In the 1910s Jeremiah Ford (1873–1958), professor of romance languages at Harvard University, urged his doctoral students to leave behind the objects and methods they had been trained on—medieval and Golden Age Spanish philology—and focus instead on the development of an academic field that was, until then, almost nonexistent: Latin American literature. Enthusiastic for the opportunities afforded by the new hegemony of the United States in the region after the opening of the Panama Canal and the outbreak of the Great War, the “Ford boys,” as they proudly liked to call themselves (Doyle, “Ford Honored,” 348), did not hesitate to embrace their supervisor’s institutional mandate. Between 1916 and 1917 Alfred Coester, Ford’s most ambitious disciple, wrote the first history, in any language, of Latin American literature and was appointed to senior positions in recently founded professional associations and specialized journals, such as the American Association of Teachers of Spanish (AATS) and its journal, *Hispania*; Isaac Goldberg translated short story anthologies and published a number of foundational studies on Brazilian literature; Sturgis Leavitt devoted himself to organizing university libraries and comprehensive bibliographies. Others wrote textbooks and put together
collections of classic Latin American writers. Although Ford’s writings on Latin America were sparse, for nearly forty years he was influential in implementing key institutional initiatives within the field, including the foundation, in 1929, of the first center for Latin American studies to be established in the United States (the Harvard Council on Hispano-American Studies); the recommendation of Pedro Henríquez Ureña as first Latin American holder of the Harvard Norton Chair in 1941 (of which his classic Literary Currents in Hispanic America was a by-product); and the endorsement of prominent philologist Amado Alonso (director of Buenos Aires’s Institute of Philology until Juan D. Perón’s rise to power in 1946) as his successor.

By the time Ford moved to consolidate Latin Americanism, there was already a distinguished roster of Hispanists in the United States who, through the nineteenth century, had put considerable effort into the study of Spain and its colonies: George Ticknor, William Prescott, and Henry Longfellow; some of them (Ticknor, Longfellow) had been Harvard professors (Jaksic 53–108). Their first efforts, however, fell short of establishing academic programs devoted to analyzing the culture of the region. Anthologies published under the rubrics of Latin American, Hispanic American, and South American literature had been under circulation since the nineteenth century—from the earlier ones by Juan María Gutiérrez and Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo to the more recent ones by Rufino Blanco-Fombona and Manuel Ugarte. All of these, however, had been conceived as archival projects devoted to legitimate political events (either Latin American independence or Spanish imperialism); their proponents did not imagine them, either explicitly or implicitly, as scholarly instruments intended to promote the foundation of a discipline.

Ford insisted, instead, in making Latin American literature a specialized field of teaching and research, justifying its pedagogical value in both civic and economic terms. This implied confronting the skepticism of critics who had doubted either the actual existence or the cultural significance of Latin American literature as a discursive construct—among them the Argentine letrado Bartolomé Mitre and, perhaps more significantly, the Uruguayan essayist José E. Rodó. If, for Mitre, the Latin American literature corpus lacked any modelic value in terms of national-subject formation (its texts were devoid of linguistic and rhetorical excellence as well as of clear patriotic contents), for Rodó the articulation of a Latin American aestheticism as opposed to US rationally infused capitalism was to be founded upon classical and Christian sources, not in the continent’s texts (Mitre, “Letras americanas”; Rodó, Ariel).

For Ford, the prospect of developing and legitimizing Latin American literature as an academic field was a result of the new political and cultural capital acquired by the United States after its triumph in the Spanish-American War (1898), the formulation of the Monroe Doctrine Corollary (1904), and the subsequent
construction of the Panama Canal (1904–1914). The outbreak of the Great War offered further opportunities for US influence in countries with strong economic and cultural connections to Europe such as Argentina, Chile, and Brazil. In Ford’s mind, disciplinary Latin Americanism ought to serve as a pedagogical tool of Pan-Americanism—the discourse that had promoted, since the Washington Congress of 1889–1890 (under the leadership of Secretary of State James G. Blaine), a hemispheric economic and diplomatic collaboration under US hegemony (Schoultz 282–84). In other words, the rise of the United States as a global power demanded the creation of an academic field able to answer to the values of US capitalist modernity and its geopolitical interests.

In fact, Ford’s initial commitment to the new field could be traced back to his participation in an ambitious educational project devoted to legitimizing the new US imperial power in Latin America in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War: The Cuban Summer School—a training session lasting a month and a half organized by Harvard University (in cooperation with the US government) in 1900 to cement the ideology of annexation among Cuban educators. Organized by Alexis E. Freye (superintendent of Cuba’s public schools) and Charles Eliot (president of Harvard), the stay in Cambridge, Massachusetts, provided the 1,283 teachers (almost half of the island’s total) lessons in English, US history and geography, pedagogical methods, educational psychology, and school administration. The Summer School curriculum also included visits to government institutions, schools, universities, factories, and industrial complexes in cities such as Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. Having arrived in Boston in five US Navy vessels just in time for the July 4 Independence Day festivities, the teachers traveled to Washington to greet President McKinley in the White House and to see the Capitol; they visited Grant’s Tomb, Independence Hall, and the West Point military academy. The experience of traveling around the Northeast via ship, train, and tram was meant to show the teachers’ the technological advantages afforded by a society that adhered to a rationalized and highly efficient system of communications. It was expected that the teachers, once back in Cuba, would advocate in favor of belonging to a modern and prosperous colonial power.¹

Ford was very active in the organization of the Cuban teachers’ visit to the United States, serving also as the group’s instructor of US history. After this experience, he published A Spanish Anthology (1901), a book meant to increase the available pedagogic materials for the teaching of a language that was crucial to understand, administrate, and control areas of political and economic interest to the new empire. While acknowledging receipt of the book, Harvard president Charles Eliot congratulated Ford for the timing of the publication and confirmed the university’s commitment to US interests in the region: “You seem to have sized up the opportunity which the increased attention to Spanish in schools and colleges has
brought you. So far one can judge from present political aspects, there is likely to be a steady demand for good Spanish text books. Congress will be foolish indeed if it does not soon make possible profitable trade between this country and the South American republics.”

Henry G. Doyle, another of his disciples, wrote at the end of Ford’s Harvard career that his mentor’s participation in the Cuban Summer School of 1900 was “a significant episode in the development of Hispanic studies in the United States as well as in inter-American relations,” emphasizing that Ford’s interest for Latin American literature “antedates that of most Americans scholars in this field” (“J. D. M. Ford,” 156–57). In similar fashion, William Barrien, responsible for the Latin American division at the American Council of Learned Societies, said in a 1941 letter to Ford himself: “To those of us who are devoting the major part of our attention to furthering Latin American studies in the humanities, it is always especially encouraging to receive a word of support from the man who is responsible for establishing this work in the United States.”

A scholar of medieval literature and author of studies in French, Portuguese, and Spanish philology, Ford was named Smith Professor of French and Spanish in 1907, and four years later he was appointed to the position of Chairman of Romance Languages, which he held until his retirement in 1943. From these institutional spaces, he directly favored the collusion of university knowledges and the US government and corporations’ strategies of capitalist expansion in Latin America. Convinced that the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914 inevitably required the reframing of the disciplinary priorities of Hispanism and the place of Latin America within it, he accepted an invitation to participate in an extensive tour of the southern cone (the empire’s new frontier), organized by the Boston Chamber of Commerce in 1913. The purpose of the tour was to extend the area of commercial influence of New England businessmen beyond the Caribbean basin. This trip, in which he served as Harvard’s official representative, was the definitive trigger for his four-decade-long Latin Americanist activity.

The Boston Chamber of Commerce tour to South America was carried out under the banner of a particular kind of Pan-Americanism: the so-called Dollar Diplomacy promoted during William Taft’s presidency. Taft had arrived in the White House in 1909 after having served as governor-general of the Philippines, provisional governor of Cuba, and secretary of state (position in which he had overseen the construction of the Panama Canal). The creation of the Division of Latin American Affairs of the State Department at the beginning of his presidential term highlighted the central importance his administration would give to the region (Hunt 242–47). Through the implementation of a Dollar Diplomacy, he sought to replace Theodore Roosevelt’s “big stick policy,” which had been founded upon military interventions in Latin America as a way to rectify alleged political and economic “wrongdoings.” Taft was trying to promote the substitution of “dollars for
bullets;” his premise was that the infusions of capital and financial interventions in the region would reduce the need for direct military action since fiscal solvency would provide a guarantee against political disorder and revolutionary attempts. Customs control, budgetary procedures and spending, as well as loans would in themselves be instruments of “international peace,” warrantors of a sustained stability and progress. According to Emily Rosenberg, these policies essentially helped expand the influence of Washington through the use of bankers instead of marines (61).

As part of a thirty-eight-member delegation, Ford visited Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil to meet local functionaries and businessmen including each country’s president and chamber of commerce leaders. The tour’s prospectus announced that the purpose of the representatives of New England’s leather, rubber, carbon, paper, motor, automobile, and firearms sectors—as well as of the dental, optic, and agrochemical industries, real estate agents, and bankers—was to “obtain accurate information at first hand in regard to the resources, character and industries, and the basic economic and financial conditions of the countries visited” and, in particular, about the availability of commodities necessary for the expansion of New England’s manufacturing sectors (Boston Chamber, 3). But the Boston Chamber of Commerce’s mission not only included capitalists and entrepreneurs: it also enlisted representatives of the educational field in order to ensure the sought-after collaboration—and complicity—between economic and academic sectors in this new phase of hemispheric expansion. Therefore, the tour also included textbook publishers, university professors, college students, and two high-school students from Boston who had been chosen “after a competitive examination in Spanish and general information about South America” (Boston Chamber, 8). Their expenses were covered by the city of Boston, “as a reward for their earnest efforts to become familiar with South America, its languages, its peoples, and its commerce.” Last but not least, the tour included its own publicist: Albert Sequier, an “artist, traveler, lecturer” who, “upon his return to the United States [will] lecture generally through this country on the economic, social and pictorial features of South America” (Boston Chamber, 8). Sequier’s participation fit within the spectacular nature of a Latin Americanism that had begun consolidating after 1910.

Having served as one of the delegation’s Spanish interpreters, Ford presented, upon his return, some ideas for making US colleges strategic mediators in hemispheric-oriented geopolitical projects. In his opinion, the US businessmen who accompanied him to South America lacked familiarity with the countries they visited and brought with them preconceived notions about the region that usually created more obstacles than opportunities for the process of strengthening commercial ties with local leaders. It was necessary, therefore, to transform the US representatives’
simplistic depictions of their southern neighbors and thus overcome Latin American elite’s potential resistance to their expansionist ventures. As Salvatore points out, “Approximately between 1904 and 1919, when Pan-Americanism transformed the meaning of the Monroe doctrine into an ideology of mutual cooperation, many arguments came together to give ideological backing to a new type of relation between the United States and the Hispano-American republics” (Imágenes, 64–65). If Roosevelt’s “big stick policy” was characterized by a schematic and simplistic gaze over Latin American society and culture, the new Dollar Diplomacy sought to implement broader, and more subtle, cognitive tools to fulfill Pan-Americanism’s goals of capitalist expansion. The incorporation of South America into the empire’s orbit demanded, in particular, a different “representational machine” for the region (Salvatore, “Imperial Mechanics,” 663).

Ford’s second preoccupation was Europe’s strong influence in South America. In “Diplomacy below the Equator,” an article published in the Boston Evening Transcript upon his return, Ford defended the political and economic role of the United States in the region and suggested the training of knowledgeable staff in order to compete successfully against other imperial agents operating there, such as the British: “They have studied the psychology of the people and have respected their dominant traits. They have trained men for service in these countries, and have lost no good opportunity to secure for them places of advantage” (24). Demanding the appointment of “clever and energetic” diplomatic representatives, competent on issues of commercial interest for the United States, Ford criticized Washington’s “crass indifference” to its southern neighbors (24). Specifically, he called attention to the potential of the Brazilian economy and insisted on sending experts to Rio de Janeiro, given that, “for commercial and industrial purposes Brazil is still very largely a virgin field and she is ready to welcome the foreign capitalist, that comes to help her in expanding her enormous resources” (24).

The development of academic Latin Americanism was, for Ford, essential to further the understanding of the region’s “characters” or “mentalities,” and thus secure the geopolitical objectives of a nascent empire. In particular, the systematic study of literary texts could help overcome the “statistic” and “external” analytical perspectives on the continent, predominant since the Roosevelt administration. The discipline’s goal, in this regard, was to produce a more detailed and nuanced understanding of the desires, behaviors, and ideals of the economic partners in the South. Ultimately, Latin Americanism would be conceived by Ford as a “patriotic” field whose primary function was to generate an archive for the rapprochement, understanding, and domination of the Western Hemisphere. Indeed, in Ford’s mind, academic Latin Americanism should become a constitutive part of what Emily Rosenberg has called “professional-managerial discourses” (Financial Missionaries, 9), a true “cultural movement” within Dollar Diplomacy, that worked under
the premise that the formation of market specialists and financial advisors was key in promoting “monetary exchange as a path towards efficiency and prosperity” (9). For them, US economic global dominance was meant to be achieved through analytically informed decisions, as international economic intervention (rather than military occupation) was a weapon for a steady and regulated social progress (as well as for moral uplift).6

I argue that Ford understood disciplinary Latin Americanism as another specialized instrument aimed at cooperating with investment bankers and government officials to expand the global economic influence of the United States by scientific means. This is why José Martí and José E. Rodó’s humanist criticism of US capitalism was entirely foreign to Ford’s disciplinary project and was actually opposed by it. Despite cultural criticism’s usual assumptions about the place of Martí and Rodó in the origins of the field (Avelar; Beverley; Mignolo), I show that the first academic Latin Americanism does not emerge as an institutional project meant to paint Latin America as the realm of pristine spiritual values. Rather, the discipline’s foundational figures emphasized a view of the region that sought to underline its potential as a space for industrial and commercial activity, home to modern consumers and receptive to the dynamics of global markets.

Indeed, an examination of this first academic Latin Americanism’s US institutional agents and material production networks reveals that, if Martí is ever referenced, it is exclusively with regards to his place as a Cuban national hero and as a poet, not as a proponent of any sort of continental unity. This is also the case with his early readers in Latin America, for whom his chronicles were of less importance than his poetry. In the case of “Nuestra América,” for example, Margarita Merbilháá has demonstrated that even staunch defenders of Latin American integration at the beginning of the twentieth century such as Ugarte had not actually read the text and knew of it only through an “intellectual rumor” (177): the article had remained buried in the pages of the Mexican and New York newspapers where it first appeared. Even in Cuba the text had extremely limited circulation.7 It was essentially out of reach of the public until the publication of commemorative editions of Martí’s work (which included his chronicles published abroad) in the 1930s (Merbilháá 236). The first popular edition of “Nuestra América” to circulate throughout the continent was Henríquez Ureña’s, published by Losada in 1941 in the compilation of the same title.

Something similar happened with Rodó’s Ariel: few intellectuals had access to the book in 1900, the year of its initial publication. Only after 1908, with Sempere’s Spanish edition, did it become better known (Merbilháá 204). Furthermore, although the text was reprinted in various Latin American locations throughout the first half of the twentieth century (Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Mexico), these appeared in local magazines or in small print runs (Belén Castro 91–110).
More importantly, the essay was read through exclusively national lenses. This was the case in Mexico, for instance, with the edition paid for by General Bernardo Reyes during the last years of the Porfiriato. It is clear that Ariel’s reception in the United States did not occur until after 1920. Samuel Waxman, another of Ford’s disciples, confirmed the text’s minor importance in academic circles in a 1920 article: “Rubén Darío and Santos Chocano [he points out] are fairly well-known in this country among a small group of Hispanists. Much less is known of José Enrique Rodó” (“Studies,” 384). In fact, Ariel was not available in English until its translation in 1922 by Houghton Mifflin.

SPECTACULAR LATIN AMERICANISMS

Ford’s real concern was not the work of Martí or Rodó. His real fixation was instead the aggressive cultural campaigns deployed in the public sphere by two resolute anti-imperialist intellectuals: the Argentine Manuel Ugarte (1875–1951) and the Venezuelan Rufino Blanco-Fombona (1874–1944), both well known in the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century. Living in Paris and Madrid, Ugarte and Blanco-Fombona took advantage of communication technologies—in particular, lecture tours, the popular press, and large editions of cheap books—to articulate a systematic attack on US financial and military expansionism in Latin America. Exceptionally skilled in managing the possibilities offered by the growing market of symbolic goods, Ugarte and Blanco-Fombona contributed to the emergence of a new kind of intellectual: the Latin Americanist cultural organizer who, leaving aside all anti-utilitarian or spiritualist understanding of the continent, approached the issue of regional integration from an economic point of view. Their Latin Americanism was shaped not only by the development of the publishing industry but also by the “spectacularization” of the intellectual figure. Fixated with Ugarte and Blanco-Fombona’s wide-ranging influence in the Americas, Pan-Americanist scholars would promote the production of academic discourses to counteract their ideas.

Ugarte was the first Latin Americanist cultural organizer to come under attack from Ford and his disciples. Born in Buenos Aires to an aristocratic family, in 1897 Ugarte moved to Paris where he lived until 1911. It was there that he decided to start a two-year tour of Latin Americanist propaganda through every country in the continent (plus the United States), which would eventually earn him hemispheric renown. A poet and chronicler since youth, Ugarte first achieved international recognition through the opinion articles he published in Spanish newspapers in Paris and Madrid, as well as through his contributions to the Argentine print media. In Ugarte’s view, his continentalist thinking did not emerge, however, until his visit to New York City in 1900. It was here (not in France or Argentina) where he came across English language publications that made him aware of US imperialist
designs in Latin America. In *El destino de un continente* (1923), Ugarte wrote that his sudden awareness of the United States’ role in Latin America was, in fact, a result of having access to a now forgotten text, William T. Stead’s *The Americanization of the World, or the Trend of the World in the Twentieth Century* (*Destiny*, 11). The British Sead, one of the founders of yellow journalism, celebrated in this book the supremacy of the English-speaking peoples, united through their interests, over the rest of the world. In Ugarte’s recollection of his 1900 visit to New York, the recent Spanish-American War was, curiously, an incident entirely removed from his geopolitical knowledge and preoccupations. Regarding his arrival to the United States he wrote, “I knew nothing of imperialism, I had never stopped to think what might have been the cause and consequences of the Spanish-American War. . . . So there is no need to attribute to me any preconceived antipathy, prejudice, or hostility” (*Destiny*, 4).

Having become a declared Latin Americanist and a determined anti-imperialist in New York, upon his return to France Ugarte began a decade of propaganda in favor of continental unity. One of the most important documents in which he recorded his new ideological position was the prologue to the volume *La joven literatura hispanoamericana: antología de prosistas y poetas*, published in Paris in 1906 to promote the work of contemporary Latin American writers. The anthology is crucial to understand Ugarte’s ideological divergence from Rodó’s Latin Americanism, as its publication generated a sour polemic with the Uruguayan essayist. In a review for *La Nación* in Buenos Aires, Rodó criticized Ugarte’s socialist-oriented continentalism, which was inadmissible for the author of *Ariel*. Ugarte’s economic and political criticism of US imperialism contrasted with his counterpart’s moralistic approach to the issue. Although far from radical, Ugarte’s socialism was also opposed to *Ariel*’s aestheticized ideology, founded upon a moral, anti-egalitarian, and liberal education that promoted the spiritual selection of the most capable and the directing role of the lettered elite (Merhiá 204, 235–37). The dispute between the two writers produced an irreparable break between them, and Ugarte’s vehement critique of Rodó continued many years after the latter’s death. In *The Destiny of a Continent*, for instance, Ugarte framed Rodó’s Latin Americanism as being entirely removed from any kind of market-driven concerns: “A prejudice born out of this same deceptive education appears to set us apart from all material efforts and grants us, in exchange, a decisive superiority in the realm of spiritual matters. The Anglo-Saxons are the masters of practical life—repeat some—but we have a greater artistic capacity. The absurdity is so evident, that it is superfluous to emphasize it” (*Destiny*, 169).

Ugarte first attained international recognition with the publication of *El porvenir de la América Latina* (1911). In this book he defined Latin America according to psycho-anthropological variables and considered the region’s evolution as
incomplete; however, he stayed away from the fatalist pessimism that was typical of positivist analyses of regional backwardness. In fact, he distanced his proposal from nineteenth-century “right-wing” thinkers who condemned the future of the continent because of its supposed hereditary deficiencies and faults of its inhabitants (laziness, laconism, arrogance). This was the central thesis of Domingo F. Sarmiento (Conflicto y armonías de las razas en América, 1883), César Zumeta (Continente enfermo, 1899), Agustín Álvarez (La transformación de las razas en América, 1899), Francisco Bulnes (El porvenir de las naciones hispanoamericanas, 1889), Carlos O. Bunge (Nuestra América, 1903), and Alcides Arguedas (Pueblo enfermo, 1909)—all of them influenced by psychological anthropology. Instead, Ugarte defended continental solidarity against US political and economic interventionism by reaffirming the region’s common origin in Spain and stressing the role of mestizaje as a binding force. In ideological terms he underscored the fact that continental “originality” had resulted from a common legacy—Iberian language, religion, and institutions—modified after Independence through the influence of French liberal ideas. Furthermore, and following Second International tenets (he had been Argentina’s delegate to the Amsterdam and Stuttgart congresses [Merrillhaá 109; Altamirano, Para un programa, 118]), Ugarte was optimistic about Latin America’s future integration through the socialization of its means of production. In this regard, he promoted a socialist perspective (parliamentarian, anti-anarchist, and respectful of Catholicism) for the future development of the continent.

*El porvenir* was widely reviewed in the Latin American, European, and US press. However, if the representatives of the nascent US academic Latin Americanism did not have the chance to know Ugarte’s work through the ample journalistic coverage that followed its publication, they certainly were aware of the lecture tour in which he embarked immediately upon the launching of *El porvenir* (he visited each one of the Latin American countries, as well as the United States). In New York, where he lectured at Columbia in 1912, Ugarte forcefully denounced the US naval blockade of Venezuela (1902–1903), the terms of the 1912 loan made to Nicaragua (under Dollar Diplomacy policy), and the establishment of the Republic of Panama. Small newspapers, such as the Tribune, the Daily People, the New York Herald, and the Sun covered the visit and took note of the spectacular nature of Ugarte’s public speeches. The New York Times not only reported his visit to the city but also followed the speaker and reported on his lectures in many of the campaign’s stops.11

Taking place between 1911 and 1913, Ugarte’s tour represented a decisive (and, in many cases, without precedent) event of the spectacularization of Latin Americanism, as the discourse of continental unity would now begin to rely on a public sphere situated at the margins of state institutions and beyond the book
format. Without an official or institutional mandate and covering the cost of the trip with his personal fortune, Ugarte decided to “establish a contact with each of the republics whose cause I had defended en bloc” (Destiny, 29). In opposition to other proponents of regional unity who did not see the need to personally know all the countries they proposed to unite, Ugarte’s tour was a watershed moment in the history of Latin Americanism as an ideological and experiential project. By visiting all Latin American capitals and some of its provincial cities, Ugarte aimed at spectacularizing his integrationist discourse, reaching never-before-seen audiences of workers and university students.¹²

Ugarte understood that the transformation of the writing professional into a performer, for whom the voice and the body were instruments for community-building, represented a fundamental step for articulating a grassroots, politically committed Latin Americanism. In The Destiny of a Continent he emphasized his intention to move beyond the traditional place and role of the intellectual in order to achieve “at least a co-ordination of international policy”; this goal “led the peaceful writer to desert his table and mount the platform, in order to come into direct contact with the public” (Destiny, 26). Far from proposing lettered autonomy, in the vein of the modernistas, Ugarte chose militancy and the organization of solidarity networks, as he wanted to “rub shoulders with the multitude” (116). This idea of the intellectual who takes a side—or of the organic intellectual who even within the sphere of professionalization reclaims a heteronomous knowledge as justification for his activity—led Ugarte to develop forms of political participation that included the use of not only the written word but also his voice to address mass audiences. Giving speeches and lectures became a way of transforming the writer into an activist who abandoned a contemplative position in favor of a political activity whose public platform was the balcony, the auditorium, and the private hall. These, rather than the Parliament or the party committee, became privileged spaces for the production of community. In this sense, Ugarte insisted repeatedly that his tour had “grown up unpretentiously, with no literary aim, and in sincere communion with the younger generation and the people, like a cry arising from the popular consciousness” (xxi). It was an openly populist gesture, which defended affective alliances built on the “public square,” since he considered himself “a member of this same public” (232).

As in his written interventions at the beginning of the century, in his talks Ugarte signaled the United States as the region’s common enemy. During his tour, however, he stressed resistance through a diplomatic rather than a political (socialist) means, insisting on the need for regional military and commercial coordination. What Ugarte aimed at studying was “not only the possibility of uplifting national feeling from the moral and ideal point of view, but also, and above all, the prospects in the sphere of economic organisation, the fundamental basis without
which nothing is possible” (*Destiny*, 184). The formation of a regional market was for Ugarte a crucial piece of his Latin Americanism. The creation of what Ugarte called “the great motherland” depended on the construction of railroads and the development of mines, meat-processing and cold-storage plants, and oil production facilities (168–69). This was all part of a protectionist economic plan needed to “re-create, at least by diplomatic means, the homogeneous community dreamt of by the pioneers of independence . . . and to make each republic stronger and more prosperous, within a higher organisation” (23).

Unlike Rodó, Ugarte did not attack the US “vulgarity” or “utilitarianism” but, rather, framed its negative effects on Latin American unity for its control of a tangible technology: the submarine communications cable—then at the center of the worldwide transmission of information and, therefore, a decisive element in the manipulation of “public opinion.” In *The Undersea Network*, Nicole Starosielski has argued that the global telegraphic network built in the second half of the nineteenth century was directly tied to the spread of colonialism, insofar as cables usually followed international transport and commerce routes and thus supported global capital in its most strategic geographic points. The expansion of undersea communication networks, undertaken by private companies (rather than by governments), became a way to control faraway commercial outposts and ensure colonial investments (Starosielski 31–34). Companies that covered Latin America such as the United States–based Central and South American Telegraph Company and a few others became a major source of concern for Ugarte, who believed that the cables were, as Alex Nalbach points out, “the hardware of new imperialism” (76). Highlighting the ability for news to be an agent of political division, Ugarte argued, “the world only hears what the United States choose to say about Latin American affairs, for they impose on world opinion the dominion of their cables” (*Destiny*, 144). In another section of *The Destiny of a Continent* he reflects: “Many of the collisions which have taken place between our republics have originated in malicious intelligence. And the cable foments estrangements and enmities even when the peace is not broken. Every time I tried to defend Mexico in Buenos Aires, I had to begin by destroying the hostile impression created by the press agencies” (105). The fact that “our nations have to make use of the foreign cable even for their official communications is indicative of our governments’ limited capacity for independent action” (105).

This situation made it necessary to build “public opinion” (*Destiny*, 123) from the “plaza” (90)—that is, from spaces of resistance beyond the control of the state and local party structures. As he insisted throughout his campaign, Ugarte’s was an identitarian project founded upon the defense of sovereignty and regional economic interests, a perspective in which the Latin American “people” and “youth” (not
political factions) became the protagonists. Ugarte conceived a Latin Americanism, therefore, beyond each country’s power dynamics and internal conflicts, for these would inevitably fracture and splinter the very idea of a continental bloc. Since his arrival in Mexico, Ugarte was forced to avoid “getting in close touch with the political parties. . . . It was obvious that, being legally a foreigner, I had nothing to say in the struggles, which only interested me from the point of view of the greater or lesser capacity of the country for defence against foreign pretensions” (*Destiny*, 61–62). During his tour, he insisted on always remaining “averse to all political tendencies, independent of all parties,” since his Latin Americanism sought to “confirm the higher aspirations of the [in this case] Mexican people” (69). But it was precisely this detachment from local partisan disputes and divisions that generated mistrust and rejection of Ugarte’s project. Because of his insistence in distancing himself from each country’s political associations (and especially those on the left), Ugarte was accused of complicity with the rival party (65). Indeed, his self-funded tour, not tied to any official diplomatic responsibility, was vulnerable to attacks and questionings until the end. On occasion Ugarte was even disparaged as both an “eccentric millionaire” and a fortune seeker, looking to get rich by selling tickets to his talks (136). In any case, the cable was ever-present: “It was thus that I learnt that my disinterested tour . . . was represented by the telegraphic agencies as a vulgar speculation” (193).15

The Argentine Socialist Party, Ugarte’s own political party, also branded his Latin Americanism as a contemptible form of “lofty patriotism” (*Destiny*, xxi) based on cultural elements such as language and religion. Following Second International tenets, they defended class alliance before any other kind of “bourgeois” associations (such as “nation”). Faced with his party’s assertion that class solidarity must take precedence over geopolitical regionalization (seen as insubstantial and fruitless), Ugarte responded by pointing out the utopian and reductionist character of the socialist perspective. In his opinion, Hispanic cultural legacy would allow for transnational alliances that were more lasting and effective than internationalist labor, since, as a form of community, this cultural legacy was simultaneously broader in social terms (it was poly-classist) and smaller in geographic scope (it did not aspire to a global solidarity). This explains, for example, Ugarte’s criticism of the Mexican Revolution, whose “socialist” objectives promoted, in his opinion, “an illusory view of human unity, which gave little importance to language, religion, and origin . . . trusting perhaps in the promised universal fatherland. And in the last analysis this is the supreme danger for the whole of Latin America” (*Destiny*, 85). Ugarte also broke with socialist interpretations of the United States’ role in hemispheric politics: Socialist Party leaders did not see the “yankee danger” that Ugarte denounced; instead, their optimistic evolutionism led them to believe that a
US invasion of Central America, for example, would have “civilizing” social, technical, and economic effects (Merbilhaá 279–80). Given all these disagreements, the Argentine Socialist Party expelled Ugarte from its ranks in 1913.

As a response to Pan-Americanism, which through the help of communication technologies represented the hemisphere as “an enhanced territory for the free flow of goods, technical assistance, news, and business solutions in ways that turned upside down old diplomatic conceptions of the Pax Americana” (Salvatore, “Imperial Mechanics,” 666), Ugarte proposed an integrationist communications rationality based on the development of both a regional cultural market and a continental public sphere, which were supposed to benefit from Spanish as a shared language. For Ugarte, Latin American unity should be the result of the amplification and the strengthening of communication systems in the area. Notions of connection, circulation, and accessibility among the different countries were crucial for making “Latin America” both a compact and a dynamic discursive space.

In fact, the idea of a Latin Americanism built upon communication technologies had been part of Ugarte’s project ever since his first visit to the United States in 1900. In “La defensa latina,” an article written after his return from New York in 1901, he argued that to achieve continental solidarity, “Special journals will be published . . . the international mail service will be perfected . . . newspaper exchange between different capital cities will be increased . . . and with ever faster and more complete communication networks, with an ever more efficient and firm propaganda for all citizens, industrials, consuls, etc., it will not be difficult to strengthen, after a few years, the fraternity between different nations” (8). In this sense, Ugarte rejected any anti-US policy based on the use of force and territorial defense—in other words, war. But he was also critical of a traditional “literary” Latin Americanism articulated through the creation of journals in which writers from different countries “sympathized and communicated without knowing each other” (9). Transcending discourses of spiritual solidarity, Ugarte proposed creating a communications system devoted to better informing the region about multilateral commercial treaties as well as newly appointed continental leaders (5–6).

More important, in “La defensa latina,” Ugarte also urged the construction of Latin Americanist communities beyond writing technologies, pointing out that it was necessary to create social bonds through performative experiences. Along with taking advantage of mail, cable, and news services, “lectures will increase[.] . . . tours with students will be organized around Latin America” (9). His Latin American campaign put into practice these ideas. Tom F. Wright has defined the lecture culture as “a cluster of practices of speech, listening, watching, and reading that constellated around a certain type of vocal performance” (Cosmopolitan Lyceum, 3). Its format went a step beyond the dynamics of print capitalism as a form of community building, yet without entirely abandoning it: the talks were usually preceded
by publicity campaigns in the press and received press coverage that either reproduced parts or the whole speech, or extracted and commented on its main passages. Furthermore, the talks could eventually be published in book format. All of this occurred in Ugarte’s case: his speeches, given in theaters and halls and covered systematically by the press, created a public author figure between knowledge and spectacle who was both a thinker and a cultural star. The power of this “oral propagandist,” as Rubén Darío called Ugarte (cited in Barrios 166), resided not only in the fact that his discourses were spoken and cheered for but also that they were reproduced and commented on by scores of newspapers and journals.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, popular lectures were part of the international literary world, and Ugarte was aware of the civic impact of what has been called “embodied performance” (Adams 9). A product of the eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment, they were a prominent feature of the US cultural landscape throughout the nineteenth century; many local intellectuals (Ralph W. Emerson, Mark Twain, Harriet Beecher Stowe, for example) actively participated in the lecture circuit. A number of writers (such as Charles Dickens and Oscar Wilde) achieved transnational star status by traveling around Europe and the United States. Lectures formed part of a cultural machinery that, toward the end of the nineteenth century, included not only managers but also companies specialized in promoting public speakers. The very existence of an international lecture market was made possible by the material transformation of communication technologies. The expansion of the railroad, as well as ship travel, and the use of the telegraph were all crucial in transporting and publicizing speakers. Wright has characterized the lecture circuit as a cosmopolitan practice that, by the fin de siècle, allowed intellectuals to transcend national borders and publics (5–7), a perception clearly articulated in Ugarte’s “La defensa latina.”

Ugarte seems to have imagined his Latin American tour as a way of overcoming the limitations of print capitalism. Although supposedly creating a certain social and cultural horizontality and simultaneity at a national level (Benedict Anderson’s hypothesis), he realized that newspapers had an uneven development in each country and experienced difficulties crossing national borders. Therefore, the conference tour became a crucial strategy for Ugarte to come together and connect with a live audience: in this sense, he conceived voice and body as critical elements to forge alternative forms of loyalty and solidarity, particularly in transnational political projects. The very knowledge structure embedded in the public talk conveyed an alternative form of cultural democratization: the orators’ verbal and corporal display in theaters, popular Athenaeums, and workers’ centers allowed participants not only to discuss topics often omitted in degree-granting academic programs but also to articulate collective and collectivizing identities unleashed by the orator’s fleeting presence in a room.
It is evident that Ugarte himself must have designed a kind of tour for which there was minimal infrastructure available. His campaign goes well beyond the notion of “European traveler,” which had been around since 1900 in certain Latin American cities and whose unavoidable destination was Buenos Aires—Ramón Gómez de la Serna described the city as “the world’s first consumer of public talks” (1–2).16 Ugarte’s tour not only altered the standard itinerary of lecture tours by visiting every Latin American capital (and some provincial cities) and by making it a very extended sojourn (it lasted two years). He also promoted the legitimation of a new cultural referent—the “Latin American” intellectual, not the European traveler—as symbolic authority. To visit, in 1911, all of the continent’s nations was an enormously difficult project because of logistical and monetary factors. Without the support of theater impresarios or civil society organizations (such as immigrant associations), as was common for European travelers, Ugarte took upon himself the task of locating public venues for his lectures and even advertised his own events. As can be seen throughout *The Destiny of a Continent*, his main ally in the preparatory stage of his tour was the telegram: he relied on it to announce his arrival in ports and cities, to find places for his talks, and to communicate in advance with political, syndical, and student leaders, as well as to publicize the events in newspapers.

In this way, Ugarte began building up a performative Latin Americanism based on the speaker’s charisma and the corporeal presence of students and workers. As his campaign account suggests, public auditoriums served for Ugarte as a kind of alternative parliament for a project that went beyond the state’s established institutional settings, and which competed against its representational mechanisms: the theater and the private hall (not the school or the parliament chamber) were for him platforms for the creation of an alternative kind of politics. Moreover, his lectures revived the practice of the—secular—sermon. Like Matthew Arnold, Oscar Wilde, and Henry James in their tours through the United States, Ugarte gave his speeches a missionary tone: as a secular preacher, he held and revealed a truth, arguing for “salvation” against a stalking enemy, one that neither national leaders nor political parties were conscious of at all (Adams 21).

Finally, Ugarte adopted an early populist approach to Latin Americanism. By moving away from the book and the privacy of the study as the privileged location of intellectual practice, he attempted to make Latin Americanism an experience fundamentally built on relations between voices and bodies: a form of social performance in which the encounter of communal affinities was as important as the speeches’ content. This derived not only from the limitations imposed by illiterate audiences or publics indifferent to the printing press—“the profound verbal tradition of the people, who do not read newspapers” (*Destiny*, 19)—but also from Ugarte’s belief in the role of affect in the political realm. According to Ugarte, the
success of his speeches had less to do with “the qualifications of the speaker” than “the harmony between the idea which he was defending and the sentiments of his audience” (82), the cheering and the ovations of the public, and the speaker being accompanied back to his hotel as a sign of solidarity. When a crowd arrived to greet him in Mexico City, Ugarte said, “Above the crowd, borne on the shoulders of the others, rose a silhouette, voicing with vigorous gestures the sentiments of the demonstrators. It was impossible to hear what he was saying.” But understanding the precise message does not actually matter compared to the enthusiasm that the clamor “heard beneath the windows of my hotel” produced in everyone (71). He then emerged onto the balcony to greet and speak to the crowd: “When I mentioned [Simón] Bolívar and [José de] San Martín, every head was bared. Never have I felt such emotion” (71). Latin Americanism was for him a performative practice based on emotions and the sensorial. Narrating his stop in Tegucigalpa, he wrote, “And I confess that I have seldom felt such emotion as in that little city . . . the humble capital of an undefended country . . . and yet so independent in its bearing” (98–99). He certainly “aspired to no honours save those which arose from the enthusiasm of popular assemblies” (101).

The success of Ugarte’s campaign was such that it put on notice not only the US academic community, which was beginning to take interest in Latin America, but also the US government itself. Secretary of State Philander Knox, touring through Central America at the same time as Ugarte, pressed regional leaders to avoid meeting with him or providing him with theater space; Knox even prevented Ugarte from disembarking in Nicaragua (Destiny, 91–113). And yet, despite these successive impediments, the tour continued until it completed the proposed itinerary. Ford, touring with the Boston Chamber of Commerce, crossed paths with Ugarte in Buenos Aires in June 1913, during Ugarte’s last leg of his continental journey.

Ugarte was not the only Latin American cultural operator who put Pan-Americanism advocates on the defensive. Starting in 1911, Rufino Blanco-Fombona, a friend of Ugarte’s then also living in Paris (they had met in New York in 1900), began a Latin Americanist campaign based on the possibilities offered by the new cultural economies—especially the expansion of the Spanish publishing industry, in process of consolidation because of the Great War. Blanco-Fombona’s Latin Americanism had a similar beginning as Ugarte’s: a stay in the United States and, in particular, his reading of Stead’s The Americanization of the World, to which Blanco-Fombona retorted in a homonymous pamphlet, La americanización [sic] del mundo (1902), dedicated to Spanish and Latin American journalists. In his pamphlet, Blanco-Fombona denounced the colonial ambitions and strategies of the United States and England, as well as the political and economic bias toward Latin America in the English-speaking press. To counteract these, the
pamphlet promoted a strong continental foreign policy developed out of common legal code for the region (La americanización, 8–9). In his contributions to Spanish, French, and Latin American publications, Blanco-Fombona, like Ugarte, also attacked the role of US and European cablegrams in the advancement of imperialism: “The press has a strong influence over the current international hatred,” he wrote in Camino de imperfección (82). But it would not be until 1911 that Blanco-Fombona, by then exiled from Venezuela by Juan Vicente Gómez’s dictatorship, produced the book that would come to define, systematically and extensively, his continentalist thought: La evolución política y social de Hispano-América (1911). Starting then, his work as publicist would center around his attack on both Gómez’s regime and US expansionism.17

Like Ugarte, Blanco-Fombona argued for the reconciliation of Spanish Americans with Spain; but unlike him, he deployed positivist, psycho-anthropological categories of racist undertones that advocated for white supremacy and condemned all kind of hybridism in Latin America. From La evolución política y social de Hispano-América (1911), to Judas Capitolino (1912), to El conquistador español del siglo XVI: Ensayo de interpretación (1921), Blanco-Fombona defended the politics of racial whitening. He saw pride and hubris—inaherited, he believed, from the old Spanish ruling caste—as the essential traits necessary to stand up to the United States. Close to the thought of César Zumeta, Carlos Octavio Bunge, and Francisco García Calderón, in Judas Capitolino he argues that “the majority of our country is mulatto, mestizo, zambo, and has all the defects that, since Spencer, are associated with hybridism. The issue is not so much to destroy the country’s Indians and blacks, who are our brothers, but rather to whiten them through constant interbreeding” (16). For Blanco-Fombona, Latin American unity was, therefore, a fundamentally criollo project, promoted by the aristocracy with the help of European immigration. His paradigmatic figure was Bolívar himself: a Spaniard without indigenous or African blood in his veins (Hirshbein 37–52; Boersner 133).

Blanco-Fombona’s racist thinking was not really of concern to Ford’s Anglo-American Latin Americanists. What bothered them was his relentless and strategic use of the publishing industry to defend his anti-imperialism through propagandistic and polemic texts. While different from Ugarte’s, the spectacularization of the intellectual figure was also at the center of Blanco-Fombona’s cultural interventions. Blanco-Fombona attempted to capture sustained attention through a series of public acts: Angel Rama demonstrated how the Venezuelan himself understood the value of self-fashioning in a market of cultural goods where the intellectual could—and should—become a commodity to broaden and extend his lettered influence. His fame as a hotheaded and violent individual—prone to physical attacks, duels, and the use of the slander—even reached the United States. In a visit to New York at the turn of the century, Blanco-Fombona struck down several
people who made fun of his talking in Spanish with the Venezuelan writer César Zumeta; he also hit a policeman who tried to stop the attack (Boersner 11). This “duel,” copiously commented on in all biographical accounts, embodies a kind of “foundational” hemispheric confrontation over a threatened identity that continued to have ramifications for forty years. Rama formulated this idea very clearly when he wrote that Blanco-Fombona was “a figure, more than an oeuvre; a gesture, more than a word,” adding that his “egotism” reveals the “nineteenth-century spectacular cult of the ‘I.’” The spectacular nature of Blanco-Fombona’s acts had, according to Rama, consequences for the overall production and reception of his work: “There is nothing surprising in the series of political incidents that defined his life, but their appearance is highly surprising in the books in which they become exalted and vengeful operations” (Rufino Blanco-Fombona, 9).

Self-fashioning was crucial for a modern intellectual who, instead of defending the autonomy of writing, saw the spectacle as a tool to maintain his relationship to the publishing market. In Blanco-Fombona’s case, the task of creating the image of a bourgeois artist tied to mass production, self-promotion, and novelty (and its rapid exhaustion) led him, Rama adds, to make use of “thunderous and even brutal resources . . . which included his garments and his gestures . . . to attain a social position, to be heard, to sell his merchandise” (Rufino Blanco-Fombona, 42). Verbal and physical “terrorism” were “part of the job, and an important part of the ‘image’s’ articulation,” but they also were—as in Ugarte’s case—a “strident and democratic way of talking and being clearly understood by everyone” (45).

Indeed, Blanco-Fombona’s “exalted and vengeful operations” (Rufino Blanco-Fombona, 9) did not include only the publication of leaflets, pamphlets, libels, combat pieces in newspapers, open letters, lectures, novels, short stories, and personal diaries but also the foundation of the first-ever commercial publishing house entirely devoted to the promotion of a Latin Americanist discourse: Editorial-América. If Ugarte used theater speeches, telegrams, and letters as the essential tools in creating and bolstering his anti–United States discourse, Blanco-Fombona exploited the possibilities of the publishing industry with the same goal. A veritable textual machinery, Editorial-América was conceived as part of a communicative strategy meant to promote Latin America’s historical, literary, and political production on a mass scale, amounting to a market-based written incitement to sedition. The great success of this project in the public sphere was the reason that Blanco-Fombona would come to be loathed and challenged within US academic circles.

Founded in 1915, Editorial-América became the most important platform for the consolidation of a retrospective Latin Americanist textual repertoire, developed from Europe through private initiative and with clear commercial ends. It served as another articulation of the critical task that Blanco-Fombona himself had
developed in texts such as *Letras y letrados de Hispanoamérica* (1908) and *Grandes escritores de América: siglo XIX* (1917), as well as in his role as editor of Bolivarian documents (letters, speeches, proclamations, and testimonies). Editorial-América was founded in Madrid after the decline of France’s Spanish publishing industry at the start of the Great War and looked to promote a Bolivarian-oriented, anti–United States, and pro-socialist version of the continent’s past and present. The Editorial comprised five Latin American book series, whose biggest success came between 1917 and 1922: the Biblioteca Andrés Bello (canonical works written from the early nineteenth century to the present); the Biblioteca Ayacucho (memoirs, diaries, correspondence, biographies, and historical studies concerning the Emancipation from Spain); the Biblioteca de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales (Latin American positivist authors specializing in law, sociology, ethnography, and international affairs); the Biblioteca de la Juventud Hispano-Americana (nonspecialized texts on political, social, and diplomatic history); and Autores Varios (Peninsular critics of Latin American writers). Finally, Editorial-América published the Biblioteca Porvenir, focused on the dissemination of left-leaning, and especially Bolshevist, authors in translation (Lenin, Otto Bauer, Bukharin, and Engels, among others). Through these six series, the Editorial-América represented something of a feat: Blanco-Fombona launched an average of thirty-three volumes a year, whose print run varied between three thousand and forty thousand copies per title and made nearly five hundred titles available to the public (Boersner 78).18

Blanco-Fombona hid neither the openly biased nature of the Editorial’s textual repertoire nor his complete indifference toward philologically informed editions. Taking as example a strategy employed by La Cultura Argentina, the popular collection of classic authors founded by José Ingenieros to promote a simultaneously Jacobin and positivist view of the Argentine past (Degiovanni, *Los textos de la patria*, 215–320), Blanco-Fombona had no problem changing the titles and internal structure of the chosen texts in order to emphasize a particular reading of them. More than adhering to careful editorial criteria, what was crucial for him was to print and distribute as many books and as quickly as possible: speed was a crucial factor for the success of a commercial operation ultimately defined by the laws of supply and demand. The somewhat specialized tone of the texts included in the Editorial’s different series should not be confused, in this regard, with philological care: Blanco-Fombona took it upon himself to dismantle those disciplinary demands. As a case in point, he did not hesitate in substituting the adjective “yankee” for “American” in some titles, such as Eduardo Prado’s *La ilusión americana*, which became *La ilusión yanqui* (by this he wanted to criticize the appropriation of the terms “America” and “American” by the United States) (Segnini 82). Moreover, he only published the first two volumes of Mariano Paz Soldán’s *Historia del Perú Independiente*, since the third narrated the bloody struggle between political
parties after Bolívar’s death, and this could have potentially tarnished the hero’s legacy (Segnini 90). In other cases, in order to underscore the Editorial’s internal ideological coherence and goals, Blanco-Fombona simplified titles, added subtitles and dates, or did away with entire sections of some books (Segnini 96–97). Editorial-América was both a continuation of Blanco-Fombona’s libelous politics and an archive through which he carried out his polemics. 19

Through Editorial-América Blanco-Fombona attempted to build a Latin Americanism fueled by the development of a Spanish-language cultural market—the only viable alternative for continental unity, given the lack of compromise among the governments of the area to consolidate it politically. During the years he was in charge of Editorial-América, he devoted a dozen articles to discussing the possibilities opened up by the Great War for the articulation of a transnational cultural alliance founded upon the Spanish language. His experience in France before 1914 as editor in chief of Garnier’s Grandes Autores Americanos series, one of the many Spanish-speaking publishing houses located in Paris before the war, led him to speculate about the prospect of reorganizing the editorial business in Spain (which remained neutral during the conflict) though without submitting these initiatives to Madrid’s lettered—philological—authority. Aiming at promoting Spanish written material on an international scale, Blanco-Fombona picked up on the debates about the Hispanic “cultural meridian” started by Guillermo de Torre in 1927 (which favored Madrid over Buenos Aires as cultural capital of the Hispanic world) to reframe them in strictly market terms: “Some argue for a Madrid meridian; that is, dependency. . . . Those who believe that the language is their property forget that a fortune’s heirs are also its owners, and can do very good business and increase the capital they inherit” (Motivos y letras, 27; my emphasis). 20 The essentially economic terms in which Blanco-Fombona understands the linguistic and cultural issues at stake—property, heirs, businesses, capital—are fundamental in situating his Latin Americanism. He insists that the formation of “an international League of the Hispanic World” founded upon an editorial apparatus should be made up of “all the American and European nations that speak our language, without giving any one of one them authority over the others,” and “in proportion to the means available to each of them” (35).

Furthermore, his proposal to make the cultural market the cornerstone of an anti-imperialist Latin Americanism was not indifferent to the growth of the Spanish-language publishing industry in the United States after the outbreak of the Great War. In several articles Blanco-Fombona framed the development of Editorial-América in the context of the rapid expansion of US academic Latin Americanism after 1914; one of his goals in this regard was to challenge the reading of Latin America as promoted by a number of active US textbook publishers (Holt, Brentano, E. P. Dutton, Four Seas). While launching his project from Spain,
Blanco-Fombona wrote, “What is happening with our language in both great Saxon commercial nations [the United States and England] is well-known . . . they are creating Spanish-language chairs in many educational institutions, not just private but state-sponsored” (Motivos y letras, 81). And he added, “Before the war, Paris was a powerful center of dissemination of Spanish books toward Spanish-speaking America. But with Europe beaten and battered, the Yanks took advantage of the circumstances and increased their Spanish production by a hundredfold” (122).

Ford’s disciplinary project had indeed profited from the expanding market for Spanish academic publications. One of his disciples, the literary translator and critic Isaac Goldberg, was key in the process of building an editorial apparatus dedicated to Latin American literature. He served as editor in chief of Brentano’s Hispano-American Series and published articles on the subject in the Boston Evening Transcript and the Stratford Journal. Goldberg’s correspondence shows, for example, his eagerness for making Latin American contemporary novels available in translation in the US market in the 1910s and 1920s, as well as his connections with the emerging network of professionals at the service of the nascent academic Latin Americanism in the period, such as translators and copyright agents. Goldberg’s letters reveal a carefully thought out editorial strategy for advertising college-level Spanish textbooks, which included publicity campaigns and their timely launching at the beginning of the school year.21

Wanting to occupy the place left vacant, after the start of the war, by the decline of French Spanish-language editions, Blanco-Fombona said after leaving Paris, “I noticed, as soon as I arrived in Spain in 1914, that there was a gold mine to be made with the book trade in America. And so I became a publisher” (Motivos y letras, 121). Choosing Madrid as his seat of operations did not mean, however, that his intention was to sell Peninsular authors in the Latin American market, since the former, Blanco-Fombona concluded, were of no interest to the latter. The three French publishing houses (Garnier, Ollendorff, and Bouret) that had dominated the Latin American market before the war understood this, and Blanco-Fombona knew their well-honed strategies had to be followed: “As it can be seen, they sell relatively few books by Spanish authors . . . What do they sell, then? They sell French translations and [Latin] American books” (120).

Although he does not attack Rodó, the openly commercial terms of Blanco-Fombona’s Latin Americanism did not obey any Arielist stance in which culture is framed as a space entirely separate from material interests and opposed to “vulgarity” and “utilitarianism.” In fact, the opposite seems to be the case. From Blanco-Fombona’s publishing market perspective, Jacinto Benavente’s Nobel Prize in 1922 led him to consider, for example, the “publicity effect” that the prize could mean for a cultural politics articulated beyond state-sponsored institutions. Spanish, Blanco-Fombona adds, “is starting to be disseminated outside of the places it
is spoken, not because of the Spanish government, but almost exclusively by the
deed and grace of [Latin] American growth and the great economic possibilities
it presents for foreign activity and ambition” (Motivos y letras, 78). And, he con-
tinues, “We could put it this way: the expansion of the Spanish language follows,
nowadays, the growth of [Latin] America. Spanish prospers as [Latin] America’s
population, its political stability, exports of raw material, and consumption of for-
eign products increases” (84).

Like Ugarte, Blanco-Fombona borrowed from socialism the notion that the
cultural market and the publishing industry were crucial spaces for challenging a
traditional, state-controlled cultural politics. Skillful at negotiating the publication
and distribution of his writings (Boersner 100), in a speech at the Sociedad de
Escritores Españoles, Blanco-Fombona encouraged publishers “to dedicate sums
of money to book advertising” (Motivos y letras, 62). From the beginning of the
twentieth century, leftist cultural organizations had made the publication and in-
ternational circulation of cheap book editions—namely, of anarchist and socialist
thinkers in translation—one of the cornerstones of their political struggle in the
public sphere. Catalan publishing houses such as Sempere and La Escuela Moderna
developed successful low-priced collections as part of a leftist editorial militancy
of transatlantic scope that reached a significant number of Latin American readers
(Degiovanni, Los textos de la patria, 209–10). Starting in 1915 Blanco-Fombona
sought to reorient this strategy toward strengthening the ties between print capital-
ism and anti-imperialist Latin Americanism.

Despite his fervent Latin Americanism, Blanco-Fombona paradoxically be-
thieved that a continentalist publishing project should not be deployed from Lat-
in America itself. Problems with costs, imports, and communications led him to
conclude that Editorial-América had to be organized from Spain, the only place
with a sufficiently stable and extended infrastructure to be able to channel these
ideals: “since such difficulties cannot be resolved overnight. . . . The book pro-
duced in America cannot yet compete, in terms of diffusion, with the Spanish
book” (Motivos y letras, 124–25). He sought to reactivate the Bolivarian dream
from Spain, using cultural market forces to generate political and symbolic co-
hesion throughout Latin America. In his words, these market forces “will be a
practical step toward the amphictyony Bolívar dreamed of” (320). Other factors,
mainly political in nature, made Blanco-Fombona skeptical of a Latin Ameri-
canism developed from the region. He was convinced that each of the country’s
respective nationalisms, as well as their internal battles for regional supremacy,
posed serious obstacles for the fulfillment of his project. For example, Blan-
co-Fombona was aware that Argentina, a country with a well-consolidated market
for cultural goods in the early twentieth century (but outside Bolívar’s sphere of
influence and cult), could hegemonize his Latin Americanist project. His bitter
confrontations with Argentine intellectuals about San Martín’s role in the emancipatory process—later collected in *La espada del Samuray* (1924)—are further testimony of his anti-Argentine stance. If for Ugarte it was imperative to leave behind internal disputes such as these in order to achieve a greater, more enduring continentalist ideal (*Destiny*, 211, 222), Blanco-Fombona saw Bolivarianism as the only alternative to the Monroe Doctrine. Not even Argentina’s decisive role in the formulation and defense of the Drago Doctrine (the only successful diplomatic attempt at opposing Pan-Americanist designs) was enough to convince Blanco-Fombona to prioritize this country over others.

Ultimately, however, Ugarte and Blanco-Fombona’s market-supported Latin Americanism came under suspicion of Eurocentrism. Their vindication of Spain as the ultimate symbolic referent for any discourse of continental unification, as well as their insistence on strengthening Latin America’s commercial ties with France and Germany, garnered doubts about the implications of their anti-imperialist claims. In this sense Ugarte and Blanco-Fombona were read less as critics of anti-imperialism in general than as enemies of US expansionism. If in his writings Ugarte claims not to worry about European colonialism, because of Europe’s diminished military and economic capacity in the global arena (*Destiny*, 198–99), he repeatedly advocates for solidifying economic alliances with France and Germany as a way of opposing US hegemony. Ugarte states that, because of their influence, “it may almost be said that France lives in our life. . . . In calling her to our aid we are in reality doing no more than prompting her to defend a part of her spiritual patriotism” (28–29). And elsewhere he wrote, “what would happen if, after direct consultation with her sister republics of the South, Cuba were one day to raise a loan from France, to buy locomotives in Germany, and to engage Japanese officers to organise her army” (*Destiny*, 47). In Blanco-Fombona’s case, his admiration for French cultural politics is evident as he lauds the French government for its “practical and vital effort” to learn about Latin America (*Motivos y letras*, 83).

**A Noxious Germanism**

To US academics such as Ford, Ugarte, and Blanco-Fombona’s openly pro-German stance during the Great War were the ultimate proof of their Latin Americanism’s ideological underpinnings. The outbreak of the European war brought to the fore the issue of cultural understanding between the United States and Latin America, since the potential alliances of some of the region’s countries with Germany were seen as a threat to Washington’s hemispheric interests. In particular, monitoring the situation in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile—the so-called ABC countries in Washington’s political jargon—became a priority for US policy: during the war, these nations, the most prosperous and stable in the region (and thus beyond the grip of the Monroe Doctrine) defended their economic ties to the British Em-
pire and had prominent local groups that supported the German cause. The relationship of the United States with Argentina was considered particularly strategic: Argentina had held an explicitly anti–United States diplomatic position since the Pan-American Conference of 1889, and its intellectual elite and middle class of European descent were reluctant to support the US interests in the region.

In this context Ugarte’s Latin Americanist rhetoric after the outbreak of the Great War was a source of concern for US scholars. If at the beginning of the conflict Ugarte had favored neutrality, by 1917, while on another Latin American tour, he fomented a pro-German stance. In the Mexican, Peruvian, and Chilean press, for instance, he argued against supporting the Allies, “to save ourselves from US imperialism,” and even justified this by affirming that an Allied victory would contribute to a global US leadership (Merbilhaá 209–10). As I will demonstrate, the rejection of all pro-German intellectual positions was a central factor in the development of academic Latin Americanism in the United States for over four decades: this anti-Germanism, in fact, would run through the disciplinary discourses of Ford, Coester, and Henríquez Ureña; they all saw Latin Americanism as a shield against Germanism.

Ugarte’s and Blanco-Fombona’s Latin Americanist agenda quickly met an extensive response from Ford, who explicitly targeted both figures in a 1918 lecture series given at Boston’s Lowell Institute. Published a year later as Main Currents of Spanish Literature, Ford’s chosen title was reminiscent of Georg Brandes’s widely known Main Currents in Nineteenth Century Literature (six volumes, 1871–1890), whose influence would be felt in Latin America until the 1940s. Henríquez Ureña’s classic history, titled Literary Currents in Hispanic America (1945), still picks up on Brandes’s prestige in literary studies. Brandes provided Ford with a model to analyze several national literatures comparatively; however, the questioning of bourgeois and reactionary ideas about marriage, religion, and property embedded in his work as well as his progressive dialectic were beyond Ford’s project (and Henríquez Ureña’s).

Significant to the understanding of Ford’s title was Brandes’s public impact in the United States. His Main Currents in Nineteenth Century Literature had been translated into English in 1906, but it was not until 1914 that Brandes reached wider recognition and readership. That year, his New York lecture attracted so many attendees that police intervention was required to disperse the crowds that had gathered outside the theater to listen to him (Asmundsson). It is possible that Ford used Brandes’s popularity to promote his own lectures. What is certain, however, is that through his talks, Ford cemented a practice widely used during the field’s foundational years: the oral delivery of a literary history in a lecture series aimed at popularizing the subject (these lectures would ultimately be compiled in book format). Besides Ford’s text, Arturo Torres Rioseco’s The Epic of Latin
American Literature (first delivered as part of the Mary Flexner Lecture series at Bryn Mawr) and Henríquez Ureña’s The Literary Currents in Hispanic America (given as Norton Lectures at Harvard) were also a product of this format.

In his Boston talks, Ford explicitly confronted the enemies of Pan-Americanism. His discourse was meant for an audience that was well aware of the role of United States in Latin America since 1898 as well as of the new challenges facing the Western Hemisphere as a result of the Great War. Ford attacked Ugarte’s intellectual politics, defending Pan-Americanism as an idea completely removed from “thoughts of political federation intended to secure the domination of any one state or an aggregation or states at the expense of any others” (Ford, Main Currents, 244). Instead, Ford spoke up for the useful and disinterested nature of the Monroe Doctrine: “We have not ceased since 1823 to offer Hispanic America the benefits of that Doctrine, which they have not always been ready to interpret in the sense that sane-minded North Americans mean it to have” (245).

Ford’s depiction of the US-Latin American disagreement corresponds to a positivist, typological distinction of national “characters.” The Monroe Doctrine is seen here as a product of “sane-minded” Americans—described, in another instance, as “rational optimists” (Main Currents, 244)—who are opposed by “irrational” and “fanatic” Latin Americans. Indeed, Ford identifies Ugarte and Blanco-Fombona with these latter attributes: “there are writing against us with all the fury of fanatic hate two Spanish Americans who have attracted much attention: Rufino Blanco-Fombona and Manuel Ugarte. Blanco-Fombona is instinctively a roisterer and has the habits of one; but he is also a writer of more than ordinary force and can do much harm. Ugarte is probably a tool, but his false assertions are finding too ready an acceptance, especially with the youth of Spanish America” (274). Ford adds that his “utterances and maneuvers grow even more bitter with hate and are developing into organized propaganda” (273). Therefore, he warns: “we cannot afford to ignore them, and the time has come when the writers of the United States should refute the calumnies” (273). Against the frenzied passions of these cultural organizers—incapable of self-discipline (because of their hate, fury, and rancor)—the Pan-Americanists appear sane and disinterested: “By us, who look at the matter with minds unwrapped by any passion, their allegations and attacks are deemed foolish maunderings, when we do not regard them, as the paid utterances of the agent of a rival European power [i.e., Germany]” (273).

Ford’s statements do not only entail a psychological characterization; there are also serious geopolitical concerns. For Ford, it is worrisome that, amid the war, “these irresponsible or knavish Hispanic-Americans” (Main Currents, 273) function as agents in the service of Germany and Pan-Germanic imperial politics, which he considers in clear competition against the United States for control over Latin American markets. Indeed, Ford makes Germany’s potential role in the region a
topic with far-reaching consequences for Latin Americanist scholarship. On the one hand, Ford contrasts Pan-Americanism and Pan Germanism and understands the former as a transnational alliance, “free from all the noxious features that have characterized Pan-Germanism” (244). On the other hand, he insists on the need to create an academic Latin Americanism that could serve as an offensive weapon against Germany’s interests: as a form of anti-Germanism. Ford comes to the conclusion: “induced thereto in no small part by the insinuations and machinations of one particular European nation, which feared the revival and growth of our trade relations—I need hardly say, Germany—certain Spanish Americans have at times been inclined to regard the Monroe Doctrine as a big stick held over their heads” (245). In a 1920 lecture on the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine entitled “Hispanic America,” Ford insisted, moreover, that “the penetration of German capital into Guatemala and Costa Rica had become very disturbing by the early years of our present century” (912). Ford’s patriotic compromise to the United States became evident when he renounced all pay from Harvard during the war: as Virginia Baños recalls in one of her letters to Ford, between 1914 and 1917, he was a “dollar a year man to the service of his nation.”

US academics believed they were not alone in their opposition to Ugarte and Blanco-Fombona. According to them, they had the support of a whole group of Latin American intellectuals who, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, had repeatedly ratified their idea of a hemispheric alliance against a mistaken and biased anti–United States Latin Americanism. Because of this, Ford’s Main Currents advanced a canonical repertoire made up of authors who, in his opinion, had given either highly favorable or not adverse testimonials about the United States; in a way, they all seem to support “Pan-Americanism,” although this was before it even existed as an idea. He claimed, for instance, that José Joaquín de Olmedo’s La Victoria de Junín was a “keynote of American patriotism. . . . It may be judged in part by the Inca’s splendid apostrophe to liberty, whose Pan-American spirit has been found distasteful by Europeans like Menéndez y Pelayo but should have the approbation of all true, thinking Americans” (Main Currents, 200). With regards to Andrés Bello, for example, Ford argued, “it would be difficult for our United States to put forward any one of its sons and claim for him superiority over Bello as a man of letters, jurist and educator all together” (262). Bello’s Silvas Americanas, Ford adds, show “a patriotism that transcends the limits of the individual Spanish-American states and would make them an international fraternity” (264). José María Heredia’s poem about Niagara Falls is also read as a homage to the United States: “Undoubtedly the hymn to Niagara constitutes the best of all the descriptions and apostrophes in verse call forth by the sight of the mighty waterfalls” (268). Finally, Olegario V. Andrade, “the last of our quartet of great poets,” produced in Atlántida: Canto al porvenir de la raza latina en América a poem to
the “glory, not only of his own land, but of all Latin America”; in it, Andrade extols the Latin American nations “and proclaims their progress something inevitable” (217). Ford included long quotes to familiarize his public with these poets’ mostly inaccessible texts. He ends with the following statement: “Dealing with Olmedo, Bello and Andrade, we have intentionally but not unduly stressed their Americanism, their yearnings for a Pan-American solidarity under the banner of freedom for each and every one of the states concerned. In the case of Olmedo these yearnings embrace this country as well as the Hispanic States; Bello and Andrade do not show any trace of antipathy to us. But in the writings of more recent Spanish-American authors antipathy presents itself in unmistakable terms” (273). Main Currents makes it clear that Ford is not interested in nineteenth-century prose about nationalist topics: he overlooks all allusions to the subject and does not even mention José Fernández de Lizardi’s El Periquillo Sarniento or Domingo F. Sarmiento’s Facundo. Within modernism, he lauds José Santos Chocano for his “generous aspirations toward true Pan-Americanism” (270). He overlooks Martí and Rodó, and about Darío’s critical poem on Theodore Roosevelt, he says, “It was evoked by the jobbery . . . attending the establishment of the State of Panama. Darío was entirely mistaken in laying the blame for the operation of that affair upon our nation” (274).

Ford’s quarrel with Ugarte and Blanco-Fombona continued over the years. After publishing his Main Currents, Ford warned his disciple Isaac Goldberg, who was interested in translating Blanco-Fombona’s work for Brentano: “Be careful in your dealings with Blanco-Fombona . . . do not trust him. He will certainly hate me, if he ever sees the new book.” 24 In fact, it was not long before Blanco-Fombona came across the Main Currents. In October 1919, in a letter to Goldberg, Blanco-Fombona comments on Harvard professor Ford’s senile imbecilities; your old teacher calls me “a cad” and a “debauche,” and thinks I have sold myself to some European power to attack the United States. By the way, I have read your piece in the Boston Evening Transcript and I see that you side with the ridiculous idea that I am being paid by and obeying anti-Yankee propagandists. . . . But make no mistake about it, my friend, once and for all: I am not for sale, and I do not accept anybody’s orders or control over my ideas, or over my feelings. I know of plenty decent ways to earn a living.25

Despite Ford’s objections, Goldberg translated The Man of Gold, which was published in 1920 by Brentano. In the introduction, after admitting that Blanco-Fombona’s reputation has achieved “almost international proportions” (v), Goldberg ironically points out the political contradictions of Blanco-Fombona’s ideas: “he heralds a sort of aristodemocracy in which Karl Marx and Nietzsche will
shake hands, with Blanco-Fombona in the middle, perhaps, to insure harmony. Quite certain it is, at any rate, that his collective views proceed as much from the one as do his individualistic attitudes from the other” (vii). In any case, when Thomas S. Stribling published a novel entitled *Fombombo* in 1923, it was clear that the name Blanco-Fombona had become sufficiently well known in the United States as to have specific connotations attached to it. *Fombombo* was one of Stribling’s Venezuelan-themed novels, whose protagonist was the very embodiment of the “Latin temperament” that Ford had attributed to Blanco-Fombona. Howard MacDonald’s 1925 master’s thesis on Blanco-Fombona at Columbia University speaks of the author in similar terms; he argues that Blanco-Fombona has “the typical characteristics of his race” (*Rufino Blanco-Fombona*, 10). MacDonald scorns Blanco-Fombona’s work because of the racial inheritance of the author; he points out that his character has “a defect . . . that has been transmitted from generation to generation, and that makes each Fombona a man of violent and exalted temperament” (14–15).

Implicitly following Ford’s ideas, MacDonald indicates that academic Latin Americanism should be an instrument of “national defense” devoted to safeguard US hegemony in the region. From the organization of the Cuban Summer School, Latin Americanism had been conceived as a gnoseological tool for US expansionism, subordinated to its political and economic interests. It was not a product of *filia*, but of *fobia* toward the southern neighbors. In this sense, MacDonald points out, “What every US patriot should do (given that we must have some kind of relationship in this hemisphere), is study all these writers, to refute their arguments if they are unjust, or to present them to US public opinion if they are just” (70–71; my emphasis). In 1925 the publishing house Alfred Knopf put out an English translation of Ugarte’s *El destino de un continente*. The book’s introduction by J. Fred Rippey, a University of Chicago professor, is no less contemptuous of Ugarte, as it reinforces his role as an enemy of US interests. While Rippey points out that “Ugarte is a radical and an idealist,” he argues that “many of his statements are one-sided and inaccurate” (*Destiny*, xvi). Rippey nonetheless suggested paying attention to Ugarte’s point of view in order to develop adequate responses to his comments. For MacDonald and Rippey, as for Ford and his disciples, Latin Americanism represented a disciplinary answer to an opposing discourse, which relied on communication technologies and the spectacularization of the intellectual figure as its most important weapons. Production of scholarly knowledge on Latin America was supposed to challenge adversarial representations of the United States in the public sphere; within this new disciplinary construct, literary study was to serve as an instrument for widening and deepening the understanding of the population and the geography of this new area of imperial influence.