

INTRODUCTION

CITIZENSHIP IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY ARGENTINA

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At many moments in the twentieth century, the meaning of citizenship in Argentina has changed. In 1912, electoral reform expanded voting rights from elite men to include all men born or naturalized in the country.¹ Only in 1947 did the franchise expand to include women. Yet, that alone is not the story of Argentine citizenship. When electoral democracy was interrupted in 1930, 1943, 1955, 1962, 1966, and 1976, people did not cease to be citizens. When Juan Perón became president in 1946, he campaigned heavily on the idea of social justice. During his populist rule, the rights of citizenship came to encompass greater access to social services and housing as well as higher wages. Throughout the century, citizenship—as a concept invoked by diverse groups of people—has defined people’s relationship with the state and their expectations about that state. It also shaped the rights and duties of not only Argentines but also foreign nationals living in the country.

The language of citizenship was also fundamentally about belonging. Scholars in this volume and beyond use terms such as *cultural*, *moral*, and *social citizenship*. In seeking out these cultural, moral, and social requirements, groups with power excluded others whose status in Argentine society was vulnerable. Even if formally citizens, workers, indigenous peoples, racialized groups, leftists, and religious minorities have often not been included in the Argentine body politic or have not experienced the same rights as others in many periods of the past century. Citizenship is, therefore, both a category of inclusion and of exclusion and one of rights and of the denial of those rights.

When indigenous peoples and Argentines outside major urban centers received fewer social services from the national and provincial governments over the course of the twentieth century; when employers, the police, or the military used force to quell strikes and worker protests in the 1910s and 1920s; when female sex workers rather than their male clients were disproportionately targeted by state health authorities as the culprits in the spread of venereal disease; when military governments detained, tortured, or killed dissenters in the 1970s and 1980s; and when growing numbers of urban poor observed others with better access to education, land, and water, one sees ample evidence of social exclusion and the denial of rights. Yet these examples of inequality are also part of making citizens in Argentina.

The chapters in this book chart the evolving meanings of political, social, and cultural belonging in Argentina. Over the course of the twentieth century, the application of the label of *citizen* or its selective use affected the lives of millions of people. The volume's authors examine the power of the Argentine state and of other social actors in defining the terms and boundaries of citizenship. Examining immigration, science, race, sport, Peronism, and dictatorship, the volume illustrates how different groups and individuals developed and contested the meaning of citizenship in the country. This book argues that *citizenship* is an expansive and malleable concept worthy of analysis. It is a term that appears in sources and historiography, but its meaning is all too often taken for granted.

DEFINING CITIZENSHIP

Workers, politicians, elites, indigenous peoples, immigrants, and others in Argentina had a stake in defining citizenship. According to Anna Lundberg, citizenship describes “the relationship between individuals and a controlling authority in which rights and obligations are regulated.”² At the same time, however, through this very relationship, “women, minority groups, and the poor become outsiders or second-class citizens.”³ Various social groups have a vested interest in limiting or expanding the boundaries of inclusion and in acquiring rights or denying them to others. By negotiating the meaning of citizenship, various groups—in political, social, cultural, and economic spheres—define it in terms of rights and duties that every resident of a society has in relation to one another and to the overarching system. Kathleen Canning and Sonya Rose have proposed that “citizenship can be understood as a political

status assigned to individuals by states, as a relation of belonging to specific communities, or as a set of social practices that define the relationships between peoples and states and among peoples within communities.”⁴ Rose adds that it can be helpful to think of citizenship “as a discursive framework, as a malleable language referring to the relationship between individuals and a political community.”⁵

In the context of a country transformed by mass migration between the 1870s and the 1930s and again in the two decades after the Second World War, citizenship in Argentina in the sense of legal status or nationality was a concern for millions of people. Starting in 1913, government officials and public health advocates deemed disease sufficient grounds to impede entry to the country, thereby marking certain groups ineligible for citizenship.⁶ In the 1920s, legislators also sought to exclude single mothers, political activists, prostitutes, beggars, and alcoholics attempting to immigrate to Argentina, all with a similar logic of protecting the national body from people who supposedly had the potential to become internal threats.⁷

Children and parents often complicated the categories of citizen and foreigner in the country.⁸ In 1910, 46 percent of the 1.2 million residents of the city of Buenos Aires were foreign nationals, and in 1914, 30 percent of the country’s 7.9 million residents were foreigners.⁹ Nonnaturalized foreign nationals were the parents of many of the Argentine citizens who made up the other 54 percent of the population of Buenos Aires or the 70 percent of the population born in the country. The demographic reality of the country in the early twentieth century meant that many foreign nationals had a deep interest in questions of citizenship. Aware that their children could or should have certain rights and duties, noncitizens could also participate in public debates about the terms of citizenship.

State-funded or state-regulated education had the same impact on all families in Argentina, regardless of whether the pupils or the parents were Argentine citizens. Legislation made school attendance obligatory in 1884 in the city of Buenos Aires and in all national territories, and the country’s autonomous provinces passed similar legislation in the following decades. Nevertheless, while this official policy can serve as an example of a right and a duty of citizenship, attendance rates languished everywhere in the country outside the city and province of Buenos Aires.¹⁰ As the century wore on, millions of Argentine children did not complete their elementary education. Some children and youth attended only sporadically or dropped out in order

to meet the needs of the family economy. A lack of public services in some areas also made it difficult to provide universal access to education. This enduring deficit illustrates an important element of citizenship politics.

In the founding discourse of the public school system from the 1880s, the themes of preventing crime, fostering peace, promoting general well-being, and securing the benefits of liberty appeared frequently.¹¹ Argentine education reformers believed they could focus on the next generation and impose specific criteria of citizenship while older, less desirable civic and social cultures would vanish with the passage of time.¹² Language also became a central feature of the nascent school system and of the evolving definition of civic and cultural belonging in Argentina.¹³ In 1910 José María Ramos Mejía, president of the National Council of Education, stated that “the better we teach our language in schools, the more the child will be bound to his land, even when he is not taught for expressly patriotic purposes.”¹⁴ He also asserted, “It is well known that the mastery of a language that is spoken in a country can be a way to ensure that the country is loved and can be something that unites the men who inhabit it. Studying language has so much importance that in terms of patriotic education many feel that it is the only way to cultivate patriotism.”¹⁵

Citizenship—in the sense of nationality—could be acquired in Argentina, but doing so in the early twentieth century was uncommon. In highlighting the exclusionary vision of national belonging held by many Argentine elites, Julia Rodríguez writes that it was one thing to welcome Europeans as laborers and agricultural peons, but “it was another thing to welcome them as citizens.”¹⁶ Conversely, Lilia Ana Bertoni has shown that a group of prominent Argentines in the 1880s and 1890s, including Domingo Sarmiento, Roque Sáenz Peña, and Estanislao Zeballos, very much wanted to encourage naturalization. These liberal reformers believed that if a large portion of men were not politically represented, they would challenge the legitimacy of state authority.¹⁷

As Samuel Baily notes, until a major electoral reform in 1912 (the Sáenz Peña Law), the Argentine political system “consisted of a number of powerful groups . . . competing within a restricted arena to influence decisions of the national, provincial, and city governments. . . . Elections were a mechanism to provide the peaceful rotation of offices among the members of the recognized political groups, not a way for all adult male citizens to express their views and influence governmental actions.”¹⁸ Because citizenship did not grant the majority of residents in the country, especially workers, access to political power, few foreigners took on Argentine citizenship. Indeed, at the height of mass migration in 1914, only 1.4 percent of immigrants to the country had

become naturalized citizens. Compared to rates of approximately 50 percent in the United States and Canada at the same time, this is strikingly low.¹⁹ In seeking to understand this divergence, José Moya notes that “foreigners [in Argentina] had all the rights of citizens (except the right to vote in national elections—a dubious advantage, given Argentina’s oligarchical political system, particularly before the Sáenz Peña Law of 1912 established universal male suffrage and the secret ballot) but were exempted from the most cumbersome civic obligation: military service.”²⁰ Mandatory military service existed in Argentina from 1901 to 1994, whereas conscription existed in the United States during World War I and from 1940 to 1973 and only at the tail ends of both world wars in Canada.²¹ Moreover, in North America, the nature of the political system, including ward politics in the United States and elected school board trustees in Canada, provided a local and tangible incentive to immigrants to naturalize, as did some restrictions in the United States on who could work in government jobs and in Canada in receiving homestead grants.²²

Citizenship could also be lost in Argentina in the early twentieth century. Any Argentine-born woman who married a foreign national took on the citizenship of her husband.²³ In an 1897 court case, an Argentine judge ruled that a woman implicitly consented to this practice and that losing or retaining her citizenship was a question of her own free will.²⁴ This system of “dependent citizenship” persisted into the late 1920s in Argentina.²⁵ The country was not, however, unique. As Candice Bredbenner highlights, married women across the Americas “were involuntarily divested of their citizenship by laws that demanded that a married woman assume her husband’s nationality.”²⁶ In the United States, feminists who lobbied to change immigration and naturalization laws “challenged the traditional distribution of power and privilege within marriage and among citizens.”²⁷ This issue, which was slowly created by the combination of increased immigration and nineteenth-century legal systems oriented around male authority, was largely put to rest when nineteen countries in the Americas signed the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States in 1933.²⁸ However, since Argentine women could not vote until 1947, the possible loss of nationality through marriage was not the prime concern of Argentine feminists in the first third of the twentieth century; instead, they challenged other elements of their civic exclusion.²⁹

In an era before female suffrage and few entitlements to social welfare services, the threat of deportation of native-born women was a crucial factor that drove feminist groups in the western world to challenge the notion of dependent citizenship. In Argentina, the Law of Residence (1902) and the Law of

Social Defense (1910) targeted in particular immigrant anarchists, socialists, and labor leaders.³⁰ These laws gave the state the power to deport not only foreign nationals but also their Argentine-born wives. The dependent citizenship of wives gave all Argentine women the potential to become second-class citizens. Every Argentine-born woman could lose her citizenship while no Argentine-born man could lose his. Eli Nathans, writing about Imperial Germany, contends that one reason governments claimed to be reticent to change citizenship and naturalization laws regarding married women was the concern about breaking up families.³¹ This citizenship policy allowed the state to deport former female citizens while maintaining both the moral family and patriarchal power. According to Nathans, “Had German women been given the option of retaining their citizenship upon marriage, or becoming dual citizens, the state’s power to exclude resident foreigners would have been significantly weakened” because deporting men would break up those families.³²

CITIZENSHIP AND THE STATE

Citizenship and the state depend on one another. Rogers Brubaker contends that “every modern state identifies a particular set of persons as its citizens and defines all others as noncitizens” and that it is an instrument of social closure.³³ Even the broadest definition of citizenship (extending beyond questions of nationality and voting rights) revolves entirely around the relationship between the state and a group people who inhabit the territory that the state controls. That is not to suggest a top-down imposition of bureaucratic or elite desire. However, even if a social group succeeds in setting the terms of civic inclusion and forces public officials to change their policies of inclusion, the primary locus of their engagement is the state. As Canning and Rose note, “Invocations of citizenship can serve at times to buttress the integrative practices of states, while in other instances they might enunciate visions or claims of those formally excluded from citizenship.”³⁴ If the nation is a cultural definition of groupness and the state a political one, citizenship—with its flexible usages—is the analytical category that brings the two together and that can either shrink or expand the boundaries of the nation or the authority of the state. Argentine or Latin American nationalism and nation building are not only oriented around the nation-state but also around how that state interacts with its citizens, noncitizens, and second-class citizens.

Every national community is bound by political and ethnocultural definitions of belonging, and these two poles incorporate some and exclude others.

In the words of Rogers Brubaker, the idea that “cultural nationality and legal citizenship should be coextensive” has shaped how these state builders have imagined their nation-states.³⁵ In Argentina in 1900, foreign-born Europeans enjoyed more rights and privileges than native-born indigenous peoples. In the year 2000, residents born in Europe or in neighboring South American countries officially had the same status, while individual decisions and systemic prejudices typically gave a seventy-year-old Spaniard more rights than a twenty-five-year-old Bolivian. These are but two examples of how ethnocultural visions of belonging play a role alongside political ones. On paper and following solely a legal definition of citizenship, foreign nationals from anywhere in the world would have the same access to legal recourse or property rights regardless of skin color or socioeconomic class, and all people born in the country, whether they identify as indigenous or of European ancestry, would enjoy the same rights and privileges. Yet the boundaries of civic inclusion that oscillate between political and ethnocultural definitions of belonging have made the meaning of citizenship fluid in Argentina and across the Americas.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, liberal political ideologies governed notions of—among other things—citizenship in Argentina.³⁶ The Constitution of 1853, the Code of Commerce of 1859, and the Penal Code of 1886, as well as the law on universal public education of 1884, were all part of the growing liberal order. It is this liberal ideology that shaped how state actors interacted with people in Argentina in the first third of the twentieth century.³⁷ As Jorge Nállim shows in chapter 6, the Argentine Association for Cultural Freedom appealed to “universal liberalism” as a way to oppose both Peronism and communism (somewhat ironically, as the association praised the 1955 military coup despite its violation of electoral democracy). The years 1930 to 1983 may have been marked by numerous illiberal practices, ranging from the interruption of elections and the violation of civil and human rights to some cases of public intervention in private property. Yet the liberal order that had slowly developed from 1853 to 1930 in the form of policy, judicial decisions, and common legal practice also remained remarkably entrenched. Citizenship, private property, capitalism, and criminal law—tenets of liberalism—all continued or stumbled along in the face of authoritarian rule and progressive populism.

As Stefan Dudink, Karen Hagemann, and Anna Clark argue, the vision of modern citizenship that emerged in the age of democratic revolutions in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that claimed to be both universal and male was “at once abstract and concretely gendered. This gendering

of citizenship excluded women, but education, property, ethnicity, race, and religion also excluded many men from citizenship, despite their common manhood.”³⁸ In that period, citizenship was a relatively narrow concept that gave people the right to inhabit a political territory and to participate in its governance.³⁹ Yet as Anna Clark notes, “By the end of the nineteenth century, the challenge of socialism and the exposure of chronic poverty led to the wider idea of social citizenship—that citizenship rights include not just the right to inhabit a territory, to vote, and to enjoy civil rights, but also the right to opportunity, education, health, and family life.”⁴⁰ By the mid-twentieth century, Lara Putnam writes, “as a global trend, the entitlements citizens claimed on their home turf were expanding, in the form of nascent welfare states and proemployment policies, while the access accorded non-citizens was shrinking.”⁴¹

Michael B. Katz defines these mid-twentieth-century welfare states as “a collection of programs designed to assure economic security to all citizens by guaranteeing the fundamental necessities of life: food, shelter, medical care, protection in childhood, and support in old age.”⁴² As states came to focus on this form of social citizenship, they also began to draw the line between those who merited and those who did not merit help.⁴³ The U.S. model, according to Katz, has stressed *work* as “the new criterion of full citizenship.”⁴⁴ In writing about welfare states in Latin America in general, Donna Guy notes that services such as “help to the needy, retirement funds, workingmen’s compensation, medical services, pensions for new mothers, unemployment benefits, and public education” all came to be conceived as parts of the rights of citizenship.⁴⁵ The rise of greater state involvement in social welfare in Argentina in the 1940s and 1950s can, therefore, be seen as an expansion of the very meaning of citizenship.

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Argentina, social welfare was provided by families, the Catholic Church, charities, mutual aid societies, and some public institutions; as such, social welfare was more a question of compassion, community, or religious values than one of citizenship.⁴⁶ As Benjamin Bryce shows in chapter 1, the patchwork network of services supported by various social actors meant that state authority alone did not determine how this system evolved. His focus on charities and mutual aid societies reveals that affluent immigrant men and women had clear ideas about social obligations and moral citizenship, but for this group of social actors, nationality and legal status were not the only way to assert their Argentine belonging.

The Argentine Constitution of 1949 promised political and social rights

as well as the massive expansion of the welfare state.⁴⁷ In so doing, the Peronist government in power decreased its support of nongovernmental philanthropic organizations, many of which were led by women.⁴⁸ In expanding the meaning of citizenship, the welfare state also created more possibilities for exclusion. Not all citizens received the same services, and noncitizens' lack of access to state benefits became more apparent once the state offered more benefits to citizens. Indeed, as Eduardo Elena notes in *Dignifying Argentina*, "Peronists reformulated understandings of justice around an ideal of enhanced citizenship and elevated living standards."⁴⁹ Elena examines "the shifting terms of political membership and participation—in a word, citizenship. The midcentury era was a crucible in which existing citizenship practices were wrested apart and forged anew across much of the region [of Latin America]."⁵⁰ He contends that a significant but overlooked way that Peronism transformed the meaning of social citizenship was its focus on making ordinary citizens consumers, improving wages and enabling workers to secure a *vida digna* (dignified life).⁵¹ In countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, populist governments of the mid-twentieth century made new coalitions that ruptured the previous balance of power. Workers and peasants—while citizens in the strict legal sense—came to experience the benefits of citizenship in new ways in the mid-twentieth century. As Elena shows in chapter 3 of this volume, collective understandings of the Argentine nation (*argentinidad*) and how those relate to Latin America and the United States have shaped social understandings of citizenship as well.

Organized religion has played a role in the evolving meaning of citizenship in Argentina as well. If citizenship is defined by the relationship between individuals and the state, how those people interacted with religious organizations, particularly the Catholic Church, sometimes affected people's secular relationship with the state. For example, Catholic congregations have played an important role in education alongside state-run schools. Despite the initial secular spirit of the 1884 law on obligatory education, by the turn of the twentieth century Catholic schools were expanding their involvement in both primary and secondary education.⁵² The national and provincial governments further allowed the expansion of Catholic education in both public and private schools in the 1930s and 1940s.⁵³ As Raanan Rein notes, the military government instituted compulsory Catholic education in all public schools in 1943.⁵⁴ The church has also provided social welfare services over the course of the twentieth century, even when there were moments—particularly at midcentury—when many voters and politicians came to view national

well-being and universal access as problems that should be taken care of by the state. In a welfare-state model, citizenship is the defining criterion, but that is not the case in a religious model. Foreign nationals or marginalized groups throughout the twentieth century in Argentina turned to Catholic and other religious institutions precisely because of their status as noncitizens or second-class citizens.

The Catholic Church as an institution has played an important role in Argentine politics over the past century. From 1853 to 1994, the constitution required that the president be Catholic. Since then, article 2 of the constitution still declares that “the federal government supports Roman Catholic and Apostolic worship.”⁵⁵ In throwing its support behind specific political groups, the Argentine state has also chosen some versions of civic inclusion over others. In the 1930s, according to Loris Zanatta, the church and nationalist groups successfully reasserted the idea that the Argentine nation was Catholic.⁵⁶ This integralist Catholic nationalism of the 1930s “tended to deny the equal rights of citizenship to those who did not profess the Catholicity (*catolicidad*) of the nation.”⁵⁷ Such a definition of national belonging had and continues to have important implications for citizens. One way that second-class citizenship is created is through the discursive construction of national identity and the groups that comprise that nation. Yet these ideas and their implications for people’s lived experience can change rapidly. As Raanan Rein shows in chapter 5, one feature of Peronist rule came to be the expansion of the religious view of the nation and the inclusion of Jewish and Arab Argentines in national politics.

In 2010, Argentina became the first country in Latin America and the tenth in the world to allow same-sex marriages.⁵⁸ The leadership of the Catholic Church in Argentina—including then cardinal and soon-to-be pope Jorge Mario Bergoglio—was on the losing side of opposition to new legislation that changed the state’s relationship with lesbian and gay citizens.⁵⁹ There was some dissent from parish priests and many practicing Catholics in the country on the church’s official stance.⁶⁰ In the case of same-sex marriage and in previous debates over divorce, organized religion has attempted to influence the relationship between individuals and the state.⁶¹ In the 2010 case, Catholic and other opponents to the revision to the civil code decried the violation of constitutional procedure in passing the law. Their argument based on morality, biblical teachings, or religious conviction also took aim at the boundaries of citizenship. Opposition to same-sex marriage meant the ongoing support of the denial of the rights of some citizens to have a legal marriage. In addition,

the expansion of state-sanctioned unions to include same-sex couples granted a new group of citizens access to certain benefits in matters of pensions and taxation. Both are key components of the rights and obligations of citizenship in the early twenty-first century.

With an expanding base of potential voters between 1912 and 1947 and with contractions of that voting base during periods of military rule, electoral democracy has been a fundamental factor in shaping the evolving meaning of citizenship in Argentina. Although citizenship should be understood as a concept bigger than voting rights, democratic elections empowered the state, and the evolving nature of Argentine democracy (or the restriction of democracy) encouraged politicians and bureaucrats to serve the interests of those who gave them power. The 1912 electoral reform made voting compulsory. This provision has remained in periods of democracy ever since, and it has certain implications for citizenship and participatory democracy. It means that the state uses judicial power to force citizens to legitimate that same state's authority. According to Luciano de Privitellio, the 1920s and 1930s saw a massive expansion of those who were considered true citizens in Argentina. In the aftermath of the 1912 legislation, political reformers sought to begin a new period of education and modernization in civil society, and they presumed that the new voting system would encourage political parties to play a leadership role in this new form of civic engagement.⁶² In Privitellio's view, the changing citizenship project in the Argentina of the 1920s was intended to cater to the interests of ruling groups.

Nevertheless, as Matthew Karush shows, the relationship between elite men and all other male citizens after the 1912 electoral reforms was more complex. Various politicians in the city of Rosario explicitly spoke about citizens as a way to avoid talking about workers.⁶³ Local elites used the expanded democratic representation and the language of citizenship as a nation-building tool rather than as a way to give more representation to diverse sectorial interests.⁶⁴ The breakdown of the recently expanded democracy with a coup d'état in 1930 and then the rise of Peronism in the 1940s suggest that workers instead preferred to embrace "articulations of citizenship and nationhood that complement and reinscribe working-class identity."⁶⁵ Building on this political climate at the national level, Perón placed "the labor movement's concerns at the top of the nation's political agenda, organized and empowered the unions to an unprecedented extent, and gave workers a language of social justice that shaped Argentine politics for decades after the regime's downfall."⁶⁶ The intersection of universal suffrage (extended to women between

Juan Perón's two presidential victories), democracy, and class identity had an important impact on citizenship. A growing welfare state and a language of social justice transformed the relationship between citizen and state.

In addition to seeking representation through electoral democracy, groups without voting rights in Argentina in the first half of the twentieth century—namely Argentine women and immigrant women and men—found other avenues to influence their system of governance and define their relationship with the state. As Julia Rodriguez notes, nonvoting groups “made their voices heard through newspapers, ethnic mutual aid societies, demonstrations, and memberships in socialist and anarchist parties.”⁶⁷ Through these avenues, they could also lay claim to certain rights, services, and their own belonging in Argentine society. As Paula Alonso notes, immigrants could also vote in municipal elections if they paid a certain amount of taxes, and their participation challenges the assumption that nonnaturalized immigrants were indifferent to Argentine politics.⁶⁸ As Andrés Reggiani illustrates in chapter 4, the rapid diffusion of physical activities and spectator sports in the 1930s and 1940s emerged against the backdrop of a period of dictatorship and limited democracy. While popular participation in the political process decreased significantly in the 1930s and early 1940s, sport became a way for Argentines to shape the national community and for women and men to negotiate the terms of proper social and cultural behavior.

CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS AND STATE AUTHORITY

The state necessarily played an ongoing central role in defining citizenship. In significant measure, though, this book highlights how Argentines' ideas about legal rights shaped the state's obligations to its citizens. In pushing to expand the boundaries of citizenship to include more people or to expand the terms of citizenship to increase the kinds of public services offered, people subverted or challenged state authority. In defense of citizens' rights, sometimes the state claimed to function as “the people.” In 1983, democratic government returned to Argentina after a long period of violent military rule. President Raúl Alfonsín was elected in part to represent Argentines brutalized by the dictatorship. However, as David M. K. Sheinin explains in chapter 7, to structure an attack on the previous human rights violations and to restore civil rights, the democratic government opted not to question the military's legal basis for dictatorship. Countering damning assessments of the dictatorship by Amnesty International and other human rights organizations, the Alfonsín

administration reasoned that military authorities had the constitutional right to detain those under suspicion in military prisons provided they were brought promptly before a civil or military court. The new democracy had no judicial squabble with the 1976 coup d'état itself, the dissolution of congress, or the replacement of Supreme Court judges.

What accounted for this seeming support for gross civil rights violations? In building legal cases against military officers, including General Guillermo Suárez Mason, the Alfonsín administration decided that its most effective path was to concede the constitutionality of military rule and the abrogation of civil rights as a starting point. That narrative established the parameters for what was “acceptable” in regard to civil rights, allowing Argentine authorities in the 1980s to go after military leaders for having exceeded the bounds of their own self-justifications for military rule by kidnapping, torturing, and “disappearing” those they suspected of wrongdoing.

In contrast, Jennifer Adair explains in chapter 8 the coming of democracy in the 1980s by contemplating the grassroots organizing in the greater Buenos Aires municipality of Quilmes. She describes this process as “a reconfiguration of relationships between the state, citizens, and the local Catholic Church.” Considered subversive by the ruling military, the reconfiguration Adair describes upends long-standing historical narratives that have centered early 1980s challenges to dictatorship less on the working-class periphery of the cities and more on middle-class city centers. Focused on the early twentieth century and a very different Argentina, Carolyne Larson’s chapter 2 addresses what she calls “cultural citizenship as a non-state process in which Argentines sought to chart the boundaries of national culture and belonging as well as the ‘true’ meanings of *argentinidad*.”

In these chapters, citizenship emerges as a touchstone—in terms of political and cultural identities—around which putatively laudable nation-building norms identified in dominant ideologies and political strategies have conflicted with evolving ideas that challenge them. If the residents of Quilmes challenged the military dictatorship of the late 1970s over questions of social justice, science in the first years of the twentieth century helped shape modern cultural constructions of citizenship where citizenship’s foil was how Argentine elites understood race and ethnicity in a Europe-centered worldview. In early twentieth-century Argentina, science helped establish elite-driven notions of citizenship with its close ties to *argentinidad*—the traits, as Larson explains, that bound Argentines together as a national community. At stake in the debates over science was nothing less than the

character and identity of the nation. Many Argentines had long tied *argentinidad* to contentiously romanticized and politicized notions of rural society, a vision at odds with the city of Buenos Aires and many elites' desire to emulate European modernity. The science-inspired citizen bridged this dichotomy by recasting the Argentine nation as a center for modern science.

In chapter 5, Raanan Rein explores an ethnic challenge to nationalist visions of citizenship. One striking success of Peronism was its ability to include Arabs, Jews, and other previously marginalized ethnic groups. Rein describes those groups as “imaginary citizens” whose integration into a new, more ample vision of citizenship functioned in inverse proportion to the qualities that had rendered them distinct as far as the majority was concerned. The intersections of ethnicity and national identity have remained at the core of how the state has shaped citizenship and how people have challenged those boundaries. Bolivians and Bolivian Argentines have at times, for example, been at the center of a transformation in citizenship in Argentina. Since 1990, when the national government dismantled long-standing preferences for non-South American arrivals and implemented one of the smoothest paths in the world to residency and citizenship for those who arrived, Argentina has experienced a transformative wave of immigration. At the same time, new but recognizable tensions between belonging and identity have emerged and shaped how Argentines understand citizenship and the roles of the state. In 1998 during the FIFA World Cup of Football, Argentine media extolled the virtues of a winning national football team and one of its stars, Ariel “El Burrito” Ortega, as the team marched toward what many Argentines were confident would be a third world championship. However, at a crucial moment in a knockout-round game against the Netherlands, Ortega head-butted the opposing goaltender. Blamed for the subsequent loss, Ortega was suddenly reimagined in the media as a foreign presence in Argentina for the Bolivian background of his parents.⁶⁹

Who is and who is not an Argentine in the eyes of the state reemerged in December 2010. In a number of cities, working-class, landless, and homeless families moved en masse onto vacant lands. In the Villa Soldati, Villa Lugano, and Barracas neighborhoods of Buenos Aires, occupiers told the media that different levels of government had been promising them land for years. Tired of the unfulfilled promise, occupiers built shacks out of whatever materials they could muster and indicated they were there for the long haul. Violence in Villa Soldati sparked many Argentines to think about past notions of who was

and was not a subversive presence. There was a tense division between local working-class residents and the occupiers (called *okupas*). Over two days of ferocious skirmishes, local residents killed three occupiers. They beat a fourth after dragging him from an ambulance.

How Argentines understood race, nation, and citizenship underscored the conflict over land and public space. The stories of violence resonated across the country. Working people who lived around the occupied public spaces railed against the occupiers for the television cameras by pointing out that they—the “legitimate” residents of the zone—were the children and grandchildren of European immigrants who had built Argentina. They demanded their public spaces back from those they described as Bolivian immigrants, even though many of the occupiers had been born in Argentina and were not, in fact, of Bolivian background. More than half a century after Perón had dismissed the accusations of dual or suspect loyalties against Jewish Argentines—accusations that had brought their citizenship into question—some used similar rationales in doubting the civic legitimacy of Bolivian Argentines. Moreover, the poignancy and violence of the 2010 occupations point to both a historical and a present difference between Argentina and other frontier societies in the Americas—including Canada, the United States, and Venezuela—regarding the link between the proximity of a constructed frontier and the problem of citizenship and the state. For residents of Chicago in 1890, the frontier was two days or more from the city by rail. In 2010, for residents of Buenos Aires, the culturally constructed frontier was at their doorstep, rendering the question of citizenship both immediate and potentially dangerous.

MAKING CITIZENS IN ARGENTINA

The eight chapters in this volume tackle the question of citizenship from many angles. Focusing on various decades of the twentieth century, the authors illustrate the many meanings and uses of the citizenship in Argentina. In chapter 1, Benjamin Bryce charts the emergence of several immigrant-run social welfare institutions in Buenos Aires between 1880 and 1930. Focusing mainly on German-language organizations, he argues that affluent immigrants used various social welfare institutions to shape the meaning of citizenship in Buenos Aires. The cause of social welfare helped self-proclaimed leaders construct an image of a respectable community, solidify gender and

class hierarchies, and paternalistically organize workers under their leadership. The chapter shows how many people in Buenos Aires had ideas about rights and duties of citizenship despite their foreign nationality.

Chapter 2 shifts the focus away from social belonging and to debates about science and cultural citizenship. Carlyne Ryan Larson examines the legacy of Argentine naturalist Florentino Ameghino from the time of his death in 1911 to the 1930s. She highlights how Ameghino's findings about human evolution and the debate that ensued reflected widely held ideas of cultural citizenship. In early twentieth-century Argentina, science became a tool used to define the national community and the terms of civic belonging. The naturalist's assertion that humankind could trace its origins to Argentine soil struck a chord with nationalist desires to prove the country's cultural and scientific superiority in the western world.

Eduardo Elena builds on Larson's analysis of race and the nation in chapter 3, exploring how ideas about Latin America have informed conceptions of citizenship and nationalism in twentieth-century Argentina. Elena traces the impact of one prominent Argentine thinker, Manuel Ugarte (1875–1951), who conceived of the Argentine nation in regional, Latin American terms. He advocated fostering closer ties with other Latin American countries, and he highlighted the shared social, cultural, and racial characteristics that made modern citizens. Ugarte's ideas also exerted an influence on certain Peronist and Leftist movements during the middle third of the twentieth century, and Ugarte has recently returned to national discussions as Argentine politicians and political groups turn toward multicultural and multiracial paradigms of nationhood.

In chapter 4, Andrés Horacio Reggiani looks at how the visibility of women in athletic domains in the 1930s and 1940s elicited reactions from doctors and other Argentine elites. He examines the tension between the apparent benefits of physical exercise on hygienic grounds and the supposed disruptive potential of female physical culture. Through the focus on medical science, women's sports, and the state in Argentina, Reggiani contends that physical culture became a site where alternative notions of citizenship could be conceived and acted out.

In chapter 5, Raanan Rein analyzes the Jewish section of the Peronist movement, which called for a new cultural and civic integration of Jews into Argentine society. The Peronist search for support among Jewish Argentines reconfigured how many contemplated Argentine national identity. In conjunction with Argentine government authorities, Peronist Jewish leaders

challenged assimilationist and exclusionary nationalist tropes; for the first time, a predominant political movement gave credence to the idea that Argentine citizenship, Judaism, and Zionism were not mutually exclusive categories. In chapter 6, Jorge Nállim locates Peronism and anti-Peronism in an early cold war context. He documents the rise of the Argentine Association for Cultural Freedom (AALC), a group of prominent Argentine thinkers opposed to Peronism and linked to the Congress for Cultural Freedom, an international organization created in 1950 as a part of the U.S. cultural cold war. Here, the international overlaps with the domestic in a divided Argentina faced by cold war imperatives.

The final two chapters shed light on the experience of Argentine citizens during and after the last military dictatorship (1976–1983). In Chapter 7, David M. K. Sheinin focuses on how the military's elaborate claim to have been a defender of civil rights affected how the democratic government of Raúl Alfonsín (1983–1989) prosecuted members of the regime for their internal war on Argentine citizens. Although with objectives very different from those of military rule, the postdictatorship, democratic government's approach to civil rights and the law was shaped by continuities from the preceding years of authoritarian governance.

In chapter 8, Jennifer Adair widens the scope of Argentina's transition to democracy to demonstrate the ties between popular mobilizations on the margins of Buenos Aires and the end of dictatorship. In the municipality of Quilmes, the local Catholic Church played an active role in easing military violence. Priests, lay activists, and industrial workers came to connect political violence and the dismantling of their livelihoods. The citizenship model for which they advocated drew from their experiences in the labor movement, grassroots Catholic activism, and a new language of human rights.

Combined, these chapters show the evolving and contested meaning of citizenship in Argentina over the course of the twentieth century. Citizenship has broad but often contradictory definitions that have been shaped by the state and various social actors such as women, workers, immigrants, indigenous peoples, religious minorities, intellectuals, and scientists. The many meanings of citizenship and the efforts to subvert political authority or to assert it over subversive groups illustrate the importance of reflecting on the analytical value of citizenship in its political, social, and cultural dimensions.