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Introduction: From Protest to Policy

■ In 1979 in a small town in Maharashtra, India, protests erupted in response to the gang rape of a fourteen-year-old girl, Mathura, by local police. The case made its way through the Indian criminal justice system, and the High Court convicted the rapists. However, the Supreme Court reversed the High Court judgment and suggested that Mathura was of loose morals. The resultant outrage spawned a nationwide antirape movement, which demanded the reopening of the case and amendments in the rape law (Patel 1991). In Canada, in 1991, the Supreme Court struck down the 1983 “rape shield law” that had protected women reporting rapes from having their sexual history reviewed in court. Women’s groups mobilized to demand government action to restore the law. Within a year, after consultations with feminist groups, Minister of Justice Kim Campbell introduced legislation replacing the original law.¹ The legislation met with widespread approval from feminists (Gotell 1998; Sproule 1998). In Italy, women’s movement activists lobbied the government on the issue of violence against women for twenty years without success. In the mid-1990s, activists took to the streets

in frustration, circulating a nationwide petition to demand government action (Hellman 1996).

In all of these instances, social movements responded with outrage to state treatment of women victims of violence. They demanded change. Indeed, women's groups in countries from Trinidad and Tobago to Norway make surprisingly similar demands for an improved government response to violence against women: they demand legal reforms that recognize violent acts against women as serious crimes that should not be relegated to the private sphere; they demand government funding for services for victims; they demand government action in recognizing and promoting public awareness of violence against women; and they demand increased sensitivity on the part of police, judges, and other criminal justice officials.

In some cases, these movements have transformed government response. As recently as 1982, a discussion of wife battering provoked public snickers from legislators in the Canadian parliament (Begin 1997). Now the Canadian government spends millions of dollars responding to violence against women (Gotell 1998). In the United States in the early 1980s, Republican president Ronald Reagan canceled the limited federal funding available for shelters for women victims of violence, claiming it was a private problem and that domestic violence shelters were hostile to traditional families (Gelb 1998, 7). In 1981 Republicans unsuccessfully sought to prohibit funding for shelters through the Family Protection Act (which was introduced but not passed). However, by 1994, conservative Republican Orrin Hatch was co-sponsor of (and even at times a "key advocate" for) the Violence Against Women Act, which provided hundreds of millions of dollars to fund shelters and crisis centers, public education, training for police, and other programs (Gelb 1998, 13, 20). In 1998, the Republican-controlled House of Representatives surprised feminist activists by *unanimously* voting to approve extensions of the Violence Against Women Act and authorizing nearly a billion dollars for antiviolence programs (Erickson 1998).²

These transformations of government response, however incomplete or imperfect, are remarkable instances of how social movements can provoke official action on previously unrecognized, even taboo, issues. Of course, women's movements have had widely varying degrees of success across countries, and spectacular failures as well. The governments of Canada and Australia, for example, have worldwide reputations for introducing the most innovative programs in police training and specialized research. These governments were among the first to introduce legal reforms to encourage reporting and prosecuting of rape and domestic violence, and to provide

funding for shelters and crisis centers. Meanwhile, national governments in countries such as Italy and Spain undertook none of these activities. Even after twenty years of women's movement activity on the issue, the Italian government remained unmoved. Why are some governments quick to respond to such demands by women's movements while others resist even mere symbolic gestures, such as official recognition of violence against women as a problem?

In this book, I find that certain types of institutional reforms, coupled with independent social movement activity, can dramatically improve government responsiveness to violence against women. I argue that our current models of the politics of policymaking (both feminist and otherwise) cannot adequately capture the dynamic relationship between social movements, political institutions, and public policy. A better understanding of democratic policymaking can be achieved, I suggest, by theorizing the policy process as being fundamentally shaped by social structures that systematically disadvantage some groups and advantage others. I propose a structural account of political institutions and social movements and show how this understanding improves on current conceptualizations in feminist scholarship and policy studies. I also suggest some concrete steps that democratic governments and social activists can undertake to improve policy responsiveness to violence against women and other issues of concern to disadvantaged groups. In the sections below, I outline the book's argument and how it relates to the existing body of scholarship on policies on violence against women, social policy, and comparative public policy more generally.

POLICY ACTION, SCHOLARLY SILENCE

Over the past two decades, some governments have adopted a wide range of measures to address violence against women, while others have done little or nothing. Yet there has been little scholarly attention to cross-national variation in this area of policy. The paucity of systematic cross-national studies of policies on violence against women stands in contrast to the vast literature comparing government action in the area of social welfare policy or family policy. Violence against women is rarely considered in discussions of the welfare state or social policy, even in feminist political science and political sociology circles. Yet the cross-national pattern of government response to violence, which often involves considerable expenditures and substantial legislative change, is quite unlike the patterns scholars discern in relation to women and employment or in the area of family policy. This suggests that studying violence against women may reveal aspects

of social policymaking that are obscured in examining other issue areas. Moreover, violence against women creates barriers to many other goals of democratic governments, such as economic development, welfare reform, public health, pay equity, and the well-being of children.³ Government responsiveness to violence against women may affect policy effectiveness in these other areas. Thus, government response to violence against women is an important but understudied area of public policy.

The relative silence on issues of violence should be particularly worrying to researchers who seek to understand gender dynamics, since many feminist scholars argue that violence is central to women's subordination (MacKinnon 1989; Elman 1996a; Brownmiller 1975; Martin 1976). Barely a handful of comparative studies of national violence-against-women policy seek to investigate and explain variation in government response to violence against women (Elman 1996a; Busch 1992; Heise, Raikes, Watts, and Zwi 1994).⁴

WHAT EXPLAINS RESPONSIVENESS TO VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN?

All of these studies identify the mobilization of a women's movement, and especially a women's movement with some organizational independence from government, as a key catalyst to policy change in this area. In addition, the number of women in political office is identified as a possible determinant of government response (Heise 1994). One study finds that federal, pluralist institutional structures create more points of access for women's movements than do corporatist, unitary structures (Elman 1996a). Although these studies provide a good starting point for understanding cross-national variation in government responsiveness, they leave many questions unanswered.

In this book, I seek to further our understanding of this policy issue by providing a global overview of government response to violence against women in countries that have been continuously democratic from 1974–1994. I also examine the process of policy development in the eight most responsive countries in order to better understand the dynamics of policy change. The results are puzzling: the cross-national patterns of government responsiveness to violence against women that I identify in this study confound conventional explanations offered by feminist scholars and comparative policy scholars alike. Political culture explanations might suggest that the more egalitarian Scandinavian countries would be the most responsive, and that countries commonly thought of as having “macho”

political cultures (such as Latin American countries and Australia) would have the laggard governments. In fact, the Swedish government is far behind others in addressing this problem, while Costa Rica is among the most responsive governments. Nor does the entrenchment of the Catholic Church explain much of the difference: Ireland has had one of the most responsive governments, while Italy is one of the least responsive democratic governments in the world. I present this evidence in chapter 2.

Furthermore, as I show in chapter 3, although the presence of a strong women's movement is important, it is far from determinative: in the United States, activists demanded national government action on violence for decades without result. In other "Anglo" federal states, such as Canada and Australia, on the other hand, similar women's movement demands were met more than a decade earlier than in the United States. But perhaps the most puzzling finding of this study is the fact that the most responsive governments include many that have very few women in government (such as the United States, Australia, and France), while some governments with a large proportion of women in government (such as Finland) have been among the least responsive. The analyses I present in chapter 4 support these observations.

What, then, determines government responsiveness to violence against women? It appears to be determined to a large degree by the presence of a strong, autonomous women's movement that draws on and reinforces state institutions designed to promote the status of women. When these "women's policy agencies" (as they have come to be called) have considerable material and institutional resources, and when they maintain consultative relations with activists, they greatly improve government responsiveness to violence against women.

In chapter 5, I argue that the impact political institutions have on policies on violence suggests that "institutions matter" for comparative social policy. It also suggests that analysts of gender politics should focus more attention on variation in the structure of public administration. More generally, the study of gender and politics should focus less on women as policymakers and more on social and institutional structures and processes.

The finding that women's policy agencies affect policymaking on violence against women also has important implications for neoinstitutionalist approaches to policy analysis. It appears that women's policy machineries improve government responsiveness to violence against women because they correct for an institutional gender bias: political institutions tend to be organized around the priorities and perspectives of historically powerful groups of men. This suggests that institutional capacities (such as informa-

tion gathering or innovation) are not always group-neutral: institutions may function differently depending on the substantive issues at stake, *systematically* underperforming on issues of concern to particular marginalized groups.

But political-institutional factors alone do not explain variation in policies on violence: women's policy agencies improve government responsiveness to violence against women only when they operate in the context of a strong, autonomous women's movement. In chapter 6, I examine the impact of the interaction between social movements and political institutions on policies on violence against women. I find that women's policy agencies and strong, autonomous women's movements have a mutually reinforcing, interactive effect.

This interaction is best explained by a structural approach to policy analysis. In chapter 7, I argue that the dominant models of the policy process are inadequate for conceptualizing the interaction between political institutions and social movements and for understanding their joint impact on policies to address violence against women. A better conceptualization can be achieved if we theorize the policy process as being fundamentally shaped by social structures that systematically disadvantage some groups and advantage others. I offer a structural account of political institutions and social movements. Political institutions are components of social structures, both reflecting and shaping social norms, while social movements seek to change social structures. A structural approach, I contend, best captures the interactive effect of political institutions and social movements on policies on violence against women. Moreover, I suggest, a theoretical approach to public policy that acknowledges such social structures improves our understanding of democratic policymaking in general. It also makes policy analysis more useful in confronting important public policy issues in contemporary democracies.

In chapter 8, I make some concrete recommendations for policymakers and activists working to eliminate violence against women and other problems confronting marginalized groups. I also suggest some potential ways to improve government responsiveness to marginalized groups more generally. Before turning to the argument, however, I outline some details of conceptualization, measurement, and method.

THE DESIGN OF THE STUDY

In this study, I seek to explain why some democratic governments are more responsive to the problem of violence against women than others.

Specifically, I ask why some stable democratic governments undertake broad, multifaceted initiatives to address violence against women while other governments do not even recognize the problem, or respond only partially or belatedly.

Defining Government Responsiveness

In the policy literature, *responsiveness* can refer to bureaucratic responsiveness (whether bureaucracies respond to complaints or requests) or to government responsiveness in general (whether government acts in response to problems or citizen demands) (Bachelor 1986; Chaney and Salzman 1998; Powell 1982; Putnam 1993; Meyer and Baker 1993; Rodrik and Zeckhauser 1988; Dye 1998). In this study, I focus on government responsiveness to violence against women in the latter sense: I ask whether governments are taking action to address violence against women or whether they are avoiding such action.

This definition may seem to conflate two types of responsiveness: responsiveness to problems and responsiveness to citizen demands for action on a problem.⁵ One of these types of responsiveness involves responsiveness to citizen articulations, while the other involves identifying and addressing problems. In this book, I want to examine the claim that women's movement activity improves government responsiveness to violence against women. For this reason, I focus on government responsiveness to the problem of violence against women and ask whether and how policy responsiveness to the problem is increased by women's movement activities. In this way, the book examines both the question of responsiveness to citizen articulations and government responsiveness to violence against women itself. This approach allows me to investigate (rather than make assumptions about) the role that women's movements play in the development of government response to violence against women.

Note that responsiveness does not necessarily imply effectiveness. *Effectiveness* refers to policy impacts, such as whether government actions mitigate a particular problem. In this case, measures of effectiveness might include victims' reports about their experiences in shelters and crisis centers and about the treatment they received in the criminal justice system and hospitals; changes in public attitudes toward violence against women; and reduced incidence of such violence. A study of effectiveness would require much more detailed analysis of particular programs than is undertaken here. Given the problems of measurement and the lack of data on this policy area, it is at present unfeasible to carry out this type of study for most countries.

It is important to distinguish policy responsiveness from effectiveness for a number of reasons. Policies may be rendered ineffective at many stages. In some cases, the problem is not in the design of the particular policy or in the intentions of lawmakers, but in the policy process itself. If we want to identify the barriers to addressing a policy problem, it is critical to know whether it is a problem of political will or ignorance among the leadership (politicians are unwilling to take on a problem), institutional barriers to adopting a policy, a problem of poor policy design, a problem of inadequate implementation of a sound policy, and the like. Effectiveness can be blocked at any of these stages, but responsiveness relates primarily to the quality and timeliness of the policy response, rather than to its implementation or impact.

Some scholars have noted that responsiveness and effectiveness may be conflicting goals (Rodrik and Zeckhauser 1988). For example, many women's groups demanded mandatory arrest policies as a way of getting around police reluctance to arrest male batterers in their own homes. The police responded to the enactment of these policies by arresting both parties (claiming they didn't know who the aggressor was), thereby deterring abused women from calling the police—not the intention of the reformers (Martin 1997). Now, after learning of this and other problems, many women's groups oppose mandatory arrest policies (Mills 1998; Saunders 1995). Should we say that governments that adopted and then amended these policies were less responsive to violence against women because the policy they first adopted failed? I think not. When a government is making an effort to address a problem, it is responsive.

Policy responsiveness is at least as important as policy effectiveness. As Powell (1982, 186) notes, "The most important identifying characteristic of a democratic system is the assertion that the government is doing what the citizens want it to do." The concept of responsiveness captures whether governments are on the cutting edge of efforts to address a problem or whether they are slow to respond to problems and citizen demands. When problems are pressing, governments are sometimes willing to risk resources in order to do something about the problem in the absence of data about likely effectiveness. This impulse can reflect concern, and a willingness to act out of a legitimate sense of urgency. This willingness to act may be very important to citizens, regardless of the ultimate effectiveness of the government action. For example, it is estimated that five million women in Canada are suffering the consequences of violence (Johnson 1998). Surely, there is some urgency to the question of government response.

Responsiveness is not only about speed; quality of response is also an

issue. Are governments just doing something to make it seem as if they are responding to the problem, or are they trying to do as much as they can to address violence against women? Women's groups and international experts have developed a set of policy initiatives that national governments can undertake to address violence against women (Heise, Pitanguy, and Germain 1994; Connors 1994; United Nations 1998b, 1998c). While this set is not exhaustive, it provides a benchmark for the scope of government response. How broad is the response to violence against women? Is it focused only on domestic or "family" violence, or does it also include sexual assault? Is it primarily a criminal justice response aimed at punishment? Is it a narrow social service response aimed solely at after-the-fact treatment of victims? Or is it a broad effort, encompassing more than one form of violence and taking on treatment of victims, punishment of offenders, and prevention of future violence? Why do some governments do all of these things, while others do none? This is an important question, because exploring it will tell us what makes democratic governments more or less disposed to address an issue of critical importance for women, and for society at large.

Violence Against Women

Violence against women takes a number of forms, including female genital mutilation, rape, wife battering, incest, stalking, sexual harassment, and psychological harassment. These categories of violence are referred to as "violence against women" because this violence happens to women at least partly *because* they are women. In its declaration on this subject, the United Nations (1993) defined violence against women as "any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion, or arbitrary deprivations of liberty, whether occurring in public or private life."

The available evidence suggests that violence against women is a widespread problem with appalling consequences. In 1993, a comprehensive national study (using random sampling techniques and legal definitions of crimes) found that about half of all Canadian women were victims of violence; 39 percent reported sexual assault and 34 percent reported physical assault (some women had experienced both forms of violence) (Johnson 1998). National studies in the United States and Belgium revealed similar levels of violence (Tjaden and Thoennes 1998; Belgian Coordinating Committee 1994). Although we need better information about the level and extent of violence against women, there are sufficient data to establish that such violence is a serious public policy problem in all stable democracies

(see appendix A). Among particularly vulnerable categories of women, such as poor women in both developed and developing countries, low-caste women in India, or African American women in the United States, the rates of violence appear to be even higher.

Violence against women has effects that go beyond the harms to the immediate victims. Even women who never become victims of sexual assault or wife beating are expected to alter their behavior to minimize risk: they oughtn't stay late at the office alone, or walk unescorted after dark, or draw public attention to themselves, or be in private spaces with men—even men they know well. Thus, violence against women restricts the ability of all women to take advantage of their rights as citizens of a democratic public.

As governments and women's groups from 180 countries have affirmed, violence against women constitutes a violation of women's human rights (U.S. Department of Labor 1996; Nelson 1996). Governments that claim to be democratic must make defending the human rights and physical security of their citizens a priority. Indeed, most democratic governments have now promised in one public forum or another to address violence against women.

This study focuses on policies that address the victimization of women. This should not be taken to imply that violence against men is nonexistent or unimportant. The violence that afflicts men, however, is a different phenomenon from violence against women and must be analyzed as such. Men and women tend to be victims or perpetrators of different kinds of violence, under different circumstances. Men are more likely to be assaulted by strangers (usually men), while women are more likely to be assaulted by intimates or people they know, also usually men. This is because violence against women is largely a result of women's economic and social dependence on men, as cross-cultural studies have demonstrated (Levinson 1989; Sanday 1981). The phenomenon of violence against women is part of a network of social practices that devalue women and render them dependent on, and thus vulnerable to, men in a wide range of situations (home, employment, traveling in public spaces). Gang wars or barfights, for example, are not the result of one group's being economically and socially dependent on, and therefore vulnerable to, another. The point is not that violence against men is less serious, or the effects on the victims less harmful, but that violence against women is fruitfully analyzed as distinct from these other forms of violence.⁶

In this study, I focus on the categories of sexual assault of women by men and battering of intimate female partners by males. Focusing on these two categories facilitates cross-national comparison because violence against women, rape, and wife beating are concepts used by activist groups and governments in all stable democratic countries. Information on the in-

vidence of and activism around these two types of violence is thus available for all thirty-six countries studied here.

Comparing Government Response

This study does not attempt to explain variance in violence against women itself, but rather variation in government responsiveness to this problem. What makes some governments undertake a broad, multifaceted policy on violence against women while other governments pursue a course of inaction?

Policy refers to “a course of action or inaction pursued under the authority of government” (Hecló 1974, 4). Note that “policy silences” or “non-decisions” can be considered policy outcomes (Conway, Ahern, and Steuernagel 1995; Bachrach and Baratz 1962). *Action* includes statements by government officials, legislation, executive orders, and other activities of government and its representatives.

Government is used here to mean the agencies of highest public authority for a particular territorial unit, as in “the government of India.” Government in this sense is continuous across particular administrations (such as the Carter and Reagan administrations). Governments commit themselves to international treaties that are binding for future administrations, and they often take on the legal responsibilities (such as debts) accumulated over previous administrations. In this sense, the government of Canada is a corporate (if not unified) entity. Governments act through but are not identical to political institutions or administrative structures. Thus, it is possible that constitutional reform would transform administrative structures under the auspices of the same national government. So government is not equivalent to public administrative structures.

This distinction is important for arguments I want to make later in the book. The concept of the state, as I shall demonstrate in chapter 5, is often used to refer to policy, administrative structures, legal codes, and governments at all levels. Because I want to distinguish between national government actions and the structure of public administration, I shall usually use the concept of government, as defined above, rather than state. However, I should say at the outset that I take government, policy, and public administration to be aspects of the broader concept of the state.

A Common Standard for Comparison

Ethnocentrism is always a danger when Westerners seek to develop standards for cross-cultural comparison. It is sometimes assumed that avoiding generalizations across cultures is a guard against ethnocentrism, and this is one reason that both comparativists and feminists prefer to focus

on particular contexts in their analyses. This way of dealing with ethnocentrism, however, assumes that no cross-cultural comparison is possible. But we all know of many useful cross-cultural studies, even studies using large numbers of countries or settings, that have furthered our thinking (see, for example, Esping-Andersen 1990; Gornick, Meyers, and Ross 1997; Halperin 1997; Sanday 1981; and Levinson 1989). Moreover, assuming that others are different and that generalizations do *not* apply to them can be as dangerous as assuming that they do (Narayan 1997; Reinharz 1992). Narayan (1998), for example, joins other Indian feminists in criticizing Western feminists for not seeing dowry deaths as a form of domestic violence. Jane Jacquette points out that ignoring other countries is a form of ethnocentrism particularly virulent among feminists in the United States (cited in Reinharz 1992).

One way to mitigate this problem is to ask whether the standards one is creating would be agreeable to women's movements in the contexts in question. As I have noted, in every country in this study where women's movements are organized (which is all but one—the tiny island nation of Nauru, where there appears to be no mobilization of women as women), they have identified violence against women as an important issue. Indeed, in Beijing in 1995, women's groups from 180 countries signed an agreement stating that violence against women is a problem that demands top priority, and concluding that “violence in all its forms must be stopped” (U.S. Department of Labor 1996).⁷

This agreement reinforced the mounting evidence that violence against women in the form of sexual assault and wife battering is a serious problem everywhere in the world.⁸ For example, standardized victimization surveys, carried out in both developed and developing countries in the early 1990s, showed an alarming prevalence of sexual assault in at least thirty countries (UNICRI 1996). Numerous other studies establish the existence and seriousness of domestic violence in countries as diverse as Norway and Japan, Papua New Guinea and Poland.⁹ Violence against women is a problem in every country considered here.

Despite the diversity of institutional arrangements and legal traditions in the countries included in this study a common standard can be developed to compare the scope of national government response to violence against women. Similar features of the problem and of the existing policy structure across these countries make it possible to identify a common set of areas in which actions or reforms are needed to address violence against women. International experts find that it is a large-scale, deeply rooted problem, not easily attributed to isolated factors such as alcohol use or mental illness (Heise, Pitanguy, and Germain 1994; UN, CEDAW 1998b).

The UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (UN 1993) argues that “violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women” and that violence against women “is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into a subordinate position compared with men.” Indeed, cross-cultural studies of violence against women have found that economic inequality between women and men, cultural patterns of conflict resolution through violence, cultural norms of male dominance, toughness, and honor, and male economic and decision-making authority in the family are the best predictors of high levels of violence against women (Levinson 1989; Sanday 1981). As research on this topic has progressed, the relationship between violence against women and male dominance has become increasingly well established.

Governments can undertake to address violence against women in general, and sexual assault and domestic violence in particular, in several different areas of policy action.¹⁰ A government that addresses more of these areas is more responsive, because the scope of the response is broader. Seven aspects of national government response to violence against women can be meaningfully observed for each of the countries in this study:

- (1) Has there been legal reform dealing with wife battering?
- (2) Has there been legal reform dealing with sexual assault?
- (3) Are there shelters or other forms of emergency housing provision for victims of wife battering? Are they government-funded?
- (4) Are there crisis centers for victims of sexual assault? Are they government-funded?
- (5) Are there government-sponsored programs to train service providers and other professionals who deal with violence against women, such as police, judges, and social workers?
- (6) Are there government-sponsored initiatives to educate the public about violence against women?
- (7) Is there a central agency for coordinating national policies on violence against women?

Each of these elements of government response is explained in more detail below.

(1) and (2) Legal Reform for Wife Battering and Sexual Assault

Regardless of national context, attempts to address violence against women under the rubric of more general laws against violence or assault have generally been unsuccessful. Law enforcement officials have tended to

see the sexual assault and beating of wives as a private affair or a male prerogative that is not covered by general laws against sexual assault or assault more generally. Moreover, female victims of sexual assaults have been viewed with suspicion and have been stigmatized. For these reasons, obtaining an effective response from the law enforcement bureaucracy has generally required both legal reform and training of law enforcement officials from police officers to judges. Legal reform can greatly improve the legal and criminal justice response to sexual assault and domestic violence. For example, language detailing that rape within marriage is a crime is often required before courts will consider rape a possibility in such an intimate relationship. Similarly, "rape shield" provisions protecting victims of sexual assault from a "second violation" as defense attorneys probe their sexual history can greatly improve the likelihood that rape victims will prosecute their assailants (Connors 1989; Dutton 1984; UN, CEDAW, 1994, *Experts at Committee on Elimination of Gender Discrimination*; Elman 1996a; Greece, General Secretariat for Equality 1998; Krishnaraj 1991; Rhode 1989; Women's Research Center [Canada] 1982).

Criminal justice response can be made more effective through coordination with shelters and other service providers. For example, mandatory arrest policies have been much more effective in increasing arrests in those jurisdictions in Britain where such coordination has been undertaken (Canada, House of Commons 1982, 5:63). Similarly, a recent national evaluation of responses to domestic violence in the United States found that when community intervention projects coordinated police, judicial, and social service responses, they had "a significant impact on both police and judicial responses to woman battering" (Chalk and King 1998, 113). This underlines the importance of coupling legal reform with social policy initiatives.

(3) and (4) *Funding for Emergency Housing and Crisis Centers*

Emergency housing and financial assistance are of particular importance. In addition to providing women with an emergency escape, shelters appear to play a pivotal role in helping them seek appropriate support services (Gondolf and Fisher 1988). As the U.S. National Research Council notes, "Housing, education or job training and acquisition, economic self-sufficiency, child care, safety and other issues need to be resolved before a woman can completely separate from an abusive partner on whom she has been emotionally or financially dependent" (Chalk and King 1998, 113). Many women must leave their homes with their children at a moment's notice to escape a violent partner. These women must be assured that they will be able to go someplace where they will be safe and can get food, clothing,

and assistance with protection-from-abuse orders where applicable. Material provision is especially important, because many battered women are economically dependent on their male assailants. Counseling for children who witness domestic violence may also be provided through shelters, and such counseling can have a significant effect on children's attitudes toward the acceptability of domestic violence (Jaffe et al. 1986; Wagar and Rodway 1995; Chalk and King 1998, 293). Some observers also suggest that shelters provide battered women with a community in which they can discuss their situation with other women seeking refuge, and that this opportunity for shared analysis creates a sense of empowerment and a better understanding of the power dynamics behind intimate-partner violence.

Although there are few formal evaluations of shelters in terms of their impact on violence, one well-designed study did find that they can reduce the risk of violence for a woman who is taking control of her life in other ways (Berk, Newton, and Berk 1986). Similarly, counseling and advocacy for victims of sexual assault can facilitate their negotiation of the criminal justice system and make it more likely that they will report abuse and prosecute the offender (Elman 1996a; Krishnaraj 1991; Sullivan and Davidson 1991; Tan et al. 1995). Thus, provision of aid to victims helps both to decrease their distress and prevent further violence.

Government funding for women's shelters and crisis centers is particularly important. Initially established by autonomous women's collectives, these facilities were soon overwhelmed by demand. In retrospect, this is not surprising; a handful of shelters and crisis centers could hardly be expected to handle the millions of women affected in each country. Recall that national studies in Canada, the United States, and Belgium have found that about half of all women have, in their lifetime, been the victim of some form of violence at the hands of men. The scale of need in this area and the pressing nature of the problem suggest that government funding is needed in order to provide adequate services.

(5) Training for Police, Social Workers, and Other Service Providers

Activists worry that victims of sexual assault and domestic violence are not adequately protected from further physical and emotional violations through the legal process or from retaliatory attacks by their original abusers. One former shelter worker recently told me, "Policymakers just don't understand the danger that these women are in if they attempt to solve their problems through the criminal justice system" (U.S. Department of Justice 1998). Some women are even vulnerable to a second violation from the very police who are supposed to protect them: custodial rape is a seri-

ous problem in many countries, such as India and Brazil. Some countries, including Canada and Israel, have developed special training packages for police. Costa Rica, Colombia, and India have established women's police stations or special units of women police officers.

Social workers, lawyers, judges, and others who interact with victims are also more effective when they are more knowledgeable about the dynamics of violence against women. Training these service providers can mean important improvements for victims of violence when they seek help (see, for example, Heise, Pitanguy, and Germain 1994; Krishnaraj 1991).

(6) Public Education Programs

In order to help identify and stop violence against women and to prevent it before it starts, governments can initiate public education programs, both broadly based media campaigns and workplace and school programs. National public education programs (such as those in Australia in the early 1980s) appear to have some effect in influencing both men and women to think that wife battering is unacceptable. Similarly, violence-prevention programs in schools have succeeded in changing the attitudes of children and young adults toward the acceptability of violence (Jaffe et al. 1986; Jones 1991; Krajewski et al. 1996; Lavoie et al. 1995). Whether public education programs translate into an actual reduction in violence is not known (Chalk and King 1998, 114). In any event, they are important in sending abused women the message that they should not tolerate abuse and that the community as a whole does not condone it.

(7) A Coordinating Authority

A comprehensive government response to violence against women will attend to the immediate needs of victims (such as shelter, police protocols for dealing with victims, rape crisis services, and protection from further abuse) as well as to long-term, preventative efforts such as public education programs (Connors 1989, 1994; Bunch 1991; Davies 1994; Dobash and Dobash 1992; Heise, Pitanguy, and Germain 1994; Heise, Raikes, Watts, and Zwi 1994; Krishnaraj 1991; Japan, Office of Gender Equality 1998a, 1998b; UN 1993; Botswana, Women's Affairs Division 1995). The wide range of policy action required for an effective response to violence against women suggests that an interdepartmental coordinating authority is in order (Hague 1998). Such an office can, for example, ensure that efforts to provide victim services are linked to law enforcement responses to calls by women in distress. Some countries, such as Canada and Australia, have already created such a coordinating body. Germany, Sweden, and Norway

have recently introduced coordinating centers on a pilot basis. Thus, an official body to oversee implementation and coordination of policies is an important part of government response to violence against women.

It might be assumed that more decentralized governments, such as federal states, are less likely to have a centralized agency to coordinate national policy. Federalism does raise questions about the validity of focusing on national government response, questions that I address below. However, if we stipulate that we are focusing on policies enacted at a national level, then whether these policies are coordinated or work at cross-purposes is an important question with respect to the quality of government response. Empirically, it does not appear that federal governments are any less likely to have such coordinating mechanisms.

These seven areas of government response to violence against women are consistent with the main recommendations for national action developed by the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) at Beijing and updated in committee discussion of the reports of the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, (UN, CEDAW 1998b, paras. 26-44).¹¹

Scope of National Policy

Among the thirty-six countries considered here, I rank national policies on violence against women as better or worse based on their scope (how many of these seven areas are addressed?) and their leadership among stable democratic nations (was this government the first or the last to implement a policy?)(Putnam 1993). A government that addresses more areas is enacting a broader, more multifaceted response, and a government that addresses an area earlier is more responsive to the problem. Ranking government response on these two dimensions (scope and timing) provides a picture of which governments are doing more to address violence against women and which governments are lagging. These measures appear accurately to reflect the consensus of international experts as to which countries are aggressively and comprehensively attacking the problem at a national level and which countries entered this policy arena later on and less thoroughly. For example, Canada and Australia have addressed more issues over the study period, and addressed them earlier, than any other country. Similarly, these measures identify Costa Rica and Israel as leaders among developing countries.

All seven policy areas are important for addressing violence against women, both symbolically and substantively. Note that I am not trying to

find out which governments enact policies that result in the greatest reduction of violence. Many of the policy measures considered here are aimed at serving victims or raising awareness, rather than at directly reducing the overall incidence of violence. Instead, I am asking which governments do more types of important things to address violence against women, and which of them do so sooner. What spurs governments to take more action on violence against women, and which factors appear to block government action? This question can be distinguished from whether the policies adopted actually reduce levels of violence.

Although I am not focusing on effectiveness, this is not a study of responsiveness in purely symbolic terms. For example, in examining whether a government funds shelters, I asked first whether shelters in fact existed and whether they received funding from the government. In many cases I spoke directly with shelter representatives, who viewed financial assistance from government as critical to their operations. In other words, I asked about whether shelters actually received money from government, not whether governments promised to spend money. Similarly, in studying public education and training programs, I was able to obtain materials disseminated by these programs or to confirm with independent parties (such as scholars or activists) that the government was in fact undertaking education programs. So although the measure does not focus on implementation, it is not a measure of purely symbolic governmental activity.

Some readers will want to disaggregate the legal reforms from the redistributive aspects of government response, since the former seem like purely symbolic reforms that involve little cost to government and are therefore easier to undertake. I dispute this interpretation. Legal reforms may not put food on a woman's table, but they can have an important effect on her treatment in the criminal justice system. The women agitating for such reforms certainly do not view their efforts as merely symbolic politics. Legal reforms that specifically recognize rape and physical abuse in marriage as crimes have made it more difficult (although not impossible) for judges to conclude that such incidents are matters of private concern. Rape shield laws, in spite of their flaws and imperfect implementation, have been viewed as providing important protections for women victims of violence seeking redress. Indeed, mandatory arrest policies, rape shield laws, and other criminal justice reforms in the United States and Canada have been much more controversial politically than funding for domestic violence shelters and rape crisis centers.

It is not always the case that spending state money indicates a greater commitment to addressing a problem than does "mere" legal reform. In dis-

cussing violence against women with officials in Norway, for example, I found that they were quite amenable to speaking about redistributive policies for shelters and crisis centers but resisted using language that singled women out for special treatment, and that they viewed the concept of violence against women with disdain. I was told that such a focus on women was inferior to a gender-neutral stance, which “treated all citizens equally.” Elman (1996a) tells a similar story about Sweden: efforts to raise the issue of violence against women were characterized as “shrill” and “divisive.” This insistence on gender neutrality may be one reason that the Nordic countries lagged behind others in efforts to address violence against women. In this case, the seemingly lower-cost policies of public education, training, and legal reform likely met with the greatest resistance.

I contend that all of the seven types of policy initiatives identified above are important in addressing violence against women, and that no one policy can be assumed to be more important than the others. We can say that the more policies out of the seven that a government adopts, the more committed it is to addressing violence against women. Thus, we can ask about the number of policy initiatives as an indicator of the scope of a government’s response, regardless of which particular elements are included. An examination of patterns involving the specific elements of the response and the relationships among them is left for future research.

The question at hand concerns the overall structure (specifically, the scope) of the policy response to violence. Focusing on the overall structure of government response, as opposed to particular programs, involves a trade-off. As Esping-Andersen (1990, 2) notes, “Since our intention is to understand the ‘big picture’, we shall not be able to dwell on the detailed characteristics of the various social programs.” Nevertheless, understanding government response to violence against women more generally should ultimately provide insights into why, when, and how particular programs are adopted.

Temporal Focus

This study focuses on the responsiveness of democratic governments in the late twentieth century. Although some national governments reformed rape laws or began funding shelters in the mid-1970s, many countries did not begin to address the problem of violence against women until the latter half of the 1980s, and many more only in the first half of the 1990s. Thus, I study the development of government response since 1974. The most recent year for which I gathered data is 1994, the last year before the Beijing conference.

Focus on National-Level Policies

In examining the seven aspects of government response to violence against women, I focus on national government response for a variety of reasons. National government action has important symbolic and practical consequences, even in very decentralized states. It often indicates the importance of an issue area to the political community. For example, in the United States, although state and local governments have been responding to violence against women for more than twenty years, the amount of public attention and legitimacy the issue has received in both scholarly and mainstream political circles increased after the passage by Congress of the Violence Against Women Act in 1994. This act served to recognize violence against women as a category of national government action and reinforced the growing international consensus that dealing with rape and wife battering is an issue of basic human rights—fundamental to the functioning of the democratic polity and too important to be left to the discretion of state and local governments. In general, action by the central government, even if it consists only of providing funding to local areas, is a key symbolic indicator that the political community is seriously addressing a problem.

This focus on national government action is meaningful even in federal systems when responsibility for the issue in question belongs to the unit (state or province). For example, in both Canada and the United States, the federal government frequently buys its way into areas such as health care policy or legal drinking age—which are understood to be constitutionally allocated as a provincial or state responsibility—by tying federal funding to policy changes. In the area of violence against women, funding from the federal government for shelters, crisis centers, education, and training have galvanized state and local governments into action as they endeavor to secure and spend this money. Similarly, in Australia, although legal reforms with respect to rape and domestic violence tend to be criminal justice reforms that are state-level responsibilities, the national government has undertaken to develop model legislation in both areas, which it recommends to state governments. These actions indicate that federal governments can and often do take action on legal reform, funding for shelters, and the like even when these are formally the responsibility of the units.

Scholars of gender and public policy have emphasized the importance of regional and local variation in the impact of national policies (Duncan 1995; Haney 1996; Sabatier 1999). Certainly, the study of state and local governments and subgovernments is critical to a complete understanding of gender and public policy. It is estimated that in the United States there are more than 86,700 local governments (Peters 1998). International institu-

tions have also become more important for domestic policymaking. The interconnection between these different levels makes understanding policy outcomes and processes extremely challenging.

Pragmatically, of course, cross-national comparison, even on a smaller scale than I undertake here, requires simplification. Even in one national context, and even leaving aside international influences, it is impossible to study policy at all levels of government in any comprehensive fashion. Focusing on national government response is one way to make cross-national comparison feasible.

More importantly, however, this study concentrates on the determinants of national policy outputs because this still seems to me to be the most important level of government for setting the national agenda and responding to large-scale problems. I do consider (briefly) local and international influences as possible determinants of national government response, and it is certainly true that state and local governments are often important in implementing policies or in determining policy outcomes. However, in this study I maintain an analytic focus on the responsiveness of national government, not the outcomes of national policies. This helps to simplify the analytic task at hand: local and regional governments are considered only as possible determinants of national government response, not as an aspect of that response itself.

Variation Across Different Groups of Women

The policies considered here have differing levels of importance for different groups of women. In the United States, for example, women of color have often felt alienated from shelters run by white feminists, for a variety of reasons (Matthews 1993). In multilingual states such as India, Canada, and Belgium (and increasingly the United States), the language in which services are provided can determine how accessible they are to minority women. This raises the question of whether the seven-item indicator measures government responsiveness to all women or just to middle-class women of the dominant racial or ethnic group. There may be different dynamics behind responsiveness to women of privileged classes and attention to the needs of women from marginalized groups. As one observer has noted, it may be that women of privileged classes are more effective in eliciting government response precisely because they speak the language (literally or figuratively) of governing elites.¹²

One might be able to get at this question empirically by asking whether any of the shelters and other outreach services funded by the national government are targeted to women of vulnerable or disadvantaged groups,

such as immigrant women, women of color, or poor women.¹³ The existing data on policies to address violence against women did not permit such an investigation for the entire data set. However, I was able to consider this question through an examination of policies to address violence against indigenous, immigrant, and minority women as part of my analysis of policy development in Canada and Australia. This discussion is presented in chapter 6.¹⁴

Focus on Democratic Countries

Policymaking as it affects violence against women is likely to involve different dynamics in democratic and nondemocratic countries. First, in democratic policymaking, we expect governments to respond to publicly articulated problems. Second, where there is a minimum degree of respect for civil rights and freedom of association, one can expect that women's groups will be able to organize peaceful demonstrations and put pressure on government without facing the threat of torture or incarceration. The degree of latitude afforded women's organizations, or whether they are permitted at all, can vary greatly among nondemocratic regimes. Third, in democratic countries, one might expect women legislators to have an effect on public policy, since they are in principle free to engage in deliberation within and without their parties and may raise new issues or insights previously excluded from the legislative arena. In nondemocratic countries, women legislators may not have the freedom to dissent from a male majority and so one might not expect to see an effect. Analytically, then, in order to explore the hypotheses offered in this book, it makes sense to focus on democratic governments.

A very thin definition of democracy is necessary here. I am examining countries in which, at a minimal level, basic civil liberties (freedom of association, freedom of speech, freedom of the press) are respected and in which free and fair elections are regularly held. I selected countries using data from the Comparative Survey of Freedom, which has been conducted by Freedom House since the 1970s and aims to "provide an annual evaluation of political rights and civil liberties everywhere in the world" (Freedom House 1997). Freedom House data have been used to distinguish democracies from nondemocracies by a number of other scholars of comparative and international politics (LeDuc, Niemi, and Norris 1996; Bremer 1992; Maoz and Abdollali 1989). The survey evaluates the freedoms enjoyed by people in practice, not merely the rights formally guaranteed to them. Political rights include free and fair election of government authorities, freedom to

organize in political groupings or parties, the presence of an organized opposition, and a reasonable degree of self-determination for minorities. Thirteen civil liberties, encompassing freedom of expression, association, rule of law, and some degree of personal autonomy from the state, are examined. I view democracy as a continuum, and this operationalization reflects the minimal level of democracy required for the purposes of this study. Many of the countries I consider have a long way to go before they approximate an *ideal* democracy.

I have also used Freedom House classifications of countries to determine which ones were continuously democratic over the twenty-year period covered by this study. Some degree of continuity over time in a country's respect for minimal democratic rights and procedures is important in order for political movements and organizations to develop and for processes of accountability, such as elections, to take effect. States that were continuously democratic from 1974 to 1994 were included in the study.¹⁵ Based on these decision rules, the total number of countries in the study is thirty-six (see table 1-1).

Some will object that while all these countries meet minimal criteria for democracy, it is absurd to include countries such as India and Venezuela in the same category as European nations with long histories of stability and democracy. I disagree that these countries are obviously in a different category of democratic government. Many developing countries have been

Table 1-1: 36 Countries Continuously Democratic from 1974 to 1994

Australia	Greece	New Zealand
Austria	Iceland	Norway
Bahamas	India*	Papua New Guinea*
Barbados	Ireland	Portugal*
Belgium	Israel	Spain*
Botswana	Italy	Sweden
Canada	Jamaica	Switzerland
Colombia*	Japan	Trinidad & Tobago
Costa Rica	Luxembourg*	U.K.
Denmark	Mauritius*	U.S.
Finland	Nauru	Venezuela*
France	Netherlands	West Germany

Source: Freedom House, 1991, 1997

* Countries classified as "partially free" for less than three years of the study period and "free" for the remainder of it.

democratic longer than some European ones: India has been an independent democracy since 1947, while Spain and Portugal were controlled by fascists until the mid-1970s. Costa Rica has been independent since 1820 and Venezuela since 1821, which means they have been independent longer than Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. The literacy rate in Costa Rica and Jamaica (94 percent) is higher than in Portugal (84 percent) (Russett and Starr 1989). Women didn't get the national vote in Switzerland until 1971 (Norris 1987, 131), while they could vote in all the developing countries considered here long before that. For our present purposes, then, these thirty-six countries constitute a set of continuously democratic countries that are roughly comparable—not because they are similar in all respects, but because they are sufficiently similar in the relevant respects (Sartori 1991).

Sources of Data

Data on government response to violence against women have been compiled for this study from a variety of primary and secondary sources, including published articles and studies of government response to violence against women; CEDAW documents, including shadow reports, committee conclusions, and country reports to CEDAW; U.S. Department of State human rights reports; Human Rights Watch reports; publications of women's organizations and other activist groups; and my personal communications with activists and government representatives in the countries.

There are multiple sources for every country, including at least one government source and one source independent of the national government. For a list of sources by country, see appendix C.

Method and Methodology

This book is a global study that combines qualitative and quantitative methods.¹⁶ In comparing a large number of countries, the study is somewhat unusual for both the field of comparative politics and policy and the field of feminist scholarship. Single-country case studies may be the most common form of analysis in comparative politics (Peters 1998). In addition, many scholars associate feminist approaches with qualitative, interpretive, and historical methods.

However, there is growing acknowledgment that quantitative studies may also make a contribution to both comparative and feminist work. There are ever more works in comparative feminist policy studies and in comparative politics more generally that employ a large number of cross-national comparisons (for example, Gornick, Meyers, and Ross 1997;

Gough 1997; Bradshaw et al. 1993; Siaroff 2000; and Silver and Dowley 2000).¹⁷ In addition, as Dobash and Dobash (1998, 9) note with respect to feminist scholarship:

Until recently, many (although certainly not all) feminist scholars have stated a clear preference for qualitative methods, believing them to be more humane and more likely to produce valid results about sensitive issues. This orthodoxy has now been challenged, and examples of different methods, including the strongly quantitative and a combination of quantitative and qualitative, have now joined the once exclusive domain of qualitative research among such scholars.

Harding (1987) argues that feminist methodology means asking questions about the purpose or aim of research and about the relationship between the researcher and the research, as well as drawing on women's experiences or perspectives for new theoretical and empirical insights. Thus, it is not a particular method or technique that is feminist, but rather the end to which it is put. Methodologies may be feminist, but methods or techniques are just tools that can be used for a variety of feminist or nonfeminist ends. Many of the qualitative methods that feminist scholars prize, such as ethnography and participant observation, have traditionally been used for nonfeminist research and have not protected the investigators against male bias or ethnocentrism. Quantitative methods, depending on how they are used, may be historical, interpretive, or feminist methods. Like participant observation or discourse analysis, statistical methods can be more or less historically informed or grounded, and more or less ethnocentric.

If there is one principle that should guide selection of feminist research methods, it is the same as that which should guide all good research: to use the method of analysis best suited to the question and the data. As Dobash and Dobash (1998, 3) note, "many different methods can and must be employed in seeking to expand empirical knowledge and theoretical insights, and . . . there is no 'perfect' method nor one which is always the 'best'. Instead, there is a wide array of methods that suit the different tasks necessary to make up the whole area of study." (See also Reinharz 1992; and Neilson 1990.)

For these reasons, I employ both quantitative and qualitative methods.

The Quantitative Analysis

In the quantitative part of the analysis, I summarize the patterns of government responsiveness that I observe cross-nationally, and I ask which fac-

tors appear to be the most strongly associated with a better government response to violence against women. I compare policy development across all thirty-six countries that were continuously democratic between 1974 and 1994. In order to identify the factors that might explain differing outcomes across countries, I employ a commonly used statistical technique, multiple regression. Multiple regression is a form of analysis that helps in sorting out *how much* of the variance in one variable or factor (the dependent variable) can be reasonably attributed to changes in one of several possible explanatory factors (independent variables). Strictly speaking, such analysis examines how strongly the dependent variable is associated with each independent variable. Multivariate analysis is very useful for evaluating the relative importance of a number of closely intertwined variables.

Often, statistical methods are used to make generalizations about a wider population on the basis of a sample. In this study, I am considering the countries in table 1-1 to be the complete set, or population, of stable democracies in the late twentieth century. For this reason, I am not employing sampling techniques. I am using statistical methods to describe and assess the strength of the relationships I see in the countries under study. For a fuller explanation of these methods, see appendix B.

The Qualitative Analysis

In this study, I employ some analysis of particular cases of policy development as a sort of “plausibility probe.” Does the general argument I am making about government responsiveness capture the dynamic of policy development in particular countries over time? Claims about causality must include a convincing story about why the cause would have the observed effect. What is the process by which the cause exerts its influence? The case-study method of process tracing is useful for answering this question.

Process tracing is a method for assembling bits of evidence into a story of what happened, a detailing of a sequence of events leading up to the event of interest. In studies of foreign policy decision-making, for example, process tracing

is intended to investigate and explain the decision process by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes. A process-tracing approach entails abandonment of the strategy of “black-boxing” the decision process; instead, this decision-making process is the center of investigation. The process-tracing approach attempts to uncover what stimuli the actors attend to; the decision process that makes use of these stimuli to arrive at decisions; the actual be-

havior that then occurs; the effect of various institutional arrangements on attention, processing, and behavior; and the effect of other variables of interest on attention, processing, and behavior. (George and McKeown 1985, 35)

Throughout the book, but mostly in chapter 6, I attempt to show how the argument I advance makes sense in particular cases. I pay special attention to whether my argument captures the dynamics of policy development in the eight most responsive countries (Australia, Canada, the United States, France, Ireland, Costa Rica, Israel, and New Zealand). I focus most of my attention in chapter 5 on Canada and Australia, because these countries have responded more quickly and comprehensively to violence against women than any other democratic national government. Examining these eight cases, I ask whether the general story I develop through statistical analysis seems to describe the development of policies on violence against women in these countries. Thus, the statistical analysis is combined with a series of narrative accounts in order to develop a model of the policymaking process as it plays out in national government response to violence against women in stable democracies.

The Comparative Method

All comparative studies must strike a balance between paying attention to the details of each case and describing overall patterns across cases (Sartori 1991). Global studies and so-called large-*N* studies—those involving more than twenty countries—are often criticized as superficial or misleading (Peters 1998; Blomquist 1999). In order to create measures that “travel,” it may be necessary to define categories so vague that they are meaningless. “Conceptual stretching” to accommodate cross-national differences may result in concepts so vague that they include phenomena that are fundamentally different (Sartori 1991). Peters (1998), for example, argues that global studies simplify relationships so much that they cease to be relevant to “real countries” and real-world settings. After all, he argues, we aren’t interested in the distributions of data themselves, we are interested in particular political settings.

These concerns about oversimplification and superficiality are important. We must confront the question: Have I created a “dog-bat” (Sartori’s example of a nonsense category), or some other conceptual category that is meaningless? Does the focus on a large number of countries render this study irrelevant to scholars who seek to understand one or a few national contexts?

The measure of government response that I have developed here is certainly a rough one, and one that permits considerable variation in actual policy. However, it has “face validity”—that is, it seems to make sense given our intuitions and existing knowledge about the subject. The measure correctly identifies those countries that experts acknowledge to be the leading nations in this policy area. Similarly, nations that are doing nothing are clearly and correctly identified. Moreover, this study depends to a large degree on exactly the rich national accounts of the type that many comparativists advocate: country case studies made this study possible. Thus, although it is true that the richness and depth of country (or city) case studies is sacrificed to some degree in this analysis, the measures used are still meaningful. If this study can speak in turn to the country-specific research on which it draws—and I think it can—the study of comparative feminist policy will be advanced.