Waves crash over a pristine beach; birds sing cheerfully as the camera pans over lush tropical foliage. The serenity of the scene is quickly interrupted, however, by the sound of a helicopter and images of urban decay. Over the echo of chaos and gunshots, a TV reporter’s voice states: “The [Jamaican] government has called up the national reserves as civil unrest grips the nation this evening” (Life and Debt). The reporter pauses as the camera shows chaotic rioting, then cuts to a scene of women, children, and men injured and bleeding; we watch a set of Jamaican observers, who look not unlike those mired in the riots, surveying the chaos on their television. Over this set of concerned-looking citizens watching the violence, the reporter continues: “Food and major commodities remain low. . . . Several persons have been shot, or injured, or killed. . . . Hospitals, airlines, and vendors are hurting from the wound[s] of violent protests. A team from the IMF [International Monetary Fund], which is currently in Jamaica, is wrapping up a four-day visit for a technical assessment of the country’s financial situation” (Life and Debt).

The scene then shifts to a television set showing a man standing at a podium. In stark contrast to the previously depicted black Jamaican people
dressed casually in bright colors and gazing passively at the television set, this white man, former director of the IMF Horst Kohler, wears a gray suit, stands straight, and speaks directly into the camera: “The issue is to make globalization work for the benefit of all. There will not be a good future for the rich if there is no prospect for a better future for the poor” (*Life and Debt*). The scene concludes with a group of young men watching a television commercial during the newsbreak: an advertisement for Baskin Robbins, “where the world goes for ice cream.”

Although Horst’s statement is short, it reflects a common argument of what Arjun Appadurai has described as the “megarhetoric of developmental modernization”: that wealthier nations will not be secured financially or geopolitically if the poor are not part of a modern, global, and capitalist economy.1 As this statement exemplifies, development work is rhetorical: both the meaning of the term “development” and its wider discursive (and material) work. In his argument Horst acknowledges the global interconnectedness of the economic and political and their connection to such “risks” as poverty, diminished resources, and market crashes (see the work of Ulrich Beck). Horst’s statement, coupled with the Baskin Robbins commercial, creates a rhetorical palimpsest suggesting that “development” means expansion from the outside, through corporate investment, supranational organizations, commodity markets, and conspicuous consumption. Yet, as the scene also insinuates, for Jamaica this economic growth and expansion has not secured its local citizenry financially; instead, it has led to civil unrest and impoverishment.

In this case, rhetorical analysis helps explain the structures, frames, appeals, and assumptions at work in both Horst’s statement and the scene in the film, in part by examining the vectors of power that can be found in the contexts behind these rhetorics (such as colonial histories, economic policies, and transnational policy agreements). If rhetorical analysis were also to be attuned to the transglobal and translocal movements of texts—tracking the circulation, shifting functions, and effects of rhetoric within these contexts, as this edited collection does—then we will begin to see how development rhetorics in particular are not fixed but imbued with vast and interconnected meanings. Appadurai uses the term “megarhetorics” to describe these sorts of arguments that frame development discourses. He recognizes how the very term “development” (like our earlier example demonstrates) encompasses uneven, multiple, layered, and intertwining threads—economic, technological, geopolitical, social, and cultural ones, to name a few. For this reason we have adapted
Appadurai’s phrase “megarhetorics of developmental modernization” for this edited volume’s title (10).

The film *Life and Debt* chronicles Jamaica’s significant economic decline since 1962, when the nation was granted independence from England and the World Bank and the IMF began to provide loans to aid Jamaica’s economic development. The film illustrates several more of the “megarhetorics of development” explored in this book and brings attention to many of the key tensions that arise during the process of “developing” a lower-income country. These tensions include the struggles of postcolonial independence, the degradation of natural resources, civil unrest due to the lack of adequate resources for citizens, financial planning imposed by an outside entity, corporate development, and the recurring argument that globalization will be the great equalizer.

The film shows how the rhetorics of development found in supranational policies and tourist guides have deep material effects not only for Jamaica’s economy but also its citizens. Jamaica’s loans from the World Bank and the IMF carry stringent repayment parameters that eventually caused the country to fall into more than $4.5 billion of debt (*Life and Debt*). Despite promises from supranational development agencies like the IMF, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) that the imposed loans and structural adjustment policies would help Jamaica develop a thriving economy, the loans did not generate enough capital to pay back the loans. Jamaica ultimately became (and still is) entangled in a set of supranationally imposed policies that make it impossible for the country to grow its economy to repay these loans. As the film explains: “The amount of foreign exchange that must be generated to meet interest payments and the structural adjustment policies which have been imposed with the loans have had a negative impact on the lives of the vast majority” of Jamaica’s citizens (“About the Film”). Structural adjustment development policies made it necessary for Jamaica to devalue its currency, thereby raising the cost of foreign goods for local citizens; to raise interest rates, thereby making entrepreneurial loans too expensive; and to cut wages, thereby throwing much of its citizenry into poverty. Rhetorical analysis helps us map how these events destabilize the megarhetoric that development always leads to growth, progress, one-way assistance, and empowerment by demonstrating the connection between what is said or written and the material effects.

Such changes have especially affected dairy farmers, who in the past were able to sell large quantities of milk to Jamaican citizens. However, in
part due to the adjustment and devaluation policies, Jamaica began to import powdered milk from the United States. Although much less nutritious, this powdered milk costs a fraction of the fresh milk—a crucial point, as Jamaicans were also earning less money. Like other agricultural commodities, milk became too expensive to produce because farmers had to purchase farming equipment, feed, seed, and fertilizer from abroad and could not afford to pay for them unless they raised their prices. In turn, imported produce became significantly cheaper for Jamaicans to purchase, effectively ruining Jamaica’s local agricultural economy. These examples from the film demonstrate that the megarhetorics of development have strong structural implications—implications about the material conditions of citizens, their health and well-being, and implications about sovereignty—that inform the very arguments that various rhetors use to frame their arguments for and against development projects. Rhetorical analysis offers a unique interpretive framework that forefronts how dynamic rhetorical acts relate to wider political, social, and economic structures within and between nation-states and then how rhetorical acts have far-reaching and deep material effects.

The materiality of megarhetorics reaches beyond the local, because the very policies imposed on Jamaica ultimately extend beyond its borders, affecting other nations’ economies. In another segment of the film, for example, we learn about Kingston’s free trade zones, a collection of garment factories sectioned off by high security and barbed wire. In addition to low rent, as part of a supranational policy mandate, foreign companies are invited to bring materials to be assembled in Jamaica tax free. This means that Jamaica itself makes no money off these products or the rent of the facilities since the land itself is not owned by Jamaica. Although the factories employ Jamaican workers, as part of the policy mandate, the Jamaican government has agreed to not allow workers to unionize despite their low wages, and the factory owners do not have to adhere to Jamaica’s work-safety laws. *Life and Debt* describes how these free-trade zones have greatly benefited U.S. and Japanese companies, who, because of trade agreements between both nations, do not have to pay taxes or tariffs on the imported and exported goods. As demonstrated by Horst’s speech quoted in the film, the rhetoric of such development policies suggests that supranational agencies are helping low-income countries’ economies by aiding their entrance into a global economy; yet often the citizens of these nations grow poorer while the nations that contribute to and run supranational organizations become wealthier.
As the postdevelopment scholar and activist Gustavo Esteva has explained, development “always implies a favourable change, a step from the simple to the complex, from the inferior to the superior, from worse to better” (10).

Arguments for development often depend on an assumed beginning state (and, in some articulations, a core trait) of underdevelopment or immaturity and the supposition that the process will involve a progressive change into a better state (Esteva 7). Yet, as demonstrated in *Life and Debt*, this progression has been for many parts of the world “only a path, not an arrival” (Sbert 195). We find the term “megarhetoric” descriptive of development discourses because these discourses are often propelled by taken-for-granted assumptions about development’s goals, functions, and effects. This makes it necessary to look deeper at the historical and material conditions that shape such arguments and their dissemination.

As the anthropologist Arturo Escobar has demonstrated, development metaphors often draw from commonsense colonial arguments about saving the “natives” from their “backward” (and amoral) cultural practices. Stuart Hall has explained that commonsense rhetorics are taken for granted. They are not “coherent”; they are “usually disjointed and episodic, fragmentary and contradictory”; they contain “systems that have become sedimented over time without leaving any clear inventory”; they are the “terrain of conceptions and categories on which practical consciousness of the masses of the people is actually formed” (431). Part of the job of the rhetorical critic is to unravel that which appears to be common sense and, in doing so, explore *how* and *why* commonsense rhetorics are not temporal but circulate continually across time and space. Still today this simple commonsense narrative permeates World Bank policies, Save the Children advertisements, and even more recently diaper and feminine hygiene product commercials designed to shore up the ethos of megacorporations by showing their concern for “vulnerable” members of global society.

This colonial argument has become unquestioned (and sometimes unrecognizable) in development discourses, giving these discourses the “mega” power to shape practices across the globe. Rhetorical analyses such as those in this edited volume can help explain these bodies of persuasion in light of the rhetorical histories and intertexts behind them (including those of modernization, neocolonialism, and neoliberalism).

“Development” functions as a commonsense rhetoric implicitly meaning a movement or progression from an economic, social, and cultural state of weakness and danger to one of strength and security. Yet this commonplace needs to be unpacked. As rhetoricians, we are particularly drawn to
the concept of development as a commonsense rhetoric because, in Deirdre McCloskey’s words, it is “drenched with metaphor” (250) and indeed “the very word development is a metaphor . . . limiting our thinking at the same time it makes thinking possible” (252). Certainly, organic and biological metaphors imbue development with meanings of growth, maturation, and even evolution (see Esteva 10, 23). In her discussion of economic development models, the feminist scholar Suzanne Bergeron has noted an expansion of biological metaphors to include “mechanistic, machinelike” ones that imply a stronger sense of “rationality, control, and order” (Fragments 8). Such an expansion frames the development process as one of modernization as well as maturation and perhaps ties it more directly to Western, ethnocentric ideas of linear progress and risk management (see Pieterse 24). Views of development as an ethnocentric process of modernization also depend on spatial metaphors of geopolitical demarcation, expansion, and restructuring—“implicit,” Escobar explains, “in expressions such as First and Third World, North and South, center and periphery” (9).

In addition to their core, taken-for-granted meanings and assumptions, development arguments function as megarhetorics also because they address a range of globalization’s threads—including economic, technological, geopolitical, social, and cultural ones—the connections among which rhetoricians can help unravel and explain. To name just a few examples, the array of practices discussed under the rubric of development ranges from microlending to the poor to intercultural business training for the managerial elite, from health-care capacity building to protecting pharmaceutical patents through international trade agreements, from promoting liberal democracy to privatizing nation-states’ resources. Despite this broad scope, mainstream development approaches have been driven primarily by neoliberal capitalist goals and have been remarkably adept at absorbing antidevelopment or alternative development critiques and have even turned such critiques into calls for yet more development.

Take, for example, Joseph Stiglitz’s Making Globalization Work, which holds onto the “promise of development” (though more comprehensive and democratically accountable development) in response to his earlier critique of development institutions in Globalization and Its Discontents. We could also point to the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals for 2015, borne in part out of calls to address development’s negative “side effects.” The Millennium Development goals—which center on such on-the-ground issues as women’s inequality, child poverty, and infant mortality alongside developing partnerships for “global development”—show how development discourses respond to lower-income countries’ needs while making
an impact on everyday citizens’ lives. In this way the megarhetorics of development encompass scales of power that frame an ever-reinforcing loop of globalized efforts which extend beyond the borders of the nation-state and into the everyday lives of people.

Rhetorical analysis can help elucidate how development’s megarhetorics are both “global in geographical scale” and further manifested or lived out in the “everyday processes of social life” (Benjamin xiii). In this collection, for example, Eileen Schell shows how development megarhetorics of agricultural industrialization and sustainability can circulate “transglocally” but carry different meanings, be employed for opposed causes, and thus have immensely diverse and local material effects. As Schell’s chapter illustrates, the circulation of cultural forms transforms megarhetorics across regions and “their ongoing domestication into local practices” (Appadurai 10, 17). By analyzing its heterogeneous and interconnected meanings and tracking the operations of these meanings across global and local contexts, however, rhetoricians can complicate the limiting notion of development as a coherent expression of a single, totalizing, and inevitable force. Ultimately, rhetorical analysis can reveal how the megarhetorics of development circulate and operate as “common sense” in simultaneously micro and macro instances.

As we see it, an examination of development’s megarhetorics necessarily involves accounting for the circulation across and mutual conditioning of the global and local, and for such rhetorics’ dialectical movement of de-territorialization and reterritorialization. We call this dialectical movement “transglocal,” combining the word “glocalization,” which can refer to the blending and mutual conditioning of the global and local, with the prefix “trans,” which, as anthropologist Aihwa Ong has pointed out, “denotes both moving through space or across lines, as well as changing the nature of something” (4). Transglocal “development encounters” can generate new meanings and subject positions (Escobar 49). For example, Rebecca Dingo has tracked how “official” global development policies and the subject positions they interpellate (i.e., hail) are transcoded and inhabited across specific locales (see “Linking Transnational Logics”). As J. Blake Scott illustrates in his chapter, arguments about development’s potential effects (e.g., risks and opportunities) often describe these effects as transglocal, move in multiple, transglocal directions, and include transglocal networks of actors. Other chapters in this collection also demonstrate how rhetorical analysis can unpack and contribute to the ways patterns of persuasion work with extrarhetorical forces to inflect both global forms of power and their more specific translocal (re)articulations.
Why the “Megarhetorics” of Development?

Despite the rich and varied arguments that support global practices in the name of development, rhetorical studies has seemed reluctant, compared with such fields as sociology, anthropology, and even literary studies, to engage substantively with them. Relatively few rhetoricians have taken up Deirdre McCloskey’s invitation, issued in 1987, to further examine the rhetoric of development. The past several years have seen a growing number of journal articles and special issues, monographs (e.g., DeChaine; Gorsevski; Hartnett and Stengrim), conference presentations and workshops (at, e.g., CCCC, NCA, RSA, and Feminism[s] and Rhetoric[s]), and institutes (e.g., RSA’s 2007 Summer Institute on Rhetoric and Transnationalism)—although not focused specifically on the rhetoric of development—positioned at the intersection of rhetoric and globalization or transnational studies. A smaller subset of these have focused more specifically on development rhetorics. In her 2006 *PMLA* article on the global turn of rhetoric and composition studies, Wendy S. Hesford mapped the emergent ways scholars have engaged global and transnational pressures to (re)imagine the geography of our field and our roles as critics and teachers (“Global Turns and Cautions”). Beyond the work Hesford has documented, a number of rhetoricians in English and communication studies have begun to develop theories and analytic methods that usefully extend the rhetorical tradition and enrich our understanding of transnational processes, flows, and power relations.

In their *College English* special issue on transnational feminist rhetorics, coeditors Hesford and Schell have called on rhetoricians to move beyond treating the transnational as an abstract, context-defining force by more fully accounting for the “interarticulations of people, goods, and ideas they move across or are hindered by national boundaries” (Hesford and Schell 466; emphasis in original). Rather than abandoning the national, this approach involves exploring how it is formed through and transcoded across transnational connectivities (464). Elsewhere, Schell has critiqued common notions of the rhetorical situation for overlooking “how national interests and appeals are tied up in complex international and transnational flows of capital and people” (168). Hesford has critiqued standard takes on the public sphere for being “out of sync with the material realities of the global economy and the multiple layers of capital” (“Global/Local Labor Politics” 196).

Mary Queen and Rebecca Dingo, whose essays appear in the afore-
mentioned *College English* issue, similarly have developed analytic methods that emphasize transnational connectivities—Dingo by tracking links across U.S. and World Bank gender policy networks (“Linking Transnational Logics”), and Queen by conducting a “rhetorical genealogy” of digital texts across transnational cyberspaces. In some of the rare examples of rhetorical work specifically on development, Dingo has also illustrated the ways supranational development policies are framed by colonial discourses and driven by neoliberal economic goals (“Making a Rhetorical Analysis” and “Making the ‘Unfit, Fit’”).

While Dingo has demonstrated how neocolonialism and neoliberalism have helped shape the contexts and meanings of supranational policies around gender mainstreaming, coauthors Stephen Hartnett and Laura Stengrim, in *Globalization and Empire*, have demonstrated how post-9/11 U.S. global policy has used the rhetorics of free trade and democracy to justify war and economic conquest. Beyond providing their own powerful critique, Hartnett and Stengrim offer strategies and resources for a broader activist response to global forms of violence. Other rhetoricians, too, have focused their work on counter-rhetorics to what the feminist scholars known as J. K. Gibson-Graham have called “the violence of development.” Coauthors Kevin DeLuca and Jennifer Peeples have documented new forms of screen-based participatory democracy, characterized by “images, hypermediacy, publicity, distraction, and dissent,” that emerged out of the 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) protests in Seattle (125).

In *Global Humanitarianism*, D. Robert DeChaine has examined NGOs’ rhetorical crafting of a new vision of global community (27); his ideographic analysis focuses on Médecins Sans Frontières’s “discursive construction of a ‘humanitarian space’ for social action” in the face of global health-care inequities as well as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines’ virtual mobilization of a “universalizing moral discourse” to reframe the issue of landmines from politics to humanitarianism (69, 107; see also “Humanitarian Space”). In another rare focus on (anti)development rhetorics, communication scholar Nahed Eltantawy reads the *cacerolazos* protests (involving the public banging of pots and pans) by Argentinean women as a counterpublic discourse of resistance to the economic injustices caused by the structural adjustment programs of the IMF and the World Bank (“Pots, Pans, and Protests”).

In addition to new, hybrid methodologies, rhetoricians have begun to develop fresh takes on theoretical concepts, as illustrated by Eltantawy’s broadening of counterpublic rhetoric and Hesford’s questioning of the very framework of public-counterpublic. In two other articles that enhance rhet-
oric’s conceptual toolbox, J. Blake Scott and Hesford each have revised traditional notions of *kairos*. In her discussion of video advocacy for global sex workers, Hesford has used kairos “to understand identification and identity claims as dynamic moments of action that are at once . . . local and global” and that account for the “colonial histories that frame such identification” (“Kairos” 163). Scott has pushed common conceptions of kairos still further, drawing on the work of Ulrich Beck to recast it as the indeterminate attempt to manage incalculable and unbounded global risk, and highlighting rhetoric’s role in risk management relative to extrarhetorical forces that are part of development’s “web of interlocution” (Bergeron, *Fragments* 14). These examples show how contemporary globalization makes it necessary for rhetoricians to expand their catalog and scope of rhetorical concepts to account for changing economic, political, and cultural relationships.

Because we position this edited collection in critical development as well as rhetorical studies, we also offer it as an extension to rhetorically focused work in this former area. Several development scholars have initiated what we might call a “rhetorical turn” by focusing on the persuasive appeals of development discourses. Sociologist Jan Pieterse, for example, has used the alternative term “linguistic turn” to describe her discourse analysis, explaining that such an analysis “involves meticulous attention to development texts and utterances, not merely as ideology but as epistemology” (13). Bergeron relates her analysis of economic constructions of the nation and development to the rhetoric of economics first developed by McCloskey (*Fragments* ix); Bergeron also situates such rhetorical constructions in what she calls a larger “web of interlocution” that includes a “wider set of cultural, political, and institutional practices” (*Fragments* 14). In explaining how the World Bank draws on and appeals to cultural values, Bret Benjamin has examined its “rhetorical acts of public persuasion” (xiii). Robert McRuer also has examined World Bank rhetorics, focusing on descriptions of disability policies and considering how such concepts as “independence and inclusion mask the deeper dependencies generated by global capitalism” (5). Though not squarely positioned in rhetorical studies, the work of these scholars suggests the potential of more thoroughly rhetorical analyses. Rhetorical analysis offers development studies an awareness of how rhetorics travel and change as a means of understanding how traditionally “rational” or “objective” texts are deeply influenced by commonsense ideological scripts.

The emergent work of such rhetoricians and other rhetorically minded scholars just discussed suggests a richer repertoire of rhetorical concepts
and methodologies. Traditional, local-centric notions of the rhetorical situation, for example, could be revised to account for what Appadurai has called the global network of “intercontextual relations” (187) or what Pieterse has described as development’s “multilevel, multiscalar series of efforts” (15). We could extend models of rhetorical circulation in light of Appadurai’s characterization of (rhetorical) action sequences as turbulent, unpredictable cascades (150) or coauthors David Craig and Doug Porter’s reading of development as the iterative movement “between different territorialized and deterritorialized modes of governance” (22; emphasis in original). Beyond enriching rhetorical studies, however, the work noted here can lead to a deeper understanding of and enhanced ability to participate in transglocal development practices, rhetorical and material. DeChaine has made perhaps the most compelling case to date of why rhetoric and our study of it matters in a globalized world; he explains how the “intensifying hegemonic struggle over the meaning of ‘community’”—a struggle with implications for the shape and civic accountability of development projects—is “significantly rhetorical in nature” and “has consequences for the way we see the world, live our lives, and treat others” (Global Humanitarianism 3, 27). A revised sense of the constraints and possibilities of rhetorical deliberation and resistance could be especially useful given the hegemonic capacity of neoliberal versions of development to absorb and recast critical responses to them.

Why Now?

To further contextualize our argument for this book’s timeliness, given the current paradigm of development and the global dynamics to which it is responding, we offer a brief history, in broad strokes, of development approaches. When possible, we rely on the work of rhetorically minded scholars to help us explain how rhetorical criticism might be marshaled to reread development history by identifying the tropes and networks that allow particular development rhetorics to circulate. Benjamin, for example, has read the World Bank’s rhetorical shifts as “attempts to respond to and contain a sequence of powerful and typically unforeseen crises,” and we think what he calls “the rhetorical dialectic of crisis and possibility” (see also Scott’s chapter in this edited volume) applies to the project of development more generally (3, xxxi). In addition to identifying development’s rhetorical conditions of possibility, the rhetorical analysis of moments in development’s historical trajectory can help us identify when the megar-
heterorics of development begin to unravel, revealing ideological fissures and openings for resistance, as further illustrated in the chapters by Schell, Dingo, and others in this collection.

Although some scholars have read the history of development as part of a larger history of colonialism and postcolonialism (e.g., Escobar), modernity or modernization (e.g., Bergeron; and Kothari and Minogue), or liberal and neoliberal economic policies (e.g., Craig and Porter), most mark its beginnings in the post–World War II period, which ushered in, among other events, the Bretton Woods conference and the formation of the IMF and the World Bank. In this period through the 1950s, development followed a modernization model focused on political stability and economic growth. This model sought to help postcolonial and war-torn nations (re)construct and manage their economies to facilitate Western-led investment and trade. On its liberal face, this model was a progressive response to the political and economic instability and uneven development in parts of Europe and the Global South.

As Escobar has explained, however, modernization approaches were designed primarily not only to organize a more stable, secure political and economic global order in the wake of the war, but also to secure the supremacy of the United States in this order (32). These approaches to economic growth and accumulation targeted specific countries, emphasized state intervention and planning, viewed barriers to growth as internal, projected growth in a linear progression, and assumed that the benefits of national economic growth would “trickle down.” This trickle-down model supported the fact that organizations such as the World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now the World Trade Organization) functioned as investment mechanisms for wealthier nations. Nations invest money in these organizations and, like a more traditional bank, make interest back on their investments. These interest payments would ideally trickle into the global economy and work for both investor nations and “client” nations.

Although some scholars have argued that economic growth theories continued to dominate development approaches throughout the 1960s (Escobar), others have pointed to the late 1960s as the time when the “growth as everything” approach to development came under scrutiny” (Bergeron, Fragments 56). With the growing realization that the benefits of development were not “trickling down,” agents of development began to view redistribution as a possible component of growth models. As with U.S. welfare policy of the 1960s, this gave rise to “basic needs” initiatives,
focused on the (mostly rural) poor. In this period, development agencies worked to create in-kind and cash-benefit programs for the poor. Globally, development policies focused on how poor citizens, with proper intervention, could facilitate the industrialization and growth of their countries. Such poverty alleviation initiatives could be read as early, narrow versions of social development.

The 1970s and early 1980s saw more responses to development’s negative effects and the crises or risks they generated. In response to the welfarist development policies of the 1960s, dependency theory emerged as a critique to the modernization model, positing that this model led to the exploitation and underdevelopment of poor countries, but it did not challenge the model’s core-periphery binary or focus on economic growth. Considerations of social and human development gained more traction and began to involve not just poverty reduction through redistribution but also the capacity-building of communities and individuals (through improved education, health care, access to markets, etc.). Development approaches, such as those of the IMF, were still primarily focused on economic growth, however, and redistribution initiatives were pushed aside as targeted nations saw their budgets shrink and debt soar. Such countries were forced to increase “the size of the pie through growth before asking questions about distribution” (Bergeron, *Fragments* 65). From the perspective of the United States, this shift back toward market-centered growth was also an attempt to contain its “geopolitical and fiscal bruising” from the Vietnam War, the delinking of the dollar to gold, the oil crisis, and other events (Craig and Porter 52–53).

Called by some the “lost decade of development” for the debt-generated poverty in Latin America and other parts of the Global South, the 1980s were marked by a global debt crisis, widespread market instability, and a rise in government corruption in lower-income nations. Such corruption, coupled with an international debt crisis and market instability, challenged development agencies to create new policy initiatives that would remove economic power out of the hands of governments and into the hands of everyday citizens. At the beginning of the decade, the World Bank joined the IMF in pushing structural adjustment programs that tied loans to the implementation of free-market economic policies such as privatization and deregulation. As demonstrated in the film *Life and Debt*, structural adjustment in Jamaica, for example, led to more tourism, a drop in agricultural production, a rise in imported goods, and a drop in job security. Like earlier modernization approaches, these programs were offered as mecha-
nisms for helping poor countries address and prevent further debt, but their real goal, was to secure “conditions of capitalist profitability” in the Global South (for the Global North) (Bergeron, *Fragments* 96).

Arguments for free-market or what Escobar has termed “market-friendly” approaches to development fueled a shift in international development theory by the end of the decade, leading to what is widely known as the “Washington Consensus” (93). Undergirded by rational choice economics, the Washington Consensus viewed the adoption of neoliberal economic policy—including trade liberalization, privatization of state enterprises, and government deregulation—as the key to development and sought to “guide” this development through standardized policies of the IMF, the World Bank, and other U.S.-dominated supranational institutions. Unlike other international development approaches, which emphasized the role of the state in generating productive economies, the Washington Consensus is premised upon the belief that individual responsibility and rational choice coupled with “unfettered free markets [provide] the formula to make rich countries out of poor” (Broad, Cavanagh, and Bello 83). Local intervention and good (pro-market) governance were still necessary, but the goal was globally managed macroeconomic growth and stability.

Craig and Porter have documented the trend toward “inclusive neoliberalism” that began in the 1990s. As they explain, this was not a new paradigm but neoliberal development with a human face, still focused on global market integration and unbounded capitalist growth. The human face of such approaches included, once again, poverty reduction and human capacity-building, though in a more comprehensive, sustainable way. The Human Development Index, which measures such factors as life expectancy and education, and the UN’s *Human Development Reports* were initiated in the early 1990s. The World Bank and the United Nations followed in the mid-1990s by creating gender-inclusive policies that employed feminist arguments for women’s empowerment and the mainstreaming of women’s governmental and labor participation.

Yet despite the rhetorics promoting them, these policies still followed strong neoliberal tenets whereby individuals and families were to be integrated into the global market economy without the help of the state. During this time many lower-income countries felt the crunch of debt repayments from the 1980s, and, as in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the IMF and World Bank imposed further structural adjustment policies that forced lower-income nations to cut social services further. Many countries privatized access to water, education, and health care, making these necessities unreachable for many citizens. Other alternative approaches, in-
cluding those foregrounding environmental sustainability and bottom-up processes, became more prominent but were still absorbed by the neoliberal agenda, recast as means to a greater neoliberal end.

Craig and Porter have characterized this period as one of neoliberal institutionalization because of the emphasis on “good governance,” sometimes described in terms of increased participation and transparency (to avoid the corruption of the 1980s and 1990s) but characterized by the embedding of market concerns into institutions. The goals of good governance are microeconomic efficiency and macroeconomic stability and growth, and its focus on participation is less about participation in policymaking than participation in markets. Just as it adjusted to the Asian and other financial crises of the 1990s, the neoliberal program adjusted to renewed critiques of development’s negative effects by masking its goal of capitalist expansion, co-opting the liberal language of empowerment and opportunity, and forming global and local modes of governance that create an “inclusion delusion” (Craig and Porter 258).

Multinational corporations have argued that economic growth and sustainable development are interdependent, describing the latter in terms of partnerships that engage and empower local communities. DeChaine’s chapter in this edited volume describes how a company’s corporate social responsibility campaign around a product is representative of a broader rhetorical merging of neoliberal and humanitarian concerns. Citing another example, Craig and Porter illustrate how participatory poverty assessments involving NGOs could be read as a means of “turning potential civil society critics into consensual governing partners” while keeping neoliberal policy intact (79). At the very least, neoliberalism has thoroughly infused what DeChaine calls the “rhetorical culture” (i.e., symbolic practices connecting global actors) around global governance (Global 19).

Perhaps now more than ever, mainstream development operates hegemonically, enlisting its critics, subsuming its alternatives, concealing its contradictions and ideological underpinnings, framing debates about how to manage global risks and respond to global crises, and presenting itself as the “common sense of the age” (Cammack 177). After the 2004 World Bank conference “Disability and Inclusive Development: Sharing, Learning, and Building Alliances,” at which various speakers from across the world critiqued the effects of neoliberal development policy on people with disabilities, the bank astutely adjusted its rhetoric—but not its policies—to emphasize the empowerment of rather than pity toward such people. In another example of neoliberal development’s hegemony, ironic given the state-led nature of war, the NGO-led shift from “needs-based”
to “rights-based” humanitarianism has been marshaled in support of the “‘military humanitarianism’ of the Western states in which development could come about only through military action” (Chandler cited in Grewal 133; see also DeChaine, Global 167). These and other hegemonic functions demonstrate the need to mobilize rhetoric’s interpretive and productive toolbox now more than ever to highlight, critique, and intervene in the hegemonic functions of this enterprise, and to assist in the move from deceptive development “alternatives” to real alternatives to development.14

Rhetorical Networks of Development

The image that best captures development practices, Escobar has argued, is not one of “epistemological centers and peripheries but a decentralized network of nodes in and through which . . . multiple users move and meet, sharing and contesting the socioepistemological space” (225). Much of this contestation is rhetorical, as illustrated by the chapters in this edited collection. Dingo also turns to the network metaphor, explaining that it can help us identify how rhetoric is transcoded across “diffused yet linked” occasions “while also accounting for how contiguous power relationships add meaning and force to arguments” (“Linking Transnational Logics” 494). In addition to helping us make sense of transnational rhetorical links, the network metaphor can also help us reenvision the scholarship on development, scholarship that thus far has only occasionally drawn on rhetoric’s expansive toolbox. Rather than accept rhetoric’s contributions to development and transnational studies as too diffuse to have critical and productive force, we call on rhetoricians to expand and thicken the rhetorical clusters of this scholarly network, and we offer this edited volume as one such beginning cluster.

The subsequent chapters, or scholarly nodes, offer extended analyses of transglocal development discourses, reading such discourses as megarhetorics (we could also call them “metarhetorics”) that help shape the parameters of how development—and its participants, functions, and impacts—can be represented and understood. The chapters’ sites of analysis range across and link several continents, various types of actors (e.g., publics, counterpublics, multinational corporations, governments, NGOs), and a multitude of discourses (e.g., political speeches, activist performances, corporate responsibility campaigns, documentary films, Internet protests, individual affective reactions). At the same time, the chapters provide more focused snapshots of how specific development discourses function rhetorically, demonstrating how rhetorical analysis can contribute
to the understanding, critique, and more ethical reshaping of development practices. These snapshots, too, are “developed” using a range of rhetorical elements, including visual, embodied, and affective ones.

Each chapter makes two basic moves. The first—using rhetoric to examine development’s megarhetorics and the practices linked to them—can be viewed as the collection’s primary contribution to critical development studies. But the book also contributes to rhetorical studies through each chapter’s extension of a rhetorical concept or mode of analysis in light of both globalization scholarship (from various disciplines) and the specific dynamics of the practices under examination. That said, different sets of chapters have different emphases, and so we’ve organized the book into two parts.

The first part, “Extending Rhetorical Concepts and Methods,” includes chapters that more explicitly theorize how rhetorical concepts and methods might be used to track and unpack the megarhetorics of development. Some of these chapters focus on extending notions of rhetorical movement. In chapter 1, for example, J. Blake Scott further advances the notion of transglocal rhetorical movement in analyzing a largely Internet-based debate about legal global development—a debate spurred by pharmaceutical giant Novartis’s lawsuit against India for denying a drug patent, and one that grew to involve transglocal publics and rhetorical risk constructions about pharmaceutical access and innovation. In addition to drawing on cultural scholars to develop this concept and complexify the scope of more traditional rhetorical analyses of globalization, Scott uses sociologist Ulrich Beck’s notion of risk (as a rhetorical construction) to read the debate as a transglocal risk conflict with indeterminate effects.

In chapter 2’s analysis of former president Bill Clinton’s globalization speeches as key examples of a megarhetoric shaping U.S. foreign policy and its material consequences, Jason Edwards and Jaime Wright point to a different kind of movement, one developed from Karl Polanyi’s sociopolitical notion of “double movement.” Clinton’s double movement discourse, as Edwards and Wright explain it, illustrates the rhetorical balancing of expanding “free” trade on the one hand and regulatory protection and social safety nets on the other—a balancing made exigent by the harmful effects of neoliberal globalization and development. In discussing numerous examples of this rhetorical double movement, Edwards and Wright explain how it both reveals and enacts an economic agenda and the historical forces shaping it, also explaining how the rhetorical, political, and material impact one another.

In chapter 3, D. Robert DeChaine examines another attempt to bal-
ance, or even merge, development’s neoliberal and humanitarian impulses, in this case the marketing campaign around Ethos Water (owned by Starbucks). Through his analysis DeChaine explains how the company’s ethos of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is informed by a “humanitarian doxa,” or structure of belief, that works in the Ethos Water campaign to affectively appeal to consumer altruism. According to DeChaine, the ethos-centered notion of corporate responsibility draws on a humanitarian doxa and works as a megarhetoric to, perhaps not unlike Clinton’s globalization rhetoric, reactively legitimize the “less than humane strains of globalized venture capitalism.” DeChaine’s analysis foregrounds the connective, affective energy of ethos in CSR rhetoric that aligns various actors and values.

Following the lead of chapter 3, Matt Newcomb’s chapter extends work on affective rhetoric in analyzing how a religious development organization, Compassion International, shifts its representations of the Republic of Korea (i.e., South Korea) from an aid recipient nation to a donor one. In explaining how this shift is both economic and affective, Newcomb complicates the common economic categorization of nations, explaining how aid-centered development megarhetorics not only impact the material conditions of a nation but also change the structures of feeling about that nation’s identity in relation to development’s benefactors and beneficiaries. Like DeChaine, Newcomb focuses part of his analysis on how affective, largely image-based development rhetoric shapes the reactions and self-concepts of the individual Western citizens it addresses. Whereas scholars of affect theory typically view affect as preceding emotion, Newcomb explains how the two can also move in the other direction as well, with emotional arguments functioning to frame later affective responses in (potential) aid donors.

In chapter 5, the final chapter in the collection’s first part, Tim Jensen and Wendy S. Hesford examine the partly imagistic megarhetorics around the staging of the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, China. These rhetorics, marshaled by Chinese officials and corporate sponsors (in their CSR messages), make a causal link between economic and human rights development, a link critiqued by activist groups. Jensen and Hesford develop an intertextual and also intercontextual (borrowing from Appadurai) approach to rhetorically analyzing the spectacle, tracing rhetorical exchanges between image and audience and how the meanings such exchanges produce are materialized and experienced across interlinked, ever-shifting locales (e.g., the makeshift dormitories of migrant Chinese workers behind the Olympic spectacle). Like Scott’s opening chapter, this one foregrounds
rhetorical movement in a transnational debate about the effects of development on a nation and its people. Taken together, the chapters in this first part inventively show how rhetoric can both inform and be informed by critical, interdisciplinary scholarship about development and globalization. In their analysis of the “quiet rights revolution” gradually taking hold in China, Jensen and Hesford bridge the first part’s emphasis on extending rhetoric’s toolbox with the second part’s theorizing of rhetorical modes of resistance.

Part two of the collection, “Building Counter-Rhetorics of Resistance,” expands the first part’s focus on extending rhetorical terms and methods by considering how rhetorical analysis can reveal political possibilities often overshadowed by the megarhetorics of globalized development, though some chapters are more optimistic than others about such possibilities. In chapter 6, Eileen Schell echoes some of the analytic moves in the collection’s first part by comparing and contrasting CSR and activist rhetorics around agricultural development—namely, the public relations rhetoric of multinational agribusiness giant Archer Daniels Midland and the transnational food sovereignty arguments of the Indian feminist Vandana Shiva, respectively. In critiquing agricultural development claims of scientific and technological progress in farming practices, Schell focuses on the megarhetorical concept of sustainability, explaining how Shiva and the transnational collectivity of environmental activists and farmers she leads have reappropriated this concept to honor indigenous farming knowledge and have exposed neoliberal corporate development efforts as biopiracy. Like those in part one, Schell’s chapter demonstrates the usefulness of rhetorical theory for understanding how corporate and activist development arguments work, examining epideictic elements of the former and the use of visual synecdoche in the latter.

In chapter 7, Rebecca Dingo similarly critiques the megarhetoric of empowerment framing women’s economic development efforts. Dingo shows how this megarhetoric works in microlending charity campaigns to form an economic and affective connection between donor and recipient that compels the former to action and promises empowerment to both; in decontextualizing and individualizing poverty, however, this rhetorical exchange creates only a shallow, fleeting connection that reaffirms rather than challenges the colonial power dynamic. Dingo contrasts these campaigns with two documentary films—one about female Chinese workers in a bead factory and the other about 9/11 widows in the United States and Afghanistan—to show the political possibility of “turning the tables” on the megarhetoric of empowerment. In foregrounding contextual evidence
that links women’s lived experiences with larger global power structures (e.g., international trade agreements, war) and systems of oppression, these documentaries offer an alternative possibility of empowering viewers as informed global citizens.

Bret Benjamin follows Dingo’s chapter with another exploration of film’s possibilities for resistance, in this case with the film *Bamako*, which poses a fictional trial between “African society” and “international financial institutions.” In theorizing the film’s rhetorical (largely epideictic) functions and anti-imperialist possibilities, Benjamin (drawing on the work of Fredric Jameson and David Harvey) reanimates the analytic category of imperialism, pointing to the violence that operates across and indeed binds economic, territorial/political, and social dynamics on the levels of micropolitical formations and global capitalist structures. The “politics of dispossession and violence” taken up by *Bamako* is fueled by a utopian promise of an anti-imperialist counterpublic and foregrounds a material (as well as rhetorical) basis for such an emerging collectivity. Benjamin cautions, however, that even in providing a way to recognize the commonality of imperialism’s destructive effects, *Bamako* also reveals the limitations of collective anti-imperialist activism. The long history and sheer scope of imperialism’s oppression and destruction make it both incomprehensible and overwhelming to confront, even through utopian art.

The collection ends on a more hopeful note with Robert McRuer’s chapter describing a convivial rhetoric of resistance around “enfreakment.” McRuer reads this visual, embodied rhetoric through the video *The Chain South*, which features irreverent performances by a spoof Ronald McDonald at various McDonald’s chains on the road from San Francisco to Mexico. Reading these performances alongside critiques of McDonald’s disability practices, the effects of Western development (e.g., NAFTA) on the U.S.-Mexico border, and the historical laws regulating disabled bodies, McRuer examines how they employ the queer strategy of “disidentification,” which simultaneously works “on and against” dominant ideology (Muñoz). In theorizing an embodied rhetoric of disidentification, McRuer thus offers a “third way” of resistance, one that avoids the traps of assimilation and counteridentification. The dominant ideology of global development engaged by *The Chain South* includes the twin impulses to “enfreak” and to normalize people with disabilities, making them visible only in specific oppressive ways. Recuperating an empowering practice of enfreakment, *The Chain South* confronts us with the convivial, otherwise unrecognizable body of “extraordinary ability,” prompting McRuer’s call for collective “crip” resistance through this rhetorical strategy.
As the connections within and across the two parts indicate, we could have organized this collection in a number of ways. Several chapters—including those by Scott, DeChaine, Jensen and Hesford, Schell, and McRuer—examine megarhetorics of development operating in CSR discourse. Another group of chapters—including those by DeChaine, Newcomb, and Dingo—extend rhetoric and development studies through theories of affect. Yet additional chapter clusters take up visual (including cinematic) rhetorics (DeChaine, Newcomb, Jensen and Hesford, Dingo, Benjamin, and McRuer) and theorize rhetorical movement (Scott, Edwards and Wright, Jensen and Hesford). In keeping with the network metaphor and Appadurai’s theorizing of globalization, the collection’s chapters connect global flows, structures, and discourses with various local articulations of them, articulations that sometimes affirm existing power dynamics, sometimes resist them, but always adapt them. In their analyses these chapters also relate rhetorical moves to their extrarhetorical, material conditions of possibility and effects.

As new Web 2.0 technologies have helped spread information about the effects of megadisasters such as the tsunami in Southeast Asia, hurricane Katrina in the United States, recent earthquakes in Haiti and Chile, and global economic crisis, a growing number of publics and institutions have become more conscious of transglocal links and more aware of the limits and inadequacies of development efforts. Just after the earthquake in Haiti and in response to the global economic crisis, for example, National Public Radio aired a special report on how the IMF has altered some of its development strategies (including rhetorical ones) in light of these still-unfolding events. More specifically, the IMF is revising the megarhetoric that free-market development always brings a nation out of poverty, noting that “developing countries might benefit from controlling how much foreign capital enters their economies—and how it’s used” (Gjelten). Likewise, in a recent Reuters report, World Bank chief Robert Zoellick stated: “The old concept of ‘Third World’ no longer applies, and rich countries cannot impose their will on developing nations that are now major sources of global growth” (Wroughton). These examples of increased self-recognition (from the two most influential development agencies) certainly do not guarantee that development efforts and the rhetorics surrounding them will alter their neoliberal course—indeed, as Beck theorizes, the self-recognition of industrialized risks is one of the core elements of world risk society, and development’s megarhetorics have proven to be adaptable and difficult to challenge—but it perhaps creates a bigger opening for the types of antihegemonic rhetorical strategies explored in some of this collection’s chapters.
Indeed, we offer this collection as the beginning of a rhetorical repertoire for better understanding, critiquing, and ethically responding to global development practices and their multitude of local instantiations.

Notes

1. Ronaldo Munck similarly refers to development as a “meta-narrative” (204). See also Arturo Escobar’s Encountering Development and Rebecca Dingo’s “Making the ‘Unfit, Fit.’”

2. Escobar has discussed the marking of people, as well as regions, as underdeveloped, pointing to such subject positions as “poor,” “malnourished,” and “iliterate” (41).

3. Marshall Wolfe has called development policy discourse a “wastebasket for commonplaces” (6).

4. Ad campaigns for Pampers diapers and Always menstrual pads respectively have suggested that purchasing the product will help third world children receive vaccinations and third world young women go to school despite their periods. These examples demonstrate how development discourses often depend on colonial stereotypes (third world women and children need to be “saved” by Western corporations, and these corporations are supported by their commodities).

5. Jan Pieterse has described this model of progress as teleological. We concur but also note Escobar’s point that this teleology is paradoxically reproduced by a “separation” between the underdeveloped and developed, calling this a “perpetual recognition and disavowal of difference” (Escobar 53–54).

6. For this reason we have chosen to use the terms “lower-income,” “mid-income,” and “high-income” nations as opposed to “developed,” “developing,” or “modern” nations or even “third world,” “second world,” or “first world.”

7. Escobar has documented this hegemonic power in his history of development through the 1980s, noting that “even those who opposed the prevailing capitalist strategies were obliged to couch their critique in terms of the need for development” (5). In our view his observation could be extended to more recent “reform” efforts.

8. Paul Cammack similarly has argued that the World Bank and other international governance institutions re-present a capitalist-based program of development “as a remedy for the very human ills it generates” (160).

9. Pieterse has provided a particularly useful history of development approaches, models, and meanings (see especially the summary tables on 7, 91, 155).

10. In 1989 at the Institute for International Economics, the economist John Williamson presented what has come to be known as the “Washington Consensus,” characterized by ten strategies of policy-based economic development: financial liberalization, public priorities, tax reform, fiscal development, competitive exchange rates, trade liberalization, foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation, and property rights (Broad, Cavanagh, and Bello 94fn1). In this view international lending agencies such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO are instrumental in helping developing countries achieve “export-led growth” by opening trade barriers and by privatizing “parastatal” services (84).
11. See, for example, Susan George and Fabrizio Sabelli’s *Faith and Credit: The World Bank’s Secular Empire*; J. K. Gibson-Graham’s *The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It)*; and Suzanne Bergeron’s “Challenging the World Bank’s Narrative of Inclusion.”

12. Historically, before the 1980s, developing countries favored the state’s role in development policies and planning. In fact, leaders of developing countries had an implicit fear that unfettered markets in an already unequal world would only push poorer nations into further disadvantage. Importantly, in the post–World War II years (the 1950s through the 1970s) development debates focused on empowering governments to extend social services to their citizens. Until the 1970s it was taken for granted that policy makers should be concerned not just with the level and growth of per capita incomes, but also with income distribution and social services. Thus mid-twentieth-century development policy favored trade restrictions, national investments, and the regulation of capital in and out of the countries. Policy makers rejected this development philosophy during the Thatcher and Reagan years. Throughout the 1980s the U.S. government and other wealthy nations began to push developing countries to accept the free-market paradigm by employing quid pro quo demands; in other words, unless developing countries agreed to allow their economies to be infiltrated by the free market, their development loans would be cut.

13. The rhetoric of empowerment follows a rational choice model that seeks to make the disempowered global economic citizens by integrating them into the labor market.

14. See Escobar (215) and Munck (200) on this distinction.

**Works Cited**


Part I

Extending Rhetorical Concepts and Methods
In May 2006 pharmaceutical giant Novartis launched a two-part lawsuit in the Indian courts, challenging the government’s denial of a patent for the blockbuster anticancer drug Glivec.1 The lawsuit drew a quick response from a number of Indian and global NGOs asserting that Novartis’s actions threatened patients around the globe who depend on India as the “pharmacy of the developing world.” Over the ensuing months, this response grew into a global movement of variously connected protest campaigns, which in turn prompted a defensive countercampaign by Novartis and its allies, including American and international industry lobbying organizations. The rhetorical force of each side relied primarily on a number of arguments about the local, the global, the social, and the economic risks of the other side’s actions. Indeed, we could, drawing on the work of the sociologist Ulrich Beck, call the debate a risk conflict, with risk functioning as a megarhetoric directing what is possible and persuasive.

According to Beck, we live in a world of conflicts around the distribution and management of risks, which are the negative, unintended consequences (or “side effects”) of industrial modernization and its impulse to control. Although we are acutely aware of such risks and still desire to