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The aim of *Central Asia: Contexts for Understanding* is to reach a broad readership with diverse needs. As such, the question of notes presents a unique challenge. Academics have noting conventions that are the guideposts of scholarship yet are often extraneous to more casual readers. The varied textbook markets in which this book is likely to be used have their own conventions, with textbooks in the United States often lacking notes while those in Europe being more likely to contain them. One goal of the project has been to maximize the accessibility of the volume so more people can efficiently learn about the Central Asian region. This issue of accessibility is not only about language and style, but also about cost. Thus, to produce the most cost-effective and widely accessible volume possible, standard academic citations are available in this companion notes volume, available for download free of charge. Readers of the main text will be able to get the full meaning of the authors’ arguments without referencing the notes volume, but it is made available here for those wishing to see some of the scholarship upon which the chapters are built. In a format that quotes a sentence extract from the main text associated with the reference, with footers providing the page range corresponding to the main text, the notes volume serves as something akin to an annotated bibliography that in its own reading offers insights into the scholarly literature beyond standard bibliographies.
Mapping Context

Julien Thorez and Emmanuel Giraudet

Space has been commonly considered as a social product: Henri Lefebvre, *La production de l’espace* [The Production of Space] (Paris: Anthropos, 1974).


Long history of cartographic production: Many of these maps and atlases are available for consultation on the CartOrient website, www.cartorient.cnrs.fr/accueil.


Part I. Contextualizing Central Asia

1. Central Asia as Global

Alexander Cooley


The so-called Great Game: Peter Hopkirk, *The Great Game: On


global criminal and anti-bribery investigations: Cooley and Heathershaw, Dictators without Borders.


4

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3. Central Asia as Place

Alexander C. Diener and Nick Megoran


The “Greater Middle East,” goes further: Mehdi Parvizi Amineh, ed., The Greater Middle East in Global Politics: Social Science Perspectives on the Changing Geography of the World Politics (Lieden: Brill, 2007).


limitations involved in regarding Central Asia as “Asian”: Hauner, “Russia’s Asian Heartland Today and Tomorrow.”


works of Pan Slavic scholars: Nikolai Danilevski, Rossia o Evropa Vzgliad na kul’turnyi i politiheskie ostnosheniiia slavranskogo mira k germane-Romanskomu [Russia and Europe: A look at the cultural and political relations of the Slavic world to the German-Roman] (Moscow: Kniga, 1895); Vladimir Lamanskii, Tri Mira Aziskogo-Evropeiskogo Materika [Three worlds of the Asian-European continent] (Petrograd: Novoe Vremeia, 1916).

evidence that sought the unity of all Slavic peoples: See Bassin, “Russia between Europe and Asia,” 13

a new way for humankind: Ethnocentric thinking was at times prominent in the Slavophile movement (Hauner, What Is Asia to Us?, 49–68), as evidenced by the “Yellow Peril” discourses employed to promote a stronger Slavic presence in the Russian Far East and the anti-Islamic and antinomadic discourses used to rationalize Russian dominance in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and various Muslim border-regions. Bassin, “Russia between Europe and Asia,” 13.

culture and civilizational ideals to be problematic: Neo-Eurasianism has adapted these perspectives to the changing geopolitical realities of Eurasia (particularly Central Eurasia) by pitting a Eurasian civilizational ideal against US global hegemony.

more geographically expansive than the Pan Slavic imaginary: Arguments for the existence of a Eurasian race emerged during the period of classical Eurasianism; see Bassin, “Russia between Europe and Asia,” 13–16.

The product of the classical Eurasianist discourse: Bassin, “Russia between Europe and Asia,” 16.

political incarnation in the Eurasian Economic Union: Hauner, “Russia’s Asian Heartland Today and Tomorrow.”

“metageography” that “obscures more than it reveals”: Lewis and Wigen, Myth of Continents.

the setting for the “Silk Road”: It should be noted that those traversing the multiple routes that historically spanned Central Asia would not have employed the Silk Road descriptor. The term (die Seidenstraße) surfaced in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and is attributed to the German scholar and explorer Baron Ferdinand von Richthofen. For a critical consideration of the term and its connotation of historical connectivity see Khodadad Rezakhani, “The Road that Never Was: The Silk Road and Trans-Eurasian Exchange,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 30, no. 3 (2010): 420–34.

subjugated in this metaphorical geographic reference: Rezakhani. “Road that Never Was,” 420.


testing the Roman Empire’s defenses: Beckwith, Empires of the Silk Road, 93–111.

westernmost boundary of China’s Empire: Bregel, Historical Atlas of Central Asia, 18.


**One portion of this army ultimately laid claim:** This set the stage for their two attempted invasions of Japan in 1274 and 1281.

**ultimately engulfing the divided principalities:** Rossabi, *Mongols and Global History*; May, *Mongol Conquests in World History."

**a clear turning point of history:** In *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples*, Winston Churchill wrote:

But Asia too was marching against the West. At one moment it had seemed as if all Europe would succumb to a terrible menace looming up from the East. Heathen Mongol hordes from the heart of Asia, formidable horsemen armed with bows, had rapidly swept over Russia, Poland, Hungary, and in 1241 inflicted simultaneous crushing defeats upon the Germans near Breslau and upon European chivalry near Budapest. Germany and Austria at least lay at their mercy. Providentially in this year the Great Khan died in Mongolia; the Mongol leaders hastened back the thousands of miles to Karakorum, their capital, to elect his successor, and Western Europe escaped. ([New York: Dodd, Mead, 1938], 2:9)

**subsequently settled on the frontier:** The reality of the Mongol/Tatar Yoke may have been quite different from how it is presented in much of Russian historiography (see Marlies Bilz-Leonhardt, “Deconstructing the Myth of the Tatar Yoke,” *Central Asian Survey* 27, no. 1 [2008]: 33–43). Classical Eurasianists say it was actually good for Russia; neo-Eurasianists say its negative portrayal is a “black narrative” of the West. Bassin, “Nationhood, Natural Regions, Mestorazvitie,” 59.


**a “coin of the realm” ideal emerged:** Kotkin, “Mongol Commonwealth.”

**caravan trade continued:** See Kotkin, “Mongol Commonwealth,” for further evidence.

**not marking an absolute termination:** Levi, “Early Modern Central Asia in World History.”


**India proved particularly vexing for Tsarist elites:** Though technically a European regime, the years under Tatar rule were argued by many
Westernizers in Russia to have altered, if not stifled, Russian political, economic, and cultural development, thereby making them quasi-European in the eyes of many Western European elites. Marshall Poe, *A People Born to Slavery: Russia in Early Modern European Ethnography, 1476–1784* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000). This rendered Russia an addendum to the new globally engaged Europe; a status much resented in the tsarist capitals of Saint Petersburg and later Moscow. It should, however, be noted that a large component of the Russian elite considered themselves the Third Rome and the chosen bearer of true Christianity. So for some, no inferiority to Western Europe manifested. Bassin, “Russia between Europe and Asia,” 4.

**vie with one another in glorifying them:** Leo Tolstoy, *The Kingdom of God Is within You: Christianity and Patriotism* (London: J. M. Dent, 1905).

**Our civilizing mission in Asia will bribe our spirit:** Cited in Hauner, *What is Asia to Us?*, 50–68.

**maps of Central Eurasia were often sparse:** Accurate maps of Russian territory were created at the behest of Peter the Great, who commissioned Ivan Kirilov’s *Atlas Vserossiiskoi Imperii* published in 1734, and the more authoritative *Atlas Rossiiskoi* compiled by the newly founded Academy of Sciences in 1745; see Bassin, “Russia between Europe and Asia,” 7. Examples of such fanciful tales of the region include Owen Lattimore’s references to local people’s description of a Yeti-like creature existing in the Tien Shan mountain range and the long-standing historical legend of Prester John (see Lattimore, *Desert Road to Turkestan*). A rumor that the Tien Shan or Pamirs hosted the tallest mountain in the world existed until after WWII. Tales of warrior women, later deemed Amazons, also exist from this region’s mythical history.

**reimagined expanse of territory:** Russian expansionism was particularly fervent after the Jungar (a western Mongolian confederation) invasion of the Kazakh Steppe in the eighteenth century. The Jungar seemingly envisioned a form of Eurasianism and sought to enact it by establishing a territory stretching from Mongolia to the Caucasus.


**Access to Indian and Iranian warm-water ports:** Hauner, *What is Asia to Us?*, 50–68.


**devoted both his intellectual life and his career:** “The Teaching of Geography from an Imperial Point of View, and the Use Which Could and Should Be Made of Visual Instruction,” *Geographical Teacher* 6 (1911); Gerry Kearns, *Geopolitics and Empire: The Legacy of Halford Mackinder* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).


**proscribing the remedy of socialism:** Sh Abdullaev, O’zbekiston Xalqlarining O’tmishdagi Mavjud Tengsizligini Tugatish Tarixidan (Tashkent: O’zbekiston SSR Davlat Nashriyoti, 1959), 260.

**cities were designated, and boundaries were drawn:** Arne Haugen, *The Establishment of National Republics in Soviet Central Asia* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

**often had substate ethnically defined autonomous regions:** Graham Smith, “The Soviet State and Nationalities...


prepared the way for its own demise: Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed.


development levels of landlocked states have improved: UN-OHRLLS (Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States), *The Development Economics of Land-lockedness* (New York: UN-OHRLLS, 2015).


### 4. Central Asia as Story

**Benjamin Gatling**


**Case I-A. Ordinary Soviet Life through Collectivization**

**Marianne Kamp**

American tractorization inspired Soviet agricultural economists: In the decade of the 1920s, tractor ownership in Texas, the US’s leading cotton producing state, increased from 9,000 to 37,000 units, and it was estimated in the 1930s that every tractor displaced three to five farm worker families. Neil Foley, *The White Scourge: Mexicans, Blacks, and Poor Whites in Texas Cotton Culture*

“thousands of kulak families were exiled:


“a lot of people went to sell gold and buy flour.”: The Soviet state established Torgsin stores to obtain gold from its own citizens in order to fund its purchase abroad of technology for industrialization. Elena Osokina,


Case I-B. Regulation and Appropriation of Islam in Authoritarian Political Contexts

Tim Epkenhans


religious practice were taught, negotiated, and eventually experienced disappeared: See Shoshana Keller, To Moscow, Not Mecca: The Soviet Campaign against Islam in Central Asia, 1917–1941 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001).

practice and belief became less regulated: See Talal Asad, The Idea of an

made the religion legible for the state: The term legible is borrowed from James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).


Rahmon integrated Islam into the narrative: The government followed a similar strategy one can observe in neighboring Central Asian countries, by distinguishing between a “good” traditional Tajik Islam and a “bad” foreign extremist Islam. Furthermore, Rahmon de-Islamized Abu Hanifa and portrayed him as a Tajik merchant and not as a religious scholar.


oppressed any form of dissent: In 2015 the government banned the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) and arrested the party’s presidium and many of its members. Furthermore, the authorities placed independent ulamo, such as the popular Turajon family, under informal house arrest and suspended their communication (including their website).

Part II. Contexts of History

5. Pre-Colonial Central Asia

largely a product of successive waves of nomadic migrations and settlement: Scott C. Levi, “Turks and Tajiks in Central Asian History,” in Everyday...

Timur emerged as the most successful: Beatrice Forbes Manz, The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).


they elected to split from the Uzbeks: Joo-Yup Lee, Qazaqliq, or Ambitious Brigandage, and the Formation of the Qazaqs: State and Identity in Post-Mongol Central Eurasia (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2016).


generals to show no mercy: Perdue, China Marches West, 283.

the Qing forces had defeated the Khojas: For a discussion of the shaping of the Uyghur ethnic-national identity in the early twentieth century, see David Brophy, *Uyghur Nation: Reform and Revolution on the Russia-China Frontier* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).


a fiscal crisis that forced the Qing: Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, 58–61, 235–36.


Bukharan merchants extended their networks: This point is addressed in Erika Monahan, *The Merchants

Manghit claim to legitimacy: Manghit amirs bolstered their claim as the rightful rulers over Bukhara through strategic history writing. See Anke von Kügelgen, Die Legitimierung der mittelasiatischen Mangitendynastie in den Werken ihrer Historiker (Istanbul: Orient-Institut; Würzburg: Ergon-Verlag, 2002). Published in Russian translation as Legitimatsiia Sredneaziatskoi dinastii Mangitov v proizvedeniakh ikh istorikov (XVIII–XIX vv.) (Almaty: Daĭk-Press, 2004).

this earned Amir Nasrallah the nickname: Bregel, “New Uzbek States,” 397.


Khiva was also distinctive: See Sartori, “Introduction: On Khvārazmian Connectivity.”


the Khivan khans leveraged their ability: Bregel, “New Uzbek States,” 400, 404.

state’s new position as a Russian protectorate: Bregel, “New Uzbek States,” 409.

6. Colonial Central Asia

“Russia did not have colonies” is a common refrain: See S. V. Timchenko and V. Germanova on, respectively, modern Kazakh and modern Uzbek historiography, which make up appendices 1 & 2 of S. Abashin, D. Arapov and N. Bekmakhanova, eds., Tsentral’naia Azia i sostave Rossiiskoi Imperii (Moscow: Novoe Literaturone Obozrenie, 2007), 338–81.

The reasons cited vary: Most of these can be found in Evgenii Glushchenko, Rossiia v Srednei Azii. Zavoevanii i preobrazovaniia (Moscow: Tsentropoligrif, 2010). He does not shy away from using the term colonizers to describe the Russians in Central Asia, but argues that their role was entirely benign.


The USSR did not have colonies: E.g., G. I. Safarov, Kolonial’naia Revoliutsiia. Opyt Turkestana (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1921); P. G. Galuzo, Turkestan-Koloniiia, (Moscow: Izd. Komm. Un-ta Trudishchkhish Vostoka, 1929); A. Abdykalykova and A. Pankratova, ed., Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR s drevnejshikh vremen do nashikh dnei (Alma-Ata:


**When the conquest of Central Asia began is complicated:** See Svetlana Gorshenina, L’invention de l’Asie centrale: Histoire du concept de la Tartarie à l’Eurasie (Geneva: Droz, 2014) for the genealogy of “Central Asia” in Western writing. On the


the Middle Horde was able to maintain fairly stable diplomatic relations: Jin Noda and Onuma Takahiro, ed., A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty (Tokyo: TIAS, 2010).


the Russians also inherited its vague claims to sovereignty: See A. V. Postnikov, Skhvatka na “Kryshe mira”: politiki, razvedchiki i


they also acted as the local military commanders: Senator Gofmeister Graf K. K. Palen, *Otchet po Revizii Turkestanskogo Kraya, proizvedennoi po VYSOCHAISHEMU Poveleniyu . . .* (Saint Petersburg: Senatskaya Tipografiya, 1910), vol. 12, Uezdnoe Upravlenie, 156.
Central Asia was underadministered:

were never extended to the steppe or Turkestan:

This remained in the hands of the local:

distribution of water from irrigation canals:

officially renamed “People’s Judges”:

changes in Central Asian law:

it was preserved until the revolution:

Central Asians were clearly not citizens of the empire:

a gradual extension of recognizable rights:

intellectuals viewed their inferior status in these terms:
considered their “native” subordinates to be incorrigibly corrupt: V. P. Nalivkin, *Tuzemtsy, ran’she i teper’* (Tashkent: Tip. A. Kirsner, 1913), 69–71; N. S. Lykoshin, *Pol’ zbiini v Turkestane.*


traditionally Cossack communities had been hybrid societies: For the earlier period see Christoph Witzenrath, *Cossacks and the Russian Empire, 1598–1725: Manipulation, Rebellion, and Expansion into Siberia* (London: Routledge, 2007); a useful general history is Shane O’Rourke, *The Cossacks* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007).


**extended artificial irrigation:** Maya Peterson, Pipe Dreams: Water and Empire in Central Asia’s Aral Sea Basin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 134–42.

**cotton “boom” of the late 1890s and early 1900s:** See, e.g., Kastel’skaia, Iz istorii Turkestanskogo kraia, 55–66.


**an expansion of rice cultivation:** Senator Graf K. K. Palen, Materialy k kharakteristike narodnogo khoziaistva v Turkestane Ch.I Otd. i, 2 (Saint Petersburg: Senatskaia Tipografiia, 1911), 311–13.

**irrigated area expanded substantially:** Morrison, Russian Rule in Samarkand, 210; Palen, Materialy k kharakteristike narodnogo khoziaistva, 1, i, 102.

**Cultivation of grain on rain-fed land:** Penati, “Swamps, Sorghum and Saxauls.”

**also to the settlement of previously nomadic:** Obzor Semirechenskoi Oblasti za 1892 god. prilozheniiia k VSEPODDANEISHEMU ochetu Voennogo Gubernatora (Vernyi: Tip Semirechenskogo Oblastnogo Upravleniia, 1893), 4–12.

**livestock had been the main export:** Penati, “Managing Rural Landscapes,” 98–102.


sources in Central Asian languages become much more important:


intermarriage remained almost unknown:


they were an unrepresentative minority:


7. Soviet Central Asia

Ali İğmen

“we will give them a concert and leave”:


a genuine believer of the Soviet project: Iğmen, Speaking Soviet with an Accent, 128.


ethnic and regional groups became the official titular nationalities: For interethnic relations, see Morgan Y. Liu, Under Solomon’s Throne: Uzbek Visions of Renewal in Osh (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012).

homogenization of each republic was the ultimate goal of this nationalities policy: Timur Dadabaev, Identity and Memory in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Uzbekistan’s Soviet Past (New York: Routledge 2016), 160; Grigol Ubiria, Soviet Nation-Building in Central Asia: The Making of the Kazakh and Uzbek Nations (New York: Routledge, 2014), 158.


by the end of the Soviet era, in Central Asia every republic took pride in repeating slogans such as “the friendship of peoples”: For diaspora nations in the Soviet Union, see Erik R. Scott, Familiar Strangers: The Georgian Diaspora and the Evolution of Soviet Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

the Ürkin period, as the Kyrgyz and Kazakhs call it: Abylbek Asankanov and Oskon Osmonov, Istorìia Kyrgyzstana (s drevneishikh vremen do naskikh dnei), Uchebnik dlia VUZov (Bishkek: Uchkun, 2002), 562.


Russian imperial interest and consequent conquest into the Kazakh Steppe and Turkestan: For the history of the formation of Kazakhs, see Jooyup Lee, Qazaqlıq, or Ambitious Brigandage, and the Formation of the Qazaqs: State and Identity in Post-Mongol Central Eurasia (Leiden: Brill, 2016).


early Bolshevik leaders who served the Soviet regime until the state accused them of being “enemies of the people”: For the early purges, see Igal Halfin, *Intimate Enemies: Demonizing the Bolshevik Opposition, 1918–1928* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007).


**put on trains and dumped in Central Asia because they were seen as traitors:** For resistance in the Caucasus, see Rebecca Gould, *Writers and Rebels: The Literature of Insurgency in the Caucasus* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016).

**Houses of Culture, Clubs, Lenin’s Corners, Red Yurts, Red Chaikhanas (teahouses), and other organizations:** For Kyrgyz Houses of Culture, see İğmen, *Speaking Soviet with an Accent*.

**plays and films based on Chingiz Aitmatov’s:** For Chingiz Aitmatov’s fiction, see Joseph P. Mozur Jr., *Parables from the Past: The Prose Fiction of Chingiz Aitmatov* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994).


**being civilized and being Soviet meant that Western forms of culture, such as theater (and later cinema):** For Uzbek cinema, see Cloé Drieu, *Cinema, Nation, and Empire in Uzbekistan, 1919–1937*, trans. Adrian Morfee (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2018). For Central Asian cinema, see Michael Rouland, Gulnara Abikeyeva, and Birgit Beumers, eds., *Cinema in Central Asia: Rewriting Cultural Histories* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013).

**Kyrgyz playwrights and directors created plays to stage for these actresses:** For Soviet actresses, see Lynne Attwood, ed., *Red Women on the Silver Screen: Soviet Women and Cinema from the Beginning to the End of the Communist Era* (New York: Pandora, 1993).

**Many women officially reported that they were the liberated:** Adrienne Edgar, “Bolshevism, Patriarchy, and the Nation: The Soviet ‘Emancipation’ of Muslim Women in Pan-Islamic Perspective,” Slavic Review 65, no. 2 (2006): 252–72.

**a girl need not be a shepherdess or a housewife:** Christa Hämmerle, Nikola Langreiter, Margareth Lanzinger, and Edith Saurer, eds., *Gender Politics in Central Asia: Historical Perspectives and Current Living Conditions of Women* (Vienna: Börlau, 2008), 23.

**women with more than five living children:** For gender and Soviet identity, see Lynne Attwood, *Creating the New Soviet Woman: Women’s Magazines as Engineers of Female Identity, 1922–53* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1999).
fatwas (religious rulings) against self-immolation: For Islam in Central Asia, see Taşar, *Soviet and Muslim*.


8. Post-Soviet Central Asia

David G. Lewis


states scrambled to establish national currencies: Pomfret, Central Asian Economies since Independence.


rumors that he had been murdered by elites: Bohr, “Turkmenistan.”

rapidly developed a cult of personality almost as widespread: Bohr, “Turkmenistan.”

long prison terms without any contact: Human rights groups ran a campaign in support of these prisoners. See Prove They Are Alive!, “About Us,” https://provetheyarealive.org/about_us/.

government responded with a campaign of repression: Lewis, Temptations of Tyranny, 188–89.

Karimov was confronted by Western officials: Lewis, Temptations of Tyranny, 26–28.


argued that the US criticism of Karimov over Andijan was “one of the most unfortunate”: Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011), 633.


part of this murky deal: On the base deal, see Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules.

beneficiaries were energy and telecom companies recently privatized: Kyrgyzstan: A Hollow Regime Collapses, Crisis Group Asia Briefing No. 102, April 27, 2010.


Many of his associates were also refused extradition: Cooley and Heathershaw, Dictators without Borders.


The defining features of the personalized dictatorship continued largely unchanged: Bohr, “Turkmenistan.”


80 percent of the country’s scientists had emigrated: Bohr, “Turkmenistan,” 17.

The end of the civil war in Tajikistan introduced some formal pluralism: Jesse Driscoll, Warlords and Coalition Politics in Post-Soviet States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).


Mirziyoyev initiated a far-reaching purge of the security services: Sadriddin


Case II-A. The Rise of Vali Bay, an Entrepreneur between Two Empires

David Brophy

David Brophy acknowledges that research for his chapter was carried out with the support of an Australian Research Council Discovery Early Career Award (project number DE170100330), funded by the Australian Government.

Case II-B. The Management of Islam in the Late Soviet Period

Adeeb Khalid


allow the organization of a Spiritual Administration: Rosskii gosudarstvennyi avrakh sostsial’no-polishesheskoi istorii (Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History), f. 17, op. 162, d. 37, l. 79.

He was summoned to Moscow: Amirsaid Usmankhodzhaev, Zhizn’ muftiev Babakanovykh: Sluzhenie vozrozhdeniiu islama v Sovetskom Sowze (Nizhnii Novgorod: Medina, 2008).

Orenburg Spiritual Assembly was responsible for appointing: D. Azamatov, Orenburgskoe magometanskoie dukhovnoe sobranie v kontse XVIII–XIX vv. (Ufa: Izd-vo “Gilem,” 1999).

unlikely that the rather fragile Russian power would have been able to coax: Adeeb Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 52–56.


casualties of the antireligious campaign: Khalid, Making Uzbekistan, 235–37, 345–46.


condemned as “un-Islamic” such customs: Bakhtiiar Babadzhanov, “O fetvakh SADUM protiv «neislamskikh obychaev»,” in Islam na postsovetskom prostranstve: vzgliad iznutri, ed. Martha Brill Olcott and Aleksei Malashenko (Moscow: Moskovskii Tsentr Karnegi, 2001), 170–84; the texts of some of these fatwas can be found in Shamsuddinxon Boboxonov, Shayx Ziyovuddinxon ibn Eshon Boboxon (ma’naviyat va ibrat maktabi) (Tashkent: O’zbekiston Milliy Entsiklopediyasi, 2001).

official recognition of the place of Islam: For example, Eren Tasar, Soviet and Muslim: The Institutionalization of Islam in Central Asia, 1943–1991 (New York: Oxford University Press,
2017), argues that SADUM played a central role in Central Asian public life in the period after 1943. Such claims are hard to maintain.


Case II-C. Gendered Aspects of Soviet Industrialization in Ak Tyuz

Botakoz Kassymbekova


The lower part of the settlement was called Shanghai: Pavel Polian, Against Their Will: The History and Geography of Forced Migrations in the USSR (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004), 148.

Bombay, on the other hand, was located on a hill: “White” man in Russian means a “civilized man”—a man who lives in comfort. In the Soviet context, this is not an entirely racial category and rather refers to (Western) European life standards, and applies to ethnic Russians as well.


Stalinist and post-Stalinist policies fostered societal traditionalization:


Industrialization and private life: Nick Baron, in his book Soviet Karelia: Politics, Planning and Terror in Stalin’s Russia, 1920–1939 (London: Routledge, 2007), showed how Soviet economics and politics were interconnected. I suggest that the economic and political structure of the Soviet Union also shaped its citizens’ private sphere. Family politics (both official and its unofficial dimensions), economics, and politics were closely interrelated.

Part III. Contexts of Living

9. Rural Life

Tommaso Trevisani

People value village sociality: The Central Asian New Year holiday (Nōrūz in Persian; Navro’z in Uzbek; Nauryz in Kazakh) occurs on the spring equinox (March 21–22). The holiday coincides with the beginning of the agricultural cycle, it has Zoroastrian origins and despite Soviet officialdom’s opposition it has continued to be celebrated in Central Asia ever since. Laura Adams, The Spectacular State: Culture and National Identity in Uzbekistan (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 50ff.


traditional rural societies the rift runs:

Elizabeth E. Bacon, Central Asians under Russian Rule: A Study in Culture Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966); Lawrence
NOTES TO PAGES 184–191


emerged in the disclosing of the “cotton scandal”: By the mid-1980s Moscow-led investigations revealed a gigantic fraud perpetrated by Uzbek party officials based on widespread manipulation of cotton production statistics. The “cotton scandal” resulted in a purge of party officials and in tightened control over the internal affairs of the Central Asian union republics.


newly established large farms needed to have “bureaucratic capital”: Tommaso Trevisani, Land and Power in Khorezm: Farmers, Communities, and the State in Uzbekistan’s Decollectivisation Process (Berlin: LIT, 2011).


many families were pushed by district authorities into farming: Trevisani, Land and Power in Khorezm.

living conditions in rural communities had significantly worsened: Kandiyoti, “Cry for Land,” 225–56.


Now it is just five, the remaining had to go: Author’s interview in Makhtaral district, Southern Kazakhstan, April 12, 2016. Fieldwork was conducted in the framework of a research project hosted at the SFB 923 “Threatened Orders,” University of Tübingen (on the topic “Salinization and soil degradation as threats to the agrarian orders in Central Asia,” 2015–2019).

10. Urban Life

Natalie Koch


11. Migratory Life

Madeleine Reeves


migration is raced, classed, and gendered: Sergey Abashin, “Migration from Central Asia to Russia in the New Model of World Order,” Russian Politics and Law 52, no. 6 (2014): 8–23.


to work simply was the mark: Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 202.


wage labor undertaken for the state: Jeanne Féaux de la Croix, “After the Worker State: Competing and Converging Frames of Valuing Labor in Rural Kyrgyzstan,” Laboratorium 6, no. 2 (2014): 84.


undermines the value of work: Pine, “Migration as Hope.”


one of Russia’s most pressing social problems: Nikolay Zakharov, Attaining Whiteness: A Sociological Study of Race and Racialization in Russia (Uppsala: Acta Universitatatis Upssaliensis, 2013), 18.


12. Diaspora Life

Medina Aitieva

bus stop near Yakutsk’s Stolichnyi market: The ethnographic material presented in this chapter derives from fieldwork in Russia’s Yakutsk (March–May 2012) and Kyrgyzstan’s Naryn and Chui oblasts (2011–2012), and subsequent visits to Kyrgyzstan (2015; 2018).

sinking appearances of the traditional wooden log houses: In local parlance, “ChB” refers to “chastichno blagoustroenny dom,” houses with partial comforts. These houses were preserved for cultural heritage, despite numerous attempts to dismantle them.

visa-free open border regime: Of the post-Soviet republics, the exceptions to the visa-free regime are the Baltic states, Georgia, and Turkmenistan.


add to the migrants’ daily insecurities: Throughout the chapter, I use the general term migrant to denote both migrants and immigrants. Although they may have different legal practices, they may share common daily experiences. Migrants arrive in Russia to find temporary work and immigrants come to seek permanent residence and acquire citizenship. However, immigrants may see their future back in their country of origin, and migrants may change their primary intent of working and living temporarily. In the end, in Russia both these groups are largely seen and treated as migrants.


attracted some Central Asian migrants to naturalize: See Maria Lipman and Yulia Florinskaya, “Labor Migration in Russia,” PONARS Eurasia: New Approaches to Research and Security in Eurasia (January 9, 2019), http://ponarseurasia.org/labor-migration-in-russia/. In their discussion, Florinskaya predicted that by 2020, Russia’s labor force will have shrunk by over 10 million people, a shortage that Russia would need to address by employing retirees and increasing labor migrants.


“seasonal” migrants arriving, in their minds temporarily: Most Kyrgyzstani migrants in Sakha worked seasonally, arriving in February or March and leaving by December of the same year.

permanently relocated to Russia: Sergei Abashin, “Migration Policies in

plan was to assert regional dominance:

medical specialists who were committed to serving the diaspora: Daniel Kashnitsky and Ekaterina Demintseva, “‘Kyrgyz Clinics’ in Moscow: Medical Centers for Central Asian Migrants,” Medical Anthropology 37, no. 5 (2018): 401–11.


irregular construction side jobs earning:
In 2012, 1USD = 30RUB, 1KGS = 0.62RUB; in 2014, 1USD = 36RUB, 1RUB = 1.5KGS, and in 2019, 1USD = 65RUB, 1KGS = 0.93RUB, 1USD = 52KGS.


based on “mobility know-how”:
Michel Bruneau, “Diasporas, Transnational Spaces and Communities,” in Bauböck and Faist, Diaspora and Transnationalism, 43.


opinions on how to live their lives differed: This finding is consistent with other academic research on Central Asian labor migration patterns; cf. Thieme, “Coming Home?” 127–43; Delia Rahmonova-Schwartz, “Family and Transnational Mobility in Post-Soviet Central Asia” (PhD diss., Nomos, 2012); Medina Aitieva, “Reconstituting Transnational Families: An Ethnography of Family Practices between Kyrgyzstan and Russia” (PhD diss., University of Manchester, 2015).

amnesty for the Kyrgyzstani migrants:
According to migrants, a similar amnesty was given to Kyrgyzstani migrants in October 2018 when another migrant was implicated in a sexual abuse crime.

March 2019 anti-migrant protest in Yakutsk was not the first:
Marlène Laruelle, “Anti-Migrant Riots in Russia: The Mobilizing Potential of Xenophobia,” Russian Analytical Digest 141 (December 23, 2013): 2; and Jens Siegert, “Natives, Foreigners and Native Foreigners—the Difficult Task of Coexistence in
explicitly excluded from the national community: Laruelle, “Anti-Migrant Riots in Russia,” 2–4.


“foreign agent” laws: Rustamjon Urinboyev, Migration and Hybrid Political Regimes: Navigating the Legal Landscape in Russia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2021).

“sedimentation” that shows over a longer period: Michel Bruneau, “Diasporas, Transnational Spaces and Communities,” in Bauböck and Faist, Diaspora and Transnationalism, 36–49.

Case III-B. From Potemkin Village to Real Life in Turkmenistan

Sebastien Peyrouse


health has been fully integrated:
Abel Polese and Slavomir Horák,

launched reforms are criticized:


Great Renaissance was supposed to engage: “Politika Novogo vozrozhdeniia i Velikikh preobrazovani Prezidenta Turkmensitana,” Neitral’nyi Turkmenistan, June 27, 2007, as quoted in Polese and Horák, “Tale of Two Presidents,” 468.


Case III-C. Private Education, Inequality, and the Growing Social Divide in Bishkek

Emil Nasritdinov, Aigoul Abdoubaetova, and Gulnora Iskandarova

fairly good-quality education: The “quality” of education in this chapter is evaluated through high scores of students in the national standardized tests and high achievements in various interschool competitions on school subjects. In addition, we refer to the opinions shared by interviewed experts and parents, and to the common public opinion shaped through various online discussions and forums.

afford the cost of lower-end private schools: Only the Turkish schools have a small ideological component. Most of them are Fethullah Gullen schools, and so involve some religious mentoring, but this is not necessarily connected to the cost of education or the category of parents. These Turkish schools used to prepare graduates for applying to universities in Turkey, but at least in 2019, after the alleged 2016 coup, this is no longer an option, as a Khizmet lyceum graduate will not stand a chance applying to a Turkish university. So now they prepare students for Ala-Too and Manas Universities (both Turkish) and more prestigious universities, such as American University of Central Asia. Other than that, philosophy is correlated with wealth. For example, the most expensive schools know that parents will be able to send kids abroad, so they prepare students for studying abroad. The less expensive schools’ strategy is to keep students happy and safe.

suffer from a shortage of qualified teachers: According to the National Statistics Committee in Bishkek, a “living wage” is 4,696 som ($68), but in looking at how they compose the data, one sees how wildly unrealistic that number is. For example, the diet they compose includes $12 a month for meat (3 kg), $1 for fish (1 kg of the cheapest fish), $3 for vegetables, $5 for fruits, and $9 for milk products. Certainly, different numbers would be offered if members of the statistics committee tried to live within these ranges. See data from the National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, from April 11, 2019: http://www.stat.kg/media/files/fb3640c4-432f-42ee-a617-6be168f7978b.PDF.


limits on the duration, size, and cost of family feasts: Tom Balmforth, “Reporter’s Notebook: After Years of Work in Russia, an Uzbek Wedding in Tajikistan,” Eurasianet, May 19, 2015, https://eurasianet.org/reporters-


brought new patterns of consumption: Werner, “Household Networks, Ritual Exchange and Economic Change in Rural Kazakhstan.”


14. Social Structure

Edward Schatz


small facts speak to large issues: Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures, 23.


Rustam, whom I first met: All names used are pseudonyms.

impossible to be Uzbek and not be a Muslim: See also Adeeb Khalid, Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).

while smoking cigarettes: He smoked but abstained from drinking alcohol.


establishing that (and how) legacies matter is no mean feat: Mark Beissinger and Stephen Kotkin, eds., Historical Legacies of Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).


**among the most important defining elements:** I make this point in Edward Schatz, “Leninism’s Long Shadow in Central Asia,” in Multination States in Asia, ed. Jacques Bertrand and André Laliberté (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 244–62.

**large-scale contacts, especially in the extractive industries:** Steve LeVine, The Oil and the Glory: The Pursuit of Empire and Fortune on the Caspian Sea (New York: Random House, 2007).


**debate about Turkmen ethnic history:** See, for example, Shokhrat Kadyrov, “Natsiia” plemen: etnicheskie istoki, transformatsiia, perspektivy gosudarstvennosti v Turkmenistane (Moscow: RAN Tsentr tsivilizatsionnykh i regional’nykh issledovanii, 2003).

**transnational communities that transcend physical space:** Alexander Sodiqov, personal communication.

**Central Asians are increasingly online:** “Internet Users by Country (2016),” Internet Live Stats, accessed January 12, 2017, http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users-by-country/. This particular resource defines “internet user” as “an individual, of any age, who can access the Internet at home, via any device type and connection.”

**the world is not “flat”:** Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century (Macmillan, 2005).

**do indeed have greater access:** See Peter Rollberg and Marlène Laruelle, “The Media Landscape in Central Asia: Introduction to the Special Issue,” Demokratizatsiya 23, no. 3 (2015): 227–32.

**this brings different forms of sociability:**


ignorant of the labor provided by others: On the politics of sight, see Timothy Pachirat, Every Twelve Seconds: Industrialized Slaughter and the Politics of Sight (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011).


developed different social norms: Alima Bissenova, “Post-socialist Dreamworlds: Housing Boom and Urban Development in Kazakhstan” (PhD diss., Cornell University, 2012).

instrumentality and moral obligation: For an illuminating example from neighboring Afghanistan, see Noah Coburn, Bazaar Politics: Power and Pottery in an Afghan Market Town (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011),

common sense of appropriateness: Of course, norm-guided behavior does not preclude creativity on an individual’s part. That is, one could play “physician” in a variety of ways, and one can challenge prevailing norms through unorthodox behavior as a physician. Nonetheless, given the extent to which we in the West tend to assume that individuals are free agents only lightly constrained by their environments, it is important to focus our attention on the importance of roles, norms, and appropriateness.

power-hungry behavior exhibited: For one powerful exploration of how these elite competitions play themselves out across the globe, see Cooley and Heathershaw, Dictators without Borders.

“horizons of the thinkable” are crucial: Michael Schatzberg, Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa: Father, Family, Food (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001).


15.Moral Structure

Maria Louw

An Ironic Cinderella: This introductory story is a modified version of a case story, which previously appeared in Maria Louw, Everyday Islam in Post-Soviet Central Asia (London: Routledge, 2007).

in honor of the female saint: I use the concept of saint as an approximate translation of the Uzbek term avliyo,
which refers to a person who is close to God, a friend of God. In Arabic, *avliyo* is the plural form of *wali*.

In Uzbekistan, however, *avliyo* is commonly used as singular.


**seen as a space of monitoring, accountability, and control:** Liu, *Under Solomon’s Throne*, 120.


**skilled balancing among various claims:** Cf. Michael Lambek, “Towards an Ethics of the Act,” in Lambek, *Ordinary Ethics*.


**when the unreflective being-in-the-world is disturbed:** Zigon, “Moral Breakdown and the Ethical Demand,” 131–50.


**a moral and spiritual quality:** Sarah Kendzior, “Reclaiming Ma’naviyat: Morality, Criminality, and..."

discussion and moral problematization:

trade was condemned:

unproductive form of generating wealth:

proliferation of images of transgression:

have indeed resulted in changing moralities:


recollection of God: Central to Sufism is the Dhikr, i.e., the remembrance of recollection of God in the form of repetitive invocations of his names and various religious formulas. The Naqshbandiyya Sufi order, more particularly, is known for its inner or unspoken (xufiyya).


perceived as potentially dangerous:

characterized by moral problematization:

remitances from migrant labor:

dramatically changed family and community structures:

transformative effects on family relations:
Reeves, “Staying Put?” 557.

fewer opportunities for domestic mobility:
Reeves, “Staying Put?” 559.

allies that could be mobilized:

campaigns against Islam and the institutions of purdah:

process of women’s emancipation:


many women adopted strategies: Suyarkulova, “Fashioning the Nation,” 257.

many women had to work: Louw, Everyday Islam in Post-Soviet Central Asia, 163–66.


gradually learn to comply: Beyer, “Authority as Accomplishment.”


where open and free debate is stifled: Rasanyagam, Islam in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan.

16. Gender Structure

Svetlana Peshkova


labeling someone as a man or a woman is a social decision: Anne Fausto-Sterling, Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 3.


third gender referring to humans who are neither male or female: Serena Nanda, Neither Man nor Woman: The Hijras of India, 2nd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1998).


accomplished entertainers of older men: Nalivkina and Nalivkina, Muslim Women of the Fergana Valley.

young feminine males received wide admiration: E.g., Eugene Schuyler, Turkistan: Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand,

Reducing a complex gender identity of the bachcha: Nalivkin and Nalivkina, Muslim Women of the Fergana Valley; e.g., V. U. Kushilevskij, [Кушелевский, Валерian Иустинович], Materiali Dlya Meditsinskoi Geografii i Sanitarnogo Opisaniya Ferganskoj Oblasti [Материалы для медицинской географии и санитарного описания Ферганской области]: Novij Margeloan Ferganskaya Oblast' [Новый Маргелан: Ферг. обл.], 1891.

Gender identities erased through the efforts to “civilize”: Dan Healey, Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia: The Regulation of Sexual and Gender Dissent (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).

Guided by a religious law: Nalivkin and Nalivkina, Muslim Women of the Fergana Valley.

Polygyny was rarely practiced: Nalivkin and Nalivkina, Muslim Women of the Fergana Valley.


Complexity of local colonial gender identities: Schuyler, Turkistan.


Violently limited the power of religious leadership: Keller, To Moscow, Not Mecca.

Facilitated women’s entrance into a public: Kamp, New Woman in Uzbekistan.

Same sex practices were pathologized and criminalized: Buelow, “Paradox of the Kyrgyz Crossdressers.”


Motherhood is (also) simultaneously a Muslim woman’s religious duty: Roche, “Sound Family for a Healthy Nation,” 207–24.

Continue to successfully resolve this paradox: E.g. Ismailbekova, “Migration and Patrilineal Descent,” 375–89.
individuals’ performance of the as if helps: Harris, Control and Subversion.


high levels of sexual dissatisfaction: Harris, “State Business,” 97–111.


those who were and are in tema: Buelow, “Paradox of the Kyrgyz Crossdressers”; Suyarkulova, “Becoming an Activist Scholar.”

those with an insider’s knowledge: Stella, Lesbian Lives in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia; Suyarkulova, “Becoming an Activist Scholar.”


Case IV-A. On Mothers- and Daughters-in-law

Julie McBrien


frequently depicted as domineering: Ismailbekova, “Constructing the Authority of Women through Custom.”

meaning “to enter, come, or arrive”: Ismailbekova, “Migration and Patrilineal Descent,” 383.

Part V. Contexts of Transformation

17. Religion

David W. Montgomery

views the pre-Islamic ancestors as Muslim: This points to how some have adapted ancient practices to modern contexts. One such example is how Tengrism (Tengri is the ancient sky god) was adapted in Kyrgyzstan to political and national ends that are situated in the deep past, the Islamic milieu, and ethnic nationalism. See David W. Montgomery, Practicing Islam: Knowledge, Experience, and Social Navigation in Kyrgyzstan (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016), 95, 144; Choiun Omuraly uulu, Tengirchilik: uluttuk filosofianyn unggusuna chalgyn (Bishkek: KRON firmasy, 1994); Asya Mukambetova, “Tengriisky calendar kak osnova nomadicheskoj tzivilizatzii,” in Istoria i Kultura Aralo-Kaspiia, ed. Serik Ajigali (Almaty: Academy of Science Press, 2001); Dastan Sarygulov, Kirgiz: proshlooe, nastoiashechee i buduschshee (Bishkek: Fond Tengir-Ordo, 2005); Gulnara Aitpaeva, “Kyrghyzchylek: Searching New Paradigms for Ancient Practices,” Anthropological Journal of European Cultures 17, no. 2 (2008): 66–83; Asel Murzakulova and John Schoeberlein, “The Invention of Legitimacy: Struggles in Kyrgyzstan to Craft an Effective Nation-State Ideology,” in Symbolism and Power in Central Asia: Politics of the Spectacular, ed. Sally N. Cummings (London: Routledge, 2010), 144–63.

markers of some of these pre-Islamic traditions: See Richard Foltz, Religions of the Silk Road: Premodern Patterns of Globalization, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave, 2010).

world’s oldest surviving religions: Some identify the use of fire in ancestral veneration and practices that connect to the spirits as remnants of Zoroastrian influence and even in art, especially in suzani textiles, the ubiquity of the sun motif shows the challenge in attributing remains of past traditions—some identify the sun as a legacy of Zoroastrianism and some understand it as “traditional” without making any broader connection. For more on Zoroastrianism in the region, see Richard N. Frye, The Heritage of Central Asia: From Antiquity to the


sites may be encountered with seasonal variation: See Montgomery, Practicing Islam.

Islam spread unevenly: While the Qur’an was revealed to Muhammad through the archangel Gabriel from 610 CE until his death in 632 CE, the beginning of the Muslim era is marked by the Hijrah, when Muhammad and his followers migrated from Mecca to Medina to escape persecution in 622 CE.


Islam was slower to take hold: See, for example, Robert D. Crews, For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russian and Central Asia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

different forms of competition: See, for example, Scott C. Levi and Ron Sela, eds., Islamic Central Asia: An Anthology of Historical Sources (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), for a narrative of changing Islamic Central Asia told through historical sources. Additionally, Devin DeWeese, Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde: Baba Tükles and Conversion to Islam in Historical and Epic Tradition (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), offers a detailed account of Islamization across the region.

nativized assimilation of practice and thought: DeWeese, Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde, 51ff.

pre-Islamic practice was reframed: Montgomery, Practicing Islam, 87.

Sufi orders played an active role: See Maria Elisabeth Louw, Everyday Islam in Post-Soviet Central Asia (London: Routledge, 2007), on Naqshibandi and Bukhara; Bruce G. Privratsky, Muslim Turkistan: Kazak Religion and Collective Memory (Richmond, Surrey, UK: Curzon, 2001), on Yassawi and Turkestan; and Benjamin Gatling, Expressions of Sufi Culture in Tajikistan (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2018), on contemporary Sufis in Tajikistan.

interpretive legal process that results in variation: The four schools of jurisprudence (madhhab) within Sunni Islam—Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali—and two within Shi’ia Islam—Ja’fari and Zadi—that roughly characterize differing approaches to legal reasoning. This is, of course, an oversimplification; there is debate about the schools, with some seeing the “gates of ijtihad”—interpretational approaches to reasoning—as having closed in the tenth century, though most scholars see it as being more complex. Relatedly, some Sunnis do not accept the Shi’ia schools, some refer to Shi’ism as only one school, and still others believe there is broader diversity in jurisprudential reasoning. See David W. Montgomery, “On Muslims and the Navigation of Religiosity: Notes on the Anthropology of Islam,” in The Ashgate Research Companion to Anthropology, ed. Pamela J. Stewart and Andrew J. Strathern (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2015),
227–53, for a broader discussion of anthropological approaches to studying Islam, including *fiqh* and Sufism.

**Muslim modernist reform movement:**

**nationalism as central to their reform:**

**rituals becoming contextualized as tradition:** See Privratsky, *Muslim Turkistan*.


**the Bakhautdin Naqshband Mausoleum complex:** See Louw, *Everyday Islam in Post-Soviet Central Asia*.

**sought to transform and modernize education:** See Khalid, *Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform*.


**A demographic picture of religion:** Based on 2010 data from Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures Project, accessed June 14, 2019, http://globalreligiousfutures.org/. Population numbers for 2050 are based on trends of annual population growth rate between 2000 and 2010, respectively, at: Kazakhstan 0.7%; Kyrgyzstan 0.7%; Tajikistan 1.1%; Turkmenistan 1.1%; and Uzbekistan 1.0%. The CIA World Factbook gives similar distributions but notes: in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, the Christian population is predominantly Russian (Eastern) Orthodox while in Kyrgyzstan, Orthodox Christians make up almost half of the Christian population. Most Muslims in the region are Sunni, though in Tajikistan, around 3% of the population is noted as Shia (though not subidentified as Ismaili Shi’a, which would be most.) See https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/central-asia/


**religious practice around sacred sites:**

**ancestors playing an active role:** See Eva-Marie Dubuisson, *Living Language in Kazakhstan: The Dialogic Emergence of an Ancestral Worldview* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2017), for a discussion on the active role ancestors play in contemporary Kazakh politics.
authority as (properly) Islamic: See

he complains about corruption: See

see religious space as transformed: See

religion as not having an active role: See

support of Sufism made sense: See Louw, *Everyday Islam in Post-Soviet Central Asia*.


religious pluralism as a threat: See


value if it is an action of choice: Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, *Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari’a* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), makes a global argument for secularism from a Muslim perspective wherein being religious should be a choice one makes rather than is coerced or forced to do, i.e., for one’s faith to be meaningful, effort is required.

concerns of public and thus political space: See, for example, McBrien, *From Belonging to Belief*; Manja Stephan, “Education, Youth and


come to her with their personal and health issues: See Peshkova, Women, Islam, and Identity; Dubuisson, Living Language in Kazakhstan.


the laws of custom and tradition: See Beyer, Force of Custom.

18. Politics

John Heathershaw
disdain for politics in general: Colin Hay, Why We Hate Politics (London: Polity, 2008), 5.


retreat from political participation:


The Human Community Governed by the State: In Max Weber’s famous modern definition, the state is “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” Three elements are present in this definition: sovereignty (“monopoly of the legitimate”); nationhood (“human community . . . within a given territory”); and violence (“use of physical force”). Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation (1921), http://fs2.american.edu/dfagel/www/class%20readings/weber/politicsasavocation.pdf.


Participants May Be Absent as Labor Migrants: Madeleine Reeves, “The Ashar-State: Communal Commitment


despite repeated and dire warnings: Central Asia’s globally recognized terrorist groups—especially the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and its offshoots—all exist outside of the five republics and have relatively little ability to threaten them. Over the period 2011–17 several thousand Central Asians sought to join the jihadi struggles in Iraq/Syria during the armed conflicts there while in 2017 four major international terrorist attacks were committed by Central Asians. However, these fighters all left their countries—often for Russia, many years before—with little realistic prospect of return. Therefore, the question about terrorism in Central Asia is one of transnational flows, not domestic “breeding grounds.”

less than 0.07 percent of recorded incidents: A total of 83,626 terrorism incidents of an “unambiguous” type were recorded in 2001–2016 period by GTD.


violence was committed by gangs: Human Rights Watch, “Where is the Justice?”; International Crisis Group, Pogroms in Kyrgyzstan.


part of the reality of international security: Matthew Crosston, Fostering Fundamentalism: Terrorism, Democracy and American Engagement in Central Asia (Aldershot, Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2007); Mariya Y. Omelicheva,

state that emerged out of the civil war: Driscoll, Warlords and Coalition Politics in Post-Soviet States.


Kyrgyz sheltering their Uzbek neighbors: Human Rights Watch, “Where is the Justice?”


vehicles for rival political factions: Megoran, Nationalism in Central Asia, 6.

Nationalism of this ethnic and exclusive kind: The academic literature demonstrates that the rise of nationalism is related to war, but rather than being a sufficient cause, it is one of many factors that coincide and interact to make armed conflict probable. See Andreas Wimmer, Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Lars-Erik Cederman, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaug, Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).


have nurtured patriarchy in politics: Harris, Control and Subversion.


this cultural context is a fundamental obstacle: Liu, “Post-Soviet Paternalism and Personhood,” 225–38.


possible for a rival to become relatively wealthy: Radnitz, Weapons of the Wealthy; see also Markowitz, State Erosion.


generating severe hardships and inequalities: Nazpary, Post-Soviet Chaos.

created these two more open economies: Kelly McMann, Economic Autonomy and Democracy: Hybrid Regimes in Russia and Kyrgyzstan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

dynamic environment of the bazaar: Regine A. Spector, Order at the Bazaar: Power and Trade in Central


offshore accounts and launder their monies: Cooley and Heathershaw, Dictators without Borders.

promoting her charitable foundation overseas: Cooley and Heathershaw, Dictators without Borders.


where civil society has been vigorously repressed: Ziegler, “Great Powers, Civil Society.”


gain legitimacy for their campaigns: Cooley and Heathershaw, Dictators without Borders.

19. Law

Judith Beyer


including by some of the involved foreign experts: The German legal scholar Rolf Knieper, for example, who worked as a legal advisor in both Central Asia and the Caucasus, eventually adopted a more cautious approach to his earlier rather enthusiastic statements on the “transition” through legal reform which he helped engineer at the University of Bremen in cooperation with the German International Cooperation (GIZ) when arguing that “it seems obvious that a time span of 20 years is ridiculously short and certainly insufficient to judge on failure or success of a highly complex process.” Rolf Knieper, “Pulls and Pushes of Legal Reform in Post-Communist States,” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 2, no. 1 (March 2003): 124; see also Daniel Berkovitz, Katharina Pistor, and Jean-François Richard, “Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect,” European Economic Review 47, no. 1 (February 2003): 165–95, for an earlier critique.


a more general globalization of transnational modes: Rasulov,


spread of the distinctly US American (as opposed to, say, German or English) model: Rasulov, “Central Asia and the Globalisation,” 183.


some non-sedentary groups were not under effective state control: See Adrienne Edgar, Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), for the Turkmen in Transcaspia.

the region, a wide variety of terms exist that could be translated with this concept. In the Kyrgyz context alone, I detected around ten different words whose meaning and legal or nonlegal overtone changes according to the situation and depending on who invokes it. As I have argued elsewhere, instead of trying to translate words like salt, adat, urf-adat, nark, yrym-zhyrym or others, and delineate them from one another, it is more fruitful to analyze them in their respective contexts in order to understand what actors achieve by their invocation. Judith Beyer, *The Force of Custom: Law and the Ordering of Everyday Life in Kyrgyzstan* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016), 8.

**Sedentary groups more often applied**


**People managed to retain a sense of legal autonomy**:


targeting the family, and particularly women and youth, was an attempt to transform: Massell, “Family Law and Social Mobilization,” 374–403.

forced emancipation led to an unintended consequence: Massell, “Family Law and Social Mobilization,” 382.

the Soviet regime relied on individuals to realize their revolutionary politics: Botakoz Kassymbekova, *Despite*


amending the country’s constitution via a nation-wide referendum has been the standard way to react by new governmental powers: Judith Beyer, “Constitutional Faith: Law and Hope in Revolutionary Kyrgyzstan,” Ethnos 80, no. 3 (2015): 320–45.

to transfer presidential powers to the position of the prime minister: When Karimov died in September 2016, the acting prime minister, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, became interim president.


treaty ratification is treated as a de facto stand-in for the actual reforms: Rasulov, “Central Asia and the Globalisation,” 179.


the virtual destruction of civil society: Erika Weinthal and Kate Watters, “Transnational Environmental Activism in Central Asia: The Coupling of Domestic Law and International Conventions,” Environmental Politics 19, no. 5 (2010): 793.

NGO activists brought Kazakhstan before the Compliance Committee: Weinthal and Watters, “Transnational Environmental Activism in Central Asia,” 794.

people’s capacity to turn instruments of power into weapons: James Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987).

defy the very instrumentalization of their everyday lives through law: While we do know how laws are being drafted in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, we know next to nothing about their implementation or what living under these laws means for the population in these countries as carrying out research in both countries independently has become increasingly difficult. The next section will therefore predominantly concentrate on the other Central Asian republics.


no choice but to adopt many Central
the Arabs ultimately succeeded in establishing Islamic law: See Sartori, *Visions of Justice*.
for Turkmenistan how the council of elders was turned into a popular court: Edgar, *Tribal Nation*, 30–31.
it allows them to perform their authority publicly: See Beyer, *Force of Custom*, ch. 4, for details.
the archives of the colonial polities are filled with appeals: Sartori, *Visions of Justice*, 110–11.
the category of “custom” itself that proves most flexible: Beyer, *Force of Custom*.
He said that Atambaev had written a “fatwa”: A fatwa is an authoritative legal opinion of an Islamic expert. It derives its authority from the person issuing it.
even when authors are sympathetic toward the region: In Johan Engvall’s *The State as Investment Market: Kyrgyzstan in Comparative Perspective* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016), the index subentries for the term *judiciary* in the context of Kyrgyzstan, for example, are “effects of informal payments in”; “illicit uses of”; “influence of personal relationships in”; “job buying in.”


**have ended up in “Western peripheries” instead:** Another example is Gulnara Iskakova, a constitutional legal scholar from Kyrgyzstan who served as the ambassador of Kyrgyzstan in the UK until 2019, and was previously appointed country representative at the Human Rights Council in Geneva, Switzerland. Under the governments of both Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiev she had been a strong advocate of constitutional reforms and has published extensively on the subject, but was in the end “removed” from political processes to representative work in the West. Isakova was succeeded as ambassador to the UK by Edil Baisalov, a well-known politician and civil rights activist, who left Kyrgyzstan in 2007 after several attacks on his life.

20. Education


**Living beneath the poverty level:** “Kyrgyzstan” in the CIA *World Factbook*, last updated June 20, 2018, and, for the current population figure, National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2015, http://www.stat.kg/en/

**Almost never designs material and workshop:** The Ministry of Education clearly has many demands on its time and its funding. According to a 2018 article in *Fergana News*, for example, Bishkek schools were designed to accommodate 75,975 pupils yet in fall 2018 planned to enroll nearly twice as many: 147,160. “Бишкекские школы оказались двукратно перегружены учениками” [Bishkek schools have twice the load of students], *International news agency “Fergana,”* August 16, 2018, http://www. fergananews.com/news/32069.


**a number of professors in Kyrgyzstan:** Personal communications, various dates.


**to prepare students for employment:** Hans de Wit, *Internationalization of Higher Education in the United States of America and Europe: A Historical, Comparative, and Conceptual Analysis* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2002).


**retain longer degrees:** Merrill and Ryskulova, “Kyrgyzstan’s New Degree System,” 18–20.

**wanted to destroy the strong Soviet system:** Merrill, Baitugulova, and Ryskulova, “Faculty in Contemporary Kyrgyzstan: Reactions to Reforms,” 97–114.

**discourses of nostalgia:** Tampayeva, “Implementation of the Bologna Process.”

**faculty struggling with mandates:** Merrill, Baitugulova, and Ryskulova, “Faculty in Contemporary Kyrgyzstan: Reactions to Reforms,” 97–114.


**participants were unable to implement:** Personal communications to Martha Merrill, May 2015.


**incomplete higher education:** Anna Smolentseva, Jeroen Huisman, and Isak Froumin, “Transformation of Higher Education Institutional Landscape in Post-Soviet Countries: From Soviet Model to Where?” in Huisman, Smolentseva, and Froumin, *25 Years of Transformations*, 1–44.

**regulations now say:** Government of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, “Постановление об установлении двухуровневой структуры высшего профессионального образования”


complained bitterly about the lowering of quality: Ryskulova, personal communication, 1999.

just like you American capitalists: Personal communication, 1999.

complain about the additional expense: Merrill, Baitugulova, and Ryskulova, “Faculty in Contemporary Kyrgyzstan: Reactions to Reforms,” 97–114.


help to validate the quality: European Quality Assurance Register for Higher Education (EQAR), https://www.eqar.eu/


need to expand higher education enrollments: Ruziev and Burkhanov, “Uzbekistan,” 441.


destroyed much of the educational infrastructure: DeYoung, Kataeva, andJonbekova, “Higher Education in Tajikistan,” 368. As Jonbekova elaborates: “Visits to universities, both in Khorog and Dushanbe, confirmed employers’ claims related to the shortage of resources. Laboratories were almost empty, with most equipment appearing to be left over from the Soviet era, largely nonfunctional and used primarily for demonstrations during lectures.” Jonbekova, “University Graduates’ Skills Mismatches in Central Asia,” 177.

necessitates the use of Tajik as the medium of instruction: Mehrinisso Nagzibekova, “Language and Education Policies in Tajikistan,”


school system was restructured:


lacked faculty with qualifications:

problems presented then still remain:

list of the problems of schools: DeYoung, “Problems and Trends in Education in Central Asia since 1990,” 499–514; Shamatov, and Sainazarov, “Impact
of Standardized Testing on Education Quality in Kyrgyzstan,” 145–79.

funding for education in Soviet times: DeYoung, “Problems and Trends in Education in Central Asia since 1990,” 499–514.

most Ministry of Education staff were trained to administer: DeYoung, “Problems and Trends in Education in Central Asia since 1990,” 499–514.


Some employers have started to complain:

See Jonbekova, “University Graduates’ Skills Mismatches in Central Asia,” 173–74. In my own interviews in 2018, the teacher at one elite public school in Bishkek said parents pay $1,000 for their children to be admitted; another said some children were admitted because of calls from “top” people.

Case V-B. Spectacular Politics at the World Nomad Games

Mathijs Pelkmans

These games just can’t get any better:


understand their nation’s greatness:


learning about the history of nomads:


storied history as a rugged nomadic tribe:


we have carried our culture, traditions, and games:


overwhelmingly impressed and astonished:


the country had crossed the Rubicon:


he would be a kok-boru captain: Stephen Lioy, @slioy, September 4, 2016.
Case V-C. Displacement and Belonging in Eurasia

Jennifer S. Wistrand

The ethnographic material upon which this case study is based was collected in Azerbaijan in Azerbaijani, Russian, and English in ninth-, tenth-, and eleventh-grade history, civics, and constitution classes at an IDP school on the outskirts of Baku and at a regular (non-IDP) school in central Baku over the course of twenty-two months between January 2006 and April 2008. The author returned to Azerbaijan in April and May of 2017 and in November of 2019 as a consultant to the World Bank for a project concerning Azerbaijan’s IDPs. The author’s work for the World Bank is not represented in this case study, however, and the author’s views do not necessarily represent those of the World Bank.

shared written languages and religions:

most well-known displaced peoples:
Yaacov Ro’i, “The Transformation of Historiography on the ‘Punished Peoples,’” History and Memory 21, no. 2 (2009): 153. The “charges” against these peoples were varied. However, the greater share was accused of being members of “enemy nations” who might collaborate with the Nazis; see Ro’i, “Transformation of Historiography on the ‘Punished Peoples,’” 153–58.


displaced within rather than outside of:
According to Article 1 of the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, a “refugee” is defined as an individual who, “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” According to the introduction to the 1998 United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, “[I]nternally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border” (emphasis added).

working in Azerbaijan since 1992: The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the part of the UN that is responsible for protecting and assisting refugees and other “persons of concern.”


Armenia controls Nagorno-Karabakh:

Geographer Richard Rowland offers a more precise definition of the disputed territory. He writes: “The current rayons [regions] or parts thereof which comprise the former Nagorno-Karabakh A.O. [Autonomous Oblast] include the following: all of Khojaly (including Khankendi city), Khojavend, and Shusha rayons; the eastern roughly one-third of Kelbajar Rayon; and the western roughly four-fifths of Terter Rayon (Azerbaijan, 1997, p. 26). The current rayons or parts thereof that comprise the even larger Occupied Zone [OZ] (Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent areas) include the following: all of Khojaly (including Khankendi city), Shusha, Kelbajar, Lachin, Gubadly, Zangilan and Jebrail rayons; virtually all (roughly 90 percent) of Khojavend Rayon (only the small extreme eastern part is beyond the OZ); the western roughly 70 percent of Aghdam Rayon; the western roughly three-fifths of Terter Rayon; and the western roughly one-fifth of Fizuli Rayon (Azerbaijan, 1997, p. 26). Thus, overall, the OZ essentially comprises the southwestern part of Azerbaijan ‘proper’ (that is, excluding Nakhichevan A.R. [Autonomous Republic]).” Richard Rowland, “National and Regional Population Trends in Azerbaijan,” *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 45, no. 4 (2004): 287. Note: following the April 2016 “four-day war” between Azerbaijan and Armenia, land changed sides for the first time since the ceasefire, with Azerbaijan regaining control of Jouj Marjanli village in Jabrayil. Laurence Broers, *The Nagorny Karabakh Conflict: Defaulting to War*, Research Paper, Chatham House, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Russia and Eurasia Programme, 2016.

not very familiar with the distinctions:

Throughout this case study, the term “IDP” is used to refer to Azerbaijan’s IDPs unless there is a reference to an ethnographic example where the word refugee is used. Then the word refugee is used.

poor and dependent on the state:

There are other stereotypes of Azerbaijan’s IDPs. This is just one example, albeit one that predominates.

Part VI. Contexts of Work

21. Resources

Jeanne Féaux de la Croix and David Gullette

scattered unevenly with small, decorative symbols:


sheepskins, which had a huge impact on local markets:


boom and bust of fishing on the Aral Sea:


expanded agricultural sector in the lowlands:

Unfortunately, most statistics on these (e.g., as percentages of gross domestic product) are not reliable and difficult to collate, so we have omitted them.

Cotton-growing plantations still dominate:

On the relationship between water policy and expanding irrigation, and the problematic consequences see Alexander Morrison, “Irrigation and Colonization: Water and the Politics of

natural resources are not just “there”: The vocabulary to describe a valuable asset as a “resource” seems to be colonizing other domains, as in “human resources”—fields which we do not have space to engage with here.


assumed that land would only generate income: Virginia Martin, Law and Custom in the Steppe: The Kazakhs of the Middle Horde and Russian Colonialism in the Nineteenth Century (London: Routledge, 2001); Isabelle Ohayon, La sédentarisation des Kazakhs dans l’URSS de Staline (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2006).


helpful to think about “resource complexes”: Anke K. Scholz, Martin Bartelheim, Roland Hardenberg, and Jörn Staecker, eds., Resource Cultures: Sociocultural Dynamics and the Use of Resources—Theories, Methods, Perspectives (Tübingen: University of Tübingen, 2017), 15.

organizations have to be created to export: Koray Çalişkan, Market Threads: How Cotton Farmers and Traders Create a Global Commodity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).


rights to drinking water were a common good: Jacquesson, Pastoréalismes; James Roe, “Naming the Waters: New Insights into the Nomadic Use of Oases in the Libyan Desert of Egypt,” in The Archaeology of Mobility: Old World and New World Nomadism, ed. Hans Barnard and Wendrich Willeke (Los Angeles: Cotsen Institute of Archaeology, University of California, Los Angeles, 2008), 487–504.

extensive irrigation networks were developed: Akifumi Shioya, “Who Should Manage the Water of the Amu-Darya? Controversy over Irrigation Concessions between Russian and Khiva, 1913–1914,” in Explorations in


effort to establish regional institutions: N. Mirzaev, Establishment of Basic Institutional Arrangements for IWRM Structures and Strengthening their Organizational Capacities at Three Lower Levels with Focus on Resources Management and Water Delivery


water systems are diverse arrangements of life: Rohan D’Souza, “Filling Multipurpose Reservoir with Politics: Displacing the Modern Large Dam in India,” in Large Dams in Asia: Contested Environments between Technological Hydroscapes and Social Resistance, ed. Marcus Nüsser (Heidelberg: Springer, 2013), 70.


access often facilitated through informal networks: These networks were often referred to in Russian as poblatu.


interest from neighboring countries: According to the United States Energy Information Administration in 2018, Kazakhstan has proven crude oil reserves of 50 billion barrels, making it the eleventh largest reserve in the world. Turkmenistan has proven gas reserves of 265 trillion cubic feet in 2016, making it the fifth largest reserves in the world and Kazakhstan has around 85 trillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves, making it fourteenth among world gas reserves. For more information, see US Energy Information Administration, Country analysis “Kazakhstan,” https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/KAZ, and “Turkmenistan,” https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/TKM.

explored as export potential: Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan export electricity through the Central Asia South Asia Electricity Trade and Transmission project (CASA-1000).

British and Russian empires competed: It should be noted, however, that the images the “Great Game” conjures can be misleading. As Alexander Morrison has argued, “It suggests a set of mutually-understood rules, clear strategic and economic goals, and a mixture of adventurousness and rational calculation in pursuit of these goals. Above all, it suggests that only the ‘Great Powers’ had or have any agency in Central Asia.” Alexander Morrison, “Central Asia’s Catechism of Cliché: From the Great Game to Silk Road,” Eurasianet, July 25, 2017, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/84491. As before, it suggests that other states, such as China and Russia, are using Central Asia for their power games and the republics are somewhat at their mercy. This is an incorrect view, as Central Asian republics advance their own politics and through energy projects and insert themselves through these projects in interstate relations beyond the region.

demonstrations: Amanda E. Wooden, “Kyrgyzstan’s Dark Ages: Framing and the 2010 Hydroelectric Revolution,” Central Asian Survey 33, no. 4 (2014): 463–81. It should be emphasized that energy was only one (if prominent) dissatisfaction among a whole range of grievances, in a context of mounting resistance not only by angry citizens but also by other politicians sensing an opportunity.

This was combined with people’s shock: Wooden, “Kyrgyzstan’s Dark Ages,” 466.

The city’s architecture still stands in stark contrast: The Kazakh government has recently begun efforts to distribute oil wealth and attention also to the rural and agricultural economy.


concerns for their health and environment: This is the central theme of the documentary film Flowers of Freedom (2014), directed by Mirjam Leuze.

Regulation on extractive industries: Ryskeldi Satke, “Protests over

disputes on the expected returns: It is important to note that Kumtor, as the largest mining enterprise in Kyrgyzstan, is subject to a number of negative media campaigns. Questions related to whether the mine should be nationalized are in constant focus. As with the example from protests over land legislation in Kazakhstan, some people feel that they may be losing their country’s resources to foreign companies and individuals who do not have the interests of the country and people at heart.


access to drinking and irrigation water: In the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, there is much evidence that while water access was always precious and occasionally conflictual, there were workable methods and recognized sources of local authority such as the “mirob” position in each village to deal with these. While they probably rarely guaranteed complete “fairness”—for example, between wealthy and less influential families or villages—these disputes rarely led to more wide-scale or violent conflict.

lived out in its most radical form: Anna L. Tsing gives a very persuasive analysis of rainforest exploitation in Indonesia, for comparison. Anna L. Tsing, “Natural Resources and Capitalist Frontiers,” Economic and Political Weekly 38, no. 48 (November 29, 2003): 5100–5106.

22. Economics

Elmira Satybaldieva and Balihar Sanghera


23. Property

Eric McGlinchey


US House of Representatives are a comparative bargain: Kim, “Price of Winning Just Got Higher.”


incentives to block further advances


spirited 1.6 tons of Kyrgyz gold to Zurich: Zamira Sydykova, Za Kulismi Demokratii Po-Kyrgyzzki (Bishkek: Res Publica, 1997).


$4 million of the credit had “went missing”: Boulton, “Soviet Insider, the Gold, and Kyrgyzstan’s Political Innocents.”


few local relationships to build on: Pope, “Undeadly Cyanide Spill.”


$3 million in 2005 to be distributed to residents: Wooden, “Images of Harm, Imagining Justice,” 174.


agreed to use this advance to renovate: Interview with Natalia Lozitskaiya and Victor Lozitsky, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 2015.


to pressure officials in the Bishkek: Kalkanova, “Pod Lichinoi’ Chestnosti I Kristal’noi’ Chistoty,”


legal challenges began to seesaw: Stepkicheva, “Bender V Podmetki Ne Goditsia.”


only two privatization transactions of at least $1.0 million: Asian Development Bank, Private Sector Assessment Update—the Kyrgyz Republic (Asian Development Bank, 2013), 40.

Uzbek government began privatizing state assets: Shamil Baigin, “Key Uzbek Copper Privatisation Fails,” Reuters, June 1999.

articulated the Uzbek government’s high hopes: Baigin, “Key Uzbek Copper Privatisation Fails.”


the regulatory environment is capricious: “2013 Investment Climate Statement—Uzbekistan,” Report, Department of State, Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2013.

established pattern of privatization to foreign investors: The discussion below draws from Vladislav Kim et al. v. Republic of Uzbekistan.


create their own stable spaces: Spector, Order at the Bazaar, 188.


Case VI-A. Language as the Wealth of the Turkmen Nation

Victoria Clement


Turkmen language regained its prestige: Clement, Learning to Become Turkmen.

state jobs required employees to speak Turkmen: The state is the main employer in Turkmenistan.


the state dismissed twelve thousand teachers: Unclassified memo E.O.
NOTES TO PAGES 503–505


a Latin script assist them in learning

Ongoing reform in education: Syýasy ylym we ylmy syýasat: Täze eýýamyň beyik özgertmeleri (Ashgabat: Türkmen döwlet neşirýat gullugy, 2010), 120.

learned, well brought up, and patriotic:


language training is the most important:

general economic development: Syýasy ylym we ylmy syýasat, 114–15.

economic policy and educational reforms:
Syýasy ylym we ylmy syýasat, 114.

international contacts in education:
Syýasy ylym we ylmy syýasat, 115.

especially those who study abroad:
Syýasy ylym we ylmy syýasat, 115–18.

foreign languages and computer technologies: Syýasy ylym we ylmy syýasat, 122.


role of private education centers:

to study foreign languages: Interview with Kakajan Agajykow, Principal of Gujurly Nesil Education Center, Ashgabat, November 9, 2017.

They are studying not only English and Russian: China knows it cannot compete with the international role of English but has been offering scholarships to Turkmen students for study in China. Mandarin is important in part because of the natural gas pipeline that stretches from Turkmenistan to China. Students at the Gas and Oil Institute in Ashgabat study Mandarin as their foreign language. See Gujurly Nesil Okuw Merkezi [Energetic Generation Language Center], accessed July 9, 2020, www.gujurlynesil.edu.tm.


centers offer courses in: For example, Günbatar Şapagy [Western sunset], accessed July 9, 2020, https://www.gunbatarshapagy.com.

represent local entrepreneurship: There are private schools or educational centers in Balkanabat, Daşoguz, Köneürgenç, Mary, and several in the capital city Ashgabat.

They do not have an underlying ideological or religious focus: Victoria Clement, “Faith-Based Schools in Post-Soviet Türkmenistan,” European Education 43, no. 1 (2011): 76–92.

aid students in finding employment:
“Perepodgotovka i perekvalifikatsiia sotrudnikov—Kursy povysheniia
Case VI-B. Family as a Risk Management Institution in Changing Work Contexts

Sophie Roche

right to work established as doctrine:


unable to provide appropriate employment: Jesko Schmoller, Achieving a Career, Becoming a Master: Aspirations in the Lives of Young Uzbek Men (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 2012).


strategies that families use to reduce the risk: All examples are grounded in ethnographic research carried out between 2002 and 2015. The larger context of the fieldwork has been published in Sophie Roche, Domesticating Youth: Youth Bulges and Their Socio-political Implications in Tajikistan (New York: Berghahn Books, 2014); Sophie Roche, ed., The Family in Central Asia: New Research Perspectives (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 2017); and Sophie.


Case VI-C. Domestic and Foreign Policies in the Context of Eurasian Integration

Olivier Ferrando


the rise of smuggling food: Alexander Libman, “Ukrainian Crisis, Economic Crisis in Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union,” Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA), 2015, 6, https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/63861/1/MPRA_paper_63861.pdf.


Kazakhstan’s cultural mix: Edward


**if ethnic Russians represent a minority:** Data of the last population census of 2009. Five out of the seven administrative regions bordering Russia had a share of ethnic Russians higher than 30 percent: Akmolinsk (35.8 percent), Pavlodar (38.8 percent), East-Kazakhstan (40.2 percent), Kostanay (43.0 percent), and North Kazakhstan (50.4 percent). Agency for Strategic Planning and Reforms of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Bureau of National Statistics, www.stat.gov.kz.


**does not maintain the same relationships:** See for instance Ted Hopf, “‘Crimea Is Ours’: A Discursive History,” *International Relations* 30, no. 2 (2016): 247.


**young ethnic Russian blogger was arrested:** Dmitry Shlapentokh, “Kazakh and Russian History and Its Geopolitical Implications,” *Insight Turkey* 18, no. 4 (2016): 156–57.


**necessity to respect international law:** Tatiana Sidorchenko, “The Impact of Ukrainian Crisis on Russia’s Relations with the CIS Countries” (master’s thesis, Charles University in Prague, 2015), 69, http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/66812.

**offered its services as a mediator:** Vera Axyonova, *From a Security Community to a Post-Ukraine Uncertainty: Security Actors and Security Perceptions in Kazakhstan and Belarus*, Hurford Foundation Carnegie Endowment for International


the politics of positive neutrality: Axyonova, “From a Security Community to a Post-Ukraine Uncertainty,” 6.


Part VII. Contexts of Vision

25. Media

Svetlana Kulikova


union-wide newspapers that became not only the vehicles of state


reflect the atmosphere of unbreakable moral and political unity: Lapin, “SSSR: Radioveschanie I Televidenie.”


if not freedom of the press explicitly: See Article 20 of the Kazakh Constitution; Article 31 of the Kyrgyz Constitution; Article 30 of the Tajik Constitution; Article 42 of the Turkmen Constitution; and Article 29 of the Uzbek Constitution.

comparative overview of media: Compiled from 2018 IREX Media Sustainability Index, see “Media Sustainability Index (MSI),” IREX, https://www.irex.org/resource/media-
sustainability-index-msi; and BBC Monitoring, “Country Profiles.”


**The score ranges from 1 to 7:** For more information, see Freedom of the World Report methodology section, https://freedomhouse.org/reports/freedom-world/freedom-world-research-methodology.


**an investigative journalist reporting on local authorities’ corruption:** “Tajik Journalist Sentenced to 12 Years after Alleging Official Corruption,” CPJ;


Internet but also the web content: While often used interchangeably, the Internet and the web (short for the World Wide Web) are not the same. The Internet is the physical infrastructure made up of computers, servers, cable, and satellite connections that make up the global net. The web is what the Internet holds and carries: the codes and programs to navigate it such as domain names, browsers and search engines, as well as the actual content, or information. The Internet existed decades before the web, transferring encoded files in packets from one connected computer to another. But it is the creation of the World Wide Web that made the Internet easy to use and accessible to anyone without special computer programming skills. It may be useful to think of the Internet as the hardware and the web the software and content of the global information network.


Part VII. Contexts of Vision

27. Environment

Amanda E. Wooden


allowed to function in more authoritarian places: Douglas R. Weiner, A Little Corner of Freedom: Russian Nature Protection from Stalin to Gorbachev (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); See Laura A. Henry, Red to Green: Environmental Activism in Post-Soviet Russia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010) for a parallel discussion of Russian grassroots, profession-alized, and government affiliate organizations. These categories apply well to the Central Asian contexts. However, capital city professionalized organizations have sometimes been more influential and less critical of the state and private sector in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan than they seem to be in Henry’s account of Russian professional organizations, because of somewhat different reactions to Western donor support of NGOs. Additionally, new forms of environmentalism have emerged over the last decade in Central Asia. Thus, in this chapter I refer to these organizational processes as dynamic and reflect this by pluralizing environmentalist approaches and organizations, as “environmentalisms.”


Nature is heterogenous, complicated, and social: I pluralize to indicate the wide diversity of things environmental that people often misunderstand as homogenous: environmentalisms, nature/s, knowledge/s, and understanding/s. This is to indicate to the reader that there are various ways of being an environmentalist, having knowledge or understanding, perceiving Nature, etc. That is, Nature is social as well as complex and plural.

meanings that people express about places: Jeanne Féaux de la Croix, Iconic Places in Central Asia: The Moral Geography of Dams, Pastures and Holy Sites (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2016).

social as well as material: In order to reflect what I and other scholars of political ecology argue are socially shaped ideas, for the rest of this chapter I will capitalize Environment and Nature instead of using quotation marks. Political ecology is the name of the field, from critical geography, that seeks to help us understand the various ways in which the social (human)

**encompassing environmental issues we face in Central Asia:** This chapter draws on extensive field research I conducted over approximately forty-five months of field research since 2000 (in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan) in participant observation, in-depth interviews, public opinion survey, news and social media content analysis, and photographic ethnography.

**Geographic and Socio-Environmental Conditions:** For the purposes of this chapter, I consider Central Asia to be the area bounded by geographical formations rather than just current political boundaries: from the Caspian Sea to the Tien Shan and Pamir mountain ranges and Tarim/Altishahr basin, the watersheds of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya. In this way, the region includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, parts of Afghanistan, Iran, and northwest China. See Anning Huang, Yang Zhou, Yaocon Zhang, Danqing Huang, Yong Zhao, and Haomin Wu, “Changes of the Annual Precipitation over Central Asia in the Twenty-First Century Projected by Multimodels of CMIP5,” *Journal of Climate* 27, no. 17 (2014): 6627–46, for a detailed description of the region’s hydrological and ecosystem range.


**meaning beyond just where we live and work:** See Féaux de la Croix, *Iconic Places in Central Asia*, 28–41, for a theoretical discussion of the concepts of place, landscape, space, environment, and nature in a Central Asian context.

**range of geographichal and social considerations:** Environmental studies scholars in the humanities and social sciences have for many decades shifted the focus of inquiry beyond places we conceive of as “wild” (i.e., without humans) and beyond conservation and pollution problems. Thus, I use the terms place, landscape, and socionature in this piece to likewise broaden our nonspecialist conversations about these topics.

**Its ecosystems include deserts:** For a more detailed and wider ranging overview of regional environmental issues, see Eric Freedman and Mark Neuzil, eds., *Environmental Crises in Central Asia: From Steppes to Seas, from Deserts to Glaciers* (London: Routledge, 2015).

**notable large saline and alpine lakes:** The Caspian and Aral, although named seas both in Russian and in English, are actually endorheic lakes. Because of evaporation, and their formation in depressions with no outflowing rivers, these bodies of water become salty. Thus, they are commonly referred to as “seas.”


**Industrialization in a variety of spheres:**

**Leaching into drinking water supplies:**


**Caspian Basin water pollution:** For an analysis of the legal and institutional frameworks in operation regarding the Caspian Sea, see Barbara Janusz-Pawletta, *The Legal Status of the Caspian Sea: Current Challenges and Prospects for Future Development* (Berlin: Springer, 2016).
notorious for long-term health damage: See Madeleine Reeves, *Border Work: Spatial Lives of the State in Rural Central Asia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014) for discussion of the ways Moscow provisioning, Soviet industrialization projects and deindustrialization, and border delimitation have shaped ideas about Soviet-era industrial sites, narratives of conflict about canals now crossing newly securitized borders, and how these narratives and infrastructure shape daily lives of residents in the border zones and enclaves.

pressed for closing and remediating this site: In May 2019 the unionized workers at the Aiderken Mercury Plant were on strike against efforts by the Global Environmental Fund to shut down the facility. “В Айдаркене третий день работники Хайдакарского ртутного комбината,” *Economist.kg: Finansovoe izdatel'stvo*, March 15, 2019, https://economist.kg/2019/05/15/v-айдаркене-третий-день-бастуют-рабочие-хайдакарского-ртутного-комбината/. This case provides a good example of how some people working in polluted sites may choose to resist changing these work conditions, or may be unaware of or in denial about the full extent of health damage from these exposures.

where industrialization creates community conflicts: For example, see Asel Doolotkeldieva, “Social Mobilizations, Politics, and Society in Contemporary Kyrgyzstan” (PhD diss., University of Exeter, 2015), in particular chapter 5, on antimining mobilization in Aral, Talas province.


An important social rubbing point: Mining in places where livelihoods are primarily based on animal husbandry and irrigation-based agriculture may lead to land lost to mining facilities or impacts on water quality. The fear of such damage raises questions about income lost and compensated by new jobs in mining, the temporality of boom-and-bust extractive economies, and the emotional toll of losing a place and way of living. Resident opposition to mining based on these livelihood concerns sometimes surprises national officials and international corporate executives who focus on new jobs or secondary employment created, not on the meanings of these places or the importance of the work displaced. See Irène Mestre, “When Shepherds Mine Mountains: The Impact of Artisanal Mining on Agropastoral Systems in Kyrgyzstan. Case Study of Naryn Province,” *Journal of Alpine Research/Revue de géographie alpine* 105, no. 1 (2017), https://doi.org/10.4000/rga.3611, for comparison of industrial and so-called artisan mining in agropastoral communities in Naryn, and interaction between mining and livestock herding.

labor migration and the rapid urbanization: See Jäger, “Flows of Oil, Flows of People,” 500–516, for a discussion of Kazakhstan’s labor dynamics in the energy extraction sector and internal migration driven by this work.


money laundering through apartment purchases: For discussion of changes in Bishkek and the social consequences for those nostalgic of the old city and for new migrants trying to fit in, see Philipp Schröder, “Avoidance and Appropriation in Bishkek: Dealing with Time, Space and Urbanity in Kyrgyzstan’s Capital,” *Central Asian Survey* 35, no. 2 (2016):


cope with these changes practically and emotionally: From author interviews and participant observation conducted in Kyrgyzstan in 2013, 2015, and 2018.


region will shift to a precipitation dependent: Sorg, Bolch, Stoffel, Solomina, and Beniston, “Climate Change Impacts on Glaciers and Runoff, 725–31, 5.
higher rates of evapotranspiration: “Precipitation is likely to increase in winter (4–8 percent by 2050), whereas summer precipitation is expected to decrease by an equal amount (4–7 percent).” Annina Sorg, B. Mosello, G. Shalpykova, A. Allan, M. Hill Clarvis, and M. Stoffel, “Coping with Changing Water Resources: The Case of the Syr Darya River Basin in Central Asia,” Environmental Science and Policy 43 (2014): 68–77.

increased flows will turn at the tipping point: Sorg, Huss, Rohrer, and Stoffel, “Days of Plenty Might Soon Be Over,” 1.

peak water between 2020 and mid-century: Sorg, Huss, Rohrer, and Stoffel, “Days of Plenty Might Soon Be Over.” There is a range of estimates depending on global GHG mitigation and multiplier effects.

glaciers will lose up to two thirds: Sorg, Huss, Rohrer, and Stoffel, “Days of Plenty Might Soon Be Over,” 7.


discussing the climate in increasingly worrying tones: From participant observation and interview field research in Kyrgyzstan in 2018 and 2019, funded by a Fulbright Global Scholar Award.

people protested about food: “Kazakhstan: OSDP organizuet akcii protesta protiv povyshenija cen na produkty” [Kazakhstan: OSDP organizes protest


Wind and solar power development:
These projects were funded through the Clean Technology Fund (CTF) and EBRD. Interview with Natalie Koch in Dilshat Zhussupova, “Renewable Energy Potential Attracts Greater Investment to Kazakhstan, Says Scholar,” Astana Times, https://astanatimes.com/2018/11/renewable-energy-potential-attracts-greater-investment-to-kazakhstan-says-scholar/

social disruption from shifting energy:
On the reason for introducing new tariffs, see interview with Natalie Koch in Zhussupova, “Renewable Energy Potential Attracts Greater Investment.”

coal prices are already beyond reach:


insects bringing fungus to these trees: Conversation with ecologist Emil Shukurov, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, May 2019.


tungsten-deposit-in-uzbekistan/


development of renewables without bearing responsibility: Bellini, “Uzbekistan’s Steeplechase Towards Renewable Energy.”


new or recultivated uranium mines:

People have adapted and responded:

national movement demanding a ban:
The petition is “MY PROTIV RAZRABOTKI URANOVOGO MESTOROZHĐENIJA NA ISSYK-KULE!” [We are against the development of the uranium deposit in Issy-Kul!], accessed May 18, 2021, https://www.change.org.

resolution calling on the government to take action:

Residents challenge extractive industries:
A few studies of the region utilize environmental justice perspectives to reveal this kind of conundrum, such as Shannon O’Lear’s (O’Lear, “Oil Wealth, Environment, and Equity in Azerbaijan,” in Environmental Justice and Sustainability in the Former Soviet Union, ed. Julian Agyeman and Yelena Ogneva-Himmelberger [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009], 97–140), discussion of oil and inequity in Azerbaijan; Dominic Stucker’s work on unsustainable livelihoods in rural Tajikistan (Stucker, “Environmental Injustices, Unsustainable Livelihoods, and Conflict: Natural Capital Inaccessibility and Loss among Rural Households in Tajikistan,” in Agyeman and Ogneva-Himmelberger, Environmental Justice and Sustainability, 237–74); Kate
Watters’s writing on oil and injustice in Kazakhstan (Watters, “The Fight for Community Justice against Big Oil in the Caspian Region: The Case of Berezovka, Kazakhstan,” in Agyeman and Ogneva-Himmelberger, Environmental Justice and Sustainability, 153–88), and my work on shifting environmental justice discourses in anti-gold-mining activism in Kyrgyzstan (Wooden, “Images of Harm, Imagining Justice,” 169–83).


Nationalists, racists, and xenophobes hold immigrants responsible for limited jobs and low incomes, rather than primary causes such as mechanization, increased executive pay, decreased social protections, and climatic changes.


literature about the region. The social and cultural dimensions of mining and climate change are underexplored but emerging.

controlling nature and colonizing people:
Petersen, Pipe Dreams.

as one whole ecosystem no longer exists: Kristopher D. White,

regional narratives about the water-energy nexus: This narrative may be changing because of increased storage needs and political change in Uzbekistan.


hope of a utopian transformation:


to portray the situation as catastrophic:

viewpoint that ignores life that is unbridled:


partially privatized the water sector:
Franziska Gassmann and Raquel Tsukada, “Switching Off or Switching Source: Energy Consumption and Household Response to Higher

rate increase was widely unpopular:
Of residents surveyed in Kyrgyzstan in 2009, 71.4 percent indicated experiencing significant blackout impacts in the previous year (Wooden, “Kyrgyzstan’s Dark Ages,” 469).


ways people in Central Asia experience energy: Gullette and Féaux de la Croix, “Mr Light and People’s Everyday Energy Struggles,” 443.


the challenge of choosing between using dwarf shrub (primarily teresken) for heating: Kraudzun, “Bottom-Up and Top-Down Dynamics,” 550–65.


responsible for this mix of social predicaments: Heathershaw and Cooley, “Offshore Central Asia,” 4; Cooley and Heathershaw, Dictators without Borders.


replicate some limitations of mainstream Western environmentalisms: Henry, Red to Green. See also Henry’s chapter and the work by several other scholars on environmental justice in the post-Soviet space in Agyeman and Ognevahimmelberger, Environmental Justice and Sustainability.

criticism for importing mismatching Western approaches or models: Carol Kerven, Bernd Steimann, Chad


sadness and anger about trees being cut down: From author observation, interviews, and other field research in Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek and several places in Issyk-Kul province) and Almaty, 2018–2019.


via sacred geographies and social commentaries: Dubuisson, Living Language in Kazakhstan.

ancestors collapse the distance between natural and lived worlds: Dubuisson, Living Language in Kazakhstan, 82 and 77.


prominent and revived discussions of these geological bodies: Wooden, “Images of Harm, Imagining Justice,” 169–83.

28. Development

Noor O’Neill Borbieva

articulated by President Harry Truman:


on the stages of economic development:

including repairing irrigation systems:

expanded the production of cash crops:


High levels of social spending: Jane Falkingham, Jeni Klugman, Sheila Marnie, and John Micklewright. “Household Welfare in Central Asia: An Introduction to the Issues,” in
scored highly on many health indicators:


experienced a period of hyperinflation:


goals of this aid are varied: Sievers, *Post-Soviet Decline of Central Asia*.


turned off by the paternalistic tone: Laruelle and Peyrouse, *Globalizing Central Asia*, 76.


ability to profit from its mineral wealth:  

implemented some free market reforms:  
Yilamu, Neoliberalism and Post-Soviet Transition, 84–98.


In the immediate wake of these reforms and loans: William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (New York: Penguin, 2006), 67

main sources of revenue were the drug trade: Laurance Markowitz, “The Limits of International Agency: Post-Soviet State-Building in Tajikistan,” in Kavalski, Stable Outside, Fragile Inside?, 158.


focus on capacity building fostered a circularity: According to Sada Aksartova, early interest among donors in “building civil society” was partly a pretext to create a funding distribution system that would allow aid money to bypass untrustworthy state agencies. In this environment, international donors were focused before all else on “absorptive capacity”—the sector’s ability to absorb the money they needed to distribute—rather than actual democratic activism. Aksartova, “Promoting Civil Society or Diffusing NGOs?”

citizens could no longer devote time to
go to volunteer: Sievers, Post-Soviet Decline of
Central Asia, 103.

few NGOs founded before independence
still existed: Sievers, Post-Soviet Decline of
Central Asia, 106–8.

the new “independent” sector: E.g.,
Noor O’Neill Borbieva, “Empowering
Muslim Women: Independent
Religious Fellowships in the Kyrgyz
Republic,” Slavic Review 71, no. 2

projects that included mandatory testing:
Laëtitia Atlani-Duault, Humanitarian
Aid in Post-Soviet Countries: An
Anthropological Perspective, trans.
Andrew Wilson (London: Routledge,
2007); see also Svetlana Ancker and
Bernd Rechel, “‘Donors Are Not
Interested in Reality’: The Interplay
between International Donors and
Local NGOs in Kyrgyzstan’s HIV/
AIDS Sector,” Central Asian Survey

failed because they were based on a
misunderstanding: Madeleine Reeves,
“Locating Danger: Konfliktologiia and
the Search for Fixity in the Ferghana
Valley Borderlands,” Central Asian
Survey 24, no. 1 (2005): 67–81; see
also Madeleine Reeves, Border Work:
Spatial Lives of the State in Rural
Central Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2014).

Donors’ interests change quickly: E.g.,
Ilya Levine, US Policies in Central
Asia: Democracy, Energy, and the
War on Terror (London: Routledge,
2016).

shifts encourage donors to favor short-
term projects: Aksartova, “Promoting
Civil Society or Diffusing NGOs?”
182–83; Ancker and Rechel, “‘Donors
Are Not Interested in Reality,’”
516–30.

acknowledges that US foreign assistance
has two purposes: United States Agency
for International Development, “Who
We Are,” accessed June 20, 2018,

Freedom Support Act explicitly connects
economic growth: FREEDOM
102-511, 106 Stat. 3320 (1992),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/
STATUTE-106/pdf/STATUTE-106-
Pg3320.pdf
devolution money stays in the
developed world: Arturo Escobar,
Encountering Development: The
Making and Unmaking of the Third
World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1995), 166; see also
Peter Uvin, Aiding Violence: The
Development Enterprise in Rwanda
(West Hartford, CT: Kumarian, 1998).

the sector is highly professionalized:
For a more positive assessment
of the important contributions
of NGO activists, see Atlani-Duault,
Humanitarian Aid in Post-Soviet
Countries, 108–9; Borbieva,
“Empowering Muslim Women,”
288–207; Féaux de la Croix, “How
to Build a Better Future?” 448–61;
and Maija Paasiaro, “Home-Grown
Strategies for Greater Agency:
Reassessing the Outcome of Civil
Society Strengthening in Post-Soviet
Kyrgyzstan,” Central Asian Survey
28, no. 1 (2009): 59–77. These works
explore the ways local activists adapt
development initiatives to local needs.

surveys suggest that Kazakhstani
citizens prefer authoritarianism:
Kirill Nourzhanov, “International
Democratic Norms and Domestic
Socialization in Kazakhstan: Learning
Processes of the Power Elite,” in
Kavalski, Stable Outside, Fragile
Inside? 115.
imperative that wealthy nations and
individuals give: E.g., Jeffrey D.
Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic
Possibilities for Our Time (New York:
Penguin, 2005).

every wealthy nation should dedicate a
minimum: Angus Deaton, The Great
Escape: Health, Wealth, and the
Origins of Inequality (Princeton, NJ:

aid to poor states with very little to show:
Easterly, White Man’s Burden, 4.
development aid may actually hinder
economic growth: Deaton, Great
Escape, 288.
growth decreases as aid increases:
Easterly also finds that if you control
for effective governance, aid itself has a minimal to negative impact on growth. More specifically, at up to 8 percent of GDP, aid has a small positive impact on growth, but at 8 percent it has no impact and above 8 percent it has a negative impact. Easterly, White Man’s Burden, 48–50.

distorts the relationship between states and their citizens: Deaton, Great Escape, 278, 283.

undermines this delicate relationship: Deaton, Great Escape, 295.


serves poor countries better than foreign aid: Deaton, Great Escape, 280.


because of existing regimes’ reputations for corruption: E.g., Cooley and Heathershaw, Dictators without Borders.


Case VII-A. Governing Extremism through Communities in Tajikistan

Edward Lemon

Young people are trying to keep the peace:


sovereign power and disciplinary power:


human beings turn themselves into subjects: Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, ed. Paul Rabinow and Hubert Dreyfus (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).


there is resistance: Foucault, History of Sexuality, 95.

Case VII-B. Customary Governance and the State in Central Eurasia

Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili

basis of legitimacy is rooted in tradition: Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili, Informal
order and the state in Afghanistan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016).


“Neighborhood” or simply “local”: In urban areas, the term gozar or nohiya is used to signify a neighborhood (subsection) within a mahalla. The author has conducted village-based research across all three countries.


Used to signify their esteemed status: Other terms in include og soqol (“white beard,” Uzbek), risk safed (“white beard,” Persian), mu-ye safed (“white hair,” Persian), arbob, or amin. In addition to the term rais, in Afghanistan communities are increasingly using the term namayenda (“representative,” Persian).

A self-governing organization that has a range of responsibilities: Anna Cieślewska, Community, the State and Development Assistance Transforming the Mahalla in Tajikistan (Krakow: Archeobooks, 2015), 1.


Place where groups come together: Cieślewska, Community, the State and Development Assistance;

Murtazashvili, Informal Order and the State.

Customary leaders were killed in large numbers: Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan.

Traditional roles these bodies played were modified: Sergei Poliakov, Everyday Islam: Religion and Tradition in Rural Central Asia (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1992).


Not been done in practice: Authors’ field observation.

More citizens believed that mahallas were accountable: According to the survey 37 percent said mahalla leaders are accountable to citizens; this contrasts with 9 percent for jamaot council members, 6 percent for the jamoat council, and just 5 percent for the district administration.

Women are also leading mahalla committees: Murtazashvili, Evaluation Baseline Report.


distinct set of decision makers: In local languages, these elders, or “white beards,” share similar names to those in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (rish safid, mu-ye safid, oq soqol, and arbob). In addition, Pashtun titles include malik and khan). Although these titles differ, over time there has been convergence in the role these individuals play in community and political life. Murtazashvili, Informal Order and the State in Afghanistan.


**maqām** refers to a musical mode: Here the term *mode* is not used in the conventional European sense but rather as the concept of mode common to western and South Asia, whereby a musical mode is identified not only by its scale type, intervallic structure, and tonic but also by its characteristic melodic movements, intervallic motifs, and other associated traits that imbue it with a distinct musical character and modal identity.

**Performance of art music:** The term *maqām* appears in various local forms: *muğam* in Azerbaijan, *muqam* in Turkey, *maqām* in the Arab world, etc. In Central Asia today, the term is transliterated as *maqom*. In this chapter *maqom* is used to refer to the classic traditions in Central Asia since the late eighteenth century, and *maqām* will refer to maqām theory and performance in the greater Middle East and Central Asia from the thirteenth to the eighteenth century.

**Today, maqom refers to a suite form:** Here the term *suite* refers to a compound musical form that joins together multiple autonomous instrumental and vocal pieces into a multipart performance that is sequentially ordered according to traditional guidelines. The maqom suite is drawn from a repertoire of pieces that has accumulated over the past two centuries, perhaps longer. The instrumental pieces are performed first, and are drawn from a repertoire of instrumental pieces known as *mushki lot*. These are then followed by the vocal repertoire, known as *nasr*. The performance of a maqom suite in its entirety, with all associated repertoire, would take between one and two hours, but often shorter maqom suites will be performed, drawing on select pieces from the repertoire of a maqom.

**Central to the “science of music”:** That music was considered a “science” in treatises up through the seventeenth century is indicative of the primary importance placed upon music theory. Its classification alongside other of the mathematical and natural sciences likely occurred through the translation of Greek and Syriac treatises, which had in turn incorporated much of their mathematical musical theory from Akkadian and Sumerian cuneiform sources of ancient Mesopotamia. See Anne Draffkorn Kilmer, “The Discovery of an Ancient Mesopotamian Theory of Music,” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 115, no. 2 (1971): 131–49.

**The “Systematist school” of music theory:** The theorists of the Systematist school includes Safi ad-Dīn Urmawi (d. 1296), Qub Ad-Dīn Shirāzī (d. 1310), and ’Abd al-Qādir Marāghī (d. 1435 in Herāt) and several others who were active in the Timurid court in Herāt through the end of the fifteenth century.

**Musicians active in Bukhara during the rule of the Shaybānid dynasty:** Najmuddīn Kavkabī, a Bukharan astronomer and musician who had studied music in Herāt, tells us in his treatise on music (c. 1535) that he learned the “science of music” in Herāt from the well-known musician Khoja Yusuf Burhān. The anonymous author of the Nihāl al-Aswāt (sixteenth century) also claims to have learned the “science of music” from musicians that were active in Herāt during the second half of the fifteenth century.

**Consists of six large suites of music:** The term *shashmaqom* (*shash* is Persian for “six”) first appears in mid-nineteenth-century poetry compilations (*bayoz*) that contain song texts of the six suites of the shashmaqom repertoire.

**Consists of four primary suites and a body of other “classic” songs:** Chormaqom (Persian *chahārmaqām*, where *chahār* means “four”) is a common folk epithet for the tradition in Ferghana Valley. This name may be a vestige from the nineteenth or eighteenth century, as the current repertoire is more diversified and consists of many small suites that may have previously been parts of four larger suites prior to the twentieth century.
assimilated into the Khivan tradition: According to the Khorezm Musiqī Tarikhchasi (1925) by Mulla Bekjon Rahmoni Og’li and Muhammad Yusuf Devonzoda, the Khivan musician Niyāzjān Khoja learned the entire shashmaqom tradition in Bukhārā and brought it back to Khorezm, where he taught it to his pupils and thus began the transmission of the shashmaqom to the next generations of the people of Khorezm. The authors of the Khorezm Musiqī Tarikhchasi make frequent reference to the shashmaqom tradition in Khorezm. They also acknowledge that after the recognition of a seventh, or at least ½ maqom, it began to be referred to as the yedi maqom, or alti-yarim maqom (Uzbek for “six and a half” maqom).

consist almost exclusively of Persian poems: There are a few isolated examples of Turkic verses included in some of the bayoz compilations, but the overwhelming majority of the poetic texts are in Persian. This does not suggest that the musicians and singers were necessarily Persian/Tajik, but it is indicative of the long-standing importance of Perso-Tajik as a literary language and reflects the substantial presence of the Persian/Tajik population of Bukhara.


developed and implemented concepts of cultural and musical “heritage”: Alexander Djumaev, “Musical Heritage and National Identity in Uzbekistan,” Ethnomusicology Forum 14, no. 2 “Music and Identity in Central Asia” (Nov. 2005): 168. Djumaev suggests the Soviet concept of “musical heritage” may have been introduced into academic usage in Uzbekistan by the Russian ethnographer Viktor Uspenskiy (1879–1949).


competitions are the domain of a type of bard: In the past, this type of bard was not nominally distinguished from the epic singers known as ırchi (Kyrgyz), or zbyrau (Kazakh), but the term aqīn was adopted in the nineteenth century from Persian (ākhūn). The term was further distinguished into two categories of aqīn. Those who composed written poetry were called jazgīch aqīn, while those who improvised oral poetry were called tökmo aqīn. See Elmira Köchümkulova and Jangül Qojakhmetova, “Aqyns and Improvised Poetry Competitions among the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz,” in Levin, Daukeyeva, and Köchümkulova, Music of Central Asia, 149–79.

impart their own style as they craft the melody: For a detailed discussion of Kyrgyz terme, see Elmira Köchümkulova, “Kyrgyz Wisdom Songs: Terme Yrlary,” in Levin, Daukeyeva, and Köchümkulova, Music of Central Asia, 139–49. For further information on the terme of Kazakhstan, see János Sipos, Kazakh Folksongs from the Two Ends of the Steppe (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 2001).

guided their expressive culture: To get a better understanding of the complex interaction of constructing ethnic and religious identities in Soviet and post-Soviet independent Kyrgyzstan, see Baris Isci Pembeci, “Religion and the Construction of Ethnic Identity in Kyrgyzstan,” Region 6, no. 1 (2017): 133–52.
a tradition of written poetry began to be cultivated: Köchümkulova, “Kyrgyz Epic Manas,” 151.


30. Art

Aliya de Tiesenhausen


part of the Venice Biennale: Ulán Djaparov and Viktor Misiano, eds., Art from Central Asia: A Contemporary Archive, exhibition catalog accompanying the Central Asian Pavilion at the Venice Biennale (Bishkek: Kurama Art, 2005).


one of the biggest concentrations of petroglyphs: Renato Sala and Jean-Marc Deom, Petroglyphs of South Kazakhstan (Almaty: Laboratory of Geoarchaeology, 2005), 13.


in the context of group exhibitions:


alphabet may have been in use since the fourth and fifth centuries BCE: Ghayratjan Osman, Uyghur Klassik Edebiyati Qisqiche Tarikhi (Urumqi: Xinjiang Marip Nashiryati, 1992), 64.


Mongol, Khitian, and Manchu alphabets were also based: Osman, Uyghur Klassik Edebiyati Qisqiche Tarikbi, 63.


appointed to rule over mankind: Starr, Lost Enlightenment, 310.

given to him by heaven: Kashgari, Divan Lughat-al-Turk, 1:455.

a mirror for princes who taught political wisdom: Yusup Khass Hajib, Wisdom of Royal Glory (Kutadgu Bilik): A Turko-Islamic Mirror for Princes, trans. and ed. Robert Dankoff


they should have composed most in their own tongue: Mir ‘Ali Shir Nawa’i, 1387/2008–9, in *Mubakamat al-lughatayn*, 45.


the first major scholarly research on this text: Osman, *Uyghur Klassik Edebiyati Qisqiche Tarikhi*, 39.


32. Film

Michael Rouland


The most famous Soviet directors: Between 1942 and 1944 TsOKS produced many of the important films of the war, including Vera Stroeva, Son of a Soldier; Grigoriy Roshal’, Batyrs of the Steppe (1942); Konstantin Iudin, Antosha Rybkin (1942); Boris Barnet, Priceless Head (1942); Fridrikh Ermler, She Defends the Motherland (1943); Dmitrii Vas’ilev and Vsevolod Pudovkin, In the Name of the Fatherland (1943); Georgii and Sergei Vas’ilev, The Front (1943); Abram Room, The Invasion (1944); and Sergei Eisenstein, Ivan the Terrible, Part I (1944).

a very strong student movement: Abikeeva, Kino tsentral’noi Azii, 157.
a new genre of Soviet “Easterns”: See Sergei Lavrent’ev, Krasnyi vestern (Moscow: Algoritm, 2009) for discussion on Soviet adventure films in the “east.”


Case VIII-A. Soviet Cultural Construction and Its Afterlives

Artemy M. Kalinovsky


nationalized and acquired a xenophobic component: Mana Kia, Persianate Selves: Memories of Place and Origin Before Nationalism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2020.)


turning peasants into good urban citizens: See, for example, David Hoffmann, Peasant Metropolis: Social Identities in Moscow, 1929–1941 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000).


main site of transmission was the school: Adeeb Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 21.


Moral education became a “subject of its own”: Von Kügelgen, “Moral Education in Central Asia,” 85.


inheritance of world culture needs to be used: Transcript of a Meeting Regarding the Office of Arts in Tajikistan, 1939. Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), F. 962, op 3, d. 581.

this music comes from the people: Transcript of a Meeting Regarding the Office of Arts in Tajikistan, 1939. RGANI, F. 962, op 3, d. 581.

fought for the creation of a conservatory: Archive of the Communist Party of Tajikistan (ACPT) F3, op 205, d. 69, 25.

petitioned for music schools, theaters, and resources: Records of such requests are abundant in the archives
of the Ministry of Culture. See, for example, Central State Archive of the Republic of Tajikistan (CSAT) F 1483, op 4, d. 100.

**Tajik artists and directors opened new theaters:** See A. Sayfulloev, ed., Ednomai Mahmud Vohidov (Dushanbe: Irfon, 1982).


**more people were learning the Arabic:** RGANI, f 5., op 35, d. 225, ll. 5–10.

**Moscow gives orders and you just follow:** Asozoda Khudoinazar, Afghonistoni shohy (Dushanbe: Devashitch, 2002), 286.

**beliefs were not without influence:** Khudoinazar, Afghonistoni shohy, 291.

**adopting the more formal literary language:** Kalinovsky and Scar borough, “Oil Lamp and the Electric Light.”

**Case VIII-B. Sound, Aesthetics, and Instrumental Variance in Dutar Ensembles in Tashkent**

*Tanya Merchant*


**except in Afghanistan, where innovations have led:** In Afghanistan, those dutars that have added strings on them are not renamed for their new string number. I believe this stems from the fact that chortar (four-string) and panjtar (five-string) are already instrument names, as well as the fact that the dutar began in all of these countries and contexts as a two-stringed instrument. Adding strings does not change its original identity. For more information on Afghan versions of the dutar, see John Baily, “Recent Changes in the Dutar of Herat,” *Asian Music* 8, no. 1 (1976): 29–64 and J. S. Baily and J. A. R. Blacking, “Research on the Herati Dutar,” *Current Anthropology* 19, no. 3 (1978): 610–11.

**two silk strings that are plucked and strummed:** For a more thorough account of the traditional and reconstructed versions of the dutar, see Tanya Merchant, *Women Musicians in Uzbekistan: From Courtyard to Conservatory* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2015).

**for use in Soviet concert halls:** For more information on the creation of instruments for Uzbek folk orchestras, see A. Odilov, *O‘zbek Xalk Cholg’ularida Ijrochilik Tarixi* [The history of Uzbek folk orchestral performance], (Tashkent: O‘qituvchi, 1995).

**who perform the dutar and sing:** Multiple musicians explained to me that dutarists in the state ensemble are encouraged to take positions in other ensembles, like the state folk orchestra, once they are in their thirties and no longer considered young, so the associations of dutar ensembles with youth and femininity are explicitly created and controlled.

**no consequence to their masculinity:** For further discussion of this phenomenon in Afghan and other cultures, see Veronica Doubleday, “Sounds of Power: An Overview of Musical Instruments and Gender,” *Ethnomusicology Forum* 17, no. 1 (2008): 3–39.

**traditional tuning or equal temperament:** Equal temperament has been the standard tuning system used in Western art music (and later, popular music) since the early nineteenth century.

**necessary not to separate:** Personal interview, August 5, 2009.

**Roza opa’s arrangement of “Ayvon”:** R. M. Hodjayeva (Hozhieva), arranger

Case VIII-C. Translating Art into Politics through Central Asian Feminist and Queer Fantasy

Georgy Mamedov


Resistance and change often begin in art:
From Ursula Le Guin’s speech at the National Book Awards ceremony, 2014.

a vision of a society that is not antagonistic: Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 2009), 142.

Ideological fantasy strives to eliminate any contradictions: Žižek, Sublime Object of Ideology, 142.

attack ed a Women’s Day rally before it even started: International Women’s Day, celebrated around the world on March 8, commemorates the women’s rights movement. First organized in 1909 by the Socialist Party of America, it was a Soviet national holiday after 1917 and the United Nations began celebrating it in 1977.

We have our own culture, our traditions: “Deputat Tazabek Ikramov o provokatorah na mitinge feministok 8 marta,” 24.kg, March 13, 2019, https://24.kg/vlast/111644_deputat_tazabek_ikramov_oprovokatorah_namitinge_feministok_8marta/.


Translating Contexts to Policy

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