Twenty-first-century Left governments in Latin America promised to “decolonize” their societies by advancing indigenous and Afrodescendant protections and rights and by redistributing resources to the most vulnerable, who often happened to be ethnic and racialized groups (Escobar 2010; Lander 2017). On the basis of almost two decades of ethnographic research, this book discusses why these good intentions were not implemented and why indigenous rights came to be the Achilles heel of turn to the Left governments (Angosto Ferrández 2015). Seeking independence from multilateral organizations and the United States and in the context of skyrocketing commodity prices, twenty-first-century Left governments became highly reliant on natural resource extraction. Indigenous, Afrodescendant, and other organized groups resisted the expansion of extractive industries into their territories as they threatened their livelihood and safety. As governments struggled to finance budgets and keep themselves in power, they watered down subnational forms of self-government, slowed down land redistribution, weakened the politicized cultural identities that gave strength to social movements, and reversed other fundamental gains of the multicultural era. The twenty-first-century Left was particularly effective in undoing multiculturalism because its radical discourses legitimized
the regimes, its leaders justified sacrificing indigenous and environmental protections as a trade-off for redistributive policies and the alleviation of poverty, and government officials with a trajectory on leftist organizations knew well the internal dynamics of social movements.

This book analyzes the paradoxical reversal of multiculturalism under the rule of the Left through an examination of Ecuador’s Citizens’ Revolution, led by President Rafael Correa (2007–2017). The book argues that this government’s dependency on natural resources and its choice of centralized, authoritarian rule underpin this reversal. The book does not look at resource extraction per se and does not focus exclusively on the areas of the country where this activity takes place. It examines the deterioration of multiculturalism at the national level and analyzes this process within multiple layers of context. To do so, the book examines the consequences for indigenous people of the transition between neoliberalization and the regime of Rafael Correa, that has self-identified as and has been called postneoliberal. By “postneoliberal,” I do not mean that all neoliberal policies and logics were radically and permanently transformed under Correa to give way to a better and fairer economic model. The book argues instead that some processes characteristic of neoliberalism such as the reduction and privatization of the public sector and the promotion of globalization and free trade were reversed and replaced by a stronger, centralized state and nationalist economic policies funded with the revenues from oil and other natural resources. For this reason, I prefer to use the term “nationalist-extractivism” to refer to the political-economic configuration that characterized Correa’s decade. The book also argues that neoliberal forms of governance first weakened and depoliticized indigenous movements. When Correa came to power, he found organizations that were already fragile. Indigenous organizations challenged the regime’s development and centralization policies, which further circumscribed the rights of this population.

By multiculturalism, I mean the policies and state institutions seeking to recognize and include indigenous peoples and Afro-Ecuadorians. However, the book focuses mostly on the indigenous sector, given the difficulties of examining both social movements in sufficient depth. Multicultural policies such as intercultural bilingual education, the official recognition of indigenous systems of justice, and the official acknowledgment of territorial autonomy were achievements of social movement struggles in the previous decades. Under neoliberalization the state and multilateral organizations
privileged symbolic and cultural forms of recognition over the redistribution of resources and deeper structural transformations (Hale 2002). Superficial forms of recognition encouraged leaders and organizations to focus on short-term technical and cultural goals rather than working toward more radical changes (Bretón 2005). However, under Correa even these limited forms of recognition and participation typical of neoliberalism were reversed in the context of weak indigenous organization and the regime’s emphasis on centralized rule and resource extraction. This book shows that indigenous rights did not advance in Ecuador beyond vague declarations, indigenous autonomy was curtailed, and some colonial legacies were able to come back and thrive. I now turn to how I arrived at this argument.

I first came to Ecuador in 1996, a few years after the first nationwide indigenous uprising and at the peak of indigenous organizational vitality. Two years later, a new constitution recognized Ecuador as a pluricultural and multiethnic nation and granted indigenous people and Afro-Ecuadorians collective rights that included tax-free communal property, intercultural bilingual education, and the official recognition of their systems of social organization and authority. In addition, the 1998 constitution conceded indigenous people the right to be consulted about the extraction of nonrenewable resources from their territories or to benefit from it, as well as the prerogative to receive compensation from any negative effects of extraction.

At the time, I was still working on my PhD dissertation, which focused on how whites and mestizos in positions of power were able to shape the identities of indigenous migrants to the Mexico–United States border. During my Mexican fieldwork, I observed that government officials were particularly influential in defining what it meant to be indigenous and in helping organize migrants on the basis of that definition. I also studied how intellectuals and economic elites understood indigeneity, and the effects of these understandings on people so labeled. The research entailed a discussion of racism and paternalism, a phenomenon that I found to be central to interethnic relations in Mexico and that was and still is understudied. I defined paternalism as a subtle form of discrimination that constructed racialized groups as lovable (as long as they stayed in their place), but also as fundamentally inferior. I found that those labeled indigenous at the Mexican border struggled for inclusion and the opportunity to move up the socioeconomic ladder. However, the powerful encouraged them to perform elite stereotypes of indigeneity, which kept them marginalized. Some of these
preoccupations have accompanied me to this monograph. Like my previous book (Martínez Novo 2006), this one explores how the powerful conceive of indigeneity and how their ideas and related practices affect the lives of marginalized individuals and groups. Recurring topics are racism and other more subtle forms of discrimination.

I started conducting fieldwork in Ecuador in 2002. Some differences with my previous research drew my attention: although the state was over-present in Mexico, it was relatively absent from the indigenous territories that I visited in Ecuador. Other nonindigenous actors were more salient—particularly the progressive Catholic Church and left-leaning intellectuals. These groups were also important in Mexico, but they were overshadowed by the presence and influence of government officials and state institutions. I started to investigate the development projects sponsored by non-governmental actors in Ecuador, as well as the degree to which their goals harmonized or conflicted with indigenous expectations. Resonating with what I had previously found in Mexico, although the indigenous grassroots showed interest in inclusion and social mobility, leaders and their nonindigenous allies aimed to preserve native languages and cultures and keep this population relatively isolated as subsistence peasants. Later, I expanded my research into the study of intercultural bilingual education, a perfect setting to continue exploring interethnic relations. I noticed some tensions: indigenous people had achieved autonomy to manage their own system of education, but their schools received scant funding and the beneficiaries perceived them as a second-class option.

On the other hand, I was able to observe how indigenous people courageously conquered new spaces that had previously been closed to them. At FLACSO, the public research university where I worked for eight years, European cooperation agencies funded a graduate program for indigenous students from throughout Latin America. These students struggled to gain the acceptance of faculty, classmates, and the administration. Indigenous and Black students were successful in opening up this academic institution to a diverse student body and were able to graduate with advanced degrees. Their experiences are discussed in chapter 5.

The generalized perception at the time was one of a vibrant social movement struggle, increasing if reluctant societal inclusion, and new conquered spaces. In this context, I explored the ambiguities and tensions, advances and drawbacks of multicultural recognition under neoliberalization: some
spaces were opened but not without great effort. Indigeneity was celebrated, but people and the institutions that served them remained underfunded and undervalued. Limited cultural recognition was privileged over greater equality. Advances and utopian experiments coexisted with the legacies of the past.

As I was enmeshed in the analysis of interethnic relations under neoliberal conditions, a radical change took place. Rafael Correa, a candidate who self-identified as leftist and Catholic, was elected in 2006. He was a college professor, and a good number of his early collaborators came from the very institution where I worked. Although I identify with the Left and come from a long line of radical and antifascist activists in Spain, Correa’s movement did not convince me. Alianza País, Correa’s party, decided not to present candidates for Congress because that institution represented for them the corrupt rule of political parties. Once in power, Correa dismissed the just elected Congress and called for new elections for a Constituent Assembly to rewrite the constitution. Correa’s desire to reinforce executive power over checks and balances, and his social conservatism—antiabortion, ambiguously anti-LGBT, fond of aggressive masculinity—drove me away from this political movement even before Correa was first elected.

I also observed from early on the tensions in the regime’s public performances of indigeneity. In Correa’s first presidential inauguration in January 2007, he spoke the Kichwa language, wore an embroidered shirt with indigenous motifs, and chose a parish in an area populated by Kichwa-speaking peasants as the location for the event (Colloredo-Mansfeld, Mantilla, and Antrosio 2012). However, he did not interact with the locals as equals, and instead treated them as part of the background. In the launching of the regime’s first development plan in the fall of 2007, government officials had mestizos in indigenous costume representing the indigenous nationalities of Ecuador. These performances posed a stark contrast to the struggles for inclusion and participation that I had witnessed before.

On the other hand, interesting developments were taking place at the time: creative environmental currents were part of the governing coalition, the 2007–2008 Constituent Assembly was vibrant with proposals for interculturalism, plurinationalism, affirmative action, the rights of nature, and the prohibition of labor subcontracting, among others. Correa and his inner circle struggled to control the Constituent Assembly and to limit what it could do. Declarations of plurinationalism, interculturalism, and the rights
of nature made it to the constitutional text, but Kichwa and other native languages were not accepted on equal standing with Spanish; consultation with indigenous peoples regarding resource extraction was not made binding for the state; and indigenous territorial circumscriptions were set up in a way that made their creation very difficult. More important, the constitution centralized decision making in the executive and gave it absolute control over strategic sectors and nonrenewable resources.

Two years into Correa’s rule, conflict started between the government and the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), the largest, nationwide indigenous organization. Beginning in January 2009, CONAIE demonstrated against drafts of mining and water laws that the communities had not been consulted on and that, according to CONAIE and other activists, would allow for the arrival of large-scale, open-pit mining and the privatization of water. Mining companies needed water in abundance and small-scale peasants were also thirsty for the resource and expected a progressive government to redistribute it. After the agrarian reforms of 1964 and 1973, large landowners had granted their laborers small plots that were typically located in the hills and poor in water. Meanwhile, hacendia owners had kept the best valley lands and hoarded the water.

Two months after the first protests, the government ended the autonomy with which indigenous organizations had managed intercultural bilingual education and drastically reduced the budget for indigenous development. Other dramatic events followed: Bosco Wisum, a Shuar teacher, was shot to death in demonstrations against the government in September 2009, and the Shuar leadership rather than the police were charged with the homicide. A Shuar radio station was threatened with closure for having called its audience to antigovernment demonstrations. President Correa scorned Marlon Santi, the head of CONAIE, on national television. Then, public prosecutors charged several indigenous leaders with the crimes of sabotage and terrorism, until hundreds of them were entangled in lengthy legal processes. Correa and other high government officials ridiculed indigenous customary law, which was recognized in 1998 and ratified in 2008, as a primitive practice. In 2014 the Supreme Court circumscribed indigenous law to cultural issues internal to communities and of lesser importance. The councils for indigenous and Afrodescendant development and for women, which previously had the rank of ministries and were tools for the participation of social movements in government, were closed and replaced by councils.
for equality whose members were selected by merit. The president, high
government officials, and other members of the ruling party Alianza País
continued making statements about indigenous leaders and organizations
that would not have been considered politically correct in the previous peri-
od. The retrenchment in intercultural bilingual education policies, discussed
in detail in chapter 4, was notorious, with most schools now teaching only
in Spanish, indigenous teachers evaluated and then laid off, and community
schools closed for alleged lack of quality. Affected by co-optation, division,
and repression, indigenous organizations were in disarray, a process that is
discussed at length in chapter 2.

In 2015, when demonstrations against the regime erupted in opposition
to a proposal for permanent presidential reelection and changes to workers’
social security, indigenous leaders were harshly repressed and communities
in the areas of higher density of indigenous organization were militarized.
A state of exception was declared in the southern Amazon where activists
were resisting Chinese mining companies that had received government
concessions. Not only were indigenous rights not moving forward, but the
hard-won victories of the previous decades were now at risk, if not altogether
gone. The environment of tolerance that had sent racism to a backseat,
although it had definitely not ended it, transitioned toward a different mi-
lieu in which crude stereotypes were not only allowed but also celebrated.
The book calls these multidimensional transformations “the undoing of
multiculturalism.”

As this was happening, the regime and its national and international
supporters bragged about constitutional advances toward plurinationality,
interculturalism, affirmative action, the rights of nature, and Sumak Kawasy
or Buen Vivir (Good Living), a concept allegedly based on ancient Andean
philosophy that became a central goal of development. Scholars, particu-
larly at the international level, called Correa’s regime decolonizing. More
specifically, intellectuals praised Sumak Kawasy as proof that indigenous
worldviews had finally made it into public policy. More sober critics justified
the setbacks in indigenous rights with the argument that the government
had prioritized ending poverty over collective rights, but that the fight
against poverty was going to equally benefit the indigenous and Afro-Ecu-
adorian populations. A third group considered that the original project
was groundbreaking and that the 2008 constitution was at the forefront
of racial and environmental rights, but that a conservative inner circle had
betrayed the revolution. As often happens in polarized political environments, those who were critical from the start were dismissed and labeled liberal or right-wingers. These intellectual debates are explored in depth in chapter 7. These events, tensions, and ambiguities, as well as the author’s previous intellectual trajectory, inform the topics covered in this book: the rise and decline of indigenous rights in the transition from neoliberalization to the Correa regime.

Indigenous rights have retrenched not only in Ecuador but also throughout Latin America and globally, as the frontiers of extraction have moved forward in the context of the commodity boom of the first two decades of the 2000s. Here are some examples: Chile’s Mapuche struggled against multinational forest companies, hydroelectric projects, and large landowners in their territories. The Chilean state has responded to indigenous resistance by militarizing Mapuche communities and charging and sentencing indigenous leaders under antiterrorism laws (Hale and Millamán 2018; Postero, Risor, and Prieto Montt 2018). Brazil’s indigenous peoples have been displaced and some of their leaders assassinated in the context of the expansion of commercial agriculture and mining frontiers in the country’s Amazon region (Farthing and Fabricant 2018). The Standing Rock Sioux of the United States courageously fought against the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline that would move a half million barrels of oil a day beneath the Missouri River, the tribe’s main source of drinking water. The Standing Rock movement confronted brutal police violence. Although the Obama administration ended up not approving the construction of the pipeline due to environmental concerns, President Trump issued an executive decree reversing the decision (Elbein 2017). The Dongria Kondh tribal people of Odisha, India, have mobilized against a bauxite mining operation run by the Vedanta Corporation of the United Kingdom. Despite the great damage that this kind of mining has done to vulnerable tribal peoples in India, the state of Odisha supported open-pit mining as one of its main strategies for development (Martínez Novo et al. 2018). Moreover, the Indian government proposed to roll back consent requirements for development projects that impact forest-dependent indigenous communities like the Kondh (Shakia and Gordon 2016). Under pressure from several governments (particularly Kenya, Tanzania, India, and Brazil), the World Bank relaxed its standards for indigenous protections in a revision to its indigenous people’s policy in 2012 (Shakia and Gordon 2016). It was expected
that the bank would broaden its indigenous policy after the UN adoption of
the 2007 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Instead, “free,
prior, and informed consent” was watered down and substituted for the softer
crcept of “broad community support” in the revised guidelines. Some
countries have also been able to opt out of prior consent if they feel that the
policy is inconsistent with their national constitutions or that it may promote
ethnic strife.

Indigenous peoples have become the main obstacle for the extraction
of commodities, the prices of which boomed in the early 2000s. Because
native groups were historically pushed out of the fertile valleys and into the
less productive rain forests and mountain ranges, they inhabit the territories
where most of the remaining strategic resources are located. This book
shows that resource extraction impacts not only the areas and groups where
the activity takes place but also collective rights at the national and interna-
tional levels. States restrict indigenous autonomy and try to limit their po-
itical organization and cultural cohesion to curb resistance to extractivism.

In a special issue of the journal *Cultural Studies*, Laura Junka-Aikio
and Catalina Cortés-Severino (2017) define extractivism as the current
moment of dwindling resources, environmental degradation, and social
and economic inequality that conveys a sense of urgency. The authors
understand extractivism in its narrow sense as the mass-scale removal of
nonrenewable resources such as oil, gas, and minerals. However, they also
encourage scholars to think more broadly about extractivism, as a paradigm
of severe exploitation characteristic of late capitalism. Researchers must
reach beyond the immediate sites and effects of extraction and examine the
wider ideologies, discourses, and practices, the cultures and worldviews,
underpinning this activity. Imre Szeman (2017) adds that extractivism
often takes place in the periphery and the countryside. Even though urban
dwellers are highly dependent on the products of extraction, the geographic
location of this activity away from urban settings may render it invisible to
urbanites. Extraction may involve native peoples and remote territories, but
an expanded view of the phenomenon affects all contemporary situations.
Extractivism is a process that reshapes the natural and social environment
and has consequences for those living close to the sites of extraction as well
as for those far from these locations. This book focuses on the effects of
extractivism beyond mines and wells, and particularly on the consequences
of extractivism for national and international multicultural policies.
Racial Formations, Racism, and Paternalism

Neoliberalization and Correa’s nationalist-extractivism produced particular configurations in the social construction of race and ethnicity and in the management of racialized populations. I follow the premise that race and ethnicity are socially constructed and historically fluid. The process of defining racial and ethnic groups is fraught with confusion, contradiction, and unintended consequences. Definitions and categories are created and contested from above and below, as state-imposed classifications face challenges by individuals and groups (Omi and Winant 2015). Thus, this book is not only concerned with indigenous movements and communities but also with the state, nongovernmental actors, and interethnic relations. For instance, chapter 3 analyzes the Ecuadorian state’s changing definitions of ethnicity and race in the two conjunctures under study.

The book discusses not only the indigenismo of the Ecuadorian state but also the projects of Catholic missionaries, anthropologists, ethnolinguists, and other actors in the transition from neoliberalization to nationalist-extractivism. Like Joanne Rappaport (2005), this research conceptualizes indigenous movements as “intercultural utopias” shaped by indigenous peoples as well as by their allies. Indigenismo is understood widely as the policies for indigenous peoples produced by non-Indians, as non-Indians taking the role of mediators and “ventriloquists” for indigenous voices, and as the larger political realm of interethnic relations (Ramos 1998). The book argues that while some advocates have been vital for the rise of an indigenous movement and for the advancement of indigenous rights, other actors have sought to co-opt and weaken indigenous organizations, particularly those branches that have opposed resource extraction in their territories or have posed challenges to centralized governance.

I build on Michael Omi and Howard Winant’s concept of racial formation, “the socio-historical process by which racial identities are created, lived out, transformed and destroyed” (Omi and Winant 2015, 109). Omi and Winant understand race as both a social-historical structure and a set of accumulated signifiers. Racial projects link structure and signification. “A racial project is simultaneously an interpretation, representation or explanation of racial identities and meanings and an effort to organize and distribute resources (economic, political, cultural) along particular racial lines” (Omi and Winant 2015, 125). Racial projects connect the cultural
meanings of race with the ways in which social structures and everyday experiences are racially organized.

This book examines the role of government and nongovernmental actors in the creation and implementation of such racial projects. It then contrasts racial projects created from above with those of indigenous individuals, communities, and organizations. The book starts with an examination of the role of the state in race making and analyzes how official projects have shifted (or not) with historical conjunctures (see chapters 2 and 3). Chapter 4 discusses intercultural bilingual education, a space in which different actors and racial projects (state, intellectual, religious, and social movement) converge. It continues with the contribution of anthropologists to the making and unmaking of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement (chapter 5) and the role of missionaries in raising indigenous consciousness and political organization (chapter 6), and ends with an examination of subtle and more open forms of discrimination, another domain where state, intellectuals, and social actors converge (chapter 7).

Racism is often defined narrowly as racial hate, an approach that hinders the understanding of racial inequality (Omi and Winant 2015). Missing from this interpretation are the ideologies, policies, and practices that normalize racial domination. Omi and Winant argue that a racial project can be defined as racist if it reproduces structures of power based on racial signification and identities. On the other hand, an antiracist project is one that undoes or resists these structures. Therefore, hate does not need to be present for a project to be racist. Similarly, this book understands racism widely as the ideas and practices that sustain inequality on the basis of physical or cultural racialization. I am particularly concerned with paternalism and other forms of subtle discrimination, which communicate care and even love, but also uphold inequality. Chapter 7 examines ventriloquism, a practice through which the dominant speaks for, while also silencing, the subaltern. However, the book is also concerned with the reemergence of more virulent forms of discrimination, which it links to the intensification of extractivism, the erosion of democracy, and to white and mestizo backlash.

The Political Economy Approach and the Management of Diversity under Neoliberalism

This book explores forms of governance of the indigenous peoples of the Ecuadorian Andes and the Amazon by examining indigenous politics in
the wider context of interethnic relations as well as through a historical lens that reaches back to roughly the 1970s. However, some chapters look farther back in history as needed to debunk the multiple layers of the past that help explain particular issues. The book builds on the political economy and cultural studies traditions as it aims to understand contemporary people’s experiences within wider historical, socioeconomic, political, and geographic contexts (Grossberg 2006; Mintz 1985; Roseberry 1994; Wolf 2010 [1982]). Lawrence Grossberg calls this method “radical contextualism” and argues that the approach considers any event relationally, as a condensation of multiple determinations. The idea is to examine an issue by placing it in the big picture.

Grossberg notes that the practice of contextualism in cultural studies often involves an effort to critically examine a particular conjuncture. A conjuncture should not be understood simply as a slice of time or a period, but as a moment defined by the accumulation and condensation of contradictions (Grossberg 2006, 5). According to Grossberg, it is at the level of the conjuncture, and through a better understanding of the conjuncture, that knowledge can be most usefully articulated to political struggles and radical possibilities. The conjuncture examined in this book is the transition from neoliberal to economic-nationalist governance in first two decades of the twenty-first century. In each period there are important differences, but continuities as well. My purpose is to write a political history of the present (Grossberg 2006, 2). Citing Raymond Williams, Grossberg (2006, 5) encourages us to “get the balance right between the old and the new, the emergent, the dominant and the residual.” An effective analysis of the conjuncture opens onto a multiplicity of overlapping contexts, of contexts operating at different scales, and what we might call embedded contexts (Grossberg 2006). For example, to understand race and ethnicity in the 2010 population census in chapter 3, I find it necessary to examine social movement struggles, the workings of the nationalist-extractivist state, the influences of multilateral organizations such as the United Nations as well as indigenous memories of colonial and republican census taking. The commitment to complexity, contingency, contestation, and multiplicity are central to this kind of analysis (Grossberg 2006).

The book analyzes how the neoliberal and nationalist-extractivist conjunctures led to a progressive deterioration of indigenous rights. Whereas several governments had a neoliberal orientation in Ecuador since the 1980s,
the government of Rafael Correa (2007–2017) self-identified as and has been called postneoliberal (Lu, Valdivia, and Silva 2017). Correa undid some central tenets of neoliberalism: he enlarged and expanded the reach of the state, aimed to protect national production with tariffs and nationalist campaigns, and forbade precarious labor arrangements. This does not mean that the regime, as did others of the turn to the Left, transcended neoliberalism in any permanent or comprehensive way (Goodale and Postero 2013; Orta 2013). The expansion of the state was tied to the sales of Ecuadorian oil in the international market, progressive labor regulations were reversed once the prices of oil plunged, and some neoliberal cultural logics survived the shift (Orta 2013). Although the terms neoliberalism and postneoliberalism may seem technical, Ecuadorian citizens used the labels to convey their experiences: indigenous and other Ecuadorians perceived these conjunctures as sets of policies corresponding to two sharply differentiated time periods that transformed their lives in radical ways.

I prefer to use the term “nationalist-extractivism” rather than postneoliberalism to convey that neoliberalism was not permanently transcended or improved on under Correa’s rule. However, it was not left intact either, but replaced by a different political economic model that was nationalist and geared toward reinforcing and protecting the state and the national economy. It was also extractivist because it depended almost exclusively on natural resource rents for its political and economic reproduction. From a political standpoint, it was a semiauthoritarian or hybrid regime, which kept a democratic facade, holding elections and respecting some basic rules of democracy, while also manipulating the public sphere and civil society (Conaghan 2017). I prefer the term “nationalist-extractivism” to Eduardo Gudynas’s (2009) “progressive extractivism.” In my view, the term “progressive” still reflects the ambivalence of some intellectuals toward the regimes in which they participated. “Progressive extractivism” glosses over the semiauthoritarian, nationalist tendencies, and only highlights the poor environmental choices. Nationalist-extractivism is not necessarily a new configuration because it takes many traits from the former import substitution, oil-fueled (if oil was available), and nationalist Latin American states of the early twentieth century.

The first conjuncture considered in this book is neoliberalism. I understand the concept as a set of policies and processes that give shape to a particular style of capitalism. Neoliberalism is typically associated with the
undoing multiculturalism

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retrenchment of the state, the privatization of sectors previously owned and managed by the state, the shrinking of social policies, particularly in education and health, or their privatization at the hands of nonstate actors such as nongovernmental organizations or faith-based organizations. Neoliberalism is also associated with the “flexibilization” of labor. The neoliberal labor structure relies on a small core of permanent workers and a growing periphery of temporary, part-time, and subcontracted labor (Harvey 1990). Globalization is a central tenet of neoliberalism, a practice that favors open borders, free trade, outsourcing, and exports (Harvey 2005). The logic under neoliberalism is the concentration of profits at the hands of a small elite and the dispossession of the majority as labor becomes cheaper, more precarious, and more difficult to organize, and as the social services and subsidies provided by the state diminish (Harvey 2005).

As David Harvey (2005) has noted, this process started first as a set of ideas that were elaborated in conservative think tanks and then tried in different parts of the world with varying levels of effectiveness and in uneven ways. Neoliberalism started to be implemented in the 1970s and spread throughout the world in the 1980s and 1990s. It started as a response to what elites perceived as the rigidities of Fordist capitalism and the welfare state, which were characterized by an inflexible organization of production, an organized full-time labor force that was able to capture a greater share of the profits, and a safety net of state services and subsidies. Of course, the core of laborers was mostly white and male, and other workers were excluded from these benefits.

In Latin America, neoliberalism did not arrive as a choice of the government or the majority of the population, but was mostly imposed by US-led multilateral organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in the context of the debt crisis of the 1980s. Financial packages for indebted countries required undertaking structural adjustment measures and budget austerity. In this context, the size of the state was reduced, state enterprises were privatized, the budget for social services shrunk, and state subsidies for first necessity products were eliminated or reduced. These general recipes were applied unevenly depending on the social struggles and balance of power in each country. For these reasons, some authors prefer to call these changes neoliberalization instead of neoliberalism, to emphasize their unevenness instead of reifying it (Peck, Theodore, and Brenner 2010). As structural adjustment was applied in
different countries in Latin America, popular riots and uprisings took place. In the case of Ecuador, the vibrant indigenous movement of the 1990s has been interpreted as a reaction to structural adjustment measures (Zamosc 1994). Some structural adjustment recipes such as the elimination of the subsidies for oil and gas could not be implemented in Ecuador due to the recurrent uprisings of the indigenous movement and its allies.

Combining political economy with the work of Michel Foucault, other authors have understood neoliberalization as a political rationality that emerges as a form of governmentality (Brown 2003; Radcliffe 2015). Based on Foucault’s thought, Wendy Brown defines governmentality as a process by which the state educates its subjects instead of only controlling or repressing them. In this way, governmentality is a “mode of governance encompassing, but not limited to the state, which produces subjects, forms of citizenship and behavior and a new organization of the social” (Brown 2003, 2).

Brown argues that neoliberalization reaches beyond material processes to the souls of citizens by extending and disseminating market values. Neoliberal political rationality submits the political sphere and every policy and action to considerations of profitability and cost–benefit. In this mindset, all human action is understood as rational, entrepreneurial action. The makers of neoliberalism did not understand these dispositions as being inherent to human nature, but as ideas that needed to be disseminated through institutional practices and rewards for enacting this vision. According to Brown, the imposition of neoliberal rationality has dire consequences for liberal democracy. Neoliberalism entails the erosion of oppositional political, moral, or subjective claims located outside of capitalist rationality, but inside liberal democracy. This book looks not only at neoliberal but also at nationalist-extractivist rationalities and governmentalities. It considers how neoliberalization and nationalist-extractivism structured individual and collective subjectivities and behaviors. It also discusses how elements of a neoliberal rationality were able to survive under Correa’s rule, despite the fact that he rejected neoliberalism.

Omi and Winant (2015) associate neoliberalism in the United States with the racial ideology of color blindness, or the idea that race has become irrelevant. The civil rights movement accomplished partial reforms at a tremendous human cost. Omi and Winant argue that after these reforms, there was a conservative backlash that intended to resignify race in order to
contain the social movement. Because open racism was no longer legitimate, the Right continued using stereotypes, but it did so through coded words and euphemisms. Then conservatives evolved toward the idea of “reverse racism,” which held that racially inclusive policies were unfair to whites. The Right presented itself as having apprehended the true meaning of civil rights, that race should not matter. Color-blind approaches went beyond reverse racism in that they repudiated the very concept of race. This ideology fits well with neoliberalism due to its individualist emphasis. However, it clashes with the racist projects of neoliberalism such as anti-immigrant initiatives, racial profiling, mass incarceration, the disenfranchisement of voters, and the assault on welfare.

Color blindness is not the only racial project of neoliberalism. A shallow form of multiculturalism also pairs well with processes of neoliberalization. Multiculturalism consists of state and social reforms achieved as a result of the struggles of racialized populations. Similarly to the United States, in Latin America these gains eventually gave way to backlash. Conservatives accepted some symbolic and cultural recognition, while hindering deeper structural changes and the redistribution of resources. This strategy has been called “neoliberal multiculturalism” (Fraser 1996; Hale 2002, 2006; Martínez Novo 2006; Postero 2007). Indigenous activists were classified as those who were “permitted” because they stuck to shallow cultural and folkloric claims, the so-called indio permitido (a concept that Charles Hale borrowed from Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui), and those labeled “subversive” who were repressed or criminalized because they sought more profound socioeconomic changes. These strategies have allowed neoliberal multiculturalism to shape indigenous subjectivities.

For Ecuador’s indigenous peoples, neoliberal forms of governance emphasized cultural recognition and provided token positions for leaders, while also precluding deeper socioeconomic transformations for communities and the grassroots. Indigenous organizations were given autonomy in domains such as education but they were not allocated enough funds to make it work well. Moreover, policies like Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian Peoples Development Project (PRODEPINE), designed and financed by the World Bank in collaboration with the Ecuadorian state, encouraged indigenous leaders to focus on short-term technical solutions and localized development projects while postponing more comprehensive agendas that would benefit the communities (Bretón 2005). In Ecuador, neoliberal multiculturalism
produced disaffected indigenous grassroots—those for whom things had not gotten better—that were ready to support the nonindigenous project of Rafael Correa. Poor non-Indians who felt excluded from World Bank’s ethnodevelopment and other multicultural perks were also eager to support Correa’s project, particularly rural and provincial whites and mestizos.¹

On the other hand, neoliberal forms of governance did bring some cultural recognition, delegitimized open racism in the public sphere, and encouraged participation and decentralization, which in some cases facilitated indigenous political organization and allowed activists to challenge the neoliberal status quo (Postero 2007). Multicultural policies opened spaces for indigenous individuals and allowed some youth to have access to higher education, factors that contributed to the advancement of this population.

Deepening the intellectual trend that articulates larger political economic processes with the making of subjectivities, recent work combines political economy with phenomenological approaches and examines how individuals experience wider processes at the intimate levels of emotions, affects, and the body (Gutiérrez Aguilar 2014; Krupa and Nugent 2015; Tapias 2015). These works not only connect the global with the local but also articulate different scales of analysis with the affects and sensations of individuals. As María Tapias (2015, 129) puts it, “through women’s stories I seek to explore what neoliberalism ‘felt like,’ drawing upon their local knowledge of the body, emotions and sociality as these interacted in dialogic relationship with political, juridical and economic state structures.” Similarly, this book explores how political economic processes shape the intimate fabric of civil society, affect people’s everyday experiences, their subjectivities, desires, and fears. The authors cited above examined lived experiences under neoliberalization. This book expands the analysis to the study of individual experiences with nationalist-extractivism.

¹ I use “whites and mestizos” or “white-mestizo” instead of just “mestizos” to highlight the diversity within the dominant group in Ecuador. Although “mestizo” is the term that Latin American states have promoted throughout the twentieth century, not all individuals in the racially dominant or unmarked strata of society identify or are identified with this term. Some still use “white” to refer to themselves and others. The term “white-mestizo” coined by Andrés Guerrero and then used by many other scholars in Ecuador calls attention to the social difference between an elite of European and landowning descent and the middle- and working-class strata of society.
From Postneoliberalism to Nationalist-Extractivism

The literature on postneoliberalism has focused on both the antineoliberal political turn in Latin America that led to the election of several left of center governments in the first decade of the 2000s, and the aftermath of the 2008 global economic crisis that gave rise to novel forms of social and political resistance, particularly in Europe, the United States, and North Africa (Castells 2012; Peck, Theodore, and Brenner 2010). As a result, a number of experiments attempting to rework the state, the economy, and civil society have been called postneoliberal (Elwood et al. 2017). Some states undertook redistributive projects and refused to cooperate with the austerity imperatives of multinational institutions. Social movements such as Occupy in the United States, Indignados in Spain, and Aganaktismenoi in Greece resisted austerity policies and have politicized inequality in novel ways (Castells 2012).

Postneoliberalism has been interpreted as a set of contradictory and reversible interventions that articulate change with vestiges of neoliberalism and with the previous legacies of liberalism and colonialism (Elwood et al. 2017). For these reasons, some authors prefer to call the phenomenon “neoliberalism interrupted” (Goodale and Poster 2013) or “semineoliberalism” (Orta 2013). Elwood argues that although Global South states have tried to implement changes to transcend neoliberalism, they have been locked in adverse positions vis-à-vis global capital and multilateral governance that have hindered these transformations. For instance, South Africa had all the conditions for the construction of a postneoliberal society: robust social movements, high levels of inequality, and a strong left-leaning leadership. However, these conditions did not allow this country to create a postneoliberal society, but rather what Patrick Bond has called a nationalist neoliberalism (Elwood et al. 2017). While keeping a radical nationalist discourse, Nelson Mandela was forced to accept multilaterally imposed structural adjustment measures that left South Africa in a situation of high inequality, poverty, and unemployment. Similarly, the return of the state in Latin America came with attempts at redistribution and the expansion of social programs as well as a position of noncooperation with transnational capital. However, these advances were paid for by a commodity-based extraction economy governed by global prices. Global South countries trying to overcome neoliberalism were confronted with two options: either bend to
Introduction

multilateral requirements in order to get financial aid, or become independent from the IMF and the World Bank by privileging resource extraction at a time of booming prices.

The crisis of neoliberalism arrived earlier in Latin America than in the Global North. Latin Americans protested the discontinuation of social welfare benefits, as well as poverty, inequality, and stagnant economic growth during the 1990s and in the first decade of the 2000s. Latin American social movements also questioned racial and ethnic discrimination (Escobar 2010). A central tenet of postneoliberalism in South America has been “bringing back the state”—a stronger state more present in all aspects of social, political, and economic life. Bringing back the state has been fraught with paradoxes. A stronger state has sometimes meant reasonable regulation, more social services, and greater redistribution, but also an excess of control over territory and society. Furthermore, authoritarian means of securing regime power in the face of social movement resistance have produced ambiguities that have systematically truncated its transformative potential.

In its early days, the Correa regime tried to build a postneoliberal state by strengthening public participation in strategic sectors of the economy, particularly oil, mining, and public services. The state renegotiated contracts with transnational companies, raised income and indirect taxes, and increased its efficiency in collecting them. It regulated the financial sector, asking the banks to repatriate capital held abroad and strengthening public and cooperative banks. Development planning attempted to prioritize internal development and selective import substitution industrialization over an export orientation. The regime protected national industry with tariffs on imports and a publicity campaign called “Ecuador First” that encouraged citizens to consume Ecuadorian products. Correa also sought to increase national sovereignty, ending an agreement that permitted a United States military base in Ecuador, and diversified its international relations, strengthening ties with China, other Latin American countries, and the Middle East. Furthermore, Correa’s regime sought to push back neoliberalization through labor policies and redistribution. Forms of precarious labor were forbidden and all workers were expected to enjoy full-time, indefinite contracts and to be registered with the social security. State-led redistribution took several forms. The executive increased the minimum wage and assisted its poorest citizens through policies such as the Bonus for Human
Development (a conditional cash transfer), the Bonus for Housing, and the Dignity Electricity Tariff (F. Ramírez 2010).

Despite these efforts, the Correa regime did not succeed in diversifying the economy, instead continuing to depend and increasing its dependency on oil, raw materials, and agro-exports. Private investment was hindered by greater regulation and relatively high wages for the region due to a dollarized economy. In Ecuador’s rentier economy, diversification of private investment was unlikely, given that abundant public rents from oil could be easily captured with less risk (Coronil 1997). The economy relied on publicly funded projects, particularly in strategic sectors and infrastructure. The expansion of extractive activities worsened environmental damage and exacerbated opposition by indigenous peoples and others living in extraction frontiers, as well as by environmentalists, key participants in the Correa government in the early years.

Building a more inclusive society was also constrained by middle- and upper-class control of key government positions. Structural reforms to redistribute non-oil wealth and the means of production, such as a comprehensive agrarian reform, were not undertaken (Radcliffe 2012). Redistributing some oil rents to the poor proved easier than tackling complex social, political, and structural change. Elites have profited from public investment through contracts with the state and subsidies on production, with the one hundred biggest banks, construction, commercial, industry, and agrobusinesses growing 50 percent more from 2007 to 2011 than they had in the previous years (Acosta 2013, 16). Elites resisted higher wages and state regulations, yet benefited greatly from public investment, growth of internal markets, and political stability. Furthermore, a professional middle-class captured state rents through high-paid consultancies, jobs in the public sector, and scholarships. This process of rapid state formation could only continue while oil and commodities prices skyrocketed from rising Asian demand. With oil prices decreasing since 2014, the Ecuadorian state has continued relying on China as an investor and lender, but could not negotiate from a position of strength. Loans and concessions came at high interests and with disadvantageous terms. As oil prices continued plunging, Ecuador was not able to keep borrowing with its devalued hydrocarbon resources as collateral. With few resources to distribute, the political legitimacy of the regime eroded, state growth slowed, and the privatization of state enterprises and layoffs of public
employees ensued (Acosta 2016; Petrich 2016). Dwindling state rents were accompanied by the resurgence of some neoliberal strategies. Desperate for private investment, the Correa government announced a proposal of law to bring “flexible” labor arrangements back (La República, February 6, 2016).

As state redistribution stalled, social control and repression increased. Building a stronger and bigger state based on extraction resulted in authoritarian tendencies and the wish to control autonomous social movements, particularly those like the indigenous movement that were able to threaten governability and/or the extraction of those resources on which the state’s budget depended. This book examines the process of deterioration of multiculturalism in Ecuador, a trend that has been evident in recent years, but that has yet to be thoroughly studied. Anthropologists have criticized the shallowness of neoliberal multicultural policies and their inability to consistently raise the standard of living of indigenous populations (Hale 2002; Martínez Novo 2006; Postero 2007). However, the rise of nationalist, extraction-oriented governance in the period 2000–2015 shows that the state and oil and mining companies perceive even those limited understandings of collective rights typical of neoliberalism as an obstacle. On the other hand, the rentier petro state has been able to cut back on indigenous rights because the social movements were weakened and depoliticized in the previous neoliberal period.

Nationalist-Extractivism and Indigenous Rights

Turn to the Left governments in Latin America in the first decade of the 2000s not only rejected neoliberalism but also questioned the legacy of colonialism and the environmental crisis (Escobar 2010; Lander 2017; Postero 2017). Because these regimes originated in social movements—inigenous, Afrodescendant, environmental—instead of political parties, they combined the insights of socialism with those of the new social movements (Lander 2017). Scholars believed that the recognition of cultural diversity would come this time with the redistribution of resources (Hoffman French 2009; Postero 2007). However, growing dependence on resource extraction eventually thwarted the goals of expanding indigenous rights and preserving the natural environment (Lander 2017; Lu et al. 2017; Postero 2017). After a decade or more of rule by the Left in several South American countries, indigenous rights have not improved to the degree that scholars predicted.
and in many cases have retrenched. An author sympathetic to the Hugo Chávez regime has argued that indigenous rights are the Achilles heel of the twentieth-first-century Latin American Left (Angosto Ferrández 2015).

Historically, the Latin American Left criticized development based on resource extraction because it depends on exports, transnational corporations dominate the sector, and labor conditions are poor. Leftists proposed avoiding dependency, diversifying production, and industrializing raw materials (Gudynas 2009). Despite this tradition, twenty-first century-Left governments continued to prioritize “extractivism,” “a style of development based on the appropriation of nature that feeds a nondiversified production system and that depends on the international insertion of the country as a provider of raw materials” (Gudynas 2009, 188). The Latin American Left not only continued with the extractivism of previous regimes but also intensified it, opening new frontiers and pursuing the mining of new commodities (Gudynas 2009).

However, there are differences between natural resource extraction under leftist regimes and the practices of the past or those of the countries that have not turned toward the Left. For this reason, Gudynas calls the extractivism of the twenty-first-century Left “neo-extractivism” or “progressive neo-extractivism.” An important difference is that now the state has a more active role. On the other hand, the state still privileges an export orientation and accepts a subordinate position in the world market as an exporter of raw materials.

Left governments have been more effective in justifying resource extraction and in palliating the social unrest that it causes than their neoliberal counterparts. Through the renegotiation of contracts with transnational companies, higher taxation, and the preference for state companies, Latin American states have captured a larger share of the profits. Some of this money has been used for social assistance programs and conditional cash transfers to the poor, legitimating these governments as left-leaning (Gudynas 2009). Extraction has been justified as a way to end poverty and as a necessary sacrifice to achieve national development (Farthing and Fabricant 2018). However, the regimes still aimed to attain financial success and to make as much money as possible. Thus, the socioenvironmental impacts of

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2. Translations in this book are the author’s unless otherwise indicated.

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extraction have remained the same or even worse than those produced by transnational companies (Farthing and Fabricant 2018; Gudynas 2009; Lu, Valdivia, and Silva 2016). Meanwhile, twenty-first-century Left governments have denied or minimized the social and environmental impacts of extraction, and its detractors have been depicted as having occult political agendas or as being manipulated by foreign powers (Gudynas 2009). Furthermore, this book argues that government officials with a trajectory in the Left have been able to work more effectively from within social movements to divide and repress them.

As these governments opened new frontiers and externalized the social and environmental costs of extraction, they clashed with organized social actors, particularly indigenous peoples (Farthing and Fabricant 2018; Gudynas 2009). Most states have accepted consultation with indigenous communities, but prior consultation has not been legislated as binding for the state, and most of the time consultations are not conducted. Extractivism has conditioned territorial organization, the assignation of protected areas, and the plans, or lack thereof, for agrarian reform. For instance, twenty-first-century Left countries have not implemented sweeping agrarian reforms, and have instead promoted land titling. Agrarian reform conflicts with extractivism, which benefits from land concentration in private hands. There is also pressure to open protected areas and natural parks to oil and mining prospecting (Angosto Ferrández 2015; Gudynas 2009; Lander 2017).

Another difference compared to previous forms of extractivism lies in geopolitics. Asian demand produced the boom in prices of commodities from roughly 2000 to 2011, which closely coincided with the turn to the Left in Latin America. In this context, China became the main customer for Latin America’s raw materials as well as its main investor and lender. As Latin America exported raw materials to China, it imported manufactured goods from it. This commodity boom pushed the traditional boundaries of extractivism beyond hydrocarbons and mining to also include biofuels and other monocrops (Farthing and Fabricant 2018). We now examine some concrete examples of the conflict between the nationalist-extractivist state and indigenous people.

Flora Lu, Gabriela Valdivia, and Néstor Silva (2017) have conducted an ethnography on the relationship between the Waorani people of the Ecuadorian Amazon, the state, and oil companies under Correa’s rule. The authors highlight the contradictions between national discourses and what
happens on the ground. They acknowledge that oil extraction has intensified and that the government has used that money for social assistance programs, prioritizing the areas affected by resource extraction. One change is that formerly private oil companies conducted development projects directly in communities, often replacing an absent state. Under Correa, the regime has preferred to collect taxes from the companies and to take development into its own hands through a public institution called Ecuador Estratégico (Strategic Ecuador). The authors compare two Waorani communities, one that hosts a private transnational oil company and another managed by the state company Petroamazonas. After a thorough study of the health and social indicators and community perceptions, the authors conclude that the socioenvironmental impacts of the public company are worse. In addition, they find that the development work of Ecuador Estratégico has been inefficient, unsustainable, and disrespectful of Waorani culture.

Nancy Postero’s *The Indigenous State* (2017) shows that for indigenous peoples important advances took place in Bolivia after the victory of Evo Morales, its first self-identifying indigenous president in 2005. The new constitution declared Bolivia communitarian and plurinational and decolonization became the main goal of the state. However, the constitution also subsumed local autonomy to centralized decision making. As Morales’s political party Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS; Movement toward Socialism) consolidated in power, support for indigenous self-determination and autonomy waned. Resource extraction intensified under Morales and hydrocarbon contracts were renegotiated, allowing the state to capture a larger share of the profits. Those profits were redistributed as conditional cash transfers to the poor and the state also built infrastructure in their communities. Indigenous autonomy, Vivir Bien, and policies to palliate climate change contrasted with Morales’s emphasis on resource extraction in such a way that discourses started to diverge from practices. As the state prioritized resource extraction, it continued to sacrifice indigenous people. Furthermore, resistance to extractivism was repressed through co-optation, police violence, and the silencing of opponents through the legal system (Postero 2017).

In contrast to the situation in Bolivia and Ecuador, the indigenous movement in Venezuela was weak and almost nonexistent before Chávez came to power there (Angosto Ferrández 2015). The Bolivarian state launched the movement. Chávez granted ample rights to indigenous people for the
first time in the 1999 constitution, which declared the republic multiethnic and pluricultural and recognized indigenous forms of social organization and culture (Angosto Ferrández 2015; Lander 2017). However, the implementation of all these rights depended on the demarcation of indigenous territories, and territorial recognition has been minimal (Angosto Ferrández 2015; Lander 2017). The regime has promoted the creation of indigenous communal councils instead. According to Luis Fernando Angosto Ferrández, the indigenous population has agreed with the government that the priority is to bring socioeconomic and political enfranchisement rather than autonomy and self-government. Disagreeing with Angosto Ferrández, Edgardo Lander (2017) understands the requirement to create communal councils as a form of colonization because indigenous citizens are required to organize in the same way as the rest of the population to access public funds. In addition, if indigenous territories are not demarcated, the state can avoid prior consultation. Similarly, education in indigenous languages has not been implemented because it can only be implemented in indigenous territorial demarcations.

Resource extraction is the reason that the Venezuelan government has favored organization in communes and weak indigenous territorialization (Angosto Ferrández 2015; Lander 2017). The state did not want to recognize indigenous territories to avoid confronting cattle, logging, and mining interests. Lander (2017, 36) states: “To demarcate indigenous habitats would have posed important obstacles in the future to commercially exploit the abundant mineral reserves, like gold and coltan, that are located precisely in the territories that indigenous peoples currently inhabit.” Coltan is a mineral used to make electronics and batteries for electric cars.

The regime entered into a deep economic and political crisis in 2013 with the collapse of the price of oil and the death of Chávez. As oil prices plunged, the response was not to look for alternatives to extraction, but to shift from oil to mining. In 2016, President Nicolás Maduro issued an executive decree dedicating 12 percent of the national territory to a mining block called Arco Minero del Orinoco (Orinoco Mining Arc). Maduro invited transnational companies to bid for concessions to conduct large-scale open-pit mining there. Several indigenous groups inhabiting the territory were not consulted. The government used the army to repress their protests. As an area of great biodiversity, the Orinoco regions is of immense importance to the planet’s climate regulation.
Claudia Briones (2015) explores indigenista politics in Argentina during what she calls the neoliberal and “national-popular” periods. “National-popular” refers to the governments of Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2003–2015), which were part of the left turn. Briones argues that the politics of recognition arrived in Argentina along with neoliberalization in the 1990s. A constitutional reform recognized indigenous peoples in order to elevate Argentina to international standards. However, there were few initiatives to implement this constitutional mandate. Argentine indigenous people experienced multiculturalism in association with other contradictory policies like the delegation of state responsibilities to third parties, the shift of responsibility to vulnerable populations, and the transformation of indigenous political leaders into managers of development projects. During the neoliberal period, indigenous people addressed the state confrontationally, criticizing its lack of political will to fulfill international treaties.

Changes took place during the governments of the Kirchners. In 2004 indigenous leaders became advisers to the National Institute of Indigenous Affairs. In 2006 a Directorate of First Peoples (pueblos originarios) and Natural Resources was created in the Ministry of Environment and some of the most critical Mapuche leaders participated in it. According to Briones, an unprecedented dialogue took place between indigenous movements and the state. However, the conflict between indigenous Argentineans and Cristina Fernández erupted in 2010 during the bicentennial celebrations. Native leaders organized a march to the presidential palace asking for historical reparations. Among other things they requested the right to prior, informed consultation, and the regulation of extractive industries. These demands were not presented in a confrontational manner, but as a dialogue with the executive and the president. Cristina retorted that not only indigenous people but everyone had been discriminated against, challenging the idea that indigenous people deserved special reparations. She also noted that rather than creating new state structures such as indigenous territories, it was better to reinforce the already existing communities. Cristina added that oil extraction needed to continue so that Argentina could avoid importing fuel. To counter indigenous demands asking the state to respect international treaties on indigenous rights, Fernández de Kirchner called the legislation “imperialist.” After the impasse, there were evictions and deaths, and indigenous protests were criminalized.

To sum up, the governments that self-identified with the Left kept resource extraction as their main strategy for development and expanded it.
They did not improve the social and environmental costs of the activity. Adverse effects impacted indigenous peoples more than other groups. However, because these governments originated in the social movements, they also granted indigenous rights in paper and sponsored symbolic performances related to indigeneity, while making these rights difficult to implement or widening the gap between state discourses and practices. Due to resource extraction, these governments were cautious not to put into effect any rights that involved hard territoriality or self-government. Territorial demarcation and autonomy appeared in legislation and official declarations but they were weakly implemented or not applied at all. Moreover, none of these governments conducted a comprehensive agrarian reform. Cultural rights like intercultural bilingual education were also watered down because it would facilitate political consciousness and social movement cohesion. Light and folkloric versions of ethnic identity were preferred over hard and particularly territorialized autonomy. Meanwhile, social movements were co-opted, criminalized, repressed, and divided. Resource extraction limited indigenous rights in complex ways that go beyond pollution and the health effects that occur in the areas of extraction. This book is dedicated to exploring these wider impacts of extractivism.

Methodology

The book combines “studying up” the state, elites, and other influential individuals, with multisited ethnography in indigenous communities and with indigenous intellectuals, activists, and professionals (Marcus 1983; Nader 1969 Rappaport 2005; Shore and Nugent 2002). Studying up allows me to interrogate the cultures of power, to analyze the racism and paternalism of elites, and to be able to identify when powerful individuals or institutions use the symbols of indigeneity for their own purposes. When the cultures of power are not specifically interrogated, racism and paternalism might fall out of focus, and elite iterations of indigeneity might be taken for grassroots points of view. For instance, this perspective facilitates the analysis of ventriloquism, when non-Indians speak for indigenous people while also silencing their voices.

One problem ethnographers confront when they study up is that of access (Nader 1972; Shore and Nugent 2002). Political, economic, and intellectual elites might operate hidden from public view, be of difficult access, or not
want to be studied. My former location in Ecuadorian academia for eight years allowed me to make contact with an array of sectors of Ecuadorian society leading to a “kaleidoscopic” understanding of indigenous issues (Canessa 2012). I was a professor at FLACSO, a public research university in the city of Quito, from which the main cadres of Correa’s government came. This position gave me privileged access to spaces, individuals, and events that help contextualize indigenous experiences.

Studying up is combined with rigorous work in indigenous communities. I have done fieldwork for more than a decade in the Andes and the Amazon. I started working in 2002 in the parish of Zumbahua, located in the Cotopaxi province in the central highlands. Next I conducted fieldwork in communities near Cotacachi, in the northern highlands, and others close to Riobamba and Cañar, located in the central and southern highlands, respectively. In addition, I have worked extensively with the Shuar of the southeastern Amazonian province of Morona Santiago. I visited Shuar centers near the city of Macas in the Upano Valley as well as in the more remote region of Transkutukú. There, I visited the parish of Taisha, close to the border with Peru. I learned Kichwa, a dialect of Quechua, at the Catholic University of Ecuador and at the Tinkunakuy School of Kichwa Language and Culture and have continued practicing in communities and with indigenous teachers and friends.

Many students of national indigenous politics have had a highland-centric perspective, because Ecuadorian anthropology has been centered in the capital city of Quito (see chapter 5). On the other hand, many Amazonists do not study the highlands and typically do not consult that literature. However, the connections between highlands and lowlands in the Andes have been important since precolonial times (Arnold and Hastorf 2008; Muratorio 1991; Salomon 1986). As an exception, a few students of national indigenous politics have considered both the Andes and the Amazon (e.g., Lucero 2008; Postero 2017). By following a political economy perspective, I aim to place indigenous peoples in a wider geographic context and to look at connections, which explains my choice to examine indigenous politics in both regions.

Anthropologists do fieldwork in communities but less often have a national perspective or “study up” powerful non-Indian actors. Political scientists tend to have a comprehensive, state-centered perspective, but rarely speak a native language or spend significant time in communities. By combining the strengths of these approaches, this book seeks to make
a fresh contribution to the study of indigenous politics and rights. I use qualitative and interpretative methodologies, reproducing the narratives and life histories of indigenous intellectuals and commoners as well as the experiences of their allies. I also interpret in-depth state events, performances, and documents (see also Postero 2017). The book also profits from archival work, particularly in chapter 4 on intercultural bilingual education, chapter 5 on Ecuadorian anthropology, and chapter 6 on the Salesian Missions. Chapter 4 also benefits from my collaborations with indigenous graduate students from FLACSO and other indigenous scholars. Specific methodologies used in each chapter will be detailed there.

Organization of the Book

Chapter 1 provides the historical and geographical background needed to make sense of the chapters that follow. It discusses the diverse nationalities that populate Ecuador, the colonial and postcolonial oppression of indigenous people, and the history of the indigenous movement.

Chapter 2 centers on the indigenista policies of Rafael Correa and contrasts the racial projects of the state under neoliberalism and Correa’s nationalist-extractivism. State indigenismo is discussed in three contexts: the rise and decline of the indigenous movement, the contradictory legislation on indigenous rights under Correa’s Citizens’ Revolution, and the practices of government as reflected in everyday interactions between the government and indigenous citizens. The chapter argues that Correa’s regime was characterized by a central contradiction: while claiming to recognize indigenous peoples and aiming to decolonize Ecuadorian society, the regime was also engaged in a process of state formation that demanded the centralization of decision making and a focus on the extraction of natural resources. The chapter shows that individual rights in the form of antidiscrimination and affirmative action measures have been prioritized over collective and territorial rights because the latter may hinder oil and mineral extraction as well as agroindustry.

Chapter 3 discusses how the Ecuadorian state has interpreted and measured ethnicity and race in the transition from neoliberalism to nationalist-extractivism. However, to comprehend these official understandings of race, the chapter reaches back to the first 1950 census and even farther back to colonial and nineteenth-century census taking. A paradox is the contrast between the importance of indigeneity in international and national
perceptions of Ecuador, and the small number of indigenous people that repeatedly shows up in censuses since 1950. The chapter concludes that the state has had an interest in undercounting indigenous peoples to emphasize whiteness and modernity and to weaken a strong social movement. In addition, the indigenous population has not revealed itself for its own reasons: informed by colonial experiences, indigenous communities still associate censuses with taxes and forced labor recruitment.

A second line of inquiry in chapter 3 relates to changing constructions of ethnicity and race. In the 1950s, the Ecuadorian state focused on language, material culture, and occupation (who was a hacienda peon) to separate the indigenous from the mestizos, and eschewed the concept of race. In the 1980s and 1990s, in the context of increasing political mobilization by indigenous groups, Ecuadorian scholars defined indigeneity in relation to territory and political participation. More recently, the state has shifted to understandings of race of North American inspiration like hypodescent (the assignment of the children of a mixed union to the subordinate group) and self-definition. Interestingly, North American concepts of race have continued to inform Ecuadorian public policy under Rafael Correa who self-identifies as anti-imperialist.

On the basis of participant observation and interviews in rural schools in various regions of the country, chapter 4 explores the projects of indigenous communities and their nonindigenous allies in intercultural bilingual education. The indigenous individuals I interviewed perceived the school system as a tool to integrate themselves into mainstream society and move up the socioeconomic ladder. Their allies privileged the use of schools to preserve and enhance native language and culture and aimed to keep indigenous peasants relatively isolated to preserve their unique way of life.

The chapter discusses two periods of experimentation with intercultural education: the neoliberal period was characterized by the important role of nongovernment allies, localized experiences, and the tensions between ally-influenced and indigenous goals in indigenous education. In the nationalist-extractivist period, the state takes over education and discontinues indigenous and ally autonomy with dramatic consequences. The regime declares all education intercultural, but waters down the project. New standardized textbooks written in Spanish replace materials in native languages. Moreover, the Correa administration closes community schools and consolidates them in larger “schools of the millennium.” The closure of community
schools triggered a process of migration from the communities to cities that had important consequences for indigenous lives, identities, and politics.

Chapter 5 discusses the collaborations and estrangements of anthropologists and indigenous peoples from the 1970s to the Correa decade. Anthropologists and indigenous peoples are often understood as allies and collaborators. Although this assumption is certainly true, the story is more complex. Ecuadorian anthropology intended from its inception to be an applied discipline whose aim was to understand indigenous peasants’ living conditions in order to change them. The ethnographic method was considered central to this aim because it helped ground what had previously been a highly abstract conversation. Scholars have argued that the 1970s Left emphasized class and did not understand the political potential of ethnicity. However, the chapter demonstrates that part of the Left mobilized ethnic identity as a tool to resist capitalism, a conceptualization that contributed to the agenda of the indigenous movement. The chapter then analyzes the depoliticization of academics during the neoliberal period (1980s and 1990s) due to their need to double as consultants in a moment of retrenchment of the state and budget cuts in higher education. On the other hand, many anthropologists collaborated with a vibrant indigenous movement.

Chapter 5 then discusses the co-optation of some academic contributions in the context of state centralization and the commodity boom in the first decades of the 2000s. Other scholars sided in this period with indigenous struggles and against extractivist development. Still others sought to write about less controversial issues to avoid political retaliation. The chapter concludes with an examination of the recent insertion of indigenous scholars in Ecuadorian academia and the problems that they have confronted due to structural racism.

Chapter 6 focuses on the interactions between Catholic Salesian missionaries and the Kichwa and Shuar of Ecuador. In the Amazon, the Salesians faced specific tensions: How would indigenous peoples respond to the shift of missionaries from encouraging cultural assimilation (from the end of nineteenth century to the 1960s) to promoting the preservation of native languages and forms of social organization (from the 1960s to the present)? How could missionaries encourage the Shuar—and convince themselves—to preserve a cultural tradition that had been characterized by internecine wars, violence, and the custom of polygyny? In the highlands, the Salesians started their work in the 1970s with Kichwa peasants who had just been
released from servitude and granted some land through the agrarian reform. The missionaries did not need to confront their own contradictory legacy there, and it was easier to preserve an Andean tradition that they understood as characterized by reciprocity and solidarity. The challenge, however, was to encourage the formation of a self-sufficient peasantry in steep, badly eroded, tiny plots located at high altitude.

During the Correa decade, missionaries found themselves in a double bind: some allied with Correa whom they perceived as progressive and—more important—someone who was a lay Salesian missionary. On the other hand, as the conflict between the government and organized indigenous people picked up, Salesian priests working on the ground sided with the social movements and started to elaborate an environmentally and socially minded theology. The chapter analyzes how the Catholic Church transitioned from an assimilation approach to efforts to preserve indigenous cultures, and from a position that understood the environment as an object to be mastered by man to a theology invested in overcoming environmental degradation and poverty.

Chapter 7 analyzes two forms of discrimination against indigenous people, ventriloquism and open racism, and argues that a transition from paternalism to open intolerance has taken place in Ecuador in the context of nationalist-extractivism. Ventriloquism, when non-Indians speak for indigenous people, is analyzed through the Sumak Kawsay (Good Living) policies of the government of Rafael Correa. Open racism is examined by looking at government repression against indigenous leaders and communities and presidential speeches. The chapter contends that the state’s ventriloquist and racist discourses and practices are equally rooted in the country’s colonial past. These findings are then contrasted with the writings of scholars that have called the government of Correa decolonizing. The chapter examines the ways in which decolonial theorists informed and promoted Correa’s policies and argues that decolonial scholars have been insufficiently self-critical and reflective of their own complicity with the state’s repressive project vis-à-vis indigenous communities.

The conclusion analyzes two racial formations in Ecuador, the neoliberal and the nationalist-extractivist, and compares the second to what has happened in other countries that turned toward the Left in the first decade of the 2000s. The conclusion also offers a reflection on my intellectual trajectory and the advantages and disadvantages of the methodology.