Political activity is whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it. . . .
It makes visible what had no business being seen, and makes heard a discourse
where once there was only place for noise; it makes understood as discourse
what was once only heard as noise.

—Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy

In the civil rights movements of the 1960s in the United States and elsewhere,
odies shifted from their assigned places and made noise that they intended
to be heard as political discourse: the student movements in the United
States and Europe; in South Africa, especially after the 1976 Soweto massacre,
large-scale street demonstrations featured the singing and dancing called toyi-
toyi; the 1977–1978 civil resistance against the Shah in Iran; the Poland Soli-
darity movement of the 1980s and the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989; the first
Palestinian intifada in the late 1980s/early 1990s. These few selected cases from
the final decades of the last century suggest the global vitality of social protest
in this period.

From a US perspective, however, beginning with the election of Ronald
Reagan in 1980, activism seems to have subsided in an era of capitalist growth,
trickle-down economics, and cultural quietism. Other influential factors include the enactment of civil rights demands into law, the backlash against feminism, a move toward cultural conservatism, the 1990s cultural wars (fought largely in the press and in the halls of academe), and the move into a neoliberal era with its all-encompassing economies and smooth affects. For many social protest scholars, then, the so-called Battle in Seattle marked a turning point. The 1999 protest against the World Trade Association at its meeting in Seattle was a demonstration that brought together multiple constituencies against a global agent; it played out over several days with considerable performative creativity. There followed soon after the contentious election of George W. Bush, the events of 9/11, and then in the spring of 2003 massive worldwide protests against the impending US war in Iraq—millions of people marching in New York, London, Paris, and Rome. Fast forward to the spring of 2011, and we have the uprisings in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt; in the United States, rowdy labor protests in Wisconsin; and by the fall, Occupy Wall Street. A case can be made that protest movements and cultures of activism in the United States and across the globe have come to life in the twenty-first century. A number of analytic frames have been called upon or created to make sense of this upsurge and to foster speculation about its causes: globalization and its networks, the influence and availability of new media, a revival of interest in performativity and the carnivalesque, and others.

As activists respond to changing economic and global conditions, questions arise: What accounts for these ebbs and flows? Are we seeing new modes of protest? Jacques Rancière’s observation, published in 1995 in France, inspires further questions along these lines: What makes it possible for people to gather together to express a public will? What provokes bodies to shift from assigned places? What is the process of translating the often unruly noise of protest into discourses of democratic participation?

While the digitally and televisually mediated nature of much contemporary activism has drawn significant recent scholarly attention, we approach activism and protest here as a complex mix of bodies, technologies, discourses, and even histories that need to be considered collectively so as to guide a new understanding of contemporary rhetorical interventions within and across numerous spheres. For instance, during Quebec’s mass student strikes in 2012 that fought off tuition hikes and toppled the provincial government, student unions turned to social media to publicize key days of action. But it was the sea of red-shirted college students filling the boulevards, joined by thousands of residents in traditional pot-banging protest that repeatedly transformed the city of Montreal into a public space for broadcasting the students’ demands.
Quebec’s “Maple Spring” thus joins a long history demonstrating how—by
definition—protest puts bodies disruptively in public space. Indeed, when cur-
rent examples are examined closely, we find technology and embodied protest
complexly intertwined. From this angle we can consider how many twentieth-
and twenty-first-century protests are grounded in long histories of activism
and lively interanimations of old and new rhetorical means.

Consider, for example, the Egyptian phase of the so-called Arab Spring
(known locally as the January 25 Revolution)—mass demonstrations in Cairo’s
Tahrir Square beginning in January 2011 and reaching a climax on February 11
with the resignation of Hosni Mubarak from his thirty-year run as president.
One narrative circulating about the uprising features “an oppressed people who
have suffered passively suddenly decid[ing] that enough is enough and, thanks
to Western technology and inspiration, spontaneously ris[ing] up to reclaim
their freedom” (Bishara ix). This “world media narrative” (Bishara ix), high-
lighting the crucial role of social media and other new technology, needs to be
assessed in the context of a longer history of struggle and a clear-eyed account
of the role of new media in recent years. Revolutionary movements of 1881,
1919, and 1952 laid the ground for more current protests from 1998 forward
based on dire economic conditions. When the Egyptian government crushed a
strike by textile workers on April 6, 2008, a group of young activists connected
through Facebook and other social networking sites and formed the April 6
Youth Movement in solidarity with the strikers. This movement propelled the
massive popular protests in January 2011—the assembly of bodies in Tahrir
Square that finally could not be ignored by the Mubarak regime. In a fascinat-
ing and detailed calculation of the role of social media and oppositional move-
ments in Egypt leading up to the January 25 Revolution, Merlyna Lim finds
that face-to-face communications such as contacts at coffeehouses and in cabs
played as strong a role as social media in bringing masses of people to Tahrir
for those fateful eighteen days.

In a similar fashion, an analysis of the 2011 University of California, Davis,
“pepper-spray incident” highlights the combination of historical, embodied,
and technologized factors. In “Toward an Economy of Activist Literacies in
Composition Studies: Possibilities for Political Disruption,” Caroline Dadas
and Justin Jorry analyze responses arising out of the pepper-spraying by police
of a group of student protesters at UC Davis, who had organized a peaceful
sit-in to call attention to tuition hikes across the system. Dadas and Jorry link
the incident at Davis to other protests across the globe:

Incidents like Davis—as well as those that played out in other contexts such as
Occupy Wall Street and the Arab Spring—indicate that political disruption is
carried out and sustained through complex systems of situated literate activity that occur over time and across myriad locations. As participants in these systems of literate activity, activists are compelled to navigate and manage a network of semiotic resources in which the potential of any given resources—its political value—is relative to its position in the network and not always readily apparent. In this way, such phenomena raise interesting questions about the available means of disruption and, more specifically, how individuals determine the affordances and limitations of the semiotic resources that enable disruption and challenge the status quo. (144)

Turning their attention to one “available means of disruption,” Dadas and Jorry focus on semiotic remediation by analyzing remixed photos of the pepper-spraying; for instance, we see the cop spraying the Declaration of Independence, or assaulting a reclining female figure in an Andrew Wyeth painting. The remixes, which circulated widely on social media, constitute an attempted disruption of official narratives. The unruliness of the parodic images creates shock through juxtaposition. In the process, such images channel and amplify the original unruliness of the bodies of the protesters themselves in refusing to be removed from campus. Dadas and Jorry point out that such images, including video footage of the original pepper-spraying, put into circulation images of actual bodies under attack: “when [such images are] juxtaposed with administrative messages, the videos materialize the bodies of students and officers” (148).

From the vantage point of just these two examples, contemporary practices of protest seem a lively mix of bodies, technologies, and historically proven practices. Yet the technologically mediated dimensions of activist work have perhaps drawn the most scholarly attention, with some commentators arguing for new media as the leading factor in a new age of activism. In Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age, Manuel Castells focuses attention on many current activist projects, arguing that “the networked social movements of the digital age represent a new species of social movement” precisely because they “have been dependent on the existence of specific communication mechanisms” (15). Castells asserts that “multimodal, digital networks of horizontal communication are the fastest and most autonomous, interactive, reprogrammable and self-expanding means of communication in history” (15). His analysis becomes technologically determinist when he argues that “characteristics of communication processes between individuals engaged in the social movement determine the organization characteristics of the social movement itself: the more interactive and self-configurable communication is, the less hierarchical is the organization and the more participatory is the move-
ment” (15). We take the force of his argument here, acknowledging the important role that technologies of communication have played in facilitating protest. But Castell’s formulation obscures the role of other dimensions of contemporary protest. For instance, he maintains that the “faster and more interactive the process of communication is, the more likely the formation of a process of collective action becomes, rooted in outrage, propelled by enthusiasm and motivated by hope” (15). The speed of protest is important, surely, but Castell’s gesture to affects, many long-standing and developing over decades, suggests histories of deeply felt and embodied desires to disrupt the status quo. As such, we might ask, what are the relationships among histories of protest, affects, technologies, and spontaneous assemblages? We are indebted to such studies for the ways they call attention to different forms of protest. Yet fascination with new technologies can obscure how much, as labor economist Kim Moody suggests, seemingly “new” forms of organization and resistance aren’t “new in history” but, instead, are reclaimed as “new” for this era, foregrounding the technological element (7).

In this collection, then, we attend to such “networks of outrage” as they are vectored across different times and spaces via old and new media. It is possible to read scholarship like that of Dadas and Jorry, Castells, and others as attempts to translate unruly protest activities into (postmodern) forms of political argument (see DeLuca). If anything, though, these valuable amplifications suggest to us a more fundamental role for disruption in conceptualizing political activity and the need to analyze further the power of disruption and the unruly vis-à-vis politics. In this volume we give priority to unruliness as it disrupts what appears or is taken to be the normal flow of life. In the complex mix of histories, bodies, and technologies at play in each case examined by our contributors we collectively ask, What do we make of unruliness as political force? In recent events such as Occupy Wall Street and the Arab Spring, the extended span of time and mix of voices and media pose particular challenges for rhetorical analysis. Other cases—such feminist performances as SlutWalk and the interventions of Pussy Riot, for example—raise questions about participation, representation, and purpose. It is tempting to see unruliness as a kind of amorphous force breaking into the decorous and orderly spaces of public life. But as Tim Markham comments, “The valorization of amorphousness in protest cultures and social media enables affective and political projection, but overlooks politics in its institutional, professional and procedural forms” (94). Perhaps there is a problem with Markham’s opposition between amorphousness and “politics.” What is needed is an address to the “unruly” and the “political,” and their relationship to, or undoing of, rhetoric as communication, at a more fundamental level.
THE UNRULY AND THE POLITICAL

The unruly permeates discussions of contemporary protest, including forms of argumentation, technologized and multi-mediated activism, and bodies on the line. Our genealogical gestures above begin to suggest the history and persistence of the unruly: its ability to inhabit various spaces and to link technologies, past and present, to bodies. Might the unruly, in fact, not take shape as just one of many rhetorical strategies within political activity but, perhaps, be constitutive of the political itself?

Recent rhetorical scholarship is pushing the inquiry in precisely this direction. Robert Cox and Christina R. Foust, for example, in their 2009 overview of social movement rhetoric track the development of a critical conversation in communications studies that calls into question social movements as already constituted entities whose members participate on the basis of stable identities and, through deliberation, arrive at coherent demands (610). The emergence of the term “counterpublic” in the 1990s out of Habermasian public sphere theory seems to open the critical terrain to some degree (see Cox and Foust 613; Warner), but even this analytic is at risk of losing its capacity to decenter “social movements” when its use marks recognizable group identities or issues as ontologically prior to the events at which they are called forth. As the critical language turns toward performance, resistance, and bodies in their materiality, it seems better able to capture the complexity of unruly events as we envision them. Critics such as M. Lane Bruner have shifted critical attention from the specific strategy goals of the demonstration or rally to an appreciation for states of liminality or the carnivalesque, created through complex and multi-stage events such as the Seattle World Trade Organization protests. Pursuing the extra- or nonsymbolic dimensions of protest opens up the possibility for understanding the phenomenon of assembly beyond the limits of the “political” defined in modernist terms as a structure of rational exchange between groups variously empowered or disempowered along the lines of constitutionally defined rights. Under these newer frames of understanding, assembled bodies have not only semiotic meaning, as Dadas and Jorry suggest, but material force exceeding the symbolic (see DeLuca).

As resources for reimagining the relationship between unruly rhetoric and the political, we turn to two theorists of continental political philosophy whose recent work on democratic/popular sovereignty—despite some differences—offers insights on rhetoric: Jacques Rancière and Judith Butler. In brief, for Rancière, unruliness is constitutive of politics; for Butler, unruliness speaks to and from the pervasive condition of the precarity of life. For each, existential
conditions of inequality or unlivability are the inescapable conditions of the “political” and can be addressed rhetorically.

Jacques Rancière asserts that politics itself “revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties of spaces and the possibilities of time” (*The Politics of Aesthetics* 13). Rancière’s understanding of the democratic polis is deeply rhetorical. He begins by exploring the processes and mechanisms through which certain kinds of ideas come into view and who can talk about them. But such processes seem inevitably to result in the exclusion of many different voices and views. So Rancière redefines the argumentative process of democracy itself, not as rational actors meeting at a table to debate but, rather, as the process that “makes visible what had no business being seen, and makes heard a discourse where once there was only place for noise; it makes understood as discourse what was once only heard as noise” (*Disagreement* 30). For Rancière, democracy is a “rupture in the order of legitimacy and domination,” dependent on subjects engaged in perpetual dissensus, or “the making contentious of the givens of a particular situation” (Panagia and Rancière 124). While Warner figures a counterpublic as a space of alternative scene-making that may one day be transformative for how the dominant public sphere conducts its business, Rancière imagines democracy itself as ongoing disruption, as those subjects who had not even been capable of being seen breaking into the frame of vision, their voices once heard as noise making themselves heard in the conversation. Such a view departs radically from the conventions of deliberative rhetoric with its “desires to have well-identifiable groups with specific interests, aspirations, values, and ‘culture’” (Panagia and Rancière 125). Rancière actually understands consensus as the “negation of the democratic basis for politics” (Panagia and Rancière 125) and imagines in its place democracy as perpetually unruly.

For Rancière, inequality is the given condition of the political: “Politics, as we will see, is that activity which turns on equality as its principle. And the principle of equality is transformed by the distribution of community shares as defined by a quandary: when is there and when is there not equality in things between who and who else? What are these ‘things’ and who are these whos?” (*Disagreement* ix). Arendt imagines democracy through a similar figure: “To live together in the world means essentially that a world of things is between those who have it in common as a table is located between those who sit around it; the world, like every in-between, relates and separates men at the same time” (xx). But because her world is peopled only by those who do not labor, there is never an issue about who shows up at this table. For Rancière, on the other
hand, “The struggle between the rich and the poor is not social reality, which politics has then to deal with. It is the actual institution of politics itself. There is politics when there is a part of those who have no part, a part or party of the poor” (Disagreement 11). And as such, politics demands or expects spatial disruption: “Political activity is whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it or changes a place’s destination” (30). We come to understand the rhetorical implications of such a reorientation as Rancière marks the difference between “the discursive articulation of a grievance”—that is, a conventional agonistic discourse—and “the phonic articulation of a groan” as the primal or disruptive expression of inequity (2). Rancière explains his foundational conception of how “protest” comes into being: “Spectacular or otherwise, political activity is always a mode of expression that undoes the perceptible divisions of the police order by implementing a basically heterogenous assumption, that of a part of those who have no part, an assumption that, at the end of the day, itself demonstrates the sheer contingency of the order, the equality of any speaking being with any other speaking being. Politics occurs when there is a place and a way for two heterogenous processes to meet” (30). Rancière makes clear that protest does not arise out of a periodic recognition of “wrongs”—those exceptional occasions on which things are going badly and people rise up and correct wrongs, returning the state to its normal order. But, rather, “The concept of wrong is not linked to any theater of ‘victimization.’ It belongs to the original structure of all politics” (39). Thus Rancière makes it possible for us to reorient our analytic questions. A conventional rhetorical analysis would ask, Why now? Against which wrongs? Or with what technology? Or with what arguments, groups, and goals? Instead we ask, How does this particular emergence of the unruly give expression to the fundamental inequality grounding the political?

Similarly, Butler begins her recent work Notes toward a Performative Theory of Assembly by noting a disjunction between “the political form of democracy and the principle of popular sovereignty” (2). In her formulation, the latter designates a more primal political condition, one that “has to precede and exceed any form of government that confers and protects that right of assembly” (160). Freedom of assembly, asserts Butler, “may well be a precondition of politics itself” (160). It is a “performative power that lays claim to the public in a way that is not yet codified into law and that can never be fully codified into law. This performativity is not only speech, but the demands of bodily action, gesture, movement, congregation, persistence, and the exposure to possible violence. How do we understand this acting together that opens up time and space outside and against the established architecture and temporality of the regime, one that lays claim to materiality, leans into its supports, and draws from its material and technical dimensions to rework their functions?” (75).
Questioning the term “we the people,” Butler speculates, “Perhaps ‘the people’ is that designation that exceeds any and every visual frame that seeks to capture the people, and the more democratic frames are those that are able to orchestrate their porous character” (165). She asserts that democratic freedom demands “plural acts and pluralities of bodies” (182).

Perhaps more forcefully (or vividly) than Rancière, Butler is attuned to the precarity of life unrecognized by conventional political theories. She holds that there is “an irreducible fact of politics: the vulnerability to destruction by others that follows from a condition of precarity in all modes of political and social interdependency” (118). Emphasizing the dependencies of bodies on each other, Butler observes that “vulnerability is also not just a trait or an episodic disposition of a discrete body, but is, rather, a mode of relationality that time and again calls some aspect of that discreteness into question” (130). Differentiating her position from Arendt’s, for whom the unbearable is the difficulty of entering into a political relation with others, Butler acknowledges that people assembling will have differences from one another. Political struggles—scenes of protest—are, for Butler, not solely about meeting specific demands: “After all, even if we come to understand and enumerate the requirements of the body in the name of which people enter into political struggle, are we claiming that political struggle achieves its aims when those requirements are met? Or do we struggle as well for bodies to thrive, for life to become livable?” (133). For both Rancière and Butler, politics or protest is not caused by the temporary failure of systems and structures to enfranchise people or groups but, rather, erupts periodically out of the pressure to respond to the fundamental inequality and persistent precarity of life. Its temporal, spatial, and technological reach is unlimited.

Such insights emerge not only in continental philosophy but also from other lines of thought in recent rhetorical analysis. In an influential essay from the late 1990s, Kevin Michael DeLuca works with the embodied quality of radical environmental and queer protests. He argues for images of the protesting body as making arguments but also notes that the body in such events functions as a site of incoherence (20). He sees the body as being both socially constructed and excessive, and he highlights “public arguments that exceed the bonds of reason and words” (20). Expanding the range and modalities of protest seems a hallmark of activist work at the turn of the century. Marking the twenty-first century as an era with new rhetorical challenges, Kevin Mahoney argues, “The current assault upon all forms of democratic participation . . . makes it necessary to engage in a very different kind of project” (152). Citing Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire, Mahoney observes that “the most intense and broad-based political movements/rebellions within Empire are ‘all but incom-
municable” (154). Echoing this trope of “incommunicability” as well as Butler’s precarity, Kelly E. Happe sees rhetoric in Occupy as “an extension of an already existing vulnerability” (211). Her analysis draws on Foucault’s reading of *parrhēsia* not as a “free speech, dependent on conventions of intelligibility” but, rather, as an opening or rupture (216–17). From many philosophical and rhetorical perspectives, then, the political is the collective groan of deeply felt precarity and vulnerability sounding out as unruly protest.

The line of theorizing we have laid out here would suggest that unruliness breaks out spontaneously, driven by existential conditions, and certainly this is so in many scenes of political protest. But unruliness can also be staged as a rhetorical tactic. In our 2014 article “Rhetorical Education and Student Activism,” we examine a staged disruption of a talk by the Israeli ambassador Michael Oren on the University of California, Irvine (UCI) campus. Students from the Muslim Student Union (MSU), who later became known as the Irvine 11, stood up at different points during Oren’s talk to shout out slogans that called into question his honesty and ethics, citing his participation in the relocation or even death of many Palestinians. What seemed an unruly even hostile eruption of anger was, rather, a carefully choreographed protest that had taken months of planning, debate, and self-sponsored education to enact. Students in the MSU investigated different strategies of protest, considered multiple options, and debated tactics. Their goal was not just to critique Oren but also to bring to attention how they believed their views had not been heard or attended to in previous forums and platforms for debate about the Middle East at UCI. As we put it, the “students focused more on the modality of the exchange itself—the genre or structure of the event—and less on the message” (535). Such conscious attention to framing, we assert, characterizes unruly rhetoric as rhetorical practice.

Rhetorical preparation for such unruliness can be fostered within as well as outside the curriculum. Nancy Welch has for over a decade advocated for rhetorical pedagogies that pay attention to bodies engaged in political action, particularly at a time when the mass circulation of information about politics can seem overwhelming. In *Living Room: Teaching Public Writing in a Privatized World*, she worries that students are developing a reduced notion of the complexity of argument, debate, and protest, particularly when compared to the vibrancy of contemporary forms of civil unrest: “we should be collectively concerned about the disturbing gap between actual demonstrations of mass public argumentation and what many of our students, in their classrooms and in the wider culture, learn about leaving arguments to the experts or until the next election” (143–44). She proposes potential remedies in her article with Tony Scott, “One Train Can Hide Another: Critical Materialism for Public Com-
position,” in which she and her coauthor call for “enacting pedagogies that embrace . . . public rhetorical work in full, embodied form” (575). Arguing for critical materialism as a counter to the dematerializing tendencies (leaving the body behind) of public composition pedagogies and approaches to rhetoric, they state, “Just as one train can hide another, when our conceptions of public rhetorical practice prioritize discursive features and digitized form over—and to the exclusion of—historical context and human consequences, we miss how texts may mobilize meaning not to upend but to reinforce relations of power” (565). Recognizing how the bodies of protesters themselves are often on the line and at risk when protesting connects the circulation of abstract ideas with the lived realities of people fighting injustice, the authors note that such recognition is a “materially challenging task given the urgency of social and environmental conditions plus the speed, volume, and insistence of new media texts vying for attention” (575). But Scott and Welch insist that thinking carefully through those conditions is necessary to create a more informed—and potentially engaged—citizenry.

RHETORICS OF THE UNRULY

We believe that current projects in rhetoric and writing studies can be brought into fruitful contact with new political philosophies. Toward this end, we ask, how do we articulate the unruly within the political? Butler herself frames such a question: “I’m using one word after another, searching for a set of related terms as a way of approaching a problem that resists a technical nomenclature; no single word can adequately describe the character and the aim of this human striving, this striving in concert or this striving together that seems to form one meaning of political movement or mobilization” (133). We propose that “unruly” might be one word that, while hardly totalizing or encompassing all political striving, marks how speech, action, and bodies coalesce in time and space, enacting the work of politics in the ways Rancière, Butler, and contemporary rhetorical critics have imagined.

Out of what does such unruliness coalesce? As we saw in Alexander and Jarratt’s analysis of the Irvine 11 and the students’ staged protest of Michael Oren, some unruliness is tactical, a conscious strategy deployed to interrupt existing norms of political debate and discussion. In a way, the very presence of visibly nonwhite, likely Muslim bodies at the scene of the speech might itself have seemed to some to be potentially unruly, an incursion of (unwanted) presences. Indeed, some bodies in particular contexts are prone to being constituted as unruly, such as the bodies of women or racial minorities. And even other unruliness, following Rancière, arises as an un-premeditated groan, a deeply perceived if not fully conscious sense of needing to be heard in situa-
tions and in conversations in which one's voice is either actively elided or not yet legible. Those groans might constitute the political, but they do so as pre-articulate expressions across multiple political positions, from left to right. Given the different origins of unruliness, then, an ethics of unruliness based on its ontology may be less useful than a consideration of ethical action in the aftermath of unruliness. What do we do after we hear the groan? As rhetoricians, we are inclined to favor those unrulinesses that are then followed by an opening of the field of discussants and attention to the previously illegible.

Readers might note that many of the examples here, as well as those discussed throughout the chapters of this book, focus on left-leaning and progressivist forms of activism. These choices reflect the orientations of the authors and editors of this volume. But we acknowledge that a left-leaning disposition may not be a requisite for ethical unruly rhetorical practice. For instance, students in the Muslim Student Union described in Alexander and Jarratt’s article may not consider themselves “left-leaning” per se, and they might hold religious views that others would consider “conservative.” Further, recent events during the run-up to the 2016 presidential election, such as protests that turned violent outside rallies for Donald J. Trump, certainly suggest a kind of unruliness. In Rancière’s parlance, we might understand the violence outside a Trump rally as “noise” arising out of a sense of precarity and outrage; unruliness becoming rhetorical is the process of “mak[ing] understood as discourse where what was only heard as noise” (Disagreement 30, emphasis added). At the same time, though, we might assert that an ethical unruly rhetorical practice, while not inherently left-leaning, is one that aims to bring to light an inequality (in Rancière’s terms) or precarity (in Butler’s) by disrupting routinized exchange within the public sphere. Contemporary examples of unruly rhetorical protest are pitched at disrupting local and global structures of social and political inequality, racial and gender-based injustice, and governmental overreach and abuse. The progressivist nature of such unruly rhetoric is part of our sociopolitical and cultural moment. In contrast, some Trump supporters, seeking an authoritarian figure to resolve their political problems, turn to the violence of unruliness to seek security (in Butler’s terms) and “policing” (in Rancière’s) as solutions to inequities; thus democratic exchange of any kind is unwelcome. As Butler puts it, “The opposite of precarity is not security, but, rather, the struggle for an egalitarian social and political order in which a livable interdependency becomes possible” (69). Trump supporters who hit, spit on, and violently expel protestors, urged on to such violence by their leader, are enacting just the opposite of livable interdependency, their unruliness arising from a reactive impulse to exclude and silence any voices other than that of the demagogue.

Even more recent unrulinesses might serve as examples when considering
what kind of unruliness turns toward the generative and which does not. Close to home in 2016, Jonathan stumbled across a sign on his campus announcing an upcoming talk by former Brietbart correspondent Milo Yiannopolous. The handmade poster proclaimed in large block letters, “Who are we to let such dangerous faggotry go unpunished?” The provocation, particularly the use of the word “faggotry” on a college campus in southern California, which is more hospitable than not to queer people, was intended to be tactically unruly in getting attention and provoking comment. Such unruliness was likely intended to bring to the fore a view about homosexuality that was at odds with attitudes held by many students and faculty on a fairly liberal-minded campus and thus is a use of unruly speech *seemingly* to expand the conversation and include other voices about controversial topics. But while Jonathan didn’t necessarily object to Yiannopolous’s appearance on campus, he felt, as a queer man, the verbal assault of both the word “faggotry” and the implied need for queers to be punished. Many others, especially queer students, felt similarly, seeing not a call for discussion but an attempt to silence—and particularly, to silence those who have only just begun in the last half century to find a voice, to turn the groan of homophobic oppression into articulate claims for civil rights.

More dramatically, the confrontations among police and protestors at neo-Nazi and white supremacist marches in Charlottesville, Virginia, on August 11–12, 2017, resulting in at least one death, speak to another example of right-wing unruliness attempting to call attention to its racist views. And while one might argue that such views might deserve a hearing in an open and democratic society, we can’t help but see the use of Nazi salutes and gestures simulating lynching as forms of psychic terrorism intended to belittle, demean, and threaten. Again, white supremacists’ unruliness might signal their desire to be heard, but its ultimate aims are pitched at the silencing of others—at the raising of one set of voices at the expense of others. In contrast, we want to draw attention to unruly rhetorical practices that highlight both the precarity of lives and conditions of being as well as the insufficiency of prevailing or dominant platforms for public conversation. At times, these are not just disruptions that happen to have rhetorical force but, rather, are disruptions that have drawn attention to oppressive structures and walled-off attitudes; as such, they are in service not of the mob (*ochlos*) but of the *demos* (Rancière, *Politics of Aesthetics* 84).

Our contributors take up our call to consider the role of the unruly in the complex matrix of bodies, technologies, and histories that animate political protest in service of the “livable interdependence” evoked by Butler. While not every author posits the unruly as constitutive of politics, as Rancière and Butler seem to do, they all explore how the unruly moves through many different ways of understanding contemporary political protest and its historical
roots. For some scholars of composition, rhetoric, and communication studies, the ideals of discursive rationalism, stakeholders-at-the-table mediation, or dematerialized circulating discourses still hold sway, but many intermingle older and newer modes of analysis. Recognizing the ongoing importance of named collective goals and modes of representation to political activity, the contributors to this volume stage fresh encounters with the unruly as a flexible tool of analysis. In the process, contributors variously consider how new platforms of dissemination as well as long-standing rhetorical assumptions about civil discourse and effective argument might be informed and complicated by unruly bodies and gatherings. Along such lines, they ask, What threats do unruly rhetorics stage to the body politic and what role do ideals and pedagogies of civil discourse play with reference to the vulnerable body of the citizen? How can historical examinations complicate analyses that might otherwise be drawn from single moments of upsurge? How do interactions of embodied rhetoric and other rhetorical means re-create public space and public hearing? And what does a fuller understanding of unruliness bring to the teaching of rhetorics?

In the fifteen chapters that follow, scholars analyze specific cases of unruliness in public scenes ranging from street demonstrations to encounters in state houses and on university campuses to staged performances and occupations. To contextualize and deepen our understanding of bodily assemblage and performance, a number of chapters take up historical precedents and literary articulations of unruliness. Mediated encounters are tracked in chapters on an alternative newspaper, social media agonistics, and projects for writing and teaching unruly rhetorics. The chapters are grouped in three sections, “Bringing Back the Body,” “Civility Wars,” and “Limits and Horizons,” with each part designed to explore unruliness as an outbreak of political expression or as a form of rhetorical action or as a complex merging of force and tactic that mobilizes bodies, technologies, and histories in civic protest. The three sections call attention to three manifestations of or approaches to the notion of the unruly. Essays in each section highlight a particular aspect, but as you will see, there are overlapping elements in many.

PART I: BRINGING BACK THE BODY

It is the body that suffers precarity, and it is through the assembly of visible and audible bodies—often in unexpected and unsanctioned places—that the “people” claim a share in the communal (Rancière, Politics of Aesthetics 84). Thus we begin with Dana L. Cloud’s essay “Feminist Body Rhetoric in the #unrulymob, Texas, 2013,” which analyzes the 2013 “people’s filibuster” in the Texas state legislature—an uprising against a draconian antiabortion bill that also produced
backlash rhetoric naming women as an “unruly mob” that might use tampons and feces as weapons. Cloud traces how women’s bodies are both the site of public ideological and political contestation and the repository of the unruly: everything regarded as private, dangerous, disgusting—ruling women out of public political bounds. In a similar vein in “Walking with Relatives: Indigenous Bodies of Protest,” Joyce Rain Anderson insists on a continuing tradition of Indigenous resistance to the colonial forces that have sought to eradicate Indigenous bodies for centuries in order to claim and exploit the land. In particular, Anderson focuses on Idle No More, a US and Canadian movement against the Keystone XL and Dakota pipelines, hydraulic fracturing, mass hydropower projects, and more. She discusses the hunger strike, “flashmob” style dance, and occupations that bring Native bodies into public focus, and in so doing, make visible Indigenous strategies of protection and maintenance—long-term practices built on continuity rather than the short-term impulse of protest.

We turn next to a dramatic claim of embodied audibility: Canadian media and sound studies scholar Jonathan Sterne’s “A Groove We Can Move To: The Sound and Sense of Quebec’s Manifs Casseroles, Spring 2012.” For some hundred days in the spring of 2012, Montreal university students, joined each night by the city’s Francophone residents, carried out a raucous pot-banging social strike, part of a province-wide struggle against austerity cuts to university education and a draconian anti-protest law. In this essay, Sterne draws readers into the sound and sense of the manifs casseroles. In addition to providing in-the-moment snapshots of a movement that resulted in the (temporary) victories of overthrowing the provincial government and staving off tuition hikes, Sterne connects the pot-banging protests to the history of charivari or “rough music” and its uses in contemporary protests, from Quebec and Argentina to Iceland and Spain, to counter neoliberal austerity, atomization, and alienation with a public, embodied, and mass “politics of possibility.”

But what is possible when a body is unruly or when calling attention to unruly bodies? Matthew Abraham, in “Steven Salaita’s Rhetorical Refusal: Taking to Twitter as a Form of Political Resistance and Protest,” offers an examination of scholar Steven Salaita’s tweets during the summer of 2014 as an example of unruly rhetorical practice powerfully drawing attention to bodies in peril. While roundly criticized in some quarters for being uncivil, Salaita’s public comments allow Abraham an opportunity to explore how rhetorical refusals to play by the rules of normative discourse can throw into stark relief the ongoing precariousness of Palestinian bodies. And finally, returning us to women’s bodies in “SlutWalk Is Not Enough: Notes toward a Critical Feminist Rhetoric,” Jacqueline Rhodes examines the viral SlutWalk protests as both a rhetorically savvy blend of real bodies, sex, and social media needed to challenge
entrenched patriarchal culture and, simultaneously, a continuation of mainstream (white) feminism’s complicitous relationship to white supremacist patriarchy. The SlutWalk wave of in-your-face protests against slut-shaming, victim-blaming, and rape culture marks a much-needed continuation and updating of Take Back the Night and other forms of feminist street theater of the past half century. At the same time, the protests mark a continuation of white feminist privilege and exclusions. In a reading that both appreciates this twenty-first-century manifestation of feminist critical action and cautions that it is “not enough,” Rhodes argues for an antiracist, critical feminist consciousness characterized by performance, virality, and a constitutive intersectionality that not only expand feminism’s methods but challenge its goals.

**PART II: CIVILITY WARS**

In the next section, authors focus on the ways the standard of civility comes under scrutiny and containment by various forces: the state, the status quo, or the forces of so-called security (what Rancière would term “policing”) but also the seemingly neutral or innocuous surrounds of middle-class sensibilities and professional organizations. Nancy Welch, in “Informed, Passionate, and Disorderly: Uncivil Rhetoric in a New Gilded Age,” juxtaposes historical and contemporary disputes over “civil” modes of protest. Just as a prominent contemporary antinuclear activist chastises other nuclear power protestors for their “incivility” and “mob mentality” in protests of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the turn-of-the-twentieth-century settlement movement condemned the now celebrated 1912 Bread and Roses strike in the same terms. Welch demonstrates how, in the last Gilded Age as well as in our own, a ruling class enlists middle-class sentiments to defend a civil order—not for the good of democracy but against it. The next chapter, “Circulating Voices of Dissent: Rewriting the Life of James Eads How and Hobo News,” by Diana George and Paula Mathieu, takes us to another turn-of-the-twentieth-century medium for dissent: the *Hobo News* published by “hobo millionaire” James Eads How. George and Mathieu use the case study of How’s curious personality and his mainstream reception in order to highlight the pathologizing of homelessness as well as the potential for forming coherent counterpublic vehicles through which radical views could meet and ideas circulate. Through material analysis—not of typeface and design but of the embodied means of distribution and dissemination—George and Mathieu trace the multiple, shifting, and always mass collaborative tactics of dissident groups to circulate ideas in the face of power structures that would seek to shut them down.

In a personal testimony, Kevin Mahoney tracks the crosscurrents of two contemporary movements, testing their implications for teachers and scholars
of rhetoric in “We Are Not All in This Together: The Case for Advocacy, Factionalism, and Making the Political Personal.” While a National Task Force on higher education produced A Crucible Moment calling for civility as the antidote to the toxicity of public discourse that followed the election of the United States’ first African American president, Republican governor Scott Walker’s unbridled assault on Wisconsin’s public universities and collective bargaining rights demanded a bolder response: “throwing one’s body on the gears of the machine.” Mahoney reclaims Thomas Paine’s critical stance on civility, including the tactical and necessary uses of factionalism, as necessary to defending democracy’s project. Reporting from within the crucible of a university protest, Yanira Rodríguez and Ben Kuebrich chronicle their experiences with an eighteen-day sit-in at Syracuse University in “The Tone It Takes: An Eighteen-Day Sit-In at Syracuse University.” They document the ways that institutional rhetorics of free-market neutrality, coupled with academic ideals of civility and scholarly detachment, attempted to neutralize resistance to the corporate restructuring of higher education. Ultimately, the authors call for recognition that the result of embodied dissent is not division but proximity, the proximity on which deliberation and exchange depend. In a third essay focused on the university scene, John Trimbur attempts to make sense of why the Conference on College Composition and Communication and the National Council of Teachers of English, unlike other professional associations, failed to issue a statement protesting the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign’s firing of newly hired Stephen Salaita in 2014. In “The Steven Salaita Case: Public Rhetoric and the Political Imagination in US College Composition and Its Professional Associations,” Trimbur speculates that the position might be understood as emblematic of the organizations’ shared ethos of decency, sincerity, and responsibility, which have made them prey, on one hand, to neoliberal “responsibilized accountability” and leery, on the other hand, of the unruliness of the political imagination as seen in Situationist, punk, and performative styles.

PART III: LIMITS AND HORIZONS

Essays in this final section highlight the complexities of unruly performances while simultaneously recovering and celebrating the unruly—the sexual, the profane, the playful, and the persistent—as interventive forms of political behavior. Drawing on a literary resource, Deborah Mutnick in “Answering the World’s Anticipation: The Relevance of Native Son to Twenty-First-Century Protest Movements” analyzes twenty-first-century activist responses to structural racism and endemic police brutality in light of Richard Wright’s powerfully influential novel. Adopting conceptional lenses from Marx and Bakhtin, as well as Wright’s own language regarding his novel’s “x-ray vision,” Mutnick
traces Wright's dialectical understanding of black life and white power structures. This dialectical understanding and the x-ray vision that enables it, Mutnick argues, can help rhetoricians see more clearly how the rhetoric of liberal democracy—the rhetoric of “the open hand”—masks the violent means by which white power structures control and destroy the Bigger Thomases of the world. Moving from race to language in “Dignitas and ‘Shit Shovels’: Corporate Bodies and Unruly Language,” Jason Peters asserts that bodies and a body politic are constituted through linguistic regimentation. Peters reads the unruly (and even profane) rhetorical style of a 1920s New England French-language activist whose use of immigrant working-class French to challenge Catholic Church English-only policies is suggestive of an alternative, hybridized, local needs-inflected conception of language. At the same time, Peters draws out the ways linguistic fluidity—in this and other language-rights movements—is enlisted for an argument that would protect the purity of a national language and ultimately suppress alternate language practices and values.

In “Remix as Unruly Play and Participatory Method for Im/Possible Queer World-Making,” Londie T. Martin and Adela C. Licona introduce another medium for the emergence of unruliness. This chapter features the efforts of teens in an Arizona social justice summer camp through their digital video remixes to speak back to punitive state forces and laws that would herd students through a school-to-prison pipeline and pathologize their sexual identities. The videos, Martin and Licona observe, are indeed haunted by normative, neoliberal, and utopian discourses. Such discourses, however, exist in a playful and productive tension with the videos’ queer world-making tactics—creating through what Lauren Berlant terms “aspirational normativity,” the insistent and persistent hope for a better life through which a queer futurity can be glimpsed. Working with the power of a different set of voices in “On Democracy’s Return Home: The Occupation of Liberty/Zuccotti Park,” John Ackerman and Meghan Dunn take inspiration from one of the authors’ participatory study of the Occupy Wall Street movement and their collective interest in the chora, a place that acts as a kind of receptacle holding the potential for a different form of living to take place. Offering the results of fieldwork conducted during the Wall Street occupation, Ackerman and Dunn argue that Occupy provided—and continues to provide—the fertile ground for the emergence of new ideas and alternative democratic modalities. They invite us to attend to the time of the political, recognizing that “voices will fall silent” for a time, returning to “the residua of the everyday,” but that this waning can also be met by a “slow, yet vital, recovery”—a reclamation of the demos, multi-sited, without demands other than the possibility for a livable life, for plural existence in public space.

The final chapter in the volume returns us to bodies on the line—in this
case those of educators and activists from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) seeking to carry forward the Arab Spring’s rhetoric of hope in the face of the grim and de-democratizing conditions—including military usurpation of power in Egypt and devastating civil war in Syria—that have followed. In “Then Comes Fall: Activism, the Arab Spring, and the Necessity of Unruly Borders,” Steve Parks and his coauthors challenge US rhetorical scholars to understand how they are implicated in and should be hailed by the life-and-death tasks undertaken by MENA educators and activists, including grasping the connections between the barbarous acts perpetuated upon a civilian population and the seeming logic of academic writing. Introducing the work of Syrian activist Bassam Alahmad, Parks traces the alternative rhetorical framings that academics might deploy as they attempt to write, publish, and teach in solidarity with those struggling for a geographically and culturally specific survival.

Nancy Welch’s “Afterword: Science, Politics, and the Messy Arts of Rhetoric” concludes the volume with some of the probing questions that we hope our readers will continue to consider—in both activist and scholarly work. What are the implications of unruly rhetorics as we have theorized and analyzed them here? Can the practice of unruliness be learned and repeated? Should unruly rhetorics be taught? One of the strong implications of this work is that rhetoric as a theory and practice of conventional deliberation—including the solid principles of reasoning, argumentation, and persuasion taught in many rhetoric classes—exists in an uneasy or tenuous relationship with other forms of political expression, both historically and in today’s contemporary political scene. Numbers of rhetoric and writing teachers are committed to activism and have devised creative ways of incorporating activist elements into their curricula. Do such efforts lead to “unruliness”? The diversity and complexity of the cases laid out in the preceding chapters suggest that any attempt to formalize or regularize the unruly as we present it would do an injustice to the spontaneity, creativity, and local specificity of such outbreaks. Indeed, the idea of teaching unruliness seems like the opposite of the unruly.

That said, we recognize ways that political actors have learned from each other, often outside of educational settings (see, for example, Logan, Liberating Language). Martin Luther King Jr.’s adoption of Mohandas K. Gandhi’s practices of nonviolence is a classic example. More recently, we note the way Gene Sharp’s 1973 primer for nonviolence was translated into Arabic and circulated as a plan of action by Egyptian activists in the early days of the January 25, 2011, movement (Madrigal). As teachers of rhetoric, we can use the approaches and examples here to help students inquire deeply into the contexts of and pressures on rhetors in any and every moment where the inequality postulated by Rancière breaks out. Such analyses will lead to a more profound appreciation
for the precarity from which people express their sovereignty and a sharper awareness of those forces that drive them to assemble: the threat to life and safety of intellectuals in the Middle East (Parks et al., this volume), of black citizens in US cities (Mutnick, this volume), of women anywhere and everywhere in public (Rhodes, this volume), as we are being reminded so vividly in the wake of Trump’s bragging about sexual assault.

Perhaps the most compelling finding here comes from the insights concerning the time and place of “the political” or of popular sovereignty as free assembly. As Anderson observes about the Indigenous peoples responding to the pipeline projects, they have not gathered for a one-time protest but see themselves as perpetual protectors. Similarly with Ackerman and Dunn’s observations about the Occupy “movement,” we can use the “unruly” to rethink the time and space of the political itself, of assembly, and of rhetorical action.

WORKS CITED

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