select group of advisers make decisions outside of the standard interagency process or in truncated versions of the standard interagency procedures.

Regardless of the ultimate result of these tendencies, all administrations end up using three concurrent decision-making structures as a result of the evolution of the decision unit: the initial formal interagency structure, an informal structure in which the senior officials and the president meet outside the formal structures, and a confidence structure in which the president relies on one or two advisers more than any other. The informal structure seems to evolve quickly, within the first six months in office. The confidence structure takes longer to develop.

8 INTRODUCTION
The pattern of evolution is based upon decision-making principles of decision economy, political pressures, and learning that guide an administration's management of its national security policy process over time.4 As time and effort constraints on the senior policy makers increase they will begin to take procedural shortcuts to economize their decision-making energies; there are identifiable and foreseeable patterns of political pressures on an administration during its term in office, as well as unpredictable pressures; and a new foreign policy team learns about the system it had originally intended to use and about working with each other. All three types of pressures, however, have the same result. They push the administration to make changes in decision-making processes as characterized above. These principles reflect a disconnect between the product of the standard interagency processes and the decision-making needs of the president as well as a subsequent incentive for the president and senior advisers to seek more decision-making control.

This desire for control leads to the evolution in decision-making structures. In the context of the variables suggested above, the influence of the international and domestic political environment, the organizational and bureaucratic dynamics, and the management and political strategies of the president lead the administration to change its decision-making process in the manner described and to develop the three concurrent decision structures. Simply put, all the stresses and strains of making national security policy lead each president in the same direction—toward narrowing participation, increased informality and ad hoc processes, and increased bypassing or streamlining of the standard interagency process.

Differences in the way these changes occur are also evident. Although the general pattern is the same, there are differences in the way the three concurrent structures develop and the way they are used by each president. Presidential leadership style is the crucial variable in explaining any differences in the way decision-making structures evolve between one administration and another. The length of time a president takes to develop the confidence structure is deeply influenced by the president’s sense of his preferred role in the process. Informal structures that somewhat mirrored the formal interagency processes developed within the first six months in the Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations. However, the development of the confidence structure, the relationships between the three concurrent structures, the president’s use of each structure, and the ultimate successful operation of the decision-making process are contingent upon the president’s role and his relationships with his senior advisers.
In short, although all administrations move toward similar adjustments in their decision structures, the differences in the president’s leadership style produce distinct variations in the ultimate shape of that evolution.

CASE STUDIES AND METHODOLOGY

Case studies of the decision-making processes on strategic arms control and nuclear strategy during the Carter, Reagan, and G. H. W. Bush administrations offer the opportunity to examine the notion of a pattern of evolution in national security decision making. The choice of cases allows for several controls. Each administration shared a similar initial decision structure (NSC committee process), political demands for successful arms control, and nuclear strategic doctrine. A precedent had been set by the successful completion of the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) and each successive president felt pressure to match that achievement. U.S. nuclear strategy stayed essentially the same as it had since the initial Single Integrated Operating Plan (SIOP) had been designed: the United States would prepare to fight a nuclear war using limited and controlled strikes on Soviet military and industrial assets.

The limits placed on the case studies are designed to focus the research for better comparison. Only first terms will be considered. This places each case within the similar context of a new administration leading the executive branch for the first time and seeking reelection for a second term. In the years since the National Security Adviser became an important player in decision making, only Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton have finished out two complete terms. Factoring out a second term broadens the sample set to several administrations that can be candidates for comparison. In addition, preliminary study of the issue suggests that second terms are nearly completely different in their dynamics. So many other factors come into play during second terms that it seems wise to study them separately. To focus the issue on the typical evolution of foreign policy as presidents and their senior advisers become acclimated to the job and each other, second terms have been excluded from this study. Similarly, choosing only one issue to examine narrows the study in some useful ways. The question of whether issue area affects the pattern of the evolution on decision making will be set aside for further research.

Choosing Carter, Reagan, and G. H. W. Bush not only allows for some continuity in the issues involved, but it also allows for some variation. The party in power in both the White House and Congress shifted during this period from
unified Democratic leadership (Carter) to Republican White House/Senate vs. Democratic House (Reagan), to divided government (Bush). If domestic political factors such as the party in the White House or the nature of the relationships between the executive and legislative branch matter (divided or unified), then it should be revealed by this research design.

The end of the cold war also allows for some variation in the case studies. How do Carter and Reagan policy making on nuclear weapons and arms control during the cold war compare to G. H. W. Bush policy making on these same issues after the Soviet threat had begun to recede? If the international environment (and its impact on domestic politics) is a factor in shaping decision making, the end of the cold war will add another dimension to the utility of the case studies.

To focus the research on the cause of change, Chapter three explores the initial decision-making structures, processes, and presidential leadership styles for each administration. Each case study chapter is organized in a narrative that identifies the international and domestic political environments, the basic organizational dynamics within the administration, and the issues of presidential choice—leadership style, management strategy, and political goals. The focus on presidential choice in the case studies is specifically a focus on why, when, and how a president makes changes to his administration’s decision-making process. In particular, since the evolution model suggests that all of these variables except leadership style push each president’s process in the same direction, even though leadership style accounts for differences in the evolution, it is important to contrast the impact of the president’s unique inputs and the environmental and institutional factors.

The dependent variable, structure of the decision unit, is examined through a “structured, focused comparison” methodology. A standardized set of questions frames the analysis of each case study. This allows for a controlled comparison, and a single framework for each case. The method has been called a “process-tracing procedure.” In the case study narrative, these questions are not literally answered and asked; however, each case study provides an answer to these questions in its narrative of the characteristics of the decision-making process.

Given that the focus of the research is how decision-making processes change over time, single case studies of one decision in a discrete time period are not useful. It is necessary to trace the decision-making process over an extended period of time or sample the decision-making process at various intervals. The approach will depend on the quality and quantity of data. The comparison then exists on two levels. First, the set of questions are asked about each administration’s decision-making process, but in an iterative manner. The analysis must be re-
peated in order to reveal any changes in the decision-making process. Only through asking these questions several times over the four years of an administration's term will the pattern of evolution in the process be determined. Second, this process must be repeated for all three administrations so that the pattern within each can be compared. This will isolate the basic hypothesis: Is there a single pattern in the evolution of the national security decision-making process that is apparent in all administrations? The following set of questions are those that are implicitly asked.

**Initial Decision-Making Structure:** What is the initial formal design of the national security decision-making unit in terms of the committee structures, the bureaucratic level and breadth included, the desired amount of presidential involvement, and the methodology for producing advice for the president and/or decisions?

**Roles and Relationships:** Are there prime movers of policy, individual advisers charged with directing the process or given responsibility for producing the decision? If so, does this change? If not, does the president assume this role, or are all advisers equally involved in the process? If new structures or additional individuals, governmental affiliated or nongovernmental, added to the decision-making process? If so, why have they been created or included, what is their relationship to the initial formal process, and what is the duration of their involvement? What is the coalition structure of the administration, the nature of alliances or coalitions or rivalries among the senior decision makers? If we use the metaphor of bureaucratic conflict to describe decision making, the question seeks to illustrate the order of battle for the administration. What is the relationship between the senior officials and the president? Who is considered loyal to the president? Who has access and who does not? How is the inner circle versus the outer circle delineated? Of course, for all these questions, does this change?

**Process:** Are the initial formal procedures lasting, or do more informal processes take root? If so, what are the design and the scope of responsibility of the new informal processes? What is the relationship between the formal and informal processes? Does the hierarchical level at which decisions are made change at any time? Does the breadth of departmental inclusion, the horizontal participation, change at any time? Are some departments excluded from the decision at any point? Are some departments added to the decision unit?

**Political Factors:** Is the political environment, either domestic or international, related in any way to the changes in the way decisions are produced by the administration?
Pattern of Change: Finally, with answers to the preceding questions, can an overall pattern of change in the administration’s decision-making process be identified?

Applying these questions to each case study makes it possible to compare the patterns of national security policy change from administration to administration to identify the similarities and any differences discovered between them.

The case studies include the Carter administration’s decision making for the March 1977 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) proposal and Presidential Directive 59 of 1980; the Reagan decision-making process concerning the Eureka Proposals of May 1982, the Build-Down Proposals of fall 1983 and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) speech of March 1983; and the Bush administration’s decisions on the Malta Summit, the completion of the first Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START 1), and the speeches of fall–winter 1991 that led to START 2.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Each administration felt pressure to adapt its initial decision-making structure in the ways suggested by the evolution model. Each reacted to those pressures in ways guided by their leadership style. President Carter followed these pressures to their logical conclusions—deep centralization of the process, marked informality, and even bypassing the interagency process. He ultimately came to favor his confidence structure through a growing reliance on and relationship with Assistant for National Security Affairs (ANSA) Zbigniew Brzezinski. His administration was marked by policy inconsistencies, bureaucratic warfare, and eventually the resignation of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.

The Reagan administration was affected by the president’s hands-off style of management. From 1981 to late 1983 the administration decision-making evolution proceeded along a path similar to the Carter administration with more centralization, informality, and in some instances complete bypassing of the interagency process. The evolution was initially a response to deep philosophical divisions within the administration over policy toward the Soviet Union and a decentralized NSC process that led to gridlock in the formal interagency process. The informal structure that was created to resolve these differences and the confidence structure centering around ANSA William Clark collapsed in late 1983. President Reagan did not try to manage his decision-making process directly and allowed White House aides to sabotage and eventually destroy the
new structures. By the fall of 1983, the administration had completely reversed the evolution of the first two years and was once again plagued by stalemate due to unresolved philosophical differences and mired in hostile rivalries without alternate processes designed to release the internal tensions.

In sharp contrast to the Carter and Reagan experience, the Bush administration is considered an example of a well-oiled decision-making machine. It had all three structures predicted by the evolution model. The informal structure was dominant, but it always worked in tandem with the formal and confidence structures. The process worked smoothly because the president worked hard to make sure that it did. Bush adapted his decision-making process to the institutional and political pressures, while consciously trying to maintain the advantages of his initial NSC system. Bush’s previous experience in government had taught him that a well-managed policy process and good teamwork between the president and his senior aides and among those senior aides were prerequisites to good policy choices. In accordance with that belief, Bush chose as his senior advisers people he had worked with as both friends and colleagues in previous administrations. Even though these are general assessments, they are reflected in the specific cases of arms control and nuclear strategy discussed within the case studies.

The scholarly and policy implications of these findings are significant. First, in researching adaptations to existing administration structures multiple levels of analysis are necessary. The international and domestic political environments, organizational dynamics, and the president’s own preferences influence the shape of decision making. However, all of these adaptations are conscious and deliberate. This means that the international and domestic political environments and organizational dynamics only cause changes in decision-making processes in tandem with a choice made by the president to modify the decision-making process.

Second, it is clear from the case studies that all three decision structures—formal, informal, and confidence—are necessary for a smoothly functioning decision-making process. However, the proper balance between the three structures is crucial. None can be allowed to dominate the process, and the informal structure should play the key role of ironing out consensus among the key decision makers. If the formal structure dominates, the decision-making process may become paralyzed by the interagency process and departmental rivalries. If the confidence structure is supreme, those advisers who feel ignored by the president may sabotage the decision-making process or resign.

In comparing the three administrations it becomes obvious that the Bush decision-making team was far more successful than the others at managing its
decision-making process. This is not meant to suggest that its policies were better than those of Carter or Reagan. Such a judgment might be based on partisanship or whether idealism or realism was the guiding analytical principle. Success in this case is defined as the smooth and orderly manner in which decisions were made, and the lack of decision-making pathologies such as bureaucratic or organizational feuds that spilled out into the newspapers and television news shows.

A third issue concerns lessons that an incoming administration might take from this study. If a distinct pattern of evolution is evident within each administration, is this an identification of a generic “best” decision style that all administrations could use? Could any incoming administration use these procedures as an off-the-shelf decision-making process, rather than reinventing the wheel with each new administration? The answer seems to be yes and no. Incoming administrations can put in place a formal and informal structure on inauguration day. However, a president cannot know which individuals will fit into what parts of these structures until numerous decisions have been made in which relationships and processes are tested and the president learns which advisers he can trust. Learning seems to be the key. Presidents and senior officials enter office with theories of administrative decision making, ideas about which advisers will play what roles, who will be the most useful, and what role the president will play. They will eventually learn how right or wrong they were only after making repeated decisions over a period of time. There is no foolproof way to predict which advisers will assume what roles in an administration. However, being prepared to adjust the process through these three concurrent structures can help to make learning and implementing what has been learned a much easier task.

Fourth, this research suggests that a typology of decision-making adaptation can be developed. Each case of change can be placed into one of three categories: innovative, reactive, or opportunistic. Innovative modifications are those spurred by presidents in reaction to some political vision. Carter’s Deep Cuts Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) proposal of March 1977 and Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) speech of March 1983 fit into this category. Reactive modifications are those made by political necessity. In particular, domestic political pressures often (but not always) in tandem with international developments cause an administration to adjust its decision making specifically to produce a certain policy. The Reagan Eureka and Build-Down decisions, and the Bush Malta Summit and START 1 decisions are such cases. Opportunistic modifications are those in which an administration modifies its decision-making process to accomplish a shift in its policy that it feels is warranted given a new development in the international political environment. They are mainly a function of presi-
idential choice, with perhaps a nod to the domestic political considerations of a coming election year. These modifications are different from innovative and reactive modifications because the motivation for the changes has elements of both. A president may react to an international event, but he is not necessarily responding to any groundswell for changes in policy. In the case of Carter’s PD-59 and Bush’s speeches of fall and winter 1991, the president perceived the opening of a window of opportunity based on the domestic political (Carter) or international political needs (Bush) of the moment.

This is a reversal of the study of whether different styles of policy process produce different types of policy. In these cases, policies with differing characteristics require a president to use different styles of policy process. Policy change necessitates process change. Further study of this idea is crucial in the post–cold war era. The current U.S. national security decision-making system is a product of the cold war, designed in 1947 and evolved based on the exigencies of competing with and containing the USSR. The world after the collapse of communism was vastly different. The tragedy of September 11 revealed just how dangerous the world can be, even for a hegemon without any nation-state equals. A dangerous but familiar threat environment has given way to a dangerous, more complex environment filled with an array of more diverse and less predictable threats. The creation of the Homeland Security Council and Office of Homeland Security is a first step. The structure of decision making for national security, enshrined in the National Security Act of 1947, also needs to be reassessed. Simply put, if process is defined by policy needs, then the United States must undertake a serious review of its standard national security processes. Even in the stable environment of the cold war, the policy process was modified from time to time. In a more uncertain post–cold war world, more flexible and adaptable processes may be a necessity.

STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

Chapter two addresses the theoretical and methodological aspects of the book. Chapter three examines the initial NSC processes of each administration as well as the leadership styles of each president to provide a context for comparisons. Chapters four, five, and six explore the Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations’ decision making on arms control and nuclear strategy, respectively. Chapter seven considers the scholarly and policy implications of the case study findings.