On April 7, 1937, Philippine Commonwealth president Manuel L. Quezon, together with his family and representatives from the US government, among them the military advisor to the Philippines, General Douglas MacArthur, crossed the southern border of the United States into Mexico via the port of Laredo, Texas. From there, they were taken to Mexico City’s Chapultepec Castle, which at that time served as the presidential palace, where they were welcomed by Mexican government officials. Mexico’s president Lázaro Cárdenas was on tour and could not receive Quezon, but arrangements were made so that they could meet in the provincial town of Taxco. Quezon's trip to Mexico garnered widespread attention from various national and regional periodicals, but it was not clear whether the visit should be considered an official diplomatic one. A week earlier, Monterrey newspaper \textit{El Porvenir} announced that Mexico would receive Quezon “with the honors due a head of state, even though the Philippines has still not completely achieved its independence.” On March 31, Mexico’s ruling National Revolutionary Party’s newspaper, \textit{El Nacional}, declared that Quezon would be welcomed “in the name of the Mexican government, as it corresponds to his category as Head of State.” In anticipation of the Philippines’ independence from the United States, the newspaper also mentioned the “possibility of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Mexico and the Philippines.” As if to rescind these statements, on April 2, \textit{El Nacional} cited Quezon’s declaration that he was coming to Mexico “exclusively as a tourist.” Even more categorically, the publication asserted that Quezon's trip had “absolutely no political significance” since he was visiting the country as a private, albeit “very distinguished,” citizen.\footnote{1}

The expressions employed to characterize Quezon and the significance (or lack thereof) of his Mexican tour are nuanced, interpretable in at least two ways. On the one hand, they reveal that all official diplomatic relations of the Philippines, still a US territory, continued to be under the jurisdiction
of the United States. This was the result of the long-term effects of the policy of “benevolent assimilation,” announced on December 21, 1898, during the presidency of William McKinley. Under this policy, which was carried on by Theodore Roosevelt and subsequent presidents of the United States, Filipinos were to be essentially “Americanized” for their own benefit. As put by high-ranking politician Elihu Root in 1904, the US government would “train the people of the Philippine Islands in the first lessons of ordered liberty and teach them how to govern themselves.” On the other hand, reading between the lines of the articles about Quezon’s visit to Mexico in 1937, it becomes evident that something managed to escape the US government’s control: Quezon’s heightened familiarity with and fondness for Mexico. A few days before his visit, Quezon had remarked that there was “nothing in protocol” that prevented him from saying that Mexicans and Filipinos had “problems in common” or that they were “psychologically very similar.” Quezon further affirmed, “in Mexico, I don’t expect to be in a strange country. I expect to be in a country that shares fraternal bonds with mine. In your beautiful Aztec capital, I will feel as if I were in Manila observing the same customs and hearing the same language.” On another occasion, he stated that he had been planning the trip for a long time because he had “always felt seduced by Mexico, a country with great commercial and historical ties with the Philippines.” The motive of his trip, he added, responded solely to his “desire for direct knowledge of Mexico.”

Once in Mexico, Quezon found more opportunities to deviate from the formalities expected of him as a subordinate of the US government. These opportunities emerged as Mexican officials, most notably Cárdenas himself, reciprocated Quezon’s excitement and fueled it even more. During their “historic encounter” in Taxco, as described by El Porvenir, Cárdenas seized the chance to rebuke the US government’s patronizing attitude toward the Philippines, albeit in an indirect manner. Instead of mentioning the United States, Cárdenas stated that “neither Mexico nor any other nation can believe that they have reached perfection” and even if they had or believed they had “they do not have the right to plan to impose their ideas and judge the situation of other nations.” Addressing Quezon, Cárdenas added: “Take to your nation this intimate, warm and sincere message that Mexico sends as they feel, like Filipinos, the profound palpitations produced by the desire to achieve a real and definitive political and economic liberation.” As if words were not enough, Cárdenas asked Quezon to accept the “fraternal embrace” that he offered to Filipinos, “breaking protocol formulas” (see figure 1). Considering that in less than a year after the Taxco encounter, Cárdenas would nationalize Mexico’s petroleum reserves and reject the directive of foreign oil companies, Cárdenas’s rhetoric in front of Quezon certainly exceeded diplomatic protocol.
As obsequiously grateful as Filipinos may have appeared to be to the United States for its promise, recently made in 1934, to grant the Philippines its due independence after a ten-year period, Quezon made sure to express his equal if not stronger appreciation and admiration for Mexico. In spite of previously declaring in public that his visit to the Latin American country had no political motives, a hidden agenda emerges in the affective twists in Quezon’s language. In Taxco, Quezon seized the chance once more, perhaps definitively, to spell out the motive behind his visit. “I have come to Mexico,” he said, “because in front of this great Republic is the man who can serve as inspiration to educate us.” Implicit in Quezon’s characterization of Cárdenas as the one who can educate Filipinos is an interrogation of the United States’ presumptuous plan to “teach Filipinos how to govern themselves,” to recall the rhetoric employed by its government representative toward the beginning of the twentieth century. Upon his return to the United States, Quezon wired an emotive account of his trip to Mexico. He thanked Mexicans for their hospitality and commented how impressed he was by their attitude toward the United States. According to Quezon, Mexicans had “feelings of trust and even friendship” toward their northern neighbor; they considered President Franklin D. Roosevelt “the champion of freedom for all peoples.” Quezon’s adulation of Roosevelt is undeniable. However, when compared to his words of praise to Cárdenas, the US president’s grandeur turns lackluster. Cárdenas was a “complete military man” with “the kindest
and most humane heart,” according to Quezon. “Cárdenas will not end his term,” he went on to remark, “without winning the admiration not only of a nation, which he now already has together with its affection and respect, but also the admiration of America, both Saxon and Latin, and of Europe and Asia. Certainly, he has won my affection.” Confirming, moreover, that there was an inherent link between Filipinos and Mexicans, Quezon declared that their mutual affection was not merely a question of shared culture but also one of blood. Cárdenas had embraced him, he said recounting their meeting in Taxco, “in the usual manner not only amongst Mexicans, but that of all the peoples who have inherited their blood and traditions from Spain.”

The visit to Mexico left a lasting impression on Quezon. In a speech delivered a few months later, in November 1937, at a banquet in Colegio de San Juan de Letrán in the Philippines, he assured that he had been well received in Latin America not simply because of his position as the head of state of a soon-to-be independent Philippines, but, first and foremost, because he was Filipino. Quezon declared: “The Latin American people believe and feel that we Filipinos form part of that vast family, the children of Spain. Thus, although Spain ceased to govern those countries many years ago and although another nation is sovereign in the Philippines, those Latin American peoples feel themselves as brothers to the peoples of the Philippines. It is the Spanish language that still binds us to those peoples, and the Spanish language will bind us to those peoples eternally if we have the wisdom and patriotism of preserving it.”

The insistence on the feelings Latin Americans and Filipinos had toward each other is promising and worth analyzing further. But it should be noted first that their characterization as “the children of Spain” is not without problems: it reinforces the centuries-old idea that the emperor is akin to a parent and the empire a family. The reliance on the unifying power of the Spanish language is also questionable, considering that, historically, it has been a marker of authority in the Philippines and spoken by a numerical minority. Nonetheless, we can devise an alternative logic for laying claims to the linguistic legacy of Spanish colonialism: the Spanish language did not necessary link Filipinos to “mother Spain” but primarily to Latin America.

In retrospect, Quezon’s encounter with Cárdenas could be summarized as a constant interplay between complying with the expected formalities set by the US government’s control of the Philippines (let us recall that he was being accompanied by representatives from the United States) and embracing the unexpected vestiges that surfaced like a familial tie to Latin America. By repeatedly claiming that he felt that Latin Americans were the brothers of Filipinos and that Latin Americans reciprocated this sentiment, Quezon was calling into question the US government’s self-declared duty to educate their “little brown brothers,” as Filipinos were derogatively called by some US politicians at the beginning of the century. Despite having ruled the
Philippines for more than three decades, the United States could not control Quezon’s purported feelings. It could not prevent the ways in which a sense of affection born out of the residue of a common past surfaced between Filipinos and Latin Americans throughout the twentieth century. If the residue is, to quote Raymond Williams, that which “has been effectively formed in the past, but it is still active in the cultural process” and has “an alternative or even oppositional relation to the dominant culture,” by hinting at a horizontal kinship between Filipinos and Latin Americans Quezon was not just giving in to emotions but articulating a rejection of the US government’s authority. The Philippines was still part of the United States, but Filipinos were far from being considered (or considering themselves) as US Americans or even as their siblings. Instead, they were inclined to trace a Filipino link to Latin America and to partake in the making or remaking of a so-called “Latin” family.

As he evoked his encounter with Cárdenas, Quezon added, “I do not know if the Spaniards will like this, but I do not care to keep back what I feel like saying.” He then recalled an incident he had experienced much earlier, in 1926, with Sergio Osmeña, fellow senator at the time, during a trip to Paris where they had befriended an Argentine diplomat and witnessed liberty in action. As grandiose as this experience sounds, the context in which it transpired was rather casual. On one occasion, a French chauffeur was taking the three of them back to their hotels, driving at “top speed, as usual.” A police officer stopped them, and the chauffeur demonstrated his disdain for the officer’s authority by yelling at him. Turning to Quezon and Osmeña, the Argentine said, “This is how the Latin people are; there is true liberty here.” Once in the hotel, Osmeña asked Quezon: “Did you see what the people here and in the Latin countries understand by liberty?” Osmeña’s underlying suggestion, according to Quezon, was that the Argentine diplomat had interpellated them as “Latin.” To be clear, in his 1937 speech Quezon stated: “The Latin people are we. Yes, we Filipinos are that.”

To better understand the gesture of self-identifying as “Latin” or feeling a sense of kinship with those who are unequivocally identified as such, it is useful to consider the plural definitions of the terms “intimate” and “intimacy,” which have generated profound reflections on the practices and mechanisms of colonial rule. Coming from the Latin intimus, the meanings of “intimate” range from its etymological root (“essential; innermost”) to that which is “marked by close acquaintance, association or familiarity” (used as a euphemism for having sexual relations), to the verb to intimate, which can mean “to communicate with a hint or other indirect sign” or, inversely, “to announce.” Inspired by these divergent definitions, Ann Laura Stoler has reflected on the manners in which Dutch colonial authorities in Indonesia tried to control intimate spaces, including sexual practices (for instance
by promoting concubinage, creating interracial marriage laws, or surveilling the "sentimental education" of children), all in the effort to maintain a clear divide between the colonizer and colonized. I also delve into the multivalent meanings of the intimate, but not those related to sexual activities. I primarily approach intimacy as the innermost, the sense of familiarity, and connection or unity: what Lisa Lowe refers to as "the implied but less visible forms of alliance, affinity, and society among various colonized peoples beyond the metropolitan national center." Yet while Lowe studies the intimacies between the Americas, Asia, Africa, and Europe in the late eighteenth century to the early nineteenth century as a result of slavery, the coolie trade, and other forms of economic exploitation that are "eclipsed by the more dominant Anglo-American histories of liberal subjectivity, domesticity, and household," I look into the obscured links within and between "Latin" peoples across the Pacific. In particular, I examine the ways in which twentieth-century writers, diplomats, and intellectuals from Latin/o America and the Philippines have articulated that sense of intimacy while engaging with and at times reorienting the politically charged discourses of the "Latin race," latinidad, and hispanidad.

The trope of kinship ties between "Latin" peoples may seem trite, but it has not been sufficiently taken into account and problematized when considering the twists and turns of latinidad and hispanidad across the Pacific. Filling this lacuna, the present book examines the ways in which various Filipino and Latin American intellectuals recalled, inflected, and appropriated these discourses by imagining themselves as equal companions. In the various literary works and personal, diplomatic, and historical archives that I analyze, we find what I call intercolonial intimacies, that is, the residue of the direct relations between the Philippines and the Spanish Empire's colonies in the Americas. These intercolonial intimacies take myriad forms and challenge temporal linearity. Brian Massumi's elaboration on Baruch Spinoza's definition of affect as the ability or power "to affect and be affected" is useful in this context. According to Massumi, affect continually returns and materializes a pattern of reciprocal relationality. Affect is, moreover, an "event" that begins, or rather, "re-begins" in relation and "an in-between time." As a relational event it reactivates the past and "in taking up the past differently," it "creates new potentials for the future." The reciprocal movements and intertemporal itineraries of affect enable us to realize that the shared sense of familiarity between Filipinos and Latin/o Americans exceed feelings, although they are oftentimes articulated as such. They also shed light on the unpredictable paths intercolonial intimacies take.

In tracing a transpacific genealogy of latinidad, Intercolonial Intimacies goes beyond the rationale of area studies, specifically Latin American studies. This interrogation of the boundaries of Latin America, however, does
not intend to suggest that Philippine literatures should be read as part of a Latin American or Latinx literary corpus. As Javier Morillo-Alicea has affirmed in an important article on the Spanish Empire’s rule of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines throughout the nineteenth century, the idea is not for Latin Americanists (and I add US Latinx studies scholars) to “stake a claim to the Philippines,” but rather to “reevaluate the conceptual maps that may keep us from seeing the connections between seemingly incommensurable worlds.” If we were to take Morillo-Alicea’s words quite literally, there are already some historical maps that may help us. For instance, Juan López de Velasco’s map of “las Yndias ocidentales” or “the West Indies,” featured in Spanish chronicler Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas’s *Historia general de los hechos de los castellanos en las Islas i Tierra Firme del mar océano que llaman Indias Occidentales* (1601), centers on the Pacific and it is inclusive of the Philippines (see figure 2).

Velasco’s map focuses on the Americas, naturally inclining us to let go of the tendency of situating Europe at the center of the world. Note, in this respect, that Europe barely makes it onto the map. However, this map also forces us to question the implications of viewing the Philippines essentially as an extension of the Americas. Such was the view, in fact, that the Spanish Crown wished to promote once the so-called Manila galleon trade, the first commercial link between Asia and the Americas, was made possible with the discovery of a return route from the Philippines to New Spain (colo-
nial Mexico) in 1565. Conflating the Americas and the Philippines was a strategic technicality: to adhere to the demarcations of the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas that declared the Spanish and Portuguese Empires owners of the territories they claimed to have discovered. The idea, as tempting as it may be, is not to trace any link between Latin America and the Philippines, and from there to rush to view these links as antecedents to the idea of the Global South, to thus celebrate them as a kind of South-South collaboration avant la lettre. Instead, the impetus of *Intercolonial Intimacies* is to look for the residue of the relations that developed between the Spanish colonies on the Pacific Rim during the colonial period, while maintaining a critical view of the reasons for and implications of evoking these historical relations.

Considering that I situate the origin of the intimacies between Latin America and the Philippines in the middle of the sixteenth century, specifically at the beginning of the aforementioned Manila galleon trade (also known as *la nao de la China*), *Intercolonial Intimacies* can be placed in what Yolanda Martínez-San Miguel and Santa Arias call “colonial Latinx studies.” This is a new field that stretches the geographical and temporal boundaries of Latinidad by turning to Latin American colonial literatures and archives, for instance Álvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca’s *Naufragios* (1542) or even Christopher Columbus’s letters. Colonial Latinx studies acknowledges the rich and complex transnational and transhistorical nature of the field of Latinx studies, yet it also aspires (this is at least the imperative proposed by Martínez-San Miguel and Arias) to remain cautious to not “[replicate] the imperial frameworks that identified European conquest and colonization as the beginning of Latin American literatures.” Colonial Latinx studies insists instead, to quote Martínez-San Miguel, “on the importance of developing a decolonial perspective that will read these archives at face value and against the grain simultaneously.” Inspired by this decolonial framework that colonial Latinx studies offers, I turn to the Manila galleon trade, inasmuch as it functions as a starting point to deconstruct Eurocentric notions of globality. But while doing so, I intend to remain wary of other gestures that oftentimes arise, namely the tendency to idealize any intercolonial relation.

Yet another objective of *Intercolonial Intimacies* is to arrive at a different definition of “world literature.” This ambitious goal is concurrent with efforts within the new field of the global hispanophone, as will be detailed later in the introduction. For now, it is imperative to establish, in dialogue with critic Ottmar Ette, that the traditional frameworks of “national literature” and “world literature,” which were solidified in the nineteenth century, are not sufficiently adequate when linking the literary and cultural productions of Latin America and the Philippines. Delving into the interstices of the frameworks of nation, empire, and area studies is a first step toward shifting established literary routes and practices, toward the reimagining and
ultimately the visibilization of what Ette calls “literatures without a fixed abode,” a concept that refers to “a never-ending bouncing back between places and times, societies and cultures” and a mode of writing that “insists on being off-center.” In Intercolonial Intimacies, Ette’s vision of “writing-between-worlds that cannot be territorialized in any permanent (or settled) way” is inherently present as the goal is not to pinpoint the center or the origin of a particular text, discourse, or idea, but to analyze its multidirectional movements across the Pacific. For this, I rely on a series of historical and cultural entanglements evoked by Filipino and Latin/o American writers and cultural actors from 1898 to 1964. The years that mark the beginning and end point of this book embody the plurality of forms and trajectories that make up the intercolonial, and to which I now turn.

THE INTERCOLONIAL LEGACIES OF THE WARS OF 1898

An emblematic historical marker, 1898 signals the consolidation of the United States as a modern colonial power, the near complete collapse of the Spanish Empire, and the truncated aspirations for autonomy or independence in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Cuba. Each of these was the culmination of processes set in motion much earlier. Before the United States adopted the doctrine of “Manifest Destiny” and aggressively expanded its borders, it became evident that the Spanish Empire had already lost much of its grip on its colonies. In 1812, the Cortes of Cádiz (the first Spanish legislature to include delegates from the entire Spanish Empire, including the Americas and the Philippines) approved a constitution that proposed major liberal reforms: it asserted, for instance, more equal rights for Spaniards in the peninsula and the empire’s colonies. However, this constitution and subsequent amendments contained numerous loopholes that permitted biased, exclusionary, and at times racist practices, or the constitution was simply not implemented, generating discontent even among those colonial subjects who had chosen to fight in favor of Spain during the wars of independence.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Spanish metropole continued to lose control of its remaining overseas territories, most importantly Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. On the one hand, the fact that Cubans and Puerto Ricans had been granted more representation at the Cádiz Cortes gave Filipinos a reason to make demands for what they deemed to be their right, and on the other hand, Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and Filipinos in exile began, over time, to share strategies for achieving greater autonomy or independence from Spain. It is not a coincidence that Cuba and Puerto Rico declared their independence from Spain in 1868 or that later on, in the years leading up to 1898, Filipino and Hispanic Caribbean intellectuals and revolutionaries corresponded with each other to support and inform their shared desires, possible tactics, and material needs for independence.
regard to the latter, Benedict Anderson writes, “The near-simultaneity of the last nationalist insurrection in the New World (Cuba, 1895) and the first in Asia (the Philippines, 1896) was no serendipity. Natives of the last important remnants of the fabled Spanish global empire, Cubans (as well as Puerto Ricans and Dominicans) and Filipinos did not merely read about each other, but had crucial personal connections and, up to a point, coordinated their actions—the first time in world history that such transglobal coordination became possible.”

Anderson suspects that the synchronous actions of Filipino and Caribbean revolutionaries were, in part, the result of the widespread ideas of liberalism and republicanism at the time. Yet he also hints at the intercolonial coordination between these revolutionaries. He turns, for instance, to the correspondence of Filipino Mariano Ponce, exiled in Hong Kong, with various Hispanic Caribbean intellectuals in exile. In Ponce’s eyes, Cubans were the “elder brothers” of Filipinos. “Cuba and the Philippines have together trodden the tragic path of shameful enslavement,” Ponce claimed in an 1897 letter addressed to Paris-based Cuban José Alberto Izquierdo, and thus “together we should also smash our chains.” Shortly after the outbreak of the wars of 1898, Ponce went on to correspond with Puerto Rican nationalist Ramón Emeterio Betances, who resided at the time in Paris, imploring for the help of “our Antillean brothers, near the Yankee government.” By writing to each other, Filipino and Hispanic Caribbean intellectuals were enacting what Paul Estrade calls a “moral solidarity between peoples,” a solidarity network that had been initiated through associations like the Junta Central Republicana de Cuba y Puerto Rico, established in New York City in 1865, as well as periodicals like *La Solidaridad* (1888–1895), *Patria* (1892–1898), and *La République Cubaine* (1895–1898), based respectively in Madrid/Barcelona, New York City, and Paris, which published on occasion articles reporting on each other’s fights for independence. Anderson goes so far as to state that the insurrection of Cuban independence leader José Martí was an “exhilarating example for nationalist Filipinos.”

Various scholars have elaborated on the Philippine-Cuban or a larger Philippine–Latin American connection by comparing how both Martí and Filipino national hero José Rizal assumed the task of looking to previous revolutions that could be reenacted in Cuba and the Philippines. John D. Blanco, for instance, argues that Rizal and Martí cast themselves as “the problematic inheritors of an unfinished project that began with the Latin American wars of independence in 1810.” Traces of Simón Bolívar’s vision of continental solidarity, Blanco alerts us, can be found in Martí’s emblematic essay “Nuestra América” (1891), while the continuity between Rizal and Bolívar can be detected in Crisóstomo Ibarra, the protagonist of Rizal’s novels *Noli me tangere* (1887) and *El filibusterismo* (1891). In the second novel,
Ibarra returns in disguise to the Philippines with the intent of setting off bombs and initiating a revolution. The protagonist’s presentation of himself as a wealthy, educated South American, and, most of all, the name he adopts, Simoun, are clear allusions to Bolivar. Yet by the late nineteenth century, these explicit subtexts had become “overshadowed,” according to Blanco, due to the rise of Pan-Americanist and Latin Americanist discourses. Before the links between the Philippines and Latin America were cut, however, the writings of Martí and Rizal did continue to have the potential of serving as the conceptual basis for intercolonial resistance. This “intercolonial alliance,” as Koichi Hagimoto calls it, was not a “tangible coalition” but rather an idea, “the possibility that a transnational form of anti-imperialism already existed in the nineteenth century, almost half a century before the emergence of a ‘Third World’ consciousness that is associated with what is today called the ‘Global South.’”

*Intercolonial Intimacies* elaborates upon the work of these scholars, relying on a wider definition of intercolonial—one that is not defined by the limited contact and parallels between Filipino and Cuban exiles in the 1890s or the comparable visions of Martí and Rizal, but one that encompasses the arguably more profound connections between Filipinos, Mexicans, and other Latin American and Hispanic Caribbean writers and diplomats after 1898. While Hagimoto concludes that the idea of an intercolonial alliance “disappeared after 1898 and would not resurge until the mid-twentieth century,” the first chapter of *Intercolonial Intimacies* analyzes how hispanophone Filipino intellectuals actively read and engaged with the work of anticolonial (or at least anti-US) writers from Hispanic America immediately following the wars of 1898, coinciding with a boom in Spanish-language writing in the Philippines, often called the golden age of Philippine literature in Spanish. If we are to identify a rupture in the idea of intercolonial solidarity between the Philippines and Latin America, it should be situated around the 1930s, a time that saw the rise of a discourse of hispanidad that revolved around Spain and cut the bridges between hispanophone Filipino and Latin/o American writers. In part, the rupture was also the result of the increase in literary productions in Tagalog and other native languages of the Philippines as well as the emergence of Filipino writers of English. Even as the latter eventually took over the privileged position Spanish-speaking Filipino authors had held at the turn of the twentieth century, chapter 2 demonstrates that anglophone Filipino writers, too, continued to reflect on the residues of the Spanish language and an ambiguous Spanish legacy in the Philippines, inviting us to think about the commonalities between their work and that of US Latino/a writers.

Here, it is useful to consider that while the term “Latino” began to gain more currency in the United States in the 1960s, various scholars have
pointed out that its conceptual basis is actually rooted in the year 1898, when there was a radical transformation of the decades-long clash between the so-called “Latin race” and the “Anglo-Saxon race.” The year 1898 was a “turning point,” Walter Mignolo argues, for the continued justifications of the superiority of the “Anglo-Saxon race,” which went on to signify the United States. According to Mignolo, the year 1898 “provided the ideological and historical justification to recast 1848 and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo between the United States and Mexico in an ideological discourse that was still not available at that time,” becoming “the anchor for the US perspective on ‘Latinos’ continuing until today.” That the wars of 1898 are called the “Spanish-American War” further hints at how Spain was cast as the common enemy, the backward colonizer and empire, subtly masking the rise of the United States as a new empire. According to María DeGuzmán, this demonization of Spain was meant to give grounds for the United States’ participation in the wars of 1898; it “served Anglo-Americans’ need to find an adequate justification for taking over Spanish colonies and killing Spaniards as well as other Spanish-speaking peoples (namely, Cubans and Puerto Ricans).” Blurring the boundaries of Latin American and US Latino/a literary studies, Julio Ramos contends that the year 1898 prefigured the trajectories of later Latin American exiles in the United States as well as those of Chicano/a, Puerto Rican, and other Latino/a writers, artists, and critics. “These are subjects,” according to Ramos, “whose vital experiences and intellectual labour either introduce new tensors or at times cross paths with the old, cutting diagonally across those territorializing notions of roots, linguistic purity, fixed origins or continuous legacies that still manifest themselves today as tropes of vernacular Latin-Americanism.” Altogether, these scholars dare us to interrogate our strictly territorially bound and monolingual-dominated understandings of literary traditions as well as identitarian discourses, which so often mask their imperialist impetus.

It is worth reemphasizing that it would take many decades for peoples of Latin American and Hispanic Caribbean origin in the United States to mobilize, formally coalesce, and identify collectively as “Latino.” But there were many routes and detours within this intergroup formation. As early as the 1930s, Filipino and Mexican migrants were forming families and joining forces to fight the oppressive and racist government measures migrant farmworkers were subjected to; these measures included continual wage decreases, the refusal to hand out contracts, and state anti-miscegenation laws that forbade interracial marriage. Their precarious living conditions caused Filipino laborers to unite under the leadership of figures like Larry Itliong and Philip Vera Cruz, who formed the United Farm Workers labor union alongside César Chávez and Dolores Huerta in the mid-1960s. There is, however, a prehistory to this interethnic collaboration. As Rudy P.
Guevarra asserts in his study on the formation of “Mexipinos,” the people of cross-cultural Mexican-Filipino communities in Southern California, the similarities between Filipino and Mexican migrants “were initially forged from a shared Spanish colonial past and have resonated through the twentieth century.” Filipino and Mexican migrants were thus beginning to recover another intercolonial transpacific history that goes further back, to the middle of the sixteenth century.

LATIN AMERICAN IMAGINATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE “INTERCOLONIAL PACIFIC”

Setting out to find a western route to the coveted Spice Islands, Magellan and a crew of around 270 men departed from Spain in 1519, navigated around the southern tip of the Americas, crossed the enormous ocean that Magellan—or rather his scribe, Antonio Pigafetta—described as “pacific,” and eventually arrived at the Philippines in 1521. From there, Juan Sebastián Elcano led the westward return expedition, across the Indian Ocean and around the Cape of Good Hope, back to Spain, in 1522. In 1543, Ruy López de Villalobos, one of the few survivors of the world’s first circumnavigation, reached the archipelago again, this time from Mexico, and named it “Islas Filipinas” in honor of Philip II, then king of Spain. But it was not until 1565 that the Spaniards managed to gain more control of the archipelago, after the completion of another expedition to the Philippines, under the command of Miguel de Legazpi and friar Andrés de Urdaneta. Urdaneta made the coveted return voyage, or tornaviaje, to New Spain, while Legazpi stayed and partook in a “blood compact” with Dato Sikatuna, chieftain of the Kingdom of Bool, to symbolize their peace agreement.

Many are the possible focal points when telling the history of the Spanish conquest or “pacification” of the Philippines. Vicente Rafael has opened up the way, through the lens of translation theory, for reconstructing or critically imagining the point of view of the natives in the early Spanish colonial period in the Philippines who were forced to convert to Christianity. Inspired by Pigafetta, literary critic Adam Lifshey has reframed nineteenth- and twentieth-century Philippine literature in Spanish as “global.” Others, among them Ricardo Padrón, have begun to look into the imaging and imagination of the Pacific and the diverse engagements and entanglements across it during the Spanish colonial period, making it possible to talk about a new area of research within the interdisciplinary field of transpacific studies: that of Spanish Pacific studies.

Yet one aspect that deserves more scholarly attention is the fact that the Philippines was conquered and colonized by way of colonial Mexico. After the news of Magellan’s “discovery” of the Philippines spread, a series of expeditions were privately organized in present-day Mexico and Peru in hopes
of establishing another Spanish colony there and eventually finding a route back to the Americas. Ruy López de Villalobos was Spanish, and yet his expedition’s point of departure was the port of Barra de Navidad in present-day Jalisco, Mexico. Miguel López de Legazpi and friar Andrés de Urdaneta were also from Spain, but they also departed on their expedition from Barra de Navidad. It is important to stress the origins of these expeditions and the fact that prior to heading to the Philippines Legazpi had been living in colonial Mexico for more than two decades; these details signal that the first articulation of the transpacific was in many respects already delinked from the Spanish metropole. For two and a half centuries, the so-called Manila galleon trade was, to borrow Katharine Bjork’s words, “the sole link between Spain and its easternmost—or, from the perspective of the Americas, westernmost—possessions.” It was, moreover, “the link that kept the Philippines, far removed from Europe, ‘Spanish.’”

Bjork’s suggestion that it is a stretch to refer to the Philippines as “Spanish” could also be applied to the galleon trade between Manila and Acapulco. Following Mariano Ardash Bonialian, during the first years of the galleon trade, a triangular commerce developed as products from Asia circulated freely from New Spain to the port of El Callao in Peru. Soon enough, this trade became lucrative, becoming a cause for concern for merchants across the Atlantic. In response to their complaints, the Spanish Crown sought to control and ultimately suspend the traffic of Asian goods from New Spain to Peru in 1634. The 1634 law that prohibited commerce between Acapulco in New Spain and El Callao, however, was not enforced. Merchants continued to smuggle goods from the Manila galleon trade to Peru throughout the seventeenth century. In 1711 Fernando de Alencastre, Duke of Linares and thirty-fifth viceroy of New Spain, wrote to the Council of the Indies to request royal approval for free commerce between New Spain and Peru. The Council of the Indies acknowledged that there was a need for more commercial freedom between the two viceroyalties; nonetheless, Alencastre’s proposal was ultimately rejected. Accepting his request would have implied an open acknowledgment that the colonies had become proto-independent of the Crown. “By accepting the proposal,” Bonialian contends, “the territory of New Spain would become the concentric point, the primary nerve of imperial commerce.” The Pacific was theoretically a “Spanish lake,” to recall a phrase coined by William Lytle Schurz, but for all practical matters, Bonialian insists, it was “a Spanish American lake,” an ocean controlled by merchants from New Spain and Peru.

Regardless of the Crown’s attempt to maintain or regain control of the contact between its colonies, commercial activities among them continued to flourish. Ignoring the royal decrees, merchants from New Spain and the Philippines continued to transport more goods between the colonies than
what was allowed by the law. This is what made the Manila galleon trade, in the words of Carmen Yuste López, “the most important intercolonial alternative in the entire Hispanic world.” Although the Pacific was claimed by the Spanish Crown, the commercial networks across it remained largely in the hands of merchants from the colonies throughout the eighteenth century. “The transpacific axis,” Yuste López maintains, “was not in effect an ‘Iberian Pacific,’ in the sense that its negotiations did not yield benefits to the metropole, neither was it an extension of the Atlantic commercial system. It was, without a doubt, an intercolonial Pacific, an ocean of exchanges wherein Filipinos and New Spaniards benefited the most.” Silk, spices, ceramics, and other luxurious goods were transported to New Spain in exchange for silver from Mexico and Peru, which was in high demand in China. Yet along with the transport of this merchandise were also exchanges of cultural productions and practices, some of which will be discussed in chapter 3.

After two hundred and fifty years of continuous operation, the Manila-Acapulco galleon trade came to an end in 1815 as Mexicans devoted themselves to attaining independence from Spain. After Mexicans declared their independence on September 28, 1821, a Commission of Foreign Relations appointed by the short-lived Mexican Empire made plans to establish diplomatic ties with various nations, empires, and colonies across the world. According to a dictum authored by this commission on December 29, 1921, it would be convenient for Mexicans to remain tied to Manila given “the relation of its commerce with ours, which forms a chain of strong and complex links that would take considerable time to fall apart.” The document continued that “it would be convenient to explore the wishes of the manilos (people in Manila); if they are determined to be incorporated into the [Mexican] Empire, they should be admitted, like the Provinces of Chiapas, Honduras, and Nicaragua.” Through this link to Manila, the dictum further reveals, Mexico planned to have access to an abundance of construction wood from the Philippines and to foment Chinese migration to the Americas, particularly to the California and Texas Provinces, in order to remain connected to the economies of Asia. Eventually, the Mexican Empire reached out to the Philippines by sending a memorandum, which declared: “Now that we Mexicans have fortunately obtained our independence by revolution against Spanish rule, it is our solemn duty to help the less fortunate countries . . . especially the Philippines, with whom our country has had the most intimate relations during the last two centuries and a half.” The memorandum also stated: “Should the Philippines succeed in gaining her independence from Spain, we must felicitate her warmly and form an alliance of amity and commerce with her as a sister nation. Moreover, we must resume the intimate Mexico-Philippine relations, as they were during the halcyon days of Acapulco-Manila trade.” Instead of presenting the request as an impo-
tion, the idea of maintaining such intimacy was presented as an amicable and mutually beneficial bond. The language of this memorandum, however, should not be idealized. As Vicente Rafael has observed, “reciprocal obligations are, in a way, the ‘grammar’ of kinship ties.” While Rafael was referring to Southeast Asian island societies and how their logic of reciprocity was manipulated to accommodate the language and ideology of patronage during the US colonial regime in the Philippines, the rhetoric of familial reciprocity is also applicable to early Latin American governments whose interest in the Pacific and the Philippines were quite similar to, and even anticipated, those of the US government.

Mexico was hardly alone in its aspiration to extend its hegemony to the Philippines in the early 1820s. Consider Chile and Ecuador. At around the same time that Iturbide’s administration reached out to the manilos, Chilean independence leader Bernardo O’Higgins was envisioning different paths to expand Chile’s borders along the Pacific coast and across the ocean. On November 12, 1821, O’Higgins reached out in a letter to Lord Thomas Cochrane, a Scottish sailor who led the Chilean navy in its war for independence against Spain, expressing his plan to claim Guayaquil, the Galápagos Islands, and the Philippines. Within a year, however, this plan was aborted as O’Higgins focused on incorporating Chiloé, the last Spanish territory in Chile, and was exiled thereafter. Decades later, around the middle of the nineteenth century, the Philippines once again entered the purview of the Chilean government. This time, a proposal was made to form an armada to be sent across the Pacific, allegedly to cooperate with the independence efforts in the Philippines. But the plan did not come to fruition as the Chilean government continued to focus on expanding its territorial borders toward the south and the north, while maintaining an eye across the Pacific and eventually managing to annex Easter Island. In 1842, Juan José Flores, the leader of Ecuador’s separation from Gran Colombia and first president of Ecuador, took a significantly different approach. He proposed the formation of a military alliance with Spain under the guise of helping the Crown protect its rule of the Philippines. His plan for territorial expansion was to reconnect with the former colonizer and to expand Ecuador over Peru and possibly Argentina. Flores’s ultimate goal, according to Mark Van Aken, “was nothing less than the creation of a Spanish American empire.”

All in all, Latin American interest in the Philippines should not be romanticized as an intercolonial collaboration, but rather be taken as a starting point to reflect on the many layers within imperial structures, or what Immanuel Wallerstein calls “subimperialism.” The series of failed attempts to annex the Philippines reveals that, concurrent with the United States’ imperial ventures throughout the nineteenth century, Latin American states had their own expansionist and colonialist objectives. These attempts also
elucidate the role played by some criollo elites, who hoped to fill the power vacuum left by representatives of the Spanish Empire and adhered to an imperialist agenda of territorial expansion, which they deemed they had inherited. This predisposition, then, to embrace imperial territorial legacies helps us understand that the relations between Latin America and the Philippines, both during or after the Spanish colonial period, should not be deemed unproblematic on the grounds that they are “peripheral” spaces. One should proceed with caution so as not to turn a blind eye to new hierarchies or paternalist attitudes filling the absence of the Spanish Crown, the US government, or, more broadly, the West. As critic Junyoung Verónica Kim observes, when the factors under consideration in a comparative study are from Latin America and Asia, it is often the case that one of them ends up “taking the function of the West.” In tune with Kim’s skeptical response toward the tendency to welcome any study on Asia–Latin America relations on the grounds that they break the mold of area studies, Laura Torres-Rodríguez asserts that the objective of scholars who interrogate the borders of Latin America by turning toward the Pacific or Asia instead of the Atlantic and Europe should not be “simply to substitute one paradigm for another,” but to create “a model for decolonial reflection that transcends a simple contrast between the two oceanic routes.”

Intercolonial Intimacies seeks to continue these gestures of going beyond Eurocentric models. However, when reading Philippine literature in Spanish and English alongside Spanish- and English-language literatures from the Americas, more than a decolonial delinking, what becomes apparent is a kind of nostalgia for the direct link between Asia and the Americas by way of the Philippines and Mexico. What we find, ultimately, is a yearning of sorts for a relinking between former colonies of the Spanish Empire. With this, an inevitable question arises: What do we do with the heaps of praise for the Spanish Empire that so often accompany this vision of intercolonial relinking? Possible answers for this question vary across time and location, but what will become clear overall is that what intellectuals and diplomats from the Philippines and Hispanic America envisioned was not a revival of a fallen empire but a distinct intercolonial bond that, as explained earlier, was in many ways already proto-independent from their common former colonizer. In sum, the alternative we are left with should not be the other extreme, that is, to consider that all Latin American interest in the Philippines in the twentieth century is inevitably, or solely, neo-imperialist in nature. The celebrations of the fourth centenary of Legazpi and Urdaneta’s 1564 expedition to the Philippines, held both in Mexico and the Philippines in 1964, provide us with a case in point. These commemorations, as we will see in chapter 4, made use of a unique and strangely familiar intercolonial past.
REDEFINING “HISPANIC” IN PLURAL CONTEXTS

Before proceeding to chapter summaries, this section seeks to address the challenge of nomenclatures, specifically as they may have distinct (not to say unwelcome) resonances for some readers of this book. With time, this section may become dated as new categories and conceptual frameworks continue to emerge. Consider, for instance, “the global hispanophone.”

Much like the more firmly established field of francophonie, which encompasses the cultural production of countries and regions with a significant francophone community, the global hispanophone is an emerging field that encompasses literary and cultural productions from all territories once bound by the Spanish Empire, with particular focus on those beyond the Americas, the Caribbean, and the Iberian Peninsula. While the global hispanophone inevitably insinuates the contours of the Spanish Empire, it seeks to depart from that empire’s hierarchical structure. In a special double issue of the *Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies* titled “Entering the Global Hispanophone,” guest editors Adolfo Campoy-Cubillo and Benita Sampedro Vizcaya elaborate on the relatively new field’s potentialities alongside its limitations, for instance “the emphasis on, or privileging of, cultural production in Spanish as a homogenizing language regime.” From there, the editors acknowledge the perhaps “transient and contingent nature” of the field, yet they also consider how the global hispanophone relates to the broader established fields of Latin American, Iberian, and Latinx studies, assuring that one of the advantages of this new field is the possibility to dismantle if not move away, definitively, from the notion of center. According to Campoy-Cubillo and Sampedro Vizcaya, “The Global Hispanophone does not have to be driven by a centripetal force that links its diverse corpus to a Hispanophone core or essence. Doing so would in fact amount to little more than recycling and redressing of former versions of Hispanism, now put into recirculation under a contemporary transnational ethos. Instead, we have an opportunity to fashion this field as a centrifugal force that follows its subject of study away from the infelicitous essentialisms that have characterized past renditions of Hispanism.”

Likewise, the discussions in *Intercolonial Intimacies* rely largely on an enterprise operated by the Spanish Empire: the aforementioned Manila galleon trade. However, this book evokes the galleon trade precisely to question the center-periphery models that have predominated in the study of the literatures and cultural productions of the Philippines as well as Latin/o America’s link to Asia.

By approaching the Philippines from Latin America, and Latin America from the Philippines, *Intercolonial Intimacies* aspires to transcend the strictly geographical attitudes toward the fields of Hispanic and Latin American studies, which have tended to relegate Philippine literature in Spanish or...
the Philippines in general to the margins and wherein the hegemonic status of the Spanish language tends to go unquestioned.\textsuperscript{58} This work seeks, moreover, to go beyond the predisposition to approach Philippine literature in Spanish as if it were an exotic, “undiscovered” object that must be studied simply because it is understudied. The latter is the sensation one gets, at least in retrospect, when reading Adam Lifshey’s \textit{The Magellan Fallacy: Globalization and the Emergence of Asian and African Literature in Spanish} (2012) and \textit{Subversions of the American Century: Filipino Literature in Spanish and the Transpacific Transformation of the United States} (2016). \textit{The Magellan Fallacy} is presented as “the first word, not the last, on many aspects of a field that does not presently exist,” while the texts analyzed in \textit{Subversions of the American Century} are consistently introduced as unsung masterpieces or the first of firsts.\textsuperscript{59} Despite critics finding these and other shortcomings in Lifshey’s monographs, especially the second one, there has been, as of late, significant interest in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Philippine literature in Spanish as well as new ways to approach it.\textsuperscript{60} One way or another, Lifshey’s work has contributed to this growing interest. In fact, the impetus to read Filipino José Garcia Villa alongside Latin American and US Latinx writers in chapter 2 coincides in part with one of the questions articulated at the end of \textit{The Magellan Fallacy}, namely: What would change if we were to accept that “a redefinition of Latin America northward to include Latino writers in the United States could be complicated more richly and deeply still by a conceptualization of global hispanophone literature that included Asian and African writings?”\textsuperscript{61} In answering this question, there is already a category that is more pertinent than “global hispanophone” or even “hispanophone.” There is a term that is still operative and yet needs to be situated and understood in its plural contexts: “Hispanic.”

At times, my decision to use “Hispanic” instead of “Latin American” or “Latino/a/x” in \textit{Intercolonial Intimacies} is more technical than anything else. For instance, it is much more precise to refer to Hispanic American \textit{modernismo} rather than Latin American \textit{modernismo}.\textsuperscript{62} Going past those technicalities, it is crucial to call out and break the homogenizing and neo-imperial tendency to use “Hispanic” as a synonym for “Spanish.”\textsuperscript{63} As Sara Castro-Klarén has indicated, “Without a critically spelled out concept of difference, and without a clearly spelled out concept of comparative cultural studies in time and space, one can only conclude that ‘Hispanic’ is the place where all geo-cultural difference is obliterated and where ‘Hispanic’ rises as a cohesive singularity that travels back to the Roman times, and forth, unimpeded by conquest, and geo-cultural differences, into our present experience of intense globalization.” Some people may insist that “Hispanic” or one of its earlier iterations in the United States, “Hispano,” is a neutral term that refers to peoples and cultures of Spanish or Hispanic American
origin. Yet many others reject these terms as tied to a historical conformity to ideologies of racial superiority. Following Suzanne Oboler, toward the end of the nineteenth century, “Hispano” was employed by the elites of Mexican origin in New Mexico. “In adopting the term Hispano,” Oboler writes, “they were emphasizing not their miscegenated, mestizo origins, but rather their specific-class descent from original ‘pure-blooded’ Spanish conquistadores who settled in New Mexico.” The term “Hispano,” Oboler further clarifies, indicated a fantasy of racial purity. It operated as a marker of social status. According to Oboler, “Hispano” and later “Spanish American” became the preferred terms for these elites to distinguish themselves from the large groups of Mexicans who were brought to the United States to work as farmers. As explained by Paula Moya, “It is precisely because racists in the southwest (and elsewhere) have long exploited the ideology of hispanidad in order to distance themselves from their darker-skinned brethren that the term Hispanic carries connotations of racial purity in the U.S. context.”

There is, moreover, yet another specific trajectory that has caused many to reject the term “Hispanic” within the United States: its officialization in academic and popular discourse after an initiative led by Richard Nixon’s administration in the late 1960s to categorize peoples of Latin American origin (mostly, at the time, from Mexico, Puerto Rico, and Cuba). In this context, the term corresponds to a top-down effort to lump together a diverse group of people, disregarding specificities, for instance national origins, which many prefer to adhere to. The same could be said, however, of the term “Latina/o.” Although the latest iteration of the term in academia, “Latinx,” attempts to contest the conformity to previous appellations that were gradually co-opted and imposed, it still unintentionally alludes to an imperialist agenda: the French Empire’s desire in the nineteenth century to rebrand “Spanish” America as “Latin” or even what Jacques Derrida once called mondialatinisation, that is, the Christian imperial militarization and homogenization of the world from the Roman times and onward. As Latinx studies scholar Claudia Milian notes, “Ironically, the one static ‘thing’ that stands ‘there’—unasked—is another term, centuries old, with its own problematic conundrum: ‘Latin.’”

Instead of problematizing “Latin” and “Latino/a/x” separately, it is worthwhile to think about some of the overlaps that these terms have had with the trajectories of hispano/a in the Spanish language to distinguish Latin America from the United States. It is useful to consider, for instance, how the expression “América Hispana” began to gain more currency by the turn of the twentieth century, alongside “América Latina,” signaling a dismissal of the United States’ imperial threats to Latin America. Suffice to say, “América Hispana” and “América Latina” also gestured toward a clearer distinction from Spain than “América Española.” In the 1930s, however,
the semantic trajectories of hispano/a and more so hispánico/a (the latter notably sounding much closer to “Hispanic”) were interrupted, reoriented to revolve once again around Spain. This was largely the doing of Spanish ideologue Ramiro de Maeztu. In a series of articles, eventually gathered and published under the title Defensa de la Hispanidad (1934), Maeztu declared: “Hispanic [Hispánicos] are all the peoples who owe their civilization or being to the Hispanic people [pueblos hispanos] in the peninsula. Hispanidad is the concept that encompasses all of us.” In Maeztu’s view, inhabitants of the former colonies of the Spanish Empire—including the Philippines—had an enormous debt to Spain. His argument was not that this debt should somehow be repaid but rather that all former nations of the Spanish Empire should remain united on the basis of a common history, language, culture, and Catholicism. “Our community,” Maeztu claimed, “is not racial, nor geographic, but spiritual.” In 1940, shortly after General Francisco Franco rose to power, Spain’s Foreign Ministry established a so-called Council of Hispanidad, which adopted and promoted Maeztu’s redefinition of hispanidad, seeking to reaffirm the Spanish Empire’s cultural legacy throughout its former colonies.

The work of the Council of Hispanidad found enough supporters among conservative intellectuals in Latin America and the Philippines seeking to give continuity to the imperialist undertones, previously articulable through the eugenic discourse of la raza or la raza latina, to strengthen the power of the Catholic church and preserve the alleged purity of the Spanish language. In 1942, representatives from twenty Latin American nations, including Brazil, were invited to Spain to discuss the ways in which the doctrine could be applied in their respective countries, and as a result, various pro-Franco organizations were established, among them Fundación Española in Montevideo, Casa de España in Buenos Aires, Círculo de Acción Española in Santiago, and Hogar Español in São Paulo. However, these efforts were contained, in part due to the fact that the Francoist ideology of hispanidad was eclipsed by a leftist approach to hispanism promoted by Spanish intellectuals like José Gaos who went into exile and settled in Latin America, most of all Mexico. These exiles’ pan-Hispanist agenda coincided to an extent with that of the Franco regime, Sebastiaan Faber contends, but their hispanismo “celebrated republicanism, democracy, and social justice as the political expression par excellence of Hispanic, ‘humanist’ spirituality.”

Perhaps more than in Latin America, supporters of Francoist hispanidad were more pronounced in the Philippines, where there was already a solid base in defense of hispanism. At the beginning of the twentieth century, as we will see at the end of chapter 1, a fervent debate emerged in intellectual circles: whether Filipinos should embrace “Hispanismo,” that is, Hispan-
ic values and the preservation of the Spanish language in the Philippines, or “Sajonismo” (Anglo-Saxonism), the newer English-language US-centric cultural program offered by the US administration. Throughout the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), the defense of Hispanismo was exacerbated and highly politicized. Cultural institutions and journals such as Philippine Free Press, Excelsior, and Pro-Cervantes openly praised Franco. Other similarly celebratory publications were launched following Franco’s rise to power. In January 1940, for instance, the University of Santo Tomás established a monthly journal called Hispanidad, which envisioned a revival of the Spanish Empire and cast Franco as “the undisputed and undisputable Leader,” the one who “has shown us the path towards UNITY, which we must follow to the EMPIRE, to Spain.” By the time Franco had risen to power in Spain, hispanism in the Philippines had become so politicized that it reached, to borrow an expression used by historian Florentino Rodao, “a point of no return.” This extremist politicization of all things Spanish in the Philippines helps us better understand why Hispanist efforts within the Philippines are so often accused of being tainted with neo-imperialist ideology.

The trajectories of hispanism across the world are varied and we could continue delving into them. But the point to be made here is that heightened attention to how hispanism was adopted and promoted by the Franco regime and the US government has generated a long-lasting disregard for its ideological flexibility in other contexts. This does not mean that the weight of doctrine should be dismissed or overlooked. But we should not let it displace previous or concurrent Hispanist discourses with remarkably different ends. A case in point worth mentioning is the New York City–based Pueblos Hispanos. This Spanish-language weekly ran from 1943 to 1944 with a nine-point mission statement, which included “the unification of all the Hispanic colonies [colonias hispanas] in the United States to vanquish Nazi fascism.” The publication also called for “the rights of all Hispanic minorities in the United States [to] be defended—Puerto Ricans, Filipinos, Mexicans, etc.,” in order “to combat the prejudice against Hispanics because of their race or creed.” The weekly further aimed “to help and promote the unity of all Spaniards on behalf of democratic freedoms in Spain” and to make “the independence of the Philippines a fact recognized by law.” For the creators of and contributors to Pueblos Hispanos, being Hispanic served as the kernel for the collective resistance to new repressive state forces across the world, including the Franco regime and the US government’s treatment of Latinx migrants and Filipino subjects. Suffice to say, Pueblos Hispanos evoked the ideology of pan-hispanism, but for remarkably different ends.

In considering various uses of pan-hispanism, the objective is not to sanitize, so to speak, the expression “Hispanic,” but to acknowledge the need to more seriously consider the specificities of the term’s resonations in differ-
ent localities and contexts throughout the twentieth century and at present. While this book does not and cannot aspire to account for all of the term’s meanings and resonations, the use of “Hispanic” here hints at Enrique Dussel’s philosophical concept of ser-hispano or “being-in-the-world-hispanically.” An inflection of Martin Heidegger’s notion of Dasein (oftentimes translated to English as “Being-in-the-World”), ser-hispano does not refer to essential traits but to “a moving discovery of the hispano as ‘located’ creatively ‘in-between’ many worlds that continuously constitute a historical identity on the intercultural ‘border.’” Much like the discourse of latinidad, which has been and continues to be appropriated, reinvented, and repurposed in strategic, polyphonic manners, “Hispanic” is not employed here as a synonym for “Spanish,” but as a cultural marker that is, to borrow Dussel’s words once more, “always in formation.”

CHAPTER SUMMARIES

Following a chronological arc, Intercolonial Intimacies explores how writers from the Philippines and Latin/o America appropriated the discourse of latinidad, which intersected at times with the equally (if not much more) ideologically charged concept of hispanidad. The first chapter examines how hispanophone Filipino writers adopted and adapted a variety of facets of modernismo, the first Spanish-language literary movement to originate in the Americas, such as the exaltation of la raza latina and a defense of “Hispanicness.” Filipino writers like Fernando María Guerrero, Cecilio Apóstol, Manuel Bernabé, Claro M. Recto, and Jesús Balmori celebrated hispanism in tune with the political and aesthetic views of Hispanic American modernista writers, among them Nicaraguan Rubén Darío, Puerto Rican José de Diego, and Peruvian José Santos Chocano. Moreover, this chapter argues that beyond evoking la raza latina as a means to resist the imposition of Anglo-Saxon ideals by the US government, Filipino writers were making a conscious claim to the idea of latinidad through their commitment to the construction of a unique counter-discourse of morenidad (brownness).

Chapter 2 turns to the work of José Garcia Villa, one of the most important twentieth-century anglophone writers from the Philippines. It focuses on Villa’s publications and personal archives in the 1930s and early 1940s, a period that symbolizes the transitional years from Spanish-language to English-language literary production in the Philippines. Although Villa, who migrated to the United States as a young adult, continued to publish works only in English, he maintained a strong affinity for the literatures of the Hispanic world. Relying on Cuban American writer and critic Gustavo Pérez Firmat’s concept of “tongue ties,” the chapter looks into Villa’s English translations of Spanish-language poetry, as well as his unpublished poems in Spanish and “Spanglish.” The chapter ends by dialoguing with the work of
US Latinx writers and other anglophone Filipino writers, consolidating the transpacific reach of latinidad.

Chapter 3 begins with a discursive analysis of the pomp that surrounded the Aztec Eagles, a Mexican air squadron that was deployed to the Pacific theater during World War II. Although Mexico’s direct participation in the war was limited and late, members of the squadron were fervently welcomed upon their return to Mexico. Rafael Bernal, a writer and diplomat, complicates this narrative of victory by shifting our attention to the thousands of Mexicans from the other side of the Rio Bravo, the United States, as well as to the significant residual Mexican presence in Filipino society as a result of the Manila galleon trade. In Bernal’s view, Mexicans were in many ways already there in the Philippines before the arrival of the Aztec Eagles. In light of literary and scholarly works that Bernal produced during his diplomatic appointment to the Philippines in the first half of the 1960s, among them a longue durée study of the Pacific Ocean, this chapter argues that Bernal should be deemed one of the first Latin American scholars in the field of transpacific studies.

The last chapter examines three attempts in the first half of the 1960s to strengthen the intellectual and diplomatic relations between the Philippines and Latin America. It begins with an initiative to reconnect the Philippines with Latin America by refashioning the Spanish language as an “Ibero-American” language, an effort led by Filipino writer and educator Antonio Abad, who attended the Third Congress of the Association of the Academies of the Spanish Language, hosted in Colombia in 1960. In the following years, a broader definition of common language emerged, one that encompassed a rhetoric of liberation in line with the emergence of a “Third World” consciousness. This is apparent in the work of Mexican philosopher Leopoldo Zea, the only Latin American scholar to be invited to José Rizal’s birth centenary, celebrated in Manila in 1961, and the one who thereafter introduced Rizal to a large Latin American audience. Finally, the chapter assesses the significance of the 1964 celebrations of the 1564 expedition that resulted in the discovery of the return route from the Philippines to the Americas. Through an analysis of a series of speeches, articles, and memoirs from these commemorative events, the chapter demonstrates how Mexico and the Philippines’ entangled past functioned as a unique catalyst for the consolidation of a wider intercolonial world order.

With the exception of a short piece by multilingual Filipino writer Federico Espino Licci, which is partially in Tagalog and analyzed in the book conclusion, the texts examined in *Intercolonial Intimacies* are either in Spanish or English. That is to say, they are limited to the linguistic impositions of the Spanish Empire and the United States. Numerous other texts in the many Indigenous languages across the Philippines, the Americas, and the
Pacific remain to be considered together through the lens of intercoloniality. There is, however, much perspective to be gained by reaching beyond the continually reified colonizer-colonized binary from both sides of the Hispanic Pacific.