

INTRODUCTION

In June of 2013 millions of Brazilians took to the streets to protest a variety of causes, sparked by a transportation tariff hike and fueled by perception of widespread corruption and misguided priorities, particularly those of the upcoming FIFA Confederations Cup. “We want hospitals and schools with padrão FIFA,” shouted the young Brazilians, referencing the expensive stadiums, airports, and hotels built according to the soccer association guidelines.¹

Corruption and deficient infrastructure are old problems in Brazil—as are street protests—but the pervasion of these issues in 2013 was somewhat unexpected given the narrative that Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s government (2003–2010) had found the formula for income distribution with strong economic growth and political stability, pushing the country to close its modernization gaps. International media fueled this image of a rising power, and a number of books such as *Brazil on the Rise* by *New York Times* correspondent Larry Rother and *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power* by *The Economist* regional director Michael Reid were celebrating just that. Of the states comprising BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa),² Brazil seemed to have it all: democracy, natural resources, no border conflicts, no

ultra-nationalist movement, plenty of room to grow, and a positive international image. The country's economy had survived the 2008 crisis with minimal damage and was surfing the global branding wave of hosting the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympic Games. The historical income inequality was shrinking, and the country's Gini coefficient, a gauge of income inequality, fell from 0.65 in 2002 to 0.50 in 2013.³ Unlike Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Cristina Kirchner in Argentina, Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff promoted liberal leftist policies that embraced economic growth and had strong support from local capitalists. All eyes were on Brazil and it was, at that point, a case of success.⁴

That could explain why the 2013 protests were described by the Brazilian mainstream media as a surprise. "The giant has awoken," the news said in unison. This was far from reality. Since Brazilian society had initiated its process of rapid urbanization, the streets had been a stage for social movements; protests big and small happened rather frequently throughout the twentieth century.

This book explores the idea that we should interpret urban transformation through the lens of the relationship between street protests and urban policy, making explicit the conflict between popular democracy and economic interests in the production of the space at the periphery of capitalism. The tension of street protests is the foundation on which Brazilian democracy conflicts has been based. By analyzing the historical changes at such moments, we can derive important lessons on urban policy in Brazil. Following the tracks of the pioneering works of David Harvey (1976) and Manuel Castells (1984) in their classics "Labor, Capital, and Class Struggle around the Built Environment in Advanced Capitalist Societies" and *The City and the Grassroots*, we seek the Brazilian engine in which "urban forms and functions are produced and managed by the interaction between space and society" (Castells 1984, xv).

Brazilian urban inequality produced the framework for the intensive pattern of economic exploitation in the peripheral capitalism, and in that sense the subsequent urban protests challenged the governance in the Brazilian cities. The framework of this book tries to foster an understanding of the relationship between urban planning and governance in Brazil through a historical perspective. We depart from Harvey's and Castells's theoretical analysis of this relationship, but we cannot imply direct causality between urban plans and street protests. Cities are way too complex to be shaped by any group of variables, as we elaborate further with our "theoretical tripod." What this book does for the first time in the scholarship of Brazilian urban history is to tell those histories in a parallel narrative, highlighting their strong convergences and sometimes their divergences without implying that one directly

causes or induces the other. It is our hope that it may therefore be useful to address a more stable urban democracy and city governance in the future.

Is this such a radical proposal as to deserve a book? Has it not been done before? Does it help us understand what happened between 2013 and 2020? One hypothesis for why the history of urban plans has never been properly connected to the history of street protests is that these scholarships developed in opposite directions. As discussed by Clara Irazábal (2008, 26), “the literature that links public space and public sphere rarely takes a spatial angle.” Setha Low (1999, 113) reminds us that we need a “theory of lived spaces in which spatial practices elude the discipline of urban planning.” In summary, this book is a contribution to theorize spatial consequences of social practices under different historical patterns of urban planning in both the industrial and neoliberal periods of the Brazilian economy.

The historiography of social movements represents a shift in the most important explanations and theories regarding Brazilian society, moving away from its rural roots. The most stressed issues in the narrative about social movements were climate and race determinism in the nineteenth century, later adding Marxist approaches translated into the Brazilian rural and colonial economy. Even the most fruitful and modern theories that arise in the 1930s mainly focus on rural issues (Freyre 1933 and 1936; Holanda 1936). The first analyses on the specificity of Brazilian cities arise exactly from this tradition, as interpreted by Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, as part of Iberian heritage in “O Semeador e o Ladrilhador,” a famous chapter of his book *Raízes do Brasil* (Holanda 1936). This is the case of the earlier books *Formação de cidades no Brasil colonial* by Paulo Santos (1968) and *Cidade Brasileira* by Murilo Marx (1980).

The shift from an interpretation based on cultural specificities of Iberian heritage to one focused on urban and economic problems should be considered a second step in the interpretation of the urban issue in Brazil. Urban geography had already produced major contributions such as Caio Prado Jr. ([1935] 1983) and Aroldo Azevedo (1956) when two books were published in 1968 analyzing the Brazilian urban evolution. The books *Contribuição ao estudo da evolução urbana do Brasil, 1500 a 1720* by Nestor Goulart Reis and *Desenvolvimento econômico e evolução urbana* by Paul Singer set the benchmark for future interpretations of urban and socioeconomic issues in Brazil.

A specific pattern of underdeveloped city growth, however, was addressed by *Urbanismo no subdesenvolvimento*, written by Jorge Wilhelm in 1969, contemporary with the famous books of Henry Lefèvre, *Le droit à la ville* (1968), and Manuel Castells, *La question urbaine* (1972). These books were published concurrently with the institutionalization of urban sociology in Brazil, influ-

enced by Antony Leeds, who came to the country to study favelas in 1968. He was followed by a range of scholars inside and outside the country in the establishment of an entire field of knowledge based on favelas in Rio de Janeiro, as we discuss in chapter 3 of this book. Leeds returned to Brazil in 1969 to teach in the recently created master's program in anthropology at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (Valladares 2000). Students of Leeds at that time included Gilberto Velho and Carlos Nelson Ferreira dos Santos, who would help disseminate his theories of urban sociology in the early 1980s (Velho 1980; Santos 1981).

In São Paulo, the creation of the Brazilian Center for Analysis and Planning (CEBRAP) greatly improved the understanding of Brazilian urban society. The center was created in May 1969, just after the military dictatorship had restricted civil rights in Brazil, brutally repressing movements against the regime. The center was directed by Cândido Procópio Ferreira Camargo and initially supported by a Ford Foundation grant. The main research focused on population studies led by Paul Singer and Elza Berquo. The original team also included Juarez Brandão Lopes, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, José Arthur Giannotti, Octávio Ianni, and Lúcio Kowarick, who joined the original group some years later. Many of those working at CEBRAP were professors persecuted by the dictatorship who had lost their teaching positions.

Part of this team contributed chapters for the book *Imperialismo e Urbanização na América Latina*, edited by Manuel Castells in 1973. The book proposes a theory of urban marginality in Latin America (Sorj 2008; Arantes 2009; Castells 1973), which influenced Ruth Cardoso and Eunice Durhan, who in 1973 published the article “A investigação antropológica em áreas urbanas.” This paper is considered by Teresa Caldeira (2011, 19) the birth of urban anthropology in Brazil. The Brazilian Center for Analysis and Planning team of researchers grew when archbishop Dom Paulo Evaristo Arns commissioned a large study on urban poverty called “São Paulo crescimento e pobreza” in 1975.

Meanwhile, in Bahia, geographer Milton Santos was examining inequality and segregation as main explanations for underdevelopment. Away from the centers of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, and as a Black scholar in an overwhelmingly white Brazilian intelligentsia, Santos was acutely aware of the racial variable in these issues. Arrested by the military dictatorship in 1964, Santos was able to move to France in December of the same year and developed most of his important theories while teaching there. He was visiting professor in Toulouse, Bordeaux, and in Paris at Institut d'Étude du Développement Économique et Social Sorbonne where he conducted urban planning research. In that capacity Milton Santos was able to locate Brazilian spatial inequalities

in the broader context of the global south. In 1971 he moved from Europe to North America and as visiting professor at MIT, Toronto, and Columbia he wrote *O Espaço Dividido*, published in 1979. The book brought a spatial perspective challenging the idea that modernization inevitably brings well-being. His idea of a dual economic circuit—superior and inferior—anticipates the modernity/coloniality framework that Arturo Escobar used to implode the concept of developmentalism twenty years later.⁵

These books brought new perspectives to the theory and practice of urban planning in Brazil that were followed by José Alvaro Moisés (1978), Eva Blay (1978), Lúcio Kowarick (1979), Lícia Valladares and Ademir Figueiredo (1981), Maria da Glória Gohn (1982), Teresa Caldeira (1984), Sidney Chalhoub (1986), and Pedro Jacobi (1989).

All of this scholarship on Brazilian urban history stemmed from urban movements and improved the interpretation of urban society in Brazil by introducing new perspectives. Authors such as James Holston (1989), Jaime Benchimol (1992), Joel Outtes (1994), Flavio Villaça (1998), and Telma Correia (1998) pointed out the selective pattern of Brazilian urban modernization. These authors consider state entrepreneurship of major importance in the unequal modernization of Brazilian society. A second generation of Brazilian urban history scholars fostered the pioneering book by Flavio Villaça (1998), which was a significant turning point for one generation in its examination of spatial patterns of Brazilian cities.⁶

In 1999 Maria Cristina Leme organized a broad network of scholars and put together a large number of case studies to paint a fuller picture of Brazilian urban history. Working closely with experts in urban design, urban law, and planning, these authors drew on the work of the previous generation to systematize broader theories about how Brazilian cities had been built. Their significant effort consolidated a history of the institutionalization of planning in Brazil, highlighting the importance of state initiatives in the struggle toward urban improvement and modernization.

On the opposite end of the spectrum—and an indispensable reference to be included among this contemporary group—is the research on housing built by public and private capital. This research was led by Maria Ruth Amaral de Sampaio, who had participated in surveys on housing in peripheral areas with Carlos Lemos in the 1960s. The research she led in the 1990s filled an important gap in the literature about the investments made by public and private sectors to house the middle classes in Brazil, resulting in the publication of several books on affordable housing in Brazil.

Recent scholars from abroad have contribute to add different analyses such as Browdyn Fischer (2008) and Bryan McCann (2014), focusing on specific

case studies that allow us to go deeper into the issues at large, less on developing broad theories and more on the gears of urban inequalities.

Despite the richness and diversity of the debate on the urban issue in Brazil, few works have crossed the boundary between social movement and urban policy or urban planning and city history, exploring the multiple interchanges of space and society. Kathleen Bruhn (2008) compared urban protests in Mexico and Brazil with a focus on how organize labor induced street manifestations. Her book gave us many insights into the relationship between protest and labor rights. But by focusing exclusively on newspaper reports as primary sources the author misses the political nuances that are not published in the daily “police” pages focused on public disturbances only. An interesting study published by Jessica Rich in 2019 uses the Brazilian public policy around HIV/AIDS to propose an approach in which social movements are capable of both protesting and negotiating with state actors to achieve their goals. We believe that has been the case throughout the twentieth century, and the dichotomy of state bureaucracy versus civil society is insufficient to explain urban development in Brazil. A few years ago, Lúcio Kowarick (2012) moved further in his analysis of the social components of the land issue with powerful results, despite not quite including urban planning variables. Other pioneering work by Michael Conniff ([1981] 2006), documenting research from 1972, inaugurated an interpretation focused on how the complex relationship between the state bureaucracy and its public and political support. Kowarick and Conniff were very close to economics and sociology and quite distant from urban planning. One notable outlier is the work of Carlos Nelson Ferreira dos Santos (1981), who in the 1960s and 1970s understood the strong parallel relationship between urban plans and social movements.

In this book we attempt to stitch all this scholarship together. Having explored hundreds of relevant publications, we find that street protests, urban policy, urban planning, and history have always been intertwined. Apart from a few pieces that highlight this relationship, however, there has been no full narrative connecting them, the main motivation behind this book.

For instance, there is significant political science and sociology scholarship on all major protests that happened in 1894, 1904, 1909, 1923, 1930, 1947, 1954, 1963, 1979, 1982, 1991, and 2013. Hundreds of other smaller protests in which the Brazilian people took to the streets have also been documented and analyzed, some but not all of which are available in English (Moisés 1978; Conniff [1981] 2006; Fausto 1984). Despite social conflicts being an integral part of city history, they have been always portrayed in the media as exceptional, something outside the norm of “lovely people” that is part of the Brazilian identity (Kowarick 2012, 23).

Quite separately, the historiography of Brazilian urbanism has devoted significant efforts to the analysis of the main urban plans implemented throughout the last 150 years. The narrative spans from Belo Horizonte (1894–1897), Pereira Passos reforms in Rio (1903–1906), Plan Agache again in Rio (1929), Plano de Avenidas in São Paulo (1930), Brasília (1956–1960), Plano Doxiadis in Rio (1964), Curitiba (1965), the closing of the National Housing Bank (1986) Estatuto das Cidades (2001), and finally to Plano PAC (2007–2013).

Meanwhile, the analyses of contemporary dilemmas and the criticism that arose from the frustration of the leftist architects engaged with urban policies have been disseminated and consumed without proper historical contexts. We hope this book contributes to reestablishing a critical and material history of urban conflicts that could be useful for cross-fertilization of urban planning and political democracy toward a critical history of twentieth-century urban policy in Brazil.

THE DOUBLE TRIPOD AS A THEORETICAL DIAGRAM

To understand the social and spatial dynamic of the main Brazilian cities, we propose a double tripod. Formed by three rods united in the middle and separated at the ends, this tripod creates two triangles at each edge. The triangle for the wealthy minority is composed of landownership, availability of cheap labor, and relative security due to repressive policing. The triangle for the poor majority is composed of housing without property rights, availability of informal or other low-paying jobs, and state repression. Here it is important to make explicit the modernity/coloniality conundrum as defined by Quijano, Mignolo, Dussel, and Escobar. Their theory helps us understand that every push toward modernization is sustained by some form of colonization, balancing the forces that act on our theoretical tripod.

Each rod of this tripod connects two points of those triangles. We have the labor rod, the land rod, and the public safety rod. Connecting the triangles is a precarious transportation system, or what we call the “transportation knot,” which guarantees the spatial segregation between these two income groups.

We rely on an extensive literature to properly theorize this tripod diagram and test its usefulness in our analysis of urban plans placed in parallel to street protests. From Castells (1984, 336) we take the idea that “we need a theoretical perspective flexible enough to account for the production and performance of urban functions and forms in a variety of contexts.” Our tripod is therefore inspired by Castells’s search for patterns in the history of social movements and elites battling to control urban space such as in Castile in 1520s, the Paris Commune in 1871, the Glasgow strikes in 1915, and the US civil rights movement of the 1960s.




Figure 1.1. Theoretical tripod. Tripod created by the authors, art by Bruno Santana de Oliveira.

As inspiring as Castells's work is, however, it seems to us insufficient with regard to the post-colonial layer that is needed to understand societies at the periphery of capitalism. From Setha Low (1999) and Anthony King (1990) we learn that the modernist city is often theorized as the colonial city. This is an added difficulty in our case because Brazilian literature has rarely discussed colonialism, arguing that because independence happened in 1820—or even before in 1808, as we discuss in chapter 1—such concepts do not apply.

Arturo Escobar's (1995) *Encountering Development* is the key to unlocking this dilemma. Escobar was the first to demonstrate that there is no modernization without colonization. The very process of modernizing implies the colonial practice of imposing values and beliefs of ruling elites onto large swaths of the population.




Figure 1.2. Regressive and progressive movements on the theoretical tripod. Tripod created by the authors, art by Bruno Santana de Oliveira.

Our tripod diagram encompasses the modernization/colonization mirror in its very structure. Every action taken by the ruling elites from the top down in the name of modernization has an effect on the working classes below. The opposite is also true: social movements' political pressure and protests (their more radical form) push for changes in societal structure that impact the stability of those at the top of the social strata.

Castells (1984, 292) is again the one to clearly state that "any theory of urban change must account for both the spatial and social effects resulting from the actions of the dominant interests as well as from the grassroots alternative to the domination." Our tripod diagram illustrates this dynamic. Regressive policies enacted by the ruling elite have the effect of augmenting the distance between those above and the working class below.

Improvements in labor laws and wages have the opposite effect, shortening the distance. Both create instability. The former stresses the majority of the population by forcing them to live in worse conditions; the latter threatens the privileges of the elite by forcing them to pay more to obtain the same services. The push and pull of social movements and state policies affect the tripod structure and are felt on either end of the diagram. Later we discuss the position of the middle class, but before we get there allow us to discuss the three individual rods.

Take, for instance, the labor rod. Its structure assures that those on the bottom of the tripod will be subjected to high degrees of informality in their work arrangements, always serving as an excess (and therefore cheap) labor force. Fernando Haddad (2017), former mayor of São Paulo (2013–2016) and minister of education (2007–2010), summarized it well when he wrote that "the real shopping mall of the Brazilian middle class has always been the job market. Plenty of cheap labor guaranteed them nonexistent privileges in the hard core of the system. The cheap maid, the cheap nanny, the cheap driver. The lack of quality public services was largely offset by inexpensive household services."

A significant driver of the protests in Brazil throughout its history has been labor rights and labor conditions. In the tripod, we hypothesize that the labor rod had the most changes in favor of the working class throughout the twentieth century. This is sometimes a direct result of street protests, like the labor laws that followed the 1917 strike, and sometimes the result of intense lobbying and negotiations, as when the rules that applied to other workers were expanded to encompass maids by the *Estatuto das Domésticas* of 2015. Other times, such as in the dictatorships of 1937–1945 or 1964–1985, the suspension of strike laws and the regressive nature of governmental policies oper-




Figure 1.3 Improved labor rights on the theoretical tripod. Tripod created by the authors, art by Bruno Santana de Oliveira.

ated in the opposite direction, suppressing rights, affecting the cost of living, and creating significant stress on the working class.

The public safety rod explains the inconsistent behavior of the Brazilian police: extremely docile with wealthy white people, extremely rude and violent with poor brown/Black people. In this book, we cannot even scratch the surface of serious issues like demilitarization, neighborhood policing, or the *Unidade de Policia Pacificadora* (UPPs) implemented in Rio de Janeiro in the early 2000s. It is apparent, however, that the binary of police protection/police repression is part of the very design of this system and a fundamental component of our tripod.

As asserted by Teresa Caldeira (1999, 87), “the most serious element in the increase of violence in São Paulo [after the 1980s] is police violence.” Police repression and the struggle for rights are intrinsically connected to space. According to Don Mitchell’s (2003, 29) *The Right to the City*, “the struggle for rights is one aspect of the struggle to resist the hegemony of abstract space.” This struggle is a constant in Brazilian history and, as discussed by Browdyn Fisher (2008), the lack of well-defined rights is itself a strategy of control




Figure 1.4. Improved land rights on the theoretical tripod. Tripod created by the authors, art by Bruno Santana de Oliveira.

by the elites, who always find a way to deflate social tension with minimal concessions.

Throughout the book we discuss many instances in which Brazilians gained land rights and labor rights. Police repression however is a constant feature in Brazilian low-income society. Important improvements were realized in the twentieth century, but in 2021 the country is experiencing a sharp backslide toward police violence as state policy, forcing the regression of labor, social, and civil rights.

The third rod is the most relevant to our analysis. Land-ownership structure was built over centuries, and our first chapter explains how. This is not uniquely Brazilian, as Martinez Estrada ([1933] 1996, 52) reminds us in his classic *Radiografia de la Pampa*: Latin America has historically had a development model that exploits the people rather than exploiting the land. Concentrated landownership means that it was used less to produce wealth and more as an instrument of social control of the labor force, both in the cities and in the countryside.

Our tripod helps frame the land concentration in terms of a gradation of rights, from full property ownership to various degrees of occupancy rights. As elaborated by Don Mitchell (2003, 27), “a claim of right, no matter how contested, establishes the framework within which power operates.” For the Brazilian working class, increasing security of tenure is a major component of

well-being. Nevertheless, on the opposite edge of the land-ownership rod, the elite are fully aware that part of their well-being depends on the fragility of working-class housing tenure. The tripod metaphor fits well here, for stability is desired by both those residing above and those below.

This structure, and the desire for stability, assures that while a minority of Brazilian society owns a tremendous amount of land, urban or rural, the majority of the population does not have full property rights. When statistics say that 70 percent of the 210 million Brazilian citizens live in their own homes, they mean that these citizens are not paying rent. The process of planning and occupation of Brazilian cities, however, where 180 million people—86 percent of the population—now live, was such that a large number do not have the proper title and registration of their land. Avila and Ferreira (2016) calculated that 26 percent of the urban households in Minas Gerais—a state that can be used as a summary of the socioeconomic conditions of the country—do not have full documentation of their land (title and registration). That amounts to approximately fifty million people when applied to the whole country.

The uniqueness of the Brazilian land and labor conundrum was summarized by Francisco de Oliveira (2003, 131), arguing in *Ornitorrinco* that “the self-built explains the paradox of the Brazilian case in which the poor becomes owners of their homes—if you can call home the horror of the favelas—helping depress the cost of their own labor force.” All this is part of Brazilian conservative modernization, a productive revolution without bourgeois revolution in the words of Florestan Fernandes ([1974] 1987). Or in the words of Arturo Escobar (1995), never stressed enough, there is no modernization without colonization. Throughout this book, we try to determine who got the bulk of the benefits of modernization, who got the bulk of the burden of colonization, and, most importantly, the conflicts embedded in different city spaces.

Urban plans have frequently stopped short of challenging landownership. In fact, the majority of the plans discussed here had disappointing results in terms of ameliorating inequalities; they have indeed exacerbated processes of exclusion that in one way or another have been in place since the Portuguese took control of the land in the sixteenth century. The institutionalization of the planning system and housing policy in Brazil were not of minor importance for the development of Brazilian cities. They managed to include a parcel of middle classes in the formal urban system, even if those plans did little to curb the huge inequalities inherited from the early republican period.

Kowarick (2012, 14) summarizes the interconnection of these issues by arguing correctly that “the capitalist expansion acquired such salvage features expressed in low wages, deficient transportation and inadequate housing.” We

chose this tripod image to illustrate the connections between these issues and convey that any change in one of the rods of our diagram creates instability in the whole city structure.

Are these changes and the consequent instability what drive the Brazilian people to protest in the streets? Does this urban instability affect the political process? We believe so, and this book aims to discuss this relationship, considering cities will be more stressed in the future by environmental issues and the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.

This book stitches together the history of plans for urban land with the protests that Brazilians organized to fight for their land. Between street protests and their resonance in the general public, we discovered that civil society applied a range of pressure points to the state bureaucracy and that even in the authoritarian periods public opinion influenced planning decisions. Our theory allows us to embed the history of civil society within the history of planning and its institutionalization. It is impossible to dissociate issues of wages and cost of living that are also always present at the root of urban protests, but our attempt is to show how urban and regional planning played a key role in the management of the social conflicts around landownership. If sometimes urban and regional planning benefited the expansion of civil rights, it quite often worked on behalf of class exploitation, deepening spatial inequalities, as we discuss in subsequent chapters.

Chapter 1 conceptualizes these issues and sets up the roots of the fight for urban equality in Brazil, discussing trends in landownership related to Portuguese occupation and the dawn of urban improvements in the nineteenth century. These improvements were mostly focused on facilitating agricultural production, a system in which the cities were subordinated to the rural economy. This sets the tone for the next four chapters, which focus on the twentieth century, dissecting changes around the time of the 1889 military coup that ended the monarchy and established the First Brazilian Republic under the leadership of Brazilian bourgeoisie.

Chapter 2 focuses on the dawn of industrialization in Brazil and how urban plans and social movements responded to the challenges of the first three decades of the twentieth century. The main labor strike of 1917 helps us understand the issues at stake at that time, inaugurating the state response that would soon become standard.

Chapter 3 analyzes the Getúlio Vargas years (1930–1945), a time of intense transformation on many fronts such as the creation of the *Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho* (CLT; 1943 labor laws) and insufficient investment in urban infrastructure due to a unique stalemate between urban and rural political

forces. Such a delicate balance of controlled modernization would lead to massive protests in the late 1940s, setting the tone for housing and transportation policies in the 1950s that were at best partial responses to structural inequalities. Later in the 1950s the demands of the periphery of Brazilian cities—not at all addressed by Juscelino Kubitschek’s accelerated developmentalism—exploded as an urban crisis, fueling the polarization that triggered the military coup of 1964.

Chapter 4 focuses on the responses to urban crises outlined in the previous section. The demands of the periphery—swept under the rug of Brazilian politics until the 1960s—were front and center in national discourse with the election of Jânio Quadros. The political crisis after Quadros resigned in 1961 dragged on for three years, culminating on the military coup of April 1, 1964. The military government recognized the importance of the urban crisis and responded by creating the SERFHAU (Federal Housing and Urban Planning Service) and the BNH (National Housing Bank). Infrastructure was indeed built at that time, easing pressure on the transportation knot that ties our conceptual tripod together. The authoritarian state changed the lengths of the rods affecting inequalities for the urban middle class, worsening conditions for the urban poor who were swelling peripheral areas of the main cities. It exacerbated structural inequalities by repressing social organizations and labor unions, imposing a twenty-year freeze in the social contract.

Chapter 5 follows with a look at the economic crisis of the 1980s, triggered by the foreign debt crisis of 1981–1982 that threatened the middle-class checkbook with stagnant wages, annual inflation of 100 percent, and increased labor demands by unions that were finally breaking away from the control of the military regime. Social movements were again protagonists in the nascent democracy that was established after the fall of the military government, culminating with the new constitution of 1988.

The last chapter proceeds to analyze the rise and fall of Fernando Collor de Mello (1990–1992), the interregnum of Itamar Franco (1993–94), and the Fernando Henrique Cardoso years (1995–2002). This dramatic decade saw significant changes in infrastructure (privatization of telecommunications and interstate roads) and land management (Favela-Bairro and Estatuto das Cidades), few gains in labor conditions, and slight relaxation of the police repression apparatus as a result of successful pressure by human rights groups since the 1970s. The low level of protest in those years would continue into the Lula presidency (2003–2010), coupled with significant gains in wages and consumption, and the consequent drastic fall of inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient (from 0.65 in 2002 to 0.50 in 2013). This final chapter, however,

was written within the framework of the massive protests of June 2013, a development that made explicit all rods and knots of our tripod, prompting us to write this book.

Indeed, the main goal of this book is to stitch together the historiography discussing all these protests as the result of social struggles; a mainstream media that tends to register the protests of the working class as radical manifestations and only give value to the struggle of the middle class, and an urban history so far quite disconnected from it all.

The Brazilian working class took to the streets in 1879, 1904, 1910, 1917, 1922, 1930, 1947, 1956, 1959, 1967, 1968, 1973, 1979, 1981, and 1987. On all occasions, the reason to protest was increase in transportation costs, labor conditions, forced relocation, or police brutality. The four causes were often present at the same time.