It was a typically frigid and rainy morning on April 12, 2013, in Temuco, the capital of the Araucanía region in southern Chile. I was awake early to attend a march, scheduled to descend from the top of Cerro Ñielol into the city to assert demands of the Mapuche Indigenous community demands with the accompaniment of trutrucas, long horns made of bamboo and a carved-out cow horn, and kultrunes, ceremonial drums.

Cerro Ñielol is a historically significant hill overlooking downtown Temuco. On November 10, 1881, Mapuche leaders supposedly ceded their land to Chilean colonists on the hill, a result of the Chilean armed forces’ brutal Pacification of the Araucanía military campaign pursuing the territorial continuity of the country and space for agricultural development on previously unconquered Mapuche territory. For some, the resulting agreement, “La Patagua del Armisticio,” ushered in peace and the founding of the regional capital of Temuco. For others, the agreement solidified the military conquest of the Mapuche nation and institutionalized persisting patterns of subordination, colonization, and marginalization. The presumed exact location of the agreement, la Patagua, continues to serve as a central meeting point to conduct Mapuche politics; even the dictator Augusto Pinochet was presented a toki-kura, a stone pendant symbolizing the authority of chief, from allied Mapuche organizations on Cerro Ñielol in 1986.

The April march was a continuation of recent events. In January 2013, assailants, alleged to be Mapuche, set fire to the house of Werner Luchsinger and Viviane Mackay, a wealthy elderly couple. The Luchsinger family owns one of the largest and historically conflictual plots of land in the region where, in 2008, the young Mapuche activist Matias Catrileo died after being shot in the back by police officer Walter Ramírez during a land occupation on a plot of land owned by the cousin of Werner Luchsinger, Jorge Luchsinger Villigier. By the time the police arrived at
the fire, the house was destroyed and the couple was dead. However, the husband did shoot and injure one of the attackers, Celestino Córdova, who was the only detained that night. Literature from a radical Mapuche organization was reportedly found at the scene, but no individual or group claimed responsibility for the attack. The government responded quickly. By noon the following day, President Sebastián Piñera reached the region, announcing plans to improve security by declaring a security zone, allocating additional police, and creating a specialized police force. Minister of the Interior Andrés Chadwick went further, suggesting a declaration of a state of emergency. Officials called for the assailants to be charged with terrorism under a controversial, Pinochet-era law that, since the return to democracy, has nearly exclusively been applied to Mapuche activists. In the following week, there were nine additional arson attacks; prominent landowners spoke of creating armed self-defense groups; truckers blocked the Pan-American Highway, protesting the uncertain security situation; and civil society organizations criticized the application of the terrorism law.

For Mapuche activists, the government’s security-focused response was insufficient and myopic; if Mapuche individuals were responsible, the violence was an expression of unheard and unmet demands about broader structural conditions. The government needed to recognize the Mapuche as Indigenous peoples with internationally recognized
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Image I.2. PACMA Reunion at la Patagua, Cerro Ñielol, Temuco, April 12, 2013. Photo by the author.

Image I.3. PACMA Reunion at la Patagua, Cerro Ñielol, Temuco, April 12, 2013. Photo by the author.
rights to self-determination and autonomy, rooted in the Mapuche people’s connection with ancestral territory. For the group of leaders that gathered in April, the events of January 2013 highlighted the need for a historically splintered movement to clearly articulate and assert the collective demands of a united Mapuche community. Diverse organizations and prominent Mapuche leaders formed the Pacto Mapuche por la Autodeterminación (PACMA, Mapuche Pact for Self-Determination). PACMA announced plans to assert their rights to self-determination and autonomy; indeed, on April 11, PACMA organized their first conference on self-determination, bringing together leaders to discuss specific demands, proposals, and processes. The march on the following day would present these decisions to the government.

We arrived to la Patagua by 8:00 a.m. on April 12, as PACMA leadership had publicized on social media. The few people who had arrived poked at a small fire and passed around steamed chestnuts, waiting for the crowds and leadership to arrive. Several prominent lonkos (chief, “head” in Mapuzungun) arrived by mid-morning, overseeing the ceremonies and a long discussion about whether to follow through on the march as scheduled. PACMA intended on delivering a letter declaring the group’s intentions to self-govern, but everyone was concerned that a march of a hundred people would not garner enough attention. Ultimately, leaders and attendees agreed that PACMA leadership would present the letter to the government and hold a press conference, and postpone the march.

I left perplexed. PACMA was the work of some of the most prominent, experienced Mapuche leaders. There were no signs of repression beyond what could be expected at similar events. A few carabineros (police officers) in riot gear stood awkwardly at the exit of the hill, and an old reporter from a conservative newspaper circulated through the ceremony, taking pictures of everyone in attendance. As the march was broadly publicized, it was confusing as to why leadership ultimately seemed eager to diffuse it.

While descending the hill, a friend shared details he had pieced together in hushed conversations throughout the morning. In a last-minute scramble to cripple the planned march and any momentum for the public articulation of Mapuche self-determination demands, the government organized ceremonies throughout the region to present resources to a number of Mapuche communities. Many Mapuche leaders and community members who had planned to attend the march decided to stay in their communities to receive the visiting politicians and participate in the last-minute ceremonies. PACMA, in fact, only learned of the government’s plans late the night before, leaving them scrambling to avoid
appearing as if the organization and call for self-determination lacked broad support from the greater Mapuche community.

I scoured the internet, finding confirmation on the website of the Chilean government’s Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena (CONADI, National Corporation for Indigenous Development). The intendente (appointed governor) of the neighboring Los Lagos region and the subsecretary of the Servicio Nacional de la Mujer (National Women’s Service) presented subsidies and fishing equipment totaling 184 million pesos to more than five hundred Lafquenche fishermen in Castro, Chiloé. The national director of CONADI held a press conference to announce two public lotteries to fund development and productivity projects in the Araucanía region, totaling 680 million pesos. In Valdivia the subdirector of CONADI and intendente of the Los Ríos region announced the eighty-seven families in the region to receive a subsidy to purchase land. On the day of the planned march, prominent politicians representing various portions of the government allocated more than US$1.4 million to Mapuche individuals and communities, in addition to an undetermined amount to subsidize land purchases. This government strategizing crippled the planned march, which explained the bizarre unfolding of events on April 12.

This chain of events stands in stark contrast to narratives of post–Pinochet Chilean governance as centralized, technocratic, and, above all, neoliberal. When I moved to Chile, I planned to study how Mapuche communities pursued their demands through the government, focusing specifically on communities’ pursuit of territory and degrees of autonomy through land policy. This policy was created with the promulgation of Indigenous Law 19.253 in 1993, which recognized a number of Indigenous demands and established CONADI to oversee implementation. Article 20B of that law created an institutional path through which Indigenous communities and individuals could apply to the government, petitioning for the government to purchase and transfer formal land titles to historically occupied land. These purchases are funded by CONADI’s Fundo de Tierra y Agua Indígena (FTAI, Fund for Indigenous Land and Water), which is the budgetary focal point of CONADI’s work, accounting for 50–75 percent of CONADI’s yearly budget between 1994 and 2013. Even from a distance, there was significant controversy and contestation over the process.

Given the strength of Chile’s neoliberal project and reputation of good governance, why are there inconsistencies over which land the government returned to which communities? How did Mapuche resistance efforts interact with state domination efforts, and what is the significance of this contestation for broader patterns of governance? I expected
to find a story of Mapuche communities navigating either through or around constrained institutions that governed to extend neoliberal governance by protecting market interests in the region and by preserving transparent and technocratic policymaking. I expected that Mapuche communities’ extrainstitutional mobilization stemmed from extremely constrained opportunities for institutional resolution of demands, particularly for the communities pursuing land that confronted the interests of powerful economic stakeholders. And I expected that inconsistencies in the government’s implementation of Indigenous land policy occurred in rare moments when the state’s efforts to extend neoliberalism through policy temporarily converged with Mapuche demands.

After living in southern Chile for sixteen months, those narratives regarding Mapuche communities navigating in or around a state operating on an insulated, hegemonic, and neoliberal logic of governance felt increasingly insufficient, if not outright inaccurate. Rather, policies and procedures were interactive and negotiated, shifting depending on the actors, place, and context. One Mapuche leader, whose story is discussed in detail in chapter 3, negotiated to exchange his community’s votes in an upcoming election for a politician’s help expediting their land claim. Politicians frequently took flour and oil to Mapuche communities when campaigning prior to elections. At a small We Triantnu (Mapuche New Year, celebrated in June on the summer solstice) celebration, a visiting politician acknowledged his purpose for attending at that particular moment far more transparently than I expected: “As you all know, it is an election year, so we are here to listen.” At the April 12 march, few were surprised that government officials strategically implemented policies and programs at that particular moment to weaken the mobilization and articulation of Indigenous demands for self-determination. I too came to expect this overt, dynamic bargaining. Yet because government officials responded to the planned march through the guise of implementing institutionalized policies, the links between these officials’ work and the march were never reported, preserving the existing façade of neoliberal, insulated Chilean governance. How much of the work of government officials, and the Chilean state’s governance strategies, is left off the record?

Negotiating Autonomy interrogates the Chilean government’s land policy response to Mapuche Indigenous communities’ territorial demands, focusing specifically on when and how the work of government officials shifts in response to actors operating both inside and outside the state. I argue that the dominant narrative about the ideological and insulated neoliberalization of Chilean governance inadequately characterizes how the Chilean government responds to Mapuche communities’
demands for territory. Rather, the state dynamically interacts with and responds to actors working inside and outside institutionalized procedures—public policy is not exclusively the outcome or expression of state domination but rather a middle space where Mapuche demands and Chilean governance are consequentially contested. State officials rely on a combination of formal and informal governance strategies, working to assert a vision of the nation-state that preserves and extends both neoliberalism and the hegemony of political and economic elites in the region. Simultaneously, Mapuche communities and individuals present institutional and extraitnstitutional demands that challenge and work within these governing efforts. Negotiations between these efforts produce contradictory, uneven outcomes, highlighting the importance of studying public policy as a consequential arena of contestation structuring both Mapuche resistance and Chilean domination.

This contextualized contestation and negotiation is significant in revealing internal contradictions in the neoliberal project. I analyze neoliberalism as the economic, political, and social restructuring of state and society according to a market-driven logic. The anthropologist Aihwa Ong describes neoliberalism to task the state with “governing through freedom” (2007, 4), working to center politics and citizenship around the individual’s responsibility to resolve demands through market mechanisms, and the state should work to funnel demands toward the market. Foucault (2008, 116) describes this as the neoliberal anti-state, with the objective for “the state [to be] under the supervision of the market rather than a market supervised by the state.” Accordingly, neoliberalization is far more than economic reform. As Read (2009, 26) describes of these broader ideological premises, neoliberalism is:

Generally understood as not just a new ideology, but a transformation of ideology in terms of its conditions and effects. In terms of its conditions, it is an ideology that is generated not from the state, or from a dominant class, but from the quotidian experience of buying and selling commodities from the market, which is then extended across other social spaces, “the marketplace of ideas,” to become an image of society. Secondly, it is an ideology that refers not only to the political realm, to an ideal of the state, but to the entirety of human existence. It claims to present not an ideal, but a reality; human nature.

If neoliberalism works to govern according to the market by presenting a particular vision of human nature, ethnic relations and identity politics also need to be restructured to that end. This presents a challenge to the state; as James (2013, 31) asserts, “Multiculturalism has been a particularly important target of neoliberal change.” Frequently, the re-
sulting policies work to translate ethnic relations into competitive and valuable market assets and commodities, often evidenced by the promotion of ethnotourism, multilingualism, and intercultural communications. Neoliberalism seeks not to create “a tolerant national citizen who is concerned for the disadvantaged in her own society but a cosmopolitan market actor who can compete effectively across state boundaries . . . [and] govern themselves in accordance with the logic of globalized capitalism” (McNeish 2008, 34). The implications of project for Indigenous communities is discussed later in this introduction.

Crucial for the argument presented in *Negotiating Autonomy* is that this “transformation of ideology” mandates that the work of neoliberalism takes on several forms. It is, as David Harvey (2007, 19) conceptualizes, both a “utopian project” and “political project,” furthered by particular techniques of governance. I focus particularly on this second form, the techniques of government used to implement a project of neoliberalization; in this book, the presentation of neoliberalism as a utopian project justifies and legitimizes the underlying political project. Considering the vastness of this project, neoliberalization is nuanced, inconsistent, and contradictory. Understanding neoliberalization as an “articulated, processual, hybridized, protean, variegated, promiscuous, and travelling phenomenon” (Springer 2011, 2567), scholars have documented the uneven diffusion and execution of neoliberal projects across time and space (see Peck and Tickell 2002; Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010; Ferguson 2010; Peck, Theodore, and Brenner 2010; Springer 2011). This unevenness in the processes of neoliberalization is understood to result from the negotiated convergence of international and local neoliberalism as well as how the interests of local stakeholders map onto these debates (Ong 2006). Effectively, it is not surprising that other governing priorities bend to neoliberalism, or that there is backlash as people demand protections from reforms.

Yet, the Chilean case reveals an additional puzzle. How, why, and under what conditions do these contradictions and inconsistencies in the implementation of the techniques of neoliberal governance undermine the neoliberal project itself? Further surprising, how, why, and to what effect are bureaucrats and government officials carrying out this work? Bureaucrats, responsible for processing Indigenous demands that fit uncomfortably with neoliberal policies, are interestingly positioned in the processes of subject formation. Subject formation, according to Foucault (1982, 777), is “the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects,” modes that serve to bring individuals and groups into a specified governing logic. Neoliberalism structures the production of subjectivity around the extension of a market logic focused on the
individual, disciplined to be empowered in all aspects of society as an individual and, more precisely, a consumer that is self-directing and autonomous, isolated from structural or collective organizations. As Wendy Brown (2003, 43) describes, “The model neoliberal citizen is one who strategizes for her or himself among various social, political, and economic options, not one who strives with others to alter or organize these options.” The collective demands of Indigenous communities for degrees of self-governance and autonomy, then, pose a challenge to this individualistic, market-motivated understanding of subjectivity and threaten to undermine efforts to extend this governing logic. Yet there is potential for actors working both inside and outside of the state to subvert governing intentions and intended forms of subject formation. Actors are simultaneously making and being made within the state’s governing logic, creating the conceptual space for actors to subvert this logic. Bureaucrats are positioned in the middle space, representing discipline and resistance, and policy outcomes are the visible outcome of the how bureaucrats work to strategically negotiate and maneuver between the ideals of the state’s governing logic and discourse, and the local application of that governing logic. For Mapuche communities pursuing degrees of autonomy through territorial rights claims through Chile’s Indigenous land policy, these outcomes of bureaucrats’ work are consequential, particularly when considering the uneven extension of neoliberalism over space and time.

The chain of events that developed the morning of the April 2013 march highlighted this puzzle about the role of bureaucrats in the work of both extending and contradicting the neoliberal project. The resources distributed that day were processed through institutionalized programs, each of which required communities or individuals to apply through policies that worked to funnel Indigenous demands into market mechanisms. Yet the timing and process of the distribution of those resources undermined a neoliberal logic that self-empowered, competitive, and autonomous individuals access resources pursuant to their relative human capital. Effectively, the logic that governed the policy-implementation process was in tension with the logic that governed the policy regulations. The former sought to demobilize a march the government perceived to threaten the hegemony of the Chilean state by subverting institutionalized policy procedures that followed a neoliberal logic; the latter sought to extend a market policy logic by preserving the same policy procedures to pursue the same neoliberal logic. In the specific policy analyzed in this book, Chile’s Indigenous land policy works to govern land in the region with market mechanisms, purchasing land from willing buyers; often, this allows large landholders and corporations to sell off less valuable land above market value. Simultaneously, the policy works to translate
Mapuche demands, and the organization of Mapuche communities and citizenship itself, into a neoliberal logic by requiring communities to document their demands according to that particular governing logic. From the perspective of the government, these policy mechanisms would ideally extend the neoliberal project in both ways, extending the strength of the market to those already operating within these market mechanisms, while bringing more actors and commodities into that market and those market mechanisms. But what if these interests contradict each other? Would the state protect the market interests of those who are already in this logic of governance? Or work to extend the reach of the market? What does the state do when policies that work to extend the scope of the market contradict with the same policies that work to preserve and extend the strength of the market? These contradicting articulations of neoliberalism, in the context of how the Chilean government processes Mapuche territorial demands through land policy, produce surprising variation in which communities receive land through government policy. Calling attention to these different articulations of neoliberalism takes up the call to study “actually existing neoliberalism” (Ferguson and Gupta 2002) and, in doing so, reveals the moments in which communities can take advantage of the contradictions of neoliberalism.

In Chile the façade of neoliberalism, as both a governing logic and ongoing political project, is extensively upheld, but masks underlying contestation over and contradictions of neoliberal governance. While it is often assumed that this project preserves and extends the strength and scope of the market, post-Pinochet governments in Chile have favored the preservation of the strength of the market that has already been created when governing Mapuche territorial demands. In doing so, Mapuche demands have the potential to split apart the state’s interests both to extend the scope of neoliberalism as a governing logic and to preserve the strength of market interests of political and economic elites in the region. This represents moments when the state is forced to choose between efforts to make Indigenous demands into something legible to the governing logic of the state, and its work to extend the benefits of the model to those already made legible within this state logic. Effectively, the state is caught between its work to discipline subjects into a legible form of neoliberal citizens by preserving institutional procedures that work to make citizens into consumers, and its work to privilege those who are already legible neoliberal citizens by preserving market investments in the region.

For Mapuche communities, these moments are costly and fleeting, and reveal unexpected variation in which communities the government processes land transfers for. I argue that these inconsistencies result from
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how actors operating both inside and outside the state (Indigenous communities, bureaucrats, politicians, administrators) take advantage of the inconsistent, contradictory nature of neoliberal governance through the work of government officials. The most dramatic stories in this book emerge when Mapuche communities pit the pursuit of the expansion of neoliberalism against the interests of economic and political elite, challenging the state to choose between two usually complementary governing neoliberal logics; as Harvey (2007, 19) predicts of this tension, “When neoliberal principles clash with the need to restore or sustain elite power, then the principles are either abandoned or so twisted as to be unrecognizable.” Indeed, Mapuche mobilization around broad territorial demands, perceived to be a threat to the integrity of the Chilean state itself, prompts dramatic interventions from national-level politicians whose work bends neoliberalism to the state’s efforts to extend its hegemony and, by extension, the power of elites and their market interests. This is not to say that the Chilean state does not pursue the extension of neoliberalism through its response to Mapuche demands. Indeed, the majority of the state’s governance of Mapuche demands fits into a neoliberal logic, characterized by an effort to translate Mapuche demands for territory and degrees of autonomy into specific demands for enough property to ensure the socioeconomic viability of the community, to be processed through market mechanisms overseen by the government. Yet the contradictions revealed throughout this book highlight the potential conditions under which public policy can provide a way for communities to creatively navigate through neoliberalism.

This introduction underscores the importance of studying these contradictions in neoliberal governance through the lens of Mapuche territorial demands and state land policy responses, situating the conversation within evolving patterns of Indigenous mobilization, neoliberal multicultural reforms, and territoriality in Latin America. This research provides insight into the persisting brecha de implementación (implementation gap) between the recognition and exercise of Indigenous rights in Latin America, exacerbated by the uneven extension of state governance over space and time; this book documents and analyzes the governing logics motivating and served by this implementation gap, emphasizing how rights demands for degrees of autonomy are undone and remade through policy.

INDIGENOUS DEMANDS AND NEOLIBERAL REFORMS IN LATIN AMERICA

PACMA’s demands, and the Chilean government’s response, needs to be contextualized within decades of Indigenous mobilization throughout
the country and region. In the 1980s and 1990s, Indigenous communities throughout Latin America organized around a collective identity in pursuit of rights recognitions that would facilitate the acquisition and restructuring of political power. While there is broad variation in the nature and demands of this mobilization, this represented a splintering of previous class-based mobilization organized by national-level peasant or labor organizations into combinations of women’s, Indigenous, landless, environmental, Afro-American, and religious interests. Indigenous activists and organizations challenged the notion of a unitary, homogenous nation, demanding a different relationship with the state based on individuals constituting themselves as political subjects with collective social identities. This frequently took the shape of calling for the recognition as “peoples” to set a legal precedent for such communities to articulate rights to self-determination and degrees of autonomy within a plurinational state. This recognition could translate into rights to degrees of autonomy in the use of land and resources, and judicial, and administrative space at the local or regional level (Sieder 2002, 7). These demands for self-determination also implied the creation of space for Indigenous conceptualizations of democracy that reject the separation of public and private spheres of association in favor of consensual, direct, collective, and accountable decision-making embedded within kinship relations and cultural identity (Van Cott 2008, 22). This stage of Indigenous mobilization did not necessarily seek to restructure the government according to this governing vision rather pursued rights recognitions that allowed for the exercise of this form of governance. While class-based labor or peasant mobilization traditionally sought to acquire and redefine political power, these new movements operated “over and above—and in spite of—institutions” (Calderón, Piscitelli, and Reyna 1992, 20), pursuing participation in, yet autonomy from, the political arena (Burdick, Oxhorn, and Roberts 2009; Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Eisenstadt 2013). For example, in 1990 Indigenous communities from the Bolivian eastern lowlands and Andean highlands participated in the seventy-day march to La Paz, demanding territorio y dignidad (territory and dignity), successfully pushing the government to officially recognize some Indigenous territories. As Rice (2012, 56) noted, the 1990 levantamiento in Ecuador “marked the first time in Ecuadorian history that an indigenous movement forced the government to enter into serious dialogue about national politics.”

Much of this mobilization represented a backlash to the neoliberal reforms implemented throughout the region from the 1970s through the 1990s. Economically, Latin American governments worked to shrink the size of the state, employing structural adjustment and austerity pro-
grams that privatized state-owned industry, reduced government spending, and liberalized trade, on the recommendations of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Inter-American Development Bank, commonly known as the Washington Consensus. These reforms disproportionately affected situations of economic vulnerability of Indigenous peoples and communities in several ways. Neoliberal reforms brought land reform back to the policy agenda, calling for the regularization of individual property rights to strengthen land markets and provide investment security (discussed in detail in chapter 1; Thiesenhusen 1995; Kay 1998; Deininger andBinswanger 1999; Deininger 2003; Veltmeyer 2005). This focus on individual property rights removed restrictions on the sale of Indigenous land, dismantled formal recognitions of Indigenous communities’ collective rights, and titled land that Indigenous communities had informally owned, controlled, or accessed. Furthermore, Latin American countries promoted national development strategies that infringed on Indigenous communities’ land. Often referred to as the Commodities Consensus, governments prioritized the export of primary products, encouraging the development of extractive industries in ways that disproportionately affected Indigenous communities (Haarstad 2012; Hindery 2013; McNeish 2013; Svampa 2013; Yates and Bakker 2013; Burchardt and Dietz 2014; López and Vértiz 2014; Veltmeyer and Petras 2014; Acuña 2015). Indigenous communities’ territorial rights recognitions, then, quickly came into conflict with these national development strategies.

The neoliberal project also restructured state-society relations through a series of political and social reforms. While democratic political transitions in the 1980s and 1990s increased political participation, the negotiated, pacted nature of many of the transitions often cemented elite privileges and failed to reshape citizenship, representation, and participation (Hagopian 1992; Weyland 2004). Combined with efforts to decrease the size of the state, policymaking became increasingly separated from political pressures and popular demands (Garretón 2003; Kurtz 2004; Silva 2009). As the Chilean economist and politician Alejandro Foxley (1982, 149) argued, “The final objective of neoliberalism in Latin America is nothing less than radically transforming the way the economy operates and, in its most extreme version, the way society and political institutions are organized.” The potential for collective action was further undercut as Latin American governments employed the “politics of antipolitics” (Loveman and Davies Jr. 1997), dismantling and demobilizing labor unions and leftist parties to prevent politics from undermining restructuring efforts, shifting mobilization to local levels (Roberts 2002; Eckstein 2006). This decreased leaders’ accountability and reduced
the state’s role as the distributor of social goods. As Francis Fukuyama (2004) documented how neoliberal reforms inadvertently reduced both the size and scope of the state, Latin Americanists warned of the emergence of delegative democracy throughout the region, in which presidents were held limitedly accountable by weakened intermediary organizations (O’Donnell 1994); Weyland (2004, 143) summarized, “Thus, by putting economic and political elites at greater ease, neoliberalism has substantially lowered internal challenges to democracy in Latin America.”

Paradoxically, restructuring citizenship in line with broader neoliberal reforms resulted in some Indigenous rights recognitions through neoliberal multicultural reforms (Sieder 2002; Van Cott 2002; Postero and Zamosc 2004). Sponsored by the state, these reforms recognized ethnic differences and promoted cultural inclusion through language, education, and healthcare programs. Donna Lee Van Cott (2007, 132) defines neoliberal multicultural reforms to include: “(1) Rhetorical recognition of the existence of Indigenous peoples as collective entities preceding the establishment of national states; (2) recognition of customary Indigenous law as binding public law, typically limited by international human rights or higher-order constitutional rights, such as the right to life; (3) protection of collective property rights from sale, dismemberment, or confiscation; (4) official status for Indigenous languages; and (5) access to bilingual education.”

Notably, these reforms were an extension of a neoliberal logic. As neoliberal reforms shrunk the size of the state to facilitate the functioning of the market, neoliberal multicultural reforms shifted responsibility for guaranteeing individual rights from the state to citizens—citizens, not the state, would solve societal problems (Yashar 1999, 2005). By the end of the 1990s, eight countries in Latin America amended or rewrote constitutions to recognize the country as multiethnic and pluricultural (Sieder 2002, 4).5

**PERSISTING INDIGENOUS-STATE TENSION**

While Indigenous rights recognitions and ensuing reforms prompted some optimism, these initiatives have fallen short of movement demands (Van Cott 2000; Hale 2006; Postero 2007, 2017). There is a tension inherent in multicultural reforms motivated by a neoliberal logic. Recognizing, incorporating, and encouraging Indigenous participation, if not accompanied by shifts in the distribution of economic and political power, turn the project to recognize the “politics of difference” into “empty rituals of recognition” (Gordon and Hale 2003, 379; see also Gustafson 2002; Hale 2002; Laurie, Andolina, and Radcliffe 2003;
Charles Hale’s analysis of neoliberal multicultural reforms in Guatemala found that la-dinos (elites) endorsed “modernizing” multicultural reforms to the extent that the reforms did not challenge productivity or state power. Privileging nonthreatening expressions of Indigeneity in the form of the indio permitido (authorized Indian) over more radical expressions of indigeneity, neoliberal multicultural reforms reinforced existing power relations (Hale 2006; Lucero 2008). Neither changing structural inequalities nor opening spaces for democratic participation, “Neoliberal multiculturalism holds out the promise of both equality and cultural recognition, but grants only the latter, and then promotes intercultural exchange anyway. Under these conditions, multiculturalism produces mutual incomprehension and strife” (Hale 2006, 38). For the state, neoliberal multicultural reforms provide a means of diffusing opposition to economic reforms, in line with what Gramsci refers to as aggiornamento, an “updating” of the governing façade to preserve and support the hegemonic style of governance. In Bolivia, where academics and activists were perhaps most optimistic about the potential construction of a decolonized, Indigenous state after the election of Evo Morales, Nancy Postero (2017, 4–5) argues that “the country has not only continued but expanded its reliance on market capitalism. . . . indigeneity has been transformed in Bolivia from a site of emancipation to one of liberal nation-state building.” Rather than remaking the state in these negotiations, these reforms most often worked to pull Indigenous demands into existing models of citizenship.

Because of the limited impact of the reforms, prominent international observers of Indigenous rights have called attention to, as indicated previously, a persisting brecha de implementación (implementation gap) between these formal recognitions and the meaningful exercise of internationally recognized Indigenous rights (UN Commission on Human Rights 2006). Rodolfo Stavenhagan (in Sieder 2002, 36) warned: “Some . . . fear that the new legislation is not really meant to be implemented and represents more of a cosmetic tinkering with the constitutional system than a real thorough change of power relations . . . the open question is how the new legislation will be implemented and how Indian communities will benefit. The answer is not at all clear. Complaints are constantly heard that the new laws are not being implemented as they should be, or that secondary legislation has not been adopted after general principles were laid down in the new constitutions.” These concerns are echoed throughout the region. Deborah Yashar (2005, 219–20) reviews that “the institutional success of the ‘indigenous reforms’ has depended on the political will of Bolivian presidents to promote them and
the institutional capacity of the state to implement them.” Rachel Sieder (2002, 8) similarly observes that the “the discourse of ‘participation’ has not yet translated into effective oversight mechanisms in practice.”

This book enters the conversation, exploring how, why, and to what effect the brecha de implementación left by neoliberal multicultural reforms in Latin America exists, and how it is contested. More than thirty years after a wave of Indigenous mobilization and rights recognitions in Latin America, many governments have translated Indigenous demands into recognitions and policy, directing a significant amount of Indigenous participation and engagement toward institutionalized policy frameworks that frequently operate at local levels. Relegating policy implementation to local government offices often empowers local bureaucrats, occasionally to challenge national directives, and often exposes substantial subnational variation in state capacity often referred to as “brown zones” (O’Donnell 1993; see also Eaton 2017; Giraudy and Luna 2017). Holes in state capacity create the potential for actors to utilize specific policy implementation in ways that can undercut policy, potentially strengthening clientelistic networks, increasing social conflict, and reinforcing patterns of unequal access to power (Laserna 2009; Selee and Peruzzotti 2009). As Lucero (2008, 135) demonstrates of these processes in the Bolivian case, “By breathing new life and channeling more money in the previously weak government, incentives now exist to work on local levels . . . The targets of indigenous political activism became local and not national.” This variation is particularly consequential for the neoliberal project, as inconsistency characterizes the extension of the project across space and subjects (Ferguson and Gupta 2002); as Ong (2007, 4) describes of this state logic: “But in emerging non-Western contexts, the strategy of governing and self-governing is not uniformly applied to all groups and domains within a nation. Indeed, neoliberal policies are all about the recalibration of the capacity of groups in relation to the dynamism of global markets. Not all populations or areas can or should be subjected to techniques of self-governing and the free play of market forces.” The outcome of these local, ongoing negotiations over degrees of autonomy are equally, if not more, consequential for the exercise of Indigenous rights.

As should be evident thus far, Negotiating Autonomy interrogates the middle space between resistance and domination structured within public policy. More specifically, this book is a study of negotiations over the state’s governance of Indigenous demands carried out by politicians and bureaucrats, understanding governance as a broad “catch-all to refer to any strategy, tactic, process, procedure or programme for controlling, regulating, shaping, mastering or exercising authority over others” (Rose
INTRODUCTION

I do not assume that the state structures all power relations; that the state is a homogenous, unitary actor with specific intent (Pringle and Watson 1992); or that the state is the only actor that governs. Rather, I see the state, and policy, as “not just functional bureaucratic apparatuses, but powerful sites of symbolic and cultural production” (Gupta 2012, 43), and the site where “movements wage their principal struggles, and where the Indian Question will be played out” (qtd. in Postero and Zamosc 2004, 3). I adopt a Foucauldian and poststructuralist view of the state as both a site and instrument of contestation (Lemke 2007) and a fragmented “coagulation of power” (Ferguson 1990, 274), where “governing people is . . . always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or modified by himself” (Foucault and Blasius 1993, 203–4).

This conceptualization of the state and governance opens conceptual space for actors to have unexpected influence, particularly when considering the contradictions of neoliberalism introduced here. Indeed, there are key moments when Mapuche communities obtain policy outcomes contradictory to key state interests. Nancy Postero similarly documents how “subjects of neoliberalism find in it a number of resources and tools. This is because neoliberalism is not an all-encompassing or hegemonic paradigm that dominates society but rather a philosophy that is expressed in various policies, practices, and institutions that are constantly being conserved and/or contested” (Postero 2007, 18). Negotiating Autonomy documents the moments in which and conditions under which creators and subjects of neoliberalism create these inconsistencies.

TERRITORIALITY AND THE STATE

Territorial rights are one of the most salient demands of the Mapuche community, underpinning broader demands for autonomy and self-determination. The Mapuche identify themselves as people of the land (mapu, “land”; che, “people”); the strength of Mapuche identity is dependent on the health of the land and the peoples’ relationship to it, as is discussed in chapter 1. A Mapuche university student most profoundly articulated this to me. After describing his community on the outskirts of Temuco early in our friendship, he asked where I was from and, accustomed to the question of how I ended up in Temuco, I described the short version. My Minnesota birthplace; Wisconsin childhood home; Carthage College dorm room; Buenos Aires host family; and Washington, DC, studio jointly, but not separately, defined where I was from. His puzzled response has become increasingly significant to this project:
“What does all that mean? Where are you actually from?” The litany of experiences that I understood to shape my own identity stood in stark contrast to his conceptualization of his identity by *tuwün* (place of origin) and *kupalme* (ancestry). My first few weeks of Mapuzungun (“the talk of the land,” with land understood to include all natural beings, including humans, mountains, animals, and wind) language classes further reinforced this difference; introductions focused on identifying and situating a person within a territorial space by the person’s *tuwün* and *kupalme*.

This conceptualization of territory as the basis of identity conflicts with the Chilean government’s use of land as a primarily economic resource and commodity. How does the state govern this tension between understandings of Mapuche territory and Chilean land? At its core, this question asks how states attempt to extend or reconfigure governance through processes of territorialization. Territory has been traditionally theorized as “the bounded space of national territorial sovereignty,” recognizing the role of the nation-state in defining and controlling space (Sassen 2013). As states have gradually weakened or lost their control over sovereign territory, scholars have described sovereignty as “fragmented” or “graduated” (Ong 2000), and territory as “blocks of space” (Agnew 2005, 441; see also Agnew 1994; O’Donnell 1999; Agnew and Oslender 2010). Decoupling territory, conceptually and empirically, from the nation-state is not necessarily an abdication of state sovereignty, but a recognition of “the use of territory for political, social, and economic end” by diverse actors (Agnew 2005, 437), and “a displacement from formal to informal techniques of government” (Lemke 2002, 84).

These shifts in territoriality accompany and mirror the neoliberal reforms introduced earlier, with the state strategically governing, formally or informally, particular spaces in particular ways so as to facilitate market efficiency and prioritize individual responsibility (see, for example, Rose and Miller 1992; Agnew and Oslender 2010; Bryan 2012; Gregory and Vaccaro 2015). As Bryan (2012, 218) summarizes: “State control over territory thus becomes less important than the ability to preserve a spatial order necessary to economic growth, security, and the task of governing itself. . . Neoliberalism has altered that perspective by recasting the role of the state as coordinating the interests of the private sector and civil society in order to maintain the socio-spatial order necessary for the functioning of markets.” Land policy scholars similarly call attention to the local exercise of power, arguing that “land tenure regulation is contested at the level of policy implementation, that is, how regulation at different levels in society undoes or reworks state efforts to regulate land tenure in accordance with policy objectives” (van der Haar 2000,
The significance of Indigenous rights recognitions, then, comes to depend on these local, bureaucratic, and political calculations.

These transitions in territorial politics provide a window into a state’s shifting approach to governance, in which the preservation or extension of an existing socioeconomic order in particular areas is paramount. Hale (2011, 204) more broadly observes, “The fate of black and indigenous land claims has come to vary widely, depending on location in relation to the empty spaces or brown areas that neoliberal development has left behind.” Considering the strength and scope of neoliberal reforms in Chile, Mapuche demands for degrees of autonomy are subject to local and national economic interests at play in the same region. The Chilean government’s response to Mapuche territorial demands provides a window into ongoing, contested state formation and restructuring occurring within policy.

**NEOLIBERALISM AND INDIGENOUS POLITICS IN CHILE**

The Chilean case is often excluded from literature on Indigenous politics in Latin America, which usually explores more dramatic or successful instances of Indigenous mobilization and rights recognitions. This limits our understanding of the broader range of Indigenous demands and the governance of Indigenous demands in the region, highlighting some experiences over others. For example, Postero and Zamosc (2006, 18) observe a split between countries in which Indigenous communities comprise the majority and those in which Indigenous communities comprise the minority, summarizing that “in the case of small minorities, it is a matter of survival, expressed primarily through demands for territory, autonomy, and special rights which would allow them to maintain their ways of life as indigenous peoples.” Observing that lowland Indigenous communities in Ecuador prioritized negotiation over institutional rights, Lucero (2008, 107) similarly calls for analysis of Indigenous politics in countries where Indigenous groups comprise a minority of the population in order to fully understand the range of experiences in the region. Extending our understanding of the scope of Indigenous politics in the region, the Chilean case offers key insight into how Latin American states have responded to Indigenous demands through policy. Chile is regionally known for its centralized, technocratic, neoliberal governance and the strength through which the early implementation of neoliberal economic and political project permeated society and disarticulated civil society’s links with the government. Chile reluctantly implemented neoliberal multicultural reforms, lagging behind its regional counterparts,
which constitutionally recognized Indigenous communities. Because of these established patterns of governance, distance between state and society, and tentative implementation of neoliberal multiculturalism, the Chilean case is a most likely case for capable policy implementation that follows a neoliberal logic, and a least likely case in which groups would be expected to influence policy implementation. These dynamics are analytically useful for isolating when and how policy outcomes deviate from these expectations.

This analysis focuses on Chile’s piecemeal policy response to Mapuche territorial demands, which allows for nuanced analysis of specific implementation decisions. This policy response is outlined in Article 20B of the Indigenous Law 19.253. The 1993 law tasked CONADI with implementing Indigenous public policy. With the expressed objective of responding to historic land disputes by purchasing ancestral land from a private landowner for a community if and when that particular Indigenous community submits the application, Article 20B is one of the cornerstones of this law. *Negotiating Autonomy* analyzes the implementation of Article 20B from 1994 (when it was first implemented) to 2013 (the end of the first Piñera administration). Based on public CONADI records, 266 Mapuche communities acquired land through Article 20B during this time period, with an additional 500 placed on a waiting list. While there are more than 3,000 state-recognized Mapuche communities, there is no publicly available data on communities still working

![Figure I.1. CONADI land purchases, 1994–2013.](image-url)
through the process, those which qualify but have not applied, or those which have been rejected. These 266 communities received a total of 435 land purchases, covering 137,953 hectares. Purchases range in total cost from US$3,313 to $4,751,502 (2008 constant). In total, from 1994 to 2013, four presidential administrations spent US$303 million to purchase over 100,000 hectares for 11,000 families through Article 20B, amounting to 3 percent of all land in the region. Implementation has been less than smooth, as evident in figure I.1, with inconsistencies in which communities access land through the policy, when, and at what total cost to the Chilean government.

After the central government hesitantly recognized some rights in Article 20B, responsibility for the recognition of these rights shifted to the local level. As such, policy implementation is situated between national priorities on development and Indigenous rights recognitions, and local narratives attempting to balance those priorities while considering local power dynamics. What accounts for the inconsistencies in when, where, and how much the government invests in responding to the territorial demands of particular communities?

**RESEARCH DESIGN**

Empirically, *Negotiating Autonomy* deconstructs variation in Chile’s policy response to Mapuche territorial demands, exposing how government officials navigate through tensions in the extension of neoliberal governance in the region. This book adopts the intellectual stance of analytical eclecticism, which works to understand the “complexity and messiness of particular real-world situations” by “forgo[ing] parsimony in order to capture the interactions among different types of causal mechanisms normally analyzed in isolation from each other within separate research traditions” (Sil and Katzenstein 2010, 412). In doing so, this book draws on multiple methodologies and disciplines to unpack the conditions under which we see variation in policy implementation, an indication of how state officials and bureaucrats govern the middle space between citizen demands and state governing logic. Each subsequent chapter traces out one type of contestation over the implementation of Article 20B, relying on different data and different methods to analyze inconsistencies in Chilean governance, with the intention that each chapter separately and jointly further the argument introduced in this chapter.

Chapter 1, “Bureaucratizing Territory into Land Policy,” documents the evolution of the formal procedures governing the implementation of Article 20B, situated within a broader discussion of the challenges governments faced to translate Indigenous demands for territory into
rights recognitions and specific implementation procedures. Based on analysis of regulatory documents, chapter 1 details the ways in which Mapuche demands for territory become bureaucratically entangled with the Chilean state’s efforts to recognize Indigenous communities’ territorial rights and establish policy regulations governing implementation. In policy regulations, the Chilean government has increasingly interpreted Mapuche territorial claims as if they were for socioeconomic development, responding through land policy. This transition provides evidence of efforts to extend a neoliberal logic of governance through formal policy procedures.

Chapter 2, “Negotiating Land for Peace,” considers the bureaucratic dynamics that condition if, how, and why government officials act on the motivation to extraterritorially bend bureaucratic procedures to respond to Mapuche mobilization. Drawing on interviews with politicians, activists, and bureaucrats, chapter 2 reveals that, across four presidential administrations spanning the political spectrum, the Chilean government strove to use land policy, in addition to well-documented militarization and criminalization of Mapuche protest, to demobilize (apagar incendios, “put out fires”) Mapuche mobilization. While this motivation persists over twenty years, the government’s ability to use policy becomes constrained over time, confronting increasingly institutionalized procedures and requiring the intervention of higher-level policymakers and/or politicians. This institutionalization is the result of CONADI officials and bureaucrats working to shield themselves from blame for persisting Mapuche mobilization.

Chapter 3, “Navigating Land Policy,” develops the mechanisms through which mobilization drives policy implementation from the perspective of Mapuche community leaders, based on case studies of eight Mapuche communities in the Padre Las Casas district outside the regional capital, Temuco. Their stories highlight that the Chilean government strategically employs a range of formal and informal governance strategies to demobilize certain Mapuche communities; while the preservation and extension of neoliberal governance motivates many policy decisions, these interviews highlight that demobilizing the threat posed by Mapuche mobilization is a superseding motivation. These stories reiterate that CONADI does see and respond to very local power dynamics, and works to preserve existing market interests in the region. Mobilization and political connections can shape policy implementation, but CONADI will only respond in a way that undermines the interests of powerful stakeholders if high-ranking officials call for it. Policy implementation decisions are not, however, a proportional response to perceived threats as expected but rather shaped by a combination of bu-
reaucratic and local power dynamics. Chapter 3 expands the scope of the study by incorporating Mapuche communities who have sought, but have yet to receive, land through the government.

Chapter 4, “Quantifying Mobilization and Land Purchases,” explores the extent to which broad patterns of policy enactment follows formal procedures through a quantitative analysis of the impact of Mapuche mobilization, perceptions of Mapuche communities, and the presence of forestry companies on the likelihood of land purchases. Drawing on an original data set of mobilization by the 266 Mapuche communities that received land through Article 20B over twenty years, chapter 4 quantitatively highlights the inconsistencies in the Chilean government’s response to Mapuche communities. The government is more likely to purchase land for communities that mobilize, or are in a region with more forestry companies, in what appears to be a calculation about how to most efficiently appease communities that could pose a threat to economic investments and regional stability.

As discussed throughout this introduction, Negotiating Autonomy puts theoretical conversations about the role of government officials in extending neoliberal governance in conversations with empirical conversations about Chilean governance. The concluding chapter brings these conversations together. Those interested in how actors navigate neoliberalism will be most interested in the empirics presented in chapters 1–4. The epilogue considers the relevance of these patterns of the governance of identity politics for the October 2019 protests in Chile.

CONDUCTING RESEARCH IN TEMUCO

Chile first caught my eye in 2007. I was living in Buenos Aires at the time, but became captivated by very visible, simmering societal transformations after spending a week in Chile. Despite the comparative success and stability of post-dictatorship Chile, I saw visible contestation over the entrenched neoliberal transformation of politics, economics, and society. More puzzling was the unexpected visibility of the state, particularly in its coercive and disciplinary elements, in these negotiations over Chile’s future. Where neoliberalism perhaps most dramatically deconstructed and reconfigured the state, how did the state navigate contestation over neoliberalization while further extending neoliberal governance? And why were the state’s efforts so visible?

These questions first took me to Temuco in 2011, for sixteen months in 2012 and 2013, and several trips since in attempts to understand patterns of Chilean governance. Very quickly, I met Chilean and Mapuche scholars more qualified to document, analyze, and contextualize...
the construction and articulation of Mapuche demands than I, much of which has been recently published (see, among many others, Marimán et al. 2006; Cayuqueo 2012; Llaitul and Arrate 2012; Marimán 2012; Tricot 2013, 2014; Pairican Padilla 2014, 2017; Cayuqueo 2014; Rodríguez 2015; Cayuqueo 2017). In conversation with those I met in Temuco and Santiago, this focus narrowed over time in response to what seemed to be a remaining link in the narrative on the recognition of Indigenous rights in Chile: the very bureaucratic ways the state negotiates conversations over the politics of recognition through the work of bureaucrats and politicians. As one Mapuche friend often encouraged, “We know ourselves and our demands. What we don’t know is what the state is doing and how to change it.”

Choosing this focus raises valid concerns about assuming and legitimizing the hegemony of the Chilean state. The wonderful linguists, lawyers, anthropologists, historians, sociologists, and teachers at the Instituto de Estudios Indígenas at the Universidad de la Frontera, which I was affiliated with, constructively questioned and critiqued if this focus on governance of Indigenous rights legitimized the Chilean government as the arbiter of these rights, undermining the autonomy (and legitimacy of demands for that autonomy) of the Mapuche and other Indigenous communities in Chile. Many were simultaneously curious about what government bureaucrats and officials would tell me. Certainly, engaging with the state is only one of the ways Mapuche communities and individuals pursue territory and territorial rights. At its core, this is the tension inherent in neoliberal multiculturalism and the pursuit of territorial rights through land policy; as Hale (2011, 202) summarizes: “The predicament, in sum, rests on the premise that these two modes of struggle—one immediate and pragmatic—the other expansive with sights set on the horizon are incompatible.” Their questions and critiques honed my research to focus on naming the exercise of power through Chile’s Indigenous land policy, in hopes of better informing and empowering those who do engage with these state procedures; as Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2010, 63) describes, this debate about the potential for state reforms to be a counterhegemonic force plays out throughout Latin America. Throughout this book I note resistance to and the limits of engaging with these state procedures, and return to these more normative questions about resistance and domination within neoliberal hegemony in the conclusion.

My time in Temuco was spent understanding Chilean governance of CONADI’s land policy from a range of perspectives, including bureaucrats, politicians, activists, academics, lawyers, and Mapuche community leaders. Because of this focus, I did not seek out the Mapuche activists, leaders, communities, or regions that most frequently appear in the me-
dia or prominent court cases, although I crossed paths with many whose stories appear in this book in reference to particular requests presented to the government. I only occasionally heard the often-repeated assumptions that international researchers are either supporting radical mobilization or conducting surveillance. While I have my suspicions that my cell phone was tapped at one point because of degrees of connections to specific Mapuche activists of interest, my presence did not raise the suspicions that others have noted while in the region. While I did not sufficiently realize the implications of these decisions as I was planning and adapting the research design of this work, I resisted pressures to engage in intimate, solitary, and dangerous fieldwork presumed to produce a particular type of disembodied data. Hanson and Richards (2017, 603) appropriately call for reflection on how “all bodies are instruments of research, and all research projects are shaped by the gender, sexuality, and embodiment of the ethnographer,” and, indeed, these dynamics strongly shaped much of my research, particularly in relationships with government bureaucrats, nearly exclusively men, who were flattered by my interest in mid-level bureaucracy, unthreatened by my presence and accent, and quick to agree to a conversation (Milkman 1997). Many of these conversations turned into two-hour conversations and ended with a scribbled list of phone numbers of their friends and colleagues who had more nuanced details about a different bureaucratic position or time period. But that access also brought limits to what could have been useful follow-up conversations, which often implied meeting in less public and/or professional settings. All this to say, my identities were not set aside as I conducted this research.

When interviewing bureaucrats and politicians who were working or formerly worked on the policy, I explained that my work sought to understand how the Chilean government responds to Mapuche territorial demands through policy, which they frequently took as an opportunity to share what they perceived to be lost in the narrative that usually focused on more on activism and violence than on their bureaucratic work. These people were selected based on their familiarity with Chile’s Indigenous land policy, largely based on their time working on the development or implementation of Indigenous land policy from 1994 to 2013. Many of these individuals no longer worked in the government at the time of our interview. These interviews centered on situating that person’s experience into a continuum of the Chilean government’s approach, in hopes that I could understand how the Chilean state created and updated policy implementation and rhetoric over time. Many of these conversations started with a discussion of how that person understood the government’s response to Indigenous demands before start-
ing their position, and evolved to discuss how they kept or worked to shift that response, and how they interpreted the direction of the policy since leaving in efforts to detail which individuals, offices, and organizations were involved in which decisions at which points in time, and to understand key moments that changed or entrenched the Chilean government’s response. Interviewees usually discussed CONADI as a well-intentioned institution staffed by well-intentioned bureaucrats motivated to mediate between Mapuche communities and the interests of the national government. Fifteen minutes into the conversation, the narrative was usually about how CONADI was on the side of the communities, wanting to return land, but continued to be undercut by the national government, who persistently intervened into their carefully designed policies and regulations to appease concerns about Mapuche terrorism. News reports triangulated this information to provide additional background and context around these events.

A friend came to act as a research assistant to contact and guide me to the homes of local Mapuche community leaders who could speak of their community’s process. Born and raised in the Makewe district right outside Temuco, he was distantly related to many in the region and frequently crossed paths with these leaders at community meetings and local events (details of these interviews are discussed in chapter 3). The interviews addressed how the community learned about the policy, the steps they took to present their demand, whether the communities have connections to civil servants/politicians/academics/lawyers/political parties, if they participated in any type of protest or mobilization while presenting their demand, how they would characterize the government’s responsiveness, their general challenges and successes navigating the policy, and their perceptions of why some communities were more successful than others. The experiences of these eight communities are interwoven with local news reports on Mapuche communities in pursuing territorial rights in the same district.

All of the interviews were semi-structured and, when given permission, most were recorded. These interviews lasted between thirty minutes and two and a half hours, with the average interview lasting sixty minutes. I conducted all the interviews in Spanish; when personal interviews are cited in this text, they are my own translations from Spanish. In total, I conducted interviews with about seventy politicians and bureaucrats, twenty Mapuche leaders and activists, and twenty professionals, including academics, lawyers, and community leaders. Those categories are not mutually exclusive but categorized by how the person was most directly involved in the policy process: creating or implementing policy, utilizing or opposing the policy, or observing.
INTRODUCTION


Most interviews were conducted in or near Temuco, Chile, an eight-hour drive south of Santiago, and the location varied dramatically as most convenient for the interviewee. A former political appointee and current politician asked his assistant to schedule our conversation at the upscale Café de la P, a café on the west side of town between the newer shopping mall and upscale casino. Others were at exclusive law firms in Santiago. Many interviews with current bureaucrats were held in the national and subnational CONADI offices in Temuco. Most often, I traveled to the homes of Mapuche leaders, navigating buses and long walks on muddy roads, collecting a broader understanding of territory and mobilization around territory in the process; thankfully, my friend and research assistant stopped scheduling interviews during the rainy season.

Interviewees are not referred to by name, in accordance with university human subjects research requirements and in recognition of shifting conditions in the region. I do include the names of individuals when using secondary sources, meaning that some individuals are mentioned both anonymously and by name. I regret that specific individuals and communities are not able to publicize their demands and stories through this medium; I can only hope that the collection of stories jointly presented here uncovers previously shielded patterns of governance and contributes to the future interrogation of the Chilean state and its governance through Indigenous policies.