On August 13, 1961, in the middle of the night, the East German government closed the border between East and West Berlin, halting people, cars, and trams in their tracks and sealing off the western sectors of the city with barbed wire. The acrimony between the eastern and western Cold War powers had been growing since the end of World War II, yet the intra-city border closure had not been foreseen by citizens on either side of the barricade, and it caught western governments in particular by surprise.¹ The rulers of East Germany declared that, with the border secured against the “fascist” west, peace had finally been established in their country. In West Berlin, the *Tagesspiegel* newspaper declared the event to be East German leader “Ulbricht’s demonstration of naked violence” and a “day Berliners would never forget.”² Twenty-eight years later, another unforgettable day would transpire. On November 9, 1989, an unplanned and unexpected announcement regarding changes to the travel restrictions imposed on East Germans rendered the border closure irrelevant. The Berlin Wall “fell,” seemingly as suddenly and abruptly as it was erected.

Although Germany’s division into East and West and its subsequent reunification is often conceived of in absolute terms, the divisions did not end with the “fall” of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, just as they did not simply appear with the barbed wire on the night of August 13, 1961, or even in 1949, when the GDR (German Democratic Republic; East Germany) and Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) were formally established. In light of the irrelevance of absolutes in terms of division and reunification, the more important issue is how, after Germany had been divided politically and physically, corresponding cultural and social divisions were established between 1961 and 1989. In other words, how were East and West German national identities—identities distinct from and in dialectical opposition to one another—created *despite* a shared history and cultural heritage? In what ways was Berlin constructed, both literally and figuratively, as an important site for the creation and negotiation of these identities? Specifically, how did East and West Berlin’s dual identities (that
Capital cities are always key sites for the formation and representation of national identity. Berlin, however, is unusual in that its designation as capital has been repeatedly questioned. Germany became a nation relatively late in comparison with other European nations. Moreover, individuals in states such as Prussia and Bavaria often identified more closely with regional rather than national identity. As a result, not only was a unified sense of “Germanness” a somewhat dubious concept in the first years of the consolidated country’s existence but Berlin’s importance as a city that represented a pan-German culture and identity was as much a conceit as an accepted reality. This phenomenon in many ways continued into the twentieth century, as the historian Andreas Daum and others have noted. As a result, the various regimes that ruled Germany from Berlin could not take its status as a national capital for granted but very deliberately and consciously had to construct the city as a site of national identity. During the period of the city’s division, consciously constructing an identity meant using specific architectural styles and approaches to build quite literally a “democratic” city in the west and a “socialist” one in the east. It also meant constructing Berlin in a figurative sense, making it a symbol of democratic or socialist values and ideals and explicitly defining its role vis-à-vis the rest of East and West Germany as either the capital, in the former case, or the capital-in-waiting, in the latter.

This work traces the history of the efforts to construct Berlin in nationalist and political terms and examines how these regimes used the city to construct two divergent notions of German national identity. The examination proceeds via an analysis of key architectural undertakings, such as the State Library in West Berlin (Hans Scharoun and Edgar Wisniewski, 1967–78) and the Palace of the Republic in East Berlin (Heinz Graffunder et al., 1973–76) and considers these buildings within their architectural as well as social, political, and economic contexts. Materials culled from the German national and Berlin municipal archives, as well as from architects’ papers and contemporary journal and press accounts, reveal how designers, sponsoring regimes, and members of the critical establishment discussed these buildings and other architectural initiatives. The larger context of these buildings reveals the full complexity of the relationship between architecture and national identity in both east and west and provides new perspectives on buildings and individual architects. Examination of organizations like West Germany’s Foundation for Prussian Cultural Heritage and the East German Building Academy reveals the influences of various cultural and architectural institutions in shaping architectural theory and practice.
This work also examines the significance of specific buildings or building types within popular discourses on, for example, housing, identity, and/or the creation of community, which permits an assessment of the degree to which official rhetoric on architecture and/or national identity resonated with populations in divided Berlin and abroad.

While there are a number of texts that deal with specific architects or with particular buildings of East and West Berlin in the 1961–89 period, few discuss them in relation to one another. Furthermore, histories of East and West German architecture and planning often employ different methodological approaches: while histories of East German architecture tend to examine buildings from the perspective of politics and economics to the near exclusion of stylistic considerations, the reverse is true for histories of architecture in West Germany/West Berlin. In general, there have been very few close, comparative analyses of identity formation in the realm of Cold War cultural or architectural production in divided Berlin, despite the fact that a comparative approach is essential in addressing this question. East and West Germany’s shared history and cultural heritage bound the two nations together, as did their roles in the global political struggle of the Cold War. Because of their complex relationship, East and West Germany relied on one another to define themselves, even when official rhetoric attempted to deny or ignore the other’s existence and legitimacy. As a result, one cannot simply treat either East and West Germany or East and West Berlin as autonomous nations or cities that were completely separate and distinct.

One reason for both the tendency to discuss East or West Berlin/Germany and not the other and for the lack of scholarship on the period from 1961 to 1989 may be the Berlin Wall itself. As both a physical structure and a symbol of the Cold War, the wall became so iconic that it dominated the urban imagery of East and West Berlin and, to some degree, East and West Germany. The dominance of this image persists; one can hardly think of Berlin during this period without conjuring an image of the graffiti-covered western face of the westernmost wall. Part of the wall’s importance lies in the fact that it gave physical form to a political and ideological divide that was already conceived of in spatial terms. Built fifteen years after Winston Churchill’s famous speech, the wall was viewed as the manifestation of the “Iron Curtain,” seemingly confirming a division that already existed. It is partly because of its iconic status that the wall itself is thought of as a single and definitive division that remained impenetrable and unchanged throughout its twenty-eight-year existence.

In reality, the wall, which was actually two walls, evolved as both a structure and as a symbol throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Not only did the GDR government build, rebuild, and reconfigure the entire
system of enclosure and surveillance of which the westernmost wall was just one part, but the wall’s penetrability fluctuated as East-West German political relations changed. However, because of the wall’s importance and visibility as a symbol, it is often viewed as both the cause of the East-West Berlin/Germany divide and the proof of it. Both the Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall were political constructions that, once created, were accepted as immutable fact, although they changed in meaning and significance over time. The term “iron curtain,” for example, existed before Winston Churchill used it in his 1947 speech. It evolved from a metaphor that was intended to suggest the protection of the “West” from the “East” (in the way an iron curtain protected a theater audience if fire broke out on the stage) to a metaphor that evoked images of the unbending domination of and within the “East.” Moreover, as concepts, the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain not only described the political, social, and cultural realities of Cold War Europe but also in many ways came to dictate the perception of these realities, of “East” versus “West.” As a symbol and instrument of the Cold War divide, the wall spatialized aspects of culture, politics, and society. Even when it was not directly addressed in, for example, politicians’ rhetoric or an architectural critique, it was always an influence on construction and identity in East and West Berlin and Germany.

The Berlin Wall played an important role in the construction of East-West Berlin/German identity throughout its existence in large part because of ambiguity regarding the city’s political status and relationship to notions of “Germanness.” Even before 1961, in order to counteract the uncertainty and tensions created by Berlin’s internal divide, the ruling regimes of East and West Berlin attempted to construct more concrete notions of identity. The anxiety created by the border closure further encouraged the construction of separate German identities. At the same time, the very presence of the wall facilitated the construction of these identities in part because, in creating two distinct physical entities, the wall made it easier to create two distinct cultural entities or places. As the cultural geographer Yi-Fu Tuan notes in his book *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience*, visibility is a key way of establishing a sense of place. Place, he argues, can be made visible when “rivalry or conflict” pits one place against another and also when boundaries delimit physical space, making it more knowable, as well as more visible. In relation to nation-states, Tuan writes, “visible limits to a nation’s sovereignty, such as a row of hills or a stretch of river, support the sense of the nation as a place.” The Berlin Wall made West and East Berlin definitive places in a way they had not been before, completing Berlin’s transformation from a group of occupation zones to two separate cities.8
The wall affected identity construction in Berlin in other ways as well. Although political tensions eased after 1961, the border closure raised the stakes for Berlin in its role as the center of the Cold War. While Berlin had been the symbolic and literal frontier between “East” and “West” since the end of World War II, the wall heightened the city’s symbolic importance by formalizing Berlin’s division and its place at the center of the Cold War. After 1961, it was clear there was to be no compromise on the so-called Berlin Question. Berlin would be divided or it would be wholly western or wholly eastern; the division and conflict as a whole would end only with the victory of either the eastern or the western Cold War powers. Thus, August 13, 1961, marks a change in the way East-West Berlin/German identity was constructed in and with Berlin and to what ends: it is at this point that the divided city truly became a microcosm of the Cold War as a whole.

The symbolic importance of the Berlin Wall was such that “the wall” soon came to refer to both a physical structure and a figurative concept. As a result, the Berlin Wall made the city even more important as a staging ground for competing identities, dividing as it did Berlin and the world into “East” and “West,” as well as into socialist/communist versus democratic/capitalist. So definitive was the wall both physically and as a visual symbol that it became difficult to see the Cold War conflict in any terms other than black and white. This dichotomy was by design, as eastern and western powers encouraged a narrative of the Cold War based on a choice: one or the other, not both. This choice was made physical reality in divided Berlin, where there was what amounted to two alternate versions of a single city. Moreover, this notion of “either/or” would affect identity construction in East and West Berlin, as well as the way the built environment was used to construct such identities: “East” and “West” were constructed and represented as the opposite, politically, economically, and aesthetically, of one another.

In his book The Ghosts of Berlin, the historian Brian Ladd argues that the wall united Germans even as it divided them and that it also became a way of understanding the German national character, of dividing the population into “good” versus “bad” Germans, as well as camps of “us” versus “them”: “The very existence of the Wall served to displace any anxieties about German identity onto it. It was ‘a zipper,’ observed the East Berlin writer Lutz Rathenow, linking Germans even as it divided them. The separation enforced by the Wall made it easy to explain away any apparent disunity among Germans and to render harmless the whole idea of German identity. This is the point made recently by the West Berlin writer Peter Schneider: ‘it was the Wall alone that preserved the illusion that the Wall was the only thing separating the Germans.’”9 Perhaps from the time of its
construction, although certainly in the 1980s, the wall served as the confirmation of a fundamental difference between East and West Germans at the same time that it explained this difference.10 Decades after it was demolished, the wall remains an influence on “East” versus “West” identity construction, evidenced by, for example, the concept of “the wall in the head” (die Mauer im Kopf), which refers to the continued cultural, political, and even linguistic differences between East and West Germans.11 The continuing mental “presence” of the wall is perhaps no surprise, given the psychological impact of the structure throughout its existence. Instances of so-called “Berlin Wall disease” (die Berliner Mauerkrankheit) began to be documented immediately after its construction, and, throughout the period from 1961 through 1989, the structure was used by psychologists to theorize and explain Germans’ emotional problems and the national psyche.12 For all these reasons, the Berlin Wall’s significance as a symbol and metaphor cannot be understated.

Given its unique situation and history, divided Berlin is the exceptional case that may shed light on the larger context of which it was a part. Not only was Berlin’s urban space used to make arguments about national identity within East and West Germany, but the city was a, if not the, primary site of confrontation between the eastern and western powers of the Cold War, led by the United States and the Soviet Union. However, this view does not suggest that what was true in East and West Berlin can be directly transferred to the “East” and “West” as a whole or even to East and West Germany. In fact, it is the points of convergence and divergence that are the focus of this study. Because divided Berlin was the crucible in which these two separate national identities were forged, focusing on the divided city helps to foreground details that are lost when one considers the east-west Cold War confrontation on a larger scale.

In focusing on the specific example of wall-era Berlin, this work features the methodological approach known in the discipline of social history as “microhistory.”13 This approach is useful for studying divided Berlin because it takes into account “normative structures” (such as the state), which dictate individuals’ actions, as well as individuals’ “constant negotiation, manipulation, choices and decisions,” which variously accommodate or subvert the impositions of the normative structures. The small-scale focus of microhistory and its attention to both governing influences and individual agency are useful because both aspects help to counteract overarching and static frameworks that often lead to totalizing interpretations of history. Instead, the model for understanding the world and a person’s behavior in it is based on “action and conflict.” This model takes into account changes over time and within different contexts and also con-
siders discrepancies between general patterns and the anomalies within these patterns. As the historian Giovanni Levi writes in “On Microhistory,” society is not studied “as an object invested with inherent properties, but as a set of shifting interrelationships existing between constantly adapting configurations.” The microhistorical approach therefore allows one to consider not only the interrelations between individuals and the state in East and West Berlin but also the ways in which this relationship was affected by specific political, economic, and social changes of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The result will be a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between the built environment and identity formation in divided Berlin and Germany.

In an essay entitled “Everyday History: New Approaches to the History of the Post-War Germanies,” the historian Thomas Lindenberger discusses how the German iteration of microhistory, *Alltagsgeschichte* (everyday history), is the most appropriate approach for writing histories of East Germany. In the case of the GDR, the “official” policies and ideologies espoused by the government were often rejected by individual East Germans, although they may have paid lip service to such policies or made an outward show of belief in or adherence to official GDR doctrine. Thus, it does not make sense to gauge societal values or historical trends by considering only the GDR government or its leaders. As Lindenberger writes, “[East Germans’] lives, their behavior, their commitments and passivity, are important factors of the historical entity ‘GDR’ . . . both structures of power and domination and social practice and experience have to be studied and debated.”

Accordingly, individuals within the GDR who were committed to socialist principles and yet critical of the regime—figures such as the author Brigitte Reimann, architect Bruno Flierl, and filmmaker Wolfgang Kohlhaase—are of particular interest. These are artists, writers, and critics who negotiated a complicated relationship with the GDR government that cannot be understood in strict, binary terms. As Kohlhaase would later comment in 1996, “Now, at a time when people tend to see things in black and white, I would like to emphasize that even with a wall around your country you could still think for yourself.” In many cases, the ruling party initially embraced these individuals and their work, only to repudiate them later when the artists began to question the regime’s commitment to its own stated ideals. Analyzing how these figures negotiated government-imposed strictures as they attempted to realize the political ideals that were purportedly the same as those of the regime provides insight into the complex relationships between cultural politics, architectural policy, and the state in the GDR.
Lindenberger argues that historians should use the Alltagsgeschichte approach and conceive of the former East Germany as a “regime of borders” (Diktatur der Grenzen), “referring both to the outer geographical boundary protected against transgression by arms, concrete and barbed wire, and to the multitude of invisible boundaries pervading the body social, producing an inner landscape of relatively isolated units at the bottom of society.” A similar approach to West Berlin’s history is appropriate, although, to be sure, West Berlin was not ruled by a totalitarian regime. As in East Berlin, official rhetoric was of supreme importance in West Berlin. West Berlin’s physical isolation, its unique political status, and its significance as a symbol of the western world made it important as a showcase city. The display of solidarity and economic success within West Berlin was critical for western governments’ success in the Cold War struggle. However, in West Berlin, as in the GDR, officials often wrestled with the tension between the city’s image and its actual circumstances. For example, West Berlin could be described as the “capital of the free world” and a “shop window” or “show window” of the West (Schaufenster des Westens), although it never had a truly independent economy and was heavily subsidized by West Germany. As with the GDR, a consideration of power structures alone does not result in a complete picture of life in West Berlin during the period of its division. The use in this work of a microhistorical, “everyday” approach to the history and architecture of East and West Berlin should mitigate the influence of myths born of the Cold War, as well as critique them.

The scope of this work is limited to Berlin to avoid general and totalizing assessments of either East or West German architecture. Instead, the focus is on the immaterial borders between East and West Berlin and Germany in relation to where they are drawn, by whom, and to what ends. One key way in which the differences and similarities between east and west were alternately constructed and elided was through discourses around architectural modernism. Scholars have interrogated the role of modernism within the Cold War struggle, particularly regarding modern-type consumer products. For example, in Cold War on the Home Front: The Soft Power of Midcentury Design, the architectural historian Greg Castillo considers how the design of domestic products became a means of communicating ideas about political and economic values in divided Berlin and Germany in cultural expositions of the 1950s. The current study extends such work by considering the official endorsement or repudiation of modernism by government authorities in relation to a larger discourse on modernism that took place in professional and popular spheres, in both the east and west, and over time, from the 1960s through
the 1980s. As such, modernism in this book is revealed as both an instrument and a product of the Cold War, shaped by the forces that deployed it.

Modernism is furthermore regarded as an ongoing and shifting discourse, rather than a style or approach that can be defined singularly or absolutely. Sarah Williams Goldhagen discusses this understanding of modernism in her 2005 essay “Something to Talk About: Modernism, Discourse, Style,” when she asks, “What if we conceptualize modernism not as the result of a discourse but as itself that discourse?” She continues: “In this view, modernist buildings, projects, urban plans—including their stylistic positions—as well as manifestos, exhibitions, and other contributions, have been proposals or hypothetical positions offered up, either actually or hypothetically, to an identifiable community of recipients . . . with the intent of testing that proposal’s merit and validity. . . . the primary media through which these debates have been conducted were designs in two and three dimensions; secondary media were exhibitions, conferences, criticism, journals and books.”20 At the root of the debate, as Goldhagen explains, is the question of how architecture might best be used to order and advance society, for either a “more humanized present” or a “future in a better world.”21 This is why modernism was such a crucial weapon in the Cold War, which was often presented as a conflict between two ways of life.

A crucial aspect of these “ways of life,” and another realm of discourse within which borders were drawn, was domesticity, the home, and Heimat. The word Heimat is often translated simply as “homeland,” but in German usage the word carries connotations that go beyond this English translation, encompassing various ideas that are in some ways contradictory and inconsistent. For example, it can refer not only to the attachment one feels toward one’s birthplace but also to the feeling of kinship one shares with compatriots, thus connecting to individual and collective identities. It includes both physically locate-able spaces such as a particular nation or a region within a nation, as well as more abstract notions of place, such as “the homeland” or “the place of origin.” Heimat is usually envisioned in historical terms but is at the same time immune to specific political and social developments and associated with values that are fundamental and constant; it refers to a generalized “past” yet is also timeless. The term emerged as a significant concept in the nineteenth century in Germany and was particularly useful in a country where strong regional identities often competed with the notion of a single, national identity that was much more ambiguous. In the postwar period as well, the ability of the Heimat concept to express unity as well as diversity, to exclude as well as include, was useful in reconstructing national identity along the east-west fault line. It allowed Germans to redraw cultural borders in the wake of geographic,
political, and economic reconfiguration, offering, as the historian Celia Applegate argues, “the possibility of a community in the face of fragmentation and alienation.”

Throughout the Cold War, ideas about and images of home, belonging, and national identity were often presented by the regimes of east and west via architecture, urban planning, and design. For example, with the construction of new housing during the Cold War, authorities sought to prove they could provide for the citizens in their sphere. Using “representational” architecture, such as model homes or cityscapes shown in propaganda films, authorities offered images of the prosperous present they had created and of the progressive future promised to those who lived under their leadership. Residents in West Berlin, West Germany, and East Germany often measured the success or failure of their governments by the extent to which they lived up to the standards established by the representational media and official rhetoric around architecture and building. Governments, in turn, measured their own success in part by the numbers of “hearts and minds” won over to their way of life.

Because victory in the Cold War was tied closely to public perception, contemporary popular discourses about housing and architectural design are critical to gaining an understanding of how these concepts influenced political and national identity formation in both spheres of the Cold War. As the historian Walter Hixson argues in *The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy*, “Although deeply embedded in national consciousness, the Cold War is nonetheless a cultural construction devoid of ontological status. Simply put, the Cold War always was and still is a narrative discourse, not a reality. While the Berlin Wall, nuclear weapons, and the deaths of millions of people were all too real, to be sure, the way in which these phenomena are framed and interpreted can only be determined by representation.” Accordingly, this book considers the various ways in which these concepts, and the Cold War itself, were represented in, for example, exhibitions, conferences and publications, and mass-media outlets. The specific types of media examined in this study include press reports on divided Berlin, such as those published in magazines and newspapers and featured in newsreels. Both popular and propagandistic films and television programs are also considered. Of particular interest is how the conventions of the Cold War narrative were formed through the repetition of specific themes and images, resulting in a system of representation that was familiar and legible to the broader public, regardless of individuals’ views about the global struggle.

The focus on two-dimensional representation, as opposed to exhibitions, is partly a function of the temporal scope of this study. Before 1961,
As Castillo and others have demonstrated, exhibitions were a central site of the cultural battles of the Cold War. After the closing of the border between East and West Germany and, indeed, between the eastern and western spheres of the Cold War as a whole, the direct confrontation of east and west in exhibit halls was far less common. Although cultural exhibitions continued, eastern visitors could not attend western fairs easily, if they could at all, nor did westerners have ready access to fairs in the east. This shift had already begun before the construction of the wall; in 1957, officials with the United States Information Agency (USIA) lamented the “consistent . . . slow decline” of East German attendance at the German Industrial Fair. Castillo calls the Kitchen Debate in 1959 a “parting volley rather than [an] opening shot” in the Cold War campaign of domestic exhibitions. This transition took place in West Germany as well. As the historian Jeff R. Schutts has noted, by the late 1950s “advertising had replaced the trade fair as the primary medium through which Germans could spin out their fantasies of convenience and luxury.” As a result of this trend, literal image took on increased importance in cultural propaganda initiatives, alongside “image” in a more general sense.

In addition, the nature of the Cold War, based on surveillance and espionage rather than overt military action, resulted in a profusion of image technologies, such as spy cameras and multiscreen “situation rooms,” and the same period saw a dramatic rise in domestic consumption of mass media. Television became increasingly popular and common in the capitalist world in the 1950s and 1960s, and, by 1960, almost 90 percent of US households contained a TV set. Magazines also grew in number and readership during this period, fueled in part by the postwar boom in consumer goods, which were advertised therein. Not only spy cameras but also television, magazines, and advertising images were thus crucial weapons in the Cold War, becoming the primary means through which political arguments were transmitted to the public and influencing how individuals understood and interpreted the messages being communicated. This trend grew more pronounced after 1961, when Cold War propaganda became relegated more and more to the realm of mass media and visual culture. From this period, film and television screens, along with the pages of mass media publications, became the principal sites of Cold War cultural skirmishes, more or less replacing the exhibition hall in this regard.

In Western Europe and the United States, representations of West Berlin (and divided Berlin) on television and in magazines provide scholars with insight not only into how the city was framed by political and cultural authorities but also into popular discourse around the city and the values with which it was associated. In the GDR, the mass media were tightly
controlled by the government and as such are not very revealing of popular opinion or the public’s imagination. Articles such as those published in the ruling party’s newspaper, *Neues Deutschland*, do, however, give clear insight into how the regime intended particular buildings or urban spaces to be perceived. In addition, at specific times and in specific publications, critical voices did find a way to be heard. For example, from 1962 to 1964, the architect Bruno Flierl served as editor of the East German Building Academy journal *Deutsche Architektur* and was able to publish incisive and critical articles on the question of housing in East Germany until the party stripped him of his post. This study also draws insights into daily life and popular images of East Berlin from histories that include details about everyday life in the GDR, such as *The Ideal World of Dictatorship* (1999) by the historian and former GDR citizen Stefan Wolle. Such books help explain the relationship between lived experience and party rhetoric in the GDR.

In addition to press accounts, cinematic films are a particularly revealing representative medium for explaining the literal and figurative construction of divided Berlin. From the medium’s invention, film played a central role in the representation of the urban built environment and, more specifically, in both communicating and helping to shape perceptions of urban identity. In the early twentieth century, for example, the genre of “city films” capitalized on the potential of the film medium to convey to audiences the subjective experience of urban space, with films like Walter Ruttmann’s *Berlin: Symphony of a Big City* (1927) and Dziga Vertov’s *Man with a Movie Camera* (1929) serving as prime examples. As the film scholar Miriam Hansen has argued, “The cinema was not only part and symptom of modernity’s experience and perception of crisis and upheaval; it was also, most importantly, the single most inclusive cultural horizon in which the traumatic effects of modernity were reflected, rejected or disavowed, transmuted or negotiated.” The cinema’s unique relationship to notions of modernity is particularly relevant to a study of Berlin, because the city was, as we will see, itself linked with notions of modernity and “modern urbanity.”

Certainly in recent scholarship, much has been made of the connections between architecture and film as media, for example, in the way film can foreground the experience of moving through physical space and thus the use of a building. The architectural historian Beatriz Colomina argues in her book *Privacy and Publicity* that “to think about modern architecture must be to pass back and forth between the question of space and the question of representation.” By employing specific formal means, such as point-of-view and tracking shots, a filmmaker can direct spectators’ attention to the aesthetic and experiential aspects of a particular building.
and create empathy between the spectator and the film’s characters. Furthermore, examining what narratives and imagery filmmakers associated with what spaces allows one to gauge the effectiveness of Cold War efforts to politicize the domestic spaces of East and West Germans. For example, analysis of “Heimat films,” produced in both Germany in the 1950s, provides insight into how visions of East versus West German Heimat resonated with audiences in these countries.

Another reason film is crucial to this study is that it was afforded a particular significance in relation to national identity in both East and West Germany. In East Germany, the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED, or the Socialist Unity Party) generally considered the media to be the “sharpest weapons of the party,” and film in particular was, following Lenin’s dictum, considered “the most important of all the arts.” Film was deemed politically important in East Germany, but, at the same time, film studios in east and west sought to attract audiences into theaters. As a result, films were at once a popular medium and controlled and produced by the state and, as such, were required to satisfy the needs of both the party and the populace. As the film critic Joshua Feinstein has argued, East German films provided “an avenue of social communication” and “served a mediating function between the sphere of officially tolerated personal and cultural expression and impulses emanating from a society that, despite conformist pressure, remained essentially diverse.” East German films thus provide a means of understanding relationships between the state and popular discourse. According to Wolfgang Kohlhaase, by banning films, the SED could “[express] concerns they did not dare tackle directly.” He explained further that “this had the effect of bestowing a greater importance on art. The lack of public discussion which increased over the years led the public to seek questions and answers in films and books or in the theater.”

Films were an “avenue for social communication” in the west as well, though to a lesser extent. In West Germany (and West Berlin), a subvention system played a central role in film production from the late 1960s through the 1970s, and although the West German government did not censor individual works, film production was not entirely independent from politics. The government’s support of film was no doubt related to the medium’s significance in crafting a positive image of the country for international consumption. During the 1970s and 1980s, the New German Cinema in particular became for the government a “crucial artistic medium for the manifestation of national identity.” Regardless, in both east and west, official rhetoric, individual filmmakers’ visions, and popular reception were not always in concert. As a result, films produced from the 1960s through the 1980s provide insight into the values endorsed by the state, the values
that resonated with the population as a whole, and the points of contention and convergence between these sets of values.

In examining the material reality of Cold War Berlin in relation to its representation, this book regards the divided city as a cultural landscape. As the landscape historian Paul Groth writes in the introductory essay to the anthology *Understanding Ordinary Landscapes*, “Cultural landscape studies focus most on the history of how people have used everyday space—buildings, rooms, streets, fields or yards—to establish their identity, articulate their social relations, and derive cultural meaning.” Landscape is a useful word because it encompasses both the physicality and specificity of, in this case, the built environment of divided Berlin and the economic, political, and social processes that produced East and West Berlin. Landscape refers also to a mode of representation, a means through which individuals interpret, and influence others’ interpretations of, a particular milieu. In a 2004 address on the “spatial turn” in history, the cultural geographer Denis Cosgrove used the German word *Landschaft* (literally, “landscape”) as means of understanding space as a social construct, stating, “[*Landschaft*] points to a particular spatiality in which a geographical area and its material appearance are constituted through social practice.” Landscape as well as cityscape (*Stadtbild*) circumscribe both the physicality of a particular site and the more intangible processes that produce them; both aspects of space—the literal and the contextual—come together in representation. For example, Gerhard Klein and Wolfgang Kohlhaase’s 1957 film *Berlin: Schönhauser Corner* depicts actual street corners in Berlin’s Prenzlauer Berg neighborhood but also thematizes the political and economic forces that shaped East Berlin and constituted its identity as a space and place.

It is worth taking a moment to define the related and complex terms *space* and *place*. Place is a somewhat contested notion, having no single definition despite the prevalence of its use. In her book *The Power of Place*, the architectural historian Dolores Hayden refers to *place* as “one of the trickiest words in the English language, a suitcase so overfilled one can never shut the lid.” For the cultural geographer Yi-Fu Tuan, place is defined by experience, which he defines as “the various modes through which a person knows and constructs reality.” The home, for example, is a place in that it conjures specific associations, feelings, and thoughts; it can also function as a means to define personal identity and national identity in the sense of “homeland.” Place is, as Tuan argues, a “pause in movement” that allows for such associations to coalesce around a particular site. The definition of *space* overlaps with that of *place*. As the political geographer Edward Soja has argued, “Space may be primordially given, but the organization, use and meaning of space is a product of social translation, transformation
and experience.” The understanding of space, specifically urban space, employed in this book is informed by these conceptualizations of it and is thus regarded as contingent and contextual, to be examined, following Cosgrove, with means that are “epistemological rather than ontological” in nature.

The concepts of space and place, as defined here, help reveal how Berlin was constructed, both physically and figuratively, throughout the Cold War and thus how it functioned as a locus of identity. In the field of environmental psychology, the relationship between place and identity is studied within the subfield of place-identity. The term place-identity refers first to the way place influences an individual’s self-concept or identity. For example, places can create a sense of either belonging or alienation and can become a means of defining self or differentiating oneself from others, of defining home or homeland. But places themselves can be said to have “identities” that are both reflections of the values of the groups that live there and an influence on the formation of their self-identities. The political geographer John Agnew, for example, describes how shared meanings and values “can be projected onto [a] region or a ‘nation’ and give rise to regionalism or nationalism,” thus assigning a national identity to a particular place or set of places. The city, particularly the capital city, is a primary example of this projection and suggests a subset of place-identity: urban identity.

As with the more general term, urban identity relates both to the influence of urban life on individuals’ identity or self-concept and to the way in which the city as a whole is defined. Berlin, for example, was in the early twentieth century widely regarded as a center of “modernity,” a notion propagated through, for example, popular media. Whether or not individual Berliners or Germans agreed with this assessment, it was a well-known trope and a way of understanding Berlin’s cultural significance. As Nancy Stieber argues in her essay “Microhistory of the Modern City: Urban Space, Its Use and Representation,” visual representations are in fact what defines a city, and “the ‘city’ as such exists only as representation since the material artifacts and functional acts that constitute any city are in constant flux and the city as a whole can be encompassed only by the representational terminologies of the spatial and visual disciplines.” Furthermore, the city in its concentration of people, architecture, and capital is a locus of social discourse and is thus, as Stieber points out, “a place of making meaning.” Architecture and the urban environment as a whole, and as cultural landscapes, not only represent and reflect these meanings but also help to shape shared meanings and transform social values.

Finally, it should be noted that the goal of this study is not so much to
evaluate the veracity of specific representations of Berlin and its built environment as it is to consider how and to what ends they were constructed. Thus, the study addresses the point of view of these images’ contemporary viewers, who for the most part would have had no objective way of gauging the truthfulness of, for example, their own governments’ propaganda. Instead, these audiences judged films’ legitimacy based on other factors, such as the extent to which representations matched their lived experience. It is therefore of primary interest to ascertain why and in what instances particular films or propaganda programs were regarded as credible versus mendacious, how notions of “reality” or “realism” (and thus truth) were pictorially and narratively defined, and how viewers reacted to what they saw on the screen. As Denis Cosgrove states in writing about “landscape images” in general, “Interrogating such landscape images for the ‘accuracy’ and authenticity of their geographical descriptions is to ignore the most interesting questions about landscape today: how it gathers together nature, culture and imagination within a spatial manifold, reentering the material world as an active agent in its continuous reshaping.” Accordingly, this book examines buildings, urban spaces, and their representations in order to reveal divided Berlin as part of a shifting cultural landscape that encompasses both the built environment and the public’s imagining thereof.

Chapters in the book are organized chronologically so that political, economic, and social developments can be considered in relation to the development of the built environment and its representation. Chapter 1, “Modern Capital, Divided Capital,” provides a summary of the city’s architectural and urban development before 1961, focusing on the major projects of the immediate post–World War II period. In particular, it explains how the rebuilding projects of the 1950s, the Stalinallee development in East Berlin and the International Building Exhibition (Interbau) in West Berlin, set a precedent for how architecture was used in each sphere to make political arguments that were then transmitted to audiences in the Berlins and abroad. Chapter 2, “A Capital without a Country,” focuses on representations of West Berlin around the time of the Berlin Crisis, 1958 to 1961, as well as the early stages of the Cultural Forum and State Library project in West Berlin. The chapter examines how the literal and figurative construction of West Berlin was influenced by the events leading up to, and circumstances following, the construction of the Berlin Wall. Of particular interest is political and cultural authorities’ use of West Berlin’s built environment not only to frame it as a whole and complete city but also to tie it with the Federal Republic, an entity with which it could not officially be tied but on which it depended for its survival.

When the Cultural Forum and State Library project began in the early
1960s after the wall’s construction, the Federal Republic was still enjoying the fruits of its *Wirtschaftswunder* (economic miracle). In contrast, the East German economy, having only slowly recovered after World War II, was still faltering, and the country itself was largely ignored by the global community. The third chapter, “The Unbridled Buildup of Socialism,” considers the attempts by the GDR government to bolster morale within the country through the construction of housing and to improve its image on the international stage through construction projects in central Berlin. The regime’s efforts are considered in relation to East German architects’ critiques of industrialized building and individual East Germans’ attempts to construct a unique and beloved sense of homeland, or Heimat-GDR, despite continuing uncertainty.

The ascension of Erich Honecker to head East Germany’s government in 1971 and the subsequent period of economic growth and optimism are the subject of chapter 4, “The Dreamed-of GDR.” In particular, this chapter analyzes the design and construction of the Palace of the Republic, as well as the development of an “unofficial” homeland or Heimat among East Germans that thrived outside the realms of official and state-sponsored and state-endorsed culture. This chapter examines the role of the palace in the formation of notions of Heimat—private and public, official and unofficial—and considers the growing significance of the home and domestic space as a cultural symbol.

Chapters 5 and 6, “Capital of the Counterculture” and “Back to the Center,” return to West Berlin and cover the turbulent changes that took place in the city from the late 1960s through 1980s. Throughout this period, West Berlin became an important site of antigovernment critique emanating from a growing counterculture, and the city’s built environment played a central role therein. The city was, for example, the site of a squatter movement that was larger, more militant, and longer lasting than in West German cities. The representation of West Berlin’s crumbling infrastructure, its protest culture, and its population of Turkish immigrants created, particularly in the West German media, the impression of a “dying” city. In the late 1980s, efforts to “reclaim” the city and refurbish its “cityscape” were undertaken as part of the *International Building Exhibition*, the formal celebration of which coincided with Berlin’s 750th anniversary. The events associated with both the exhibition and the 750th jubilee, detailed in chapter 6, helped to recenter West Berlin politically, economically, and culturally and decisively influenced the development of the city after 1990.

The final chapter, “Collapsing Borders,” considers the role of architectural preservation, housing construction, and the GDR’s celebration of Berlin’s 750th anniversary in the decline and downfall of the socialist
regime and, ultimately, of the country itself. Of particular interest is the failure of the ruling party’s attempts to use the built environment generally, and East Berlin specifically, to establish its authority and to bolster the morale of its citizens. However, not only did prefabricated housing settlements and prestige projects in East Berlin, such as the reconstructed Nikolai quarter, fail to convince East Germans of the competency of their government, but the city’s urban landscape became both an instrument of resistance and a theater in which to stage dissent and, eventually, revolt.

It has become crucial to examine critically the Cold War and the myths it engendered, since such myths continue to have a powerful influence on, for example, US political discourse and notions of national identity in Germany and elsewhere. Cries of “socialism,” for example, have been more recently to impugn Democrats in the United States, which is decried as “U.S.S.A.” Cold War narratives that cast the United States as a victorious and “freedom-loving” nation have played a role in, for example, US foreign policy in Iraq. As the historian William Appleman Williams has argued, “The Cold War needs to be viewed as a confrontation that occurs throughout our history.” In particular it is because the struggle was framed as a struggle of absolutes—good and evil, love and hate, right and wrong—that it continues in many ways to define the United States’ self-conception and foreign policy. The Berlin Wall maintained and symbolized these binaries, and yet they remain although the wall is gone.

Indeed, it is clear that, although the Berlin Wall no longer constitutes a physical divide, the innumerable divisions it engendered cannot be as swiftly or completely collapsed as the wall itself was. A detailed investigation of this period is critical to understanding the continuing influence of these divides, as well as Berlin’s post-1990 development as the capital of a united Germany. The architectural discourses and construction projects that took place after unification are, at least in part, attempts to create a single city, physically as well as ideologically and symbolically, from what had for thirty years been in effect two cities. Furthermore, because contemporary debates about urban planning and construction have often been framed within the context of “restoring” a pre-wall Berlin, it has become important to examine the roots of this notion and how it may have evolved during the period of the city’s division.